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ABSTRACT	  
This	  thesis	  investigates	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  long-­‐term	  climate	  target	  to	  hold	  the	  increase	  in	  global	  average	  temperature	  below	  two	  degrees	  Celsius	  above	   pre-­‐industrial	   levels.	   This	   ‘two	   degrees	   target’	   is	   shown	   to	   be	   the	  product	  of	  efforts	   to	  embed	  climate	  science,	   ‘cost-­‐effective’	  GHG	  control,	   and	  national	   sovereignty	   in	   a	   long-­‐term	   climate	   goal,	   and	   that	   it	   became	   a	  foundation	  for	  work	  to	  align	  the	  financial	  sector	  with	  the	  transition	  to	  a	  low-­‐carbon	   economy.	   This	   thesis	   investigates	   how	   this	   target	   envisages	   an	  apparently	  simple	  and	  manageable	  future	  for	  addressing	  climate	  change,	  and	  comes	   to	   orient	   the	   strategies	   of	   diverse	   and	   distributed	   actors	   towards	   a	  common	  vision.	  The	  empirical	  core	  of	   this	   thesis	   is	  a	  participant	  observation	  of	   a	   United	   Nations	   and	   Greenhouse	   Gas	   Protocol	   standard-­‐setting	   project,	  which	   is	   supplemented	   by	   semi-­‐structured	   interviews	   and	   documentary	  analysis.	   This	   thesis	   studies	   four	   interrelated	   instruments,	   the	   two	   degrees	  target,	   the	   carbon	   budget,	   investment	   roadmaps	   and	   an	   emergent	   carbon	  accounting	   standard.	   It	   focuses	   on	   the	   work	   involved	   in	   assembling	   and	  adjusting	  these	  instruments,	  attending	  to	  the	  efforts	  to	  produce	  coherent	  and	  stable	  linkages	  between	  ideas	  of	  climate	  governance	  and	  the	  local	  specifics	  of	  the	   financial	  sector.	  This	   thesis	  shows	  how	  a	  carbon-­‐constrained	   future	  with	  financial	  sector	  implications	  was	  envisaged.	  It	  also	  traces	  how	  ideas	  stemming	  from	   the	   two	   degrees	   target	   shifted	   the	   development	   of	   finance-­‐specific	  carbon	   accounting	   practices	   away	   from	   greenhouse	   gas	   data	   and	   towards	  metrics	   for	   managing	   risk	   and	   monitoring	   alignment	   with	   investment	  roadmaps.	  This	  thesis,	  as	  a	  whole,	  contributes	  to	  our	  understanding	  of	  carbon	  accounting	   as	   a	   practice	   that	   embeds	   diverse	   modes	   of	   climate	   governance	  and	   coordinates	   action	   across	   multiple	   entities.	   It	   shows	   the	   processes	  through	   which	   an	   apparently	   simple	   vision	   for	   addressing	   climate	   change	  began	   to	   orient	   diverse	   and	   distributed	   efforts	   towards	   financing	   the	  transition	  to	  a	  low-­‐carbon	  economy.	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CHAPTER	  1	  –	  ACCOUNTING	  AND	  
CLIMATE	  CHANGE:	  AN	  INTRODUCTION	  
1.0.	  CLIMATE	  CHANGE,	  FINANCE	  AND	  ALIGNING	  ACTION	  
ACROSS	  MULTIPLE	  ENTITIES	  On	   the	   12th	   December	   2015	   196	   nations	   and	   the	   European	   Union	  adopted	  the	  Paris	  Agreement	  on	  climate	  change,	  an	   international	   framework	  to	  guide	  post-­‐2020	  reductions	   in	  global	  greenhouse	  gas	   (GHG)	  emissions.	  As	  international	   talks	   continue	   to	   develop	  mechanisms	   to	   implement	   the	   Paris	  Agreement,	  much	  attention	  has	  turned	  to	  the	  supporting	  role	  of	  the	  financial	  sector	  in	  tackling	  climate	  change.	  Indeed,	  2016	  has	  been	  hailed	  as	  the	  “year	  of	  green	  finance”	  (Robins	  2016)	  by	  the	  former	  Executive	  Director	  of	   the	  United	  Nations	  Environment	  Programme	  (UNEP),	  Achim	  Steiner,	  as	  countries	  around	  the	   world	   work	   to	   align	   “their	   financial	   systems	   with	   the	   sustainability	  imperative”	   (Ibid.).	   Efforts	   have	   ranged	   from	   China’s	   Green	   Finance	   Task	  Force	   changing	   the	   accounting	   treatment	  of	   environmental	   costs	   to	   improve	  estimates	   of	   investment	   and	   commercial	   risks	   (Green	   Finance	   Task	   Force	  2015)	   to	   the	  publication	  of	   the	  UNEP	   Inquiry	  into	  the	  Design	  of	  a	  Sustainable	  
Financial	   System	   calling	   on	   central	   banks	   to	   stimulate	   the	   creation	   and	  provision	   of	   ‘green	   finance’	   (UNEP	   2015).	   In	   the	   United	   Kingdom,	   climate	  change	  is	  becoming	  seen	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  financial	  stability	  (Carney	  2015)	  with	  the	  Governor	  of	  the	  Bank	  of	  England,	  Mark	  Carney,	  forming	  the	  Task	  Force	  on	  Climate-­‐related	  Financial	  Disclosures	  (TCFD)	  to	  report	  on	  improved	  reporting	  requirements	  that	  would	  prompt	  capital	  markets	  to	  respond	  to	  climate	  risk.	  	  This	  thesis	  investigates	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  ‘two	  degrees	  target’,	  the	  long-­‐term	   climate	   objective	   of	   holding	   the	   increase	   in	   global	   average	  temperature	  below	  two	  degrees	  Celsius	  above	  pre-­‐industrial	  levels.	  It	  further	  attends	   to	   the	   instruments	   that	   refine	   this	   target	   to	   the	   local	   specifics	  of	   the	  financial	   sector,	   focussing	   on	   the	   coordination	   of	   efforts	   to	   address	   climate	  change	   across	   diverse	   and	  distributed	   entities.	   This	   responds	   to	  Bebbington	  and	   Larrinaga	   (2014b)	   who	   argue	   that	   “no	   one	   single	   entity	   creates	   and	  sustains”	   sustainable	   development	   issues	   (Bebbington	   and	  Larrinaga	  2014b,	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p.401)	  and	  who	  call	   for	  “a	  sustained	  examination	  of	  the	  setting	  within	  which	  organisations	  operate”	   (Ibid.)	   to	   study	   the	   “combination	  of	   institutions”	   that	  frame	   the	  activities	  of	  multiple	  entities.	  To	  provide	   this	   response,	   this	   thesis	  investigates	   two	   interrelated	  questions.	  First,	   it	   focuses	  on	   the	  practices	   that	  frame	   financial	   sector	   investment	   and	   lending	   decisions,	   which	   have	   the	  potential	   to	   influence	  decision	  making	  across	  economies	   towards	  developing	  and	  implementing	  low-­‐carbon	  modes	  of	  production	  (Coulson	  and	  Dixon	  1995;	  Richardson	  2009).	   In	   this	   regard,	   thesis	   addresses	   the	  question,	  how	  are	  the	  
financial	  sector	  discourse	  on	  climate	  change	  and	  the	  development	  of	  new	  carbon	  
accounting	  tools	  interrelated?	  Second,	  to	  study	  the	  coordination	  of	  investment	  and	   lending	   activities	   across	   multiple	   entities,	   this	   thesis	   focuses	   on	   the	  instruments	  that	  link	  global	  climate	  objectives	  to	  the	  specifics	  of	  the	  financial	  sector,	  and	  their	  role	  in	  aligning	  action	  across	  financial	  organisations.	  As	  such,	  it	   addresses	   the	   question,	   how	  do	   the	   complexities	   of	   climate	   change	  become	  
embedded	   in	   multiple	   instruments	   that	   shape	   how	   the	   underlying	   issues	   are	  
managed?	  The	  thesis	  pays	  particular	  attention	  to	  the	  objective	  of	  limiting	  the	  increase	   in	   global	   average	   temperatures	   to	   two	   degrees	   Celsius	   above	   pre-­‐industrial	  levels	  (the	  two	  degrees	  target).	  It	  argues	  that	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	  rendered	  climate	  change	  into	  an	  apparently	  simple	  and	  manageable	  form.	  This	  enabled	  work	   to	   construct	   and	  mobilise	   instruments	   that	   refine	   the	   issue	   to	  specifics	   of	   multiple	   entities,	   and	   began	   to	   align	   diverse	   and	   distributed	  actions	   towards	   a	   common	   vision	   for	   addressing	   climate	   change.	   The	   next	  section	  (Section	  1.1)	  provides	  background	  to	  the	  research	  project,	  followed	  by	  a	  detailed	  overview	  of	  the	  thesis	  structure	  and	  chapter-­‐specific	  contributions	  (Section	  1.2).	  
1.1.	  THE	  RESEARCH	  PROJECT	  A	   participant	   observation	   of	   the	   UNEP	   Finance	   Initiative	   (UNEP	   FI)1	  and	  GHG	  Protocol2	  multi-­‐stakeholder	  standard-­‐setting	  project,	  initially	  known	  as	   the	   Financed	  Emissions	   Initiative,	   forms	   the	   empirical	   core	   of	   this	   thesis.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  UNEP	   FI	   was	   established	   in	   1992	   as	   a	   partnership	   between	   UNEP,	   the	   United	  2	  The	  GHG	  Protocol	   is	   a	   standard-­‐setting	  organisation	  established	  by	   the	   think	   tank,	  the	   World	   Resources	   Institute,	   and	   the	   World	   Business	   Council	   for	   sustainable	  development.	   Its	   carbon	   accounting	   standards	   are	   the	   most	   widely	   used	   basis	   for	  mandatory	   GHG	   reporting	   requirements	   as	   well	   as	   for	   voluntary	   disclosure	  mechanisms	  (J.	  F.	  Green	  2010).	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The	   Financed	   Emissions	   Initiative	   set	   out	   to	   create	   guidance	   specifically	   for	  financial	   organisations,	   which	   would	   detail	   the	   requirements	   for	   complying	  with	   the	   GHG	   Protocol’s	   core	   accounting	   standards.	   The	   GHG	   Protocol	  published	  A	  Corporate	  Accounting	  and	  Reporting	  Standard	  in	  2004,	  setting	  out	  measurement	   and	   reporting	   requirements	   for	   the	   emissions	   of	   an	  organisation	  (GHG	  Protocol	  2004).	  Its	  2011	  Corporate	  Value	  Chain	  Accounting	  
and	  Reporting	  Standard	  (GHG	  Protocol	  2011)	  set	  out	  related	  requirements	  for	  GHG	  emissions	  within	  the	  supply	  chain.	  The	  Financed	  Emissions	  Initiative	  was	  launched	   to	   create	   guidance	   tailored	   to	   the	   financial	   sector	   regarding	  compliance	   with	   this	   ‘supply	   chain	   standard’.	   That	   is,	   it	   set	   out	   to	   produce	  measurement	   and	   reporting	   requirements	   for	   reporting	   the	   GHG	   emissions	  enabled	   by	   a	   financial	   organisation’s	   investment	   and	   lending	   activities,	  referred	   to	   as	   the	   their	   financed	   emissions.	   Over	   120	   hours	   of	   meeting	  observations	   were	   conducted	   between	   January	   2014	   and	   February	   2016,	  including	  attendance	  of	  in-­‐person	  workshops	  in	  London,	  Milan	  and	  New	  York,	  conferences	   in	   Paris	   as	  well	   as	   numerous	   online	  webinars.	   The	   engagement	  was	   conducted	   as	   a	   “moderate	   participant”	   (Spradley	   1980,	   p.60),	   initially	  observing	  webinars	  and	  gradually	  making	  some	  contributions	  to	  discussions.	  This	  enabled	   the	   researcher	   to	   “gain	   some	  degree	  of	   acceptance	   from	   [other	  participants]”	  (Jorgensen	  1989,	  p.73),	  and	  also	  to	  take	  steps	  to	  limit	  influence	  over	  the	  purpose	  and	  content	  of	  the	  documents	  (Section	  3.1.1).	  Eighteen	  semi-­‐structured	  interviews	  were	  conducted	  across	  2014	  and	  2015	  to	  supplement,	  check	  and	  refute	  observations	  made	  during	  the	  Financed	  Emissions	   Initiative	   engagement	   (Becker	   and	   Geer	   2003,	   pp.250–251).	  Interviewees	   included	   individuals	   from	   NGOs,	   think	   tanks,	   financial	  organisations	   and	   governments,	   providing	   a	   range	   of	   perspectives	   on	   the	  intersection	  of	  climate	  change	  and	  finance	  (Horton,	  Macve,	  and	  Struyen	  2004,	  p.344).	   Combining	   insights	   from	   the	   interviews	   with	   those	   from	   the	  participant	   observation,	   it	   became	   apparent	   that	   the	   two	   degrees	   target	  underpinned	  shifting	  notions	  of	  climate	  risk	  and	  the	  financial	  sector’s	  role	   in	  supporting	   efforts	   to	   tackle	   climate	   change.	   Interviewees	   provided	   some	  insight	   into	   the	   emergence	   of	   this	   two	   degrees	   target,	   which	   guided	   the	  preliminary	  collection	  of	  documentary	  evidence	  for	  charting	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	   target	   from	   a	   range	   of	   other	   climate	   metrics.	   Where	   this	   initial	   data	  collection	  centred	  on	   texts	   relating	   to	   long-­‐term	  climate	   targets	   (Prior	  2011,	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pp.94–96),	   this	   developed	   into	   a	   more	   'archaeological'	   approach	   (Ibid.)	   to	  gathering	  materials	   pertaining	   to	   how	   the	  documents	   came	   into	   being.	  Over	  60	   reports	   and	   proceedings	   –	   from	   conferences,	   research	   centres,	  international	   bodies,	   NGOs	   and	   governments	   –	   as	   well	   as	   more	   than	   55	  academic	   texts	   –	   from	   climatologists	   and	   meteorologists	   to	   economists	   and	  lawyers	   –	   were	   analysed	   to	   document	   the	   controversies	   surrounding	   the	  emergence	  of	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	  since	  the	  mid-­‐20th	  century.	  Through	  the	  iterative	  process	  of	  data	  collection	  and	  analysis	  across	  the	  three	   methods	   (cf.	   Marginson	   2004,	   p.332;	   Dey	   2007,	   pp.431–432),	   four	  interconnected	   instruments	   –	   the	   two	   degrees	   target,	   the	   carbon	   budget,	  investment	   roadmaps,	   and	   the	   emergent	   carbon	   accounting	   standard	   –	  emerged	  as	  creating	  the	  linkages	  through	  which	  an	  apparently	  simple	  climate	  objective	  came	   to	   frame:	  national-­‐level	  policy	  making;	   the	   future	  constraints	  facing	  the	  financial	  sector;	  and	  the	  climate	  impact	  of	  a	  financial	  organisation’s	  investment	  and	  lending	  activities.	  In	  this	  regard,	  the	  thesis	  maps	  an	  emerging	  calculative	  infrastructure3	  that	  connects	  “local	   issues	  to	   larger	  questions,	  and	  vice	   versa”	   (Miller	   and	   Napier	   1993,	   p.634)	   through	   the	   interconnecting	   of	  “practices	   together	   into	   a	   complex	   web”	   where	   the	   two	   degrees	   target	  “emerge[d]	   as	   central	   to	   a	   certain	  way	   of	   calculating”	   (Ibid.).	  Moreover,	   this	  informed	  the	  positioning	  of	  the	  data	  to	  examine	  the	  specific	  characteristics	  of	  these	   devices	   as	   mediating	   instruments	   (Miller	   and	   O’Leary	   2007),	   the	  interconnections	  between	  which	  demonstrate	  how	  the	  apparently	  simple	  two	  degrees	  target	  came	  to	  stimulate	  and	  orient	  action	  towards	  a	  common	  vision	  across	  multiple	  entities.	  	  Indeed,	  Miller	  and	  O’Leary	  demonstrate	  the	  linking	  of	  science	  and	  the	  economy	   through	   the	   “performing	   and	   connecting	   up	   a	   whole	   series	   of	  calculations	   based	   on	   Moore’s	   Law,	   technology	   roadmaps,	   and	   cost-­‐of-­‐ownership	  models”	  that	  “link	  formally	  separate	  actors	  and	  arenas,	  and	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  adhere	  to	  the	  apparently	  beneficent	  imperatives	  of	  Moore’s	  Law”	  (Miller	  and	  O’Leary	  2007,	  p.729).	  However	  where	  Miller	  and	  O’Leary	  focus	  on	  how	   these	   mediating	   instruments	   aligned	   action	   to	   enable	   the	   “making	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  The	  term	  ‘calculative	  infrastructure’	  is	  used	  to	  refer	  to	  “the	  relatively	  stabilised	  chain	  of	   accounting	   calculations	   and	   associated	   narratives,	   the	   ensemble	   of	   calculative	  technologies	  and	  rationales	  that	  has	  come	  to	  appear	  necessary	  for	  the	  assessment	  of”,	  in	   this	   thesis,	   the	   contributions	   of	   different	   entities	   to	   the	   international	   efforts	   to	  address	  climate	  change	  (Kurunmäki	  and	  Miller	  2013,	  p.1101).	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markets”	   (Ibid.),	   this	   thesis	   specifically	   investigates	   the	   dynamics	   of	  constructing	   a	   calculative	   infrastructure,	   attending	   to	   the	   work	   of	   linking	  scientific,	   economic	   and	   political	   concerns	   on	   climate	   change	   to	   the	   diverse	  and	   distributed	   actions	   of	   multiple	   entities.	   However	   it	   has	   been	   argued	  “[s]cholars	  working	  within	   this	   [mediating	   instruments]	   framework	  [...]	  have	  only	   begun	   to	   specify	   the	   process	   by	   which	   we	   might	   study	   and	   theorise	  interactions	   between	   material	   objects	   and	   wider	   calculative	   conceptions”	  (Pollock	   and	   D’Adderio	   2012,	   p.567).	   Indeed,	   this	   thesis	   offers	   a	   partial	  response	   to	   this	   argument	   by	   studying	   the	   processes	   of	   ‘co-­‐production’	  (Hacking	   1992)	   through	   which	   “diverse	   components	   and	   practices”	   are	  assembled	  and	  adjusted	  “so	   that	   they	  might	  operate	  as	  a	  more	  or	   less	  stable	  and	   coherent	   working	   ensemble”	   (Miller	   and	   O’Leary	   2007,	   p.708).	  Specifically,	  it	  draws	  on	  Gooding	  (1992)	  to	  frame	  the	  work	  of	  constructing	  and	  interconnecting	   instruments	   as	   processes	   of	   ‘experimenting’	   and	   ‘tinkering’	  through	  which	  ideas	  and	  instruments	  are	  “mutually	  adjusted”	  (Hacking	  1992,	  p.30).4	  
1.2.	  THESIS	  STRUCTURE	  After	   situating	   the	   thesis	   within	   the	   carbon	   accounting,	   sustainable	  finance	  and	  mediating	   instruments	   literatures	   in	  Chapter	  2	  and	  detailing	   the	  rationale	  and	  methods	  for	  data	  collection	  and	  analysis	  in	  Chapter	  3,	  Chapter	  4	  charts	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	  from	  a	  range	  of	  other	  climate	  metrics	  since	   the	  mid-­‐20th	   century.	   In	  particular,	   it	   investigates	  how	  the	   two	  degrees	   target	   became	   seen	   as	   the	   long-­‐term	   objective	   for	   controlling	   GHG	  emissions	  and	  how	  it	  “fram[ed]	  a	  manageable	  future”	  (Jordan,	  Jørgensen,	  and	  Mitterhofer	  2013,	  p.159)	  for	  climate	  change	  that	  became	  a	  common	  basis	  for	  work	   to	   reshape	   the	   conditions	   that	   orient	   action	   across	  multiple	   entities	   of	  different	   scales	   and	   scopes	   (Bebbington	   and	   Larrinaga	   2014b).	   Overall,	  Chapter	  4	  demonstrates	  that	  the	  construction	  of	  a	  long-­‐term	  target	  for	  climate	  change	  elicited	  and	  embedded	  multiple	  concerns:	  a	  scientific	  basis	  for	  defining	  ‘dangerous	  anthropogenic	   interference’	  with	   the	   climate	   system,5	  a	   level	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Also	   see	  Wise	   on	   “mutual	   adaptation”	   (Wise	   1988,	   p.79)	   and	  Mennicken	   on	   “how	  audit	  and	  market	  ideals	  mutually	  shape	  and	  condition	  one	  another”	  (Mennicken	  2010,	  p.354).	  5	  This	  pertains	  to	  the	  overarching	  objective	  of	  the	  UNFCCC,	  which	  states	  that	  Parties	  will	   work	   towards	   “[…]	   stabilization	   of	   greenhouse	   gas	   concentrations	   in	   the	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trajectory	   of	   GHG	   control	   that	   did	   not	   jeopardise	   economic	   growth,	   and	   a	  degree	  of	  flexibility	  that	  avoided	  encroaching	  on	  developing	  nations’	  national	  sovereignty	  (See	  first	  row	  of	  Figure	  1.1).	  	  Chapter	  4	  specifically	  argues	  that	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	  is	  unsuited	  to	  the	   ‘boundary	   object’	   framing	   (Star	   and	   Griesemer	   1989)	   that	   some	   have	  applied	  as	  an	  analytical	  lens	  (Randalls	  2010;	  Cointe,	  Ravon,	  and	  Guérin	  2011).	  Where	  a	  boundary	  object	   is	   “weakly	  structured	   in	  common	  use,	  and	  become	  strongly	   structured	   in	   local	   site	   use”	   (Star	   and	   Griesemer	   1989,	   p.393),	   the	  two	   degrees	   target	   maintains	   an	   apparently	   simple	   and	   manageable	   vision	  (Jørgensen,	   Jordan,	   and	   Mitterhofer	   2012)	   in	   common	   use	   and	   is	   flexible	  regarding	   the	   actions	   that	   work	   towards	   that	   vision	   in	   local	   site	   use.	  Furthermore,	  as	  efforts	   to	  establish	  a	   target-­‐based	  mode	  of	   formulating	  GHG	  control	   policies	   travelled	   into	   different	   domains,	   responses	   were	   provoked	  that	  elicited	  the	  ideas	  to	  be	  embedded	  in	  such	  a	  target.	  In	  this	  regard,	  the	  two	  degrees	   target	   is	   analysed	   as	   a	   mediating	   instrument	   (Miller	   and	   O’Leary	  2007)	  that	  renders	  climate	  change	  into	  a	  highly	  abstract	  and	  simplified	  form	  amenable	  to	  disaggregation,	  the	  separation	  of	  a	  problem	  into	  component	  parts	  by	  different	  actors.6	  To	  reiterate,	   it	  provides	  a	  common	  basis	   for	  diverse	  and	  distributed	   actors	   to	   analyse	   the	   implications	   of	   climate	   change	   to	   the	  conditions	   in	  which	  they	  operate.	  This	  enables	   them	  to	   identify	  and	  plan	  the	  steps	   that	   their	  nation,	  sector,	  organisation	  or	  portfolio	  need	  to	   take	   to	  align	  with	  the	  global	  response	  to	  climate	  change.	  Chapter	  5	  focuses	  on	  the	  financial	  sector	  discourse	  on	  climate	  change,	  attending	  to	  how	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	  gained	  traction	  as	  it	  became	  the	  basis	  for	   envisaging	   a	   carbon-­‐constrained	   future	   posing	   new	   risks	   to	   capital	  markets.	  Combining	  interview	  and	  observational	  materials,	  the	  chapter	  details	  how	   civil	   society	   actors	   –	   such	   as	   think	   tanks,	   campaigning-­‐NGOs,	   standard-­‐setters	   and	   disclosure	   groups	   –	   created	   and	   mobilised	   ‘the	   carbon	   budget’,	  which	  sets	  out	  the	  maximum	  level	  of	  cumulative	  GHG	  emissions	  to	  achieve	  the	  two	   degrees	   target.	   The	   chapter	   specifically	   responds	   to	   O’Sullivan	   and	  O’Dwyer’s	  (2015)	  call	  for	  research	  into	  “the	  role	  of	  the	  EP	  [Equator	  Principles]	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  atmosphere	   at	   a	   level	   that	  would	  prevent	  dangerous	  anthropogenic	   interference	  with	  
the	  climate	  system”	  (UNFCCC	  1992,	  p.4,	  emphasis	  added).	  6	  Professor	   Morgan	   presented	   her	   work	   on	   aggregation	   and	   disaggregation	   at	   an	  LSE400	  lecture	  on	  20th	  February	  2015,	  which	  was	  subsequently	  discussed	  in	   follow-­‐up	  conversation.	  Morgan’s	  research	  on	  the	  matter	  is	  ongoing	  and	  unpublished.	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issue-­‐based	   field,	   in	   ‘facilitating’	   the	   development	   of	   […]	   a	   climate	   change	  issue-­‐based	   field”	   (O’Sullivan	  and	  O’Dwyer	  2015,	  p.51).	  On	   the	  one	  hand	   the	  chapter	  supports	  their	  argument	  that	  campaigning-­‐NGOs,	  over	  time,	  achieved	  deeper	  concessions	  on	  social	  responsibility	  from	  commercial	  banks.	  It	  shows	  that	   this	   influence	   extended	   beyond	   project	   finance	   to	   a	   wider	   range	   of	  lending	   activities	   by	   pressuring	   commercial	   banks	   to	   engage	   in	   developing	  and	   implementing	   new	   carbon	   accounting	   practices.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	  Chapter	  5	  highlights	  an	  emerging	  strategy	  employed	  by	  civil	  society	  actors	  to	  establish	  a	  vision	  of	  a	  carbon-­‐constrained	  future	  that	  poses	  implications	  to	  the	  regulatory	   agenda	   of	   financial	   stability	   authorities	   and	   risk	   management	  strategies	   of	   financial	   organisations	   (cf.	  Bebbington	   and	   Larrinaga-­‐González	  2008,	   p.707).	   That	   is,	   rather	   than	   directly	   campaigning	   against	   particular	  organisations,	   the	   two	   degrees	   target	   was	   mobilised	   to	   envisage	   a	   carbon-­‐constrained	  future	  that	  diverse	  and	  distributed	  financial	  sector	  actors	  should	  seek	  to	  understand	  and	  manage.	  As	   a	  more	   concrete	   rendering	   of	   the	   two	   degrees	   target,	   the	   carbon	  budget	   is	  analysed	  as	  a	  mediating	  instrument	  (Miller	  and	  O’Leary	  2007)	  that	  ‘bridges’	   (Morgan	   and	   Morrison	   1999,	   p.30)	   between	   a	   global	   objective	   for	  climate	  change	  and	  the	  implications	  of	  that	  target	  for	  the	  financial	  sector	  as	  a	  whole.	  Where	  Miller	   and	  O’Leary’s	   analysis	   of	   technology	   roadmaps	   focuses	  on	   their	   ‘concretion’	   of	   Moore’s	   Law	   into	   “key,	   generic	   aspects	   of	   product	  development”	  (Miller	  and	  O’Leary	  2007,	  p.719),	  the	  carbon	  budget	  translates	  the	   two	   degrees	   target	   into	   ideas	   of	   climate	   risk	   and	   threats	   to	   financial	  stability	  for	  the	  financial	  sector	  (See	  ‘carbon	  budget’	  in	  Figure	  1.1).	  Put	  simply,	  the	   carbon	   budget	   presents	   one	   component	   of	   achieving	   the	   global	   two	  degrees	   target	   and	   enables	  work	   to	   orient	   the	   financial	   sector	   towards	   that	  objective.	  Chapter	  5	  further	  demonstrates	  that	  it	  was	  through	  the	  mobilisation	  of	   the	  carbon	  budget	  by	  civil	   society	  actors	   that	   concerns	  of	   investment	   risk	  and	  financial	  stability	  were	  produced	  and	  mediated	  by	  the	  instrument.	  	   Chapter	  6	  brings	  the	  reader	  inside	  the	  meeting	  rooms	  and	  webinars	  of	  the	  UNEP	  FI	  and	  GHG	  Protocol’s	  Financed	  Emissions	  Initiative,	  demonstrating	  how	   the	   shifting	   financial	   sector	   discourse	   on	   climate	   change	   gradually	  permeated	   and	   reoriented	   the	   standard-­‐setting	   project.	   This,	   in	   particular,	  highlights	   that	   the	   formation	   of	   a	   standard	   is	   only	   partly	   connected	   to	  enhancing	  input	  legitimacy	  (by	  showing	  potential	  stakeholders	  of	  the	  standard	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were	  involved	  in	  its	  creation).	  Standard	  formation	  is	  simultaneously	  a	  process	  	  of	   eliciting	   and	   embedding	   shifting	   concerns	   into	   the	   standard	   to	   enhance	  perceived	   output	   legitimacy,	   which	   results	   from	   its	   “effectiveness	   and	  coordinative	   capacity”	   in	   responding	   to	   collective	   problems	   (Botzem	   and	  
	  
Figure	   1.1:	   Diagram	   of	   the	   relationships	   between	   ideas,	   instruments	   and	   forums	   for	   work	  studied	  in	  this	  thesis.	  Dobusch	   2012,	   p.741).	   In	   this	   regard	   it	   nuances	   Botzem	   and	   Dobusch’s	  argument	   that	   output	   legitimacy	   is	   “predominantly	   related	   to	   standard	  diffusion”	   (Ibid.),	   which	   the	   authors	   argue	   is	   because	   “high	   adoption	  contributes	  to	  output	  legitimacy	  […]	  due	  to	  network	  or	  crowd	  effects”	   	  (Ibid.,	  p.743).	   The	   thesis	   argues	   that	   stakeholder	   participation	   should	   not	   only	   be	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viewed	  as	  generating	  input	  legitimacy	  by	  identifying	  “what	  the	  preferences	  of	  people	   are”	   (Boedeltje	   and	   Cornips	   2004,	   p.7);	   rather,	   standard	   formation	  draws	   on	   the	   expertise	   of	   diverse	   actors	   in	   shaping	   and	   embedding	   those	  preferences	  in	  an	  ‘effective’	  standard.	  Specifically,	  the	  chapter	  shows	  that	  the	  idea	  of	  monitoring	  the	  alignment	  of	  investment	  and	  lending	  activities	  with	  the	  two	  degrees	   target	  came	  to	  replace	  an	   initial	  objective	  of	  rendering	   financial	  organisations’	   climate	   impact	   visible	   by	   measuring	   and	   reporting	   the	   GHG	  emissions	  they	  finance.	  Indeed,	  this	  brought	  the	  Financed	  Emissions	  Initiative	  to	   the	   brink	   of	   collapse,	   leading	   to	   its	   relaunch	   as	   the	   Portfolio	   Carbon	  Initiative.	   In	   particular,	   this	   entailed	   a	   shift	   away	   from	   applying	   carbon	  accounting	  to	  produce	   ‘carbon	  footprints’	  and	  towards	  metrics	  for	  the	  extent	  to	   which	   investment	   and	   lending	   activities	   support	   the	   transition	   to	   a	   low-­‐carbon	  economy.	  It	   is	   in	   this	   regard	   that	   Chapter	   6	   demonstrates	   the	   co-­‐production	  between	   financial	   sector	   discourses	   on	   climate	   change	   and	   the	   accounting	  tools	   called	   upon	   to	   render	   the	   climate	   impact	   of	   investment	   and	   lending	  activities	   visible	   (cf.	   Pollock	   and	   D’Adderio	   2012).	   That	   is,	   the	   ideas	   of	  managing	   ‘carbon	   risk’	   and	   monitoring	   alignment	   with	   the	   two	   degrees	  scenario	   emerged	   interactively	   with	   the	   development	   of	   carbon	   accounting	  practices	   (See	   ‘Financed	  Emissions	   Initiative’	   in	  Figure	  1.1).	   In	   this	   light,	   the	  standard-­‐setting	   process	   is	   framed	   as	   the	   one	   of	   constructing	   a	   mediating	  instrument	   (Miller	   and	   O’Leary	   2007)	   and	   a	   “situated	   form	   of	   learning	   in	  which	   the	  manipulation	   of	   conceptual	   objects	   is	   often	   inseparable	   from	   the	  manipulation	   of	   material	   ones,	   and	   vice	   versa”	   (Gooding	   1992,	   p.66).	  Furthermore,	   this	   co-­‐production	  was	   interrelated	  with	   two	   other	  mediating	  instruments,	   the	   carbon	   budget	   and	   investment	   roadmaps.	   The	   carbon-­‐constrained	   future	   envisaged	   by	   the	   carbon	   budget	   was	   to	   be	   made	  compatible	  with	  risk	  management	  practices,	  and	  investment	  roadmaps	  had	  to	  be	   refined	   to	   become	   a	   basis	   for	   indicators	   of	   ‘climate	   performance’.	   The	  linking	   of	   these	   instruments	   through	   the	   Financed	   Emissions	   Initiative	  highlights	  the	  emerging	  calculative	  infrastructure	  built	  upon	  the	  two	  degrees	  target,	   and	   the	   embedding	  of	   that	   target	   in	   carbon	  accounting	  practices	   that	  frame	   investment	   and	   lending	   activities	   in	   terms	   of	   a	   global	   vision	   for	  addressing	  climate	  change.	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Cutting	   across	   these	   three	   core	   chapters,	   Chapter	   7	   discusses	   the	  overarching	   contributions	   of	   the	   thesis.	   First,	   it	   draws	   together	   the	  components	   of	   the	   thesis	   pertaining	   to	   the	   production	   of	   sustainable	  development	   issues	   across	   multiple	   entities	   (Bebbington	   and	   Larrinaga	  2014b,	   p.401).	   It	   argues	   that,	   in	   the	   case	   of	   climate	   change,	   activity	   across	  multiple	   entities	   is	   being	   reframed	   in	   terms	   of	   a	   common	   global	   vision	   for	  addressing	   the	   problem.	   Specifically,	   it	   is	   through	   multiple	   “practices	   or	  instruments	   [that]	   help	   link	   the	   actions	   and	   expectations	   of	   actors	   across	  formally	  separate	  and	  diverse	  domains”	  (Miller	  and	  O’Leary	  2007,	  p.711)	  that	  efforts	   are	   coordinated	   towards	   achieving	   that	   vision.	   Second,	   the	   chapter	  further	  contends	  that	  mediating	  instruments	  offers	  a	  useful	  analytical	  lens	  for	  studying	   the	   global	   and	   complex	   issues	   on	   the	   sustainable	   development	  agenda	  (Unerman	  and	  Chapman	  2014;	  O’Dwyer	  and	  Unerman	  2016).	  On	   the	  one	   hand,	   the	   concept	   focuses	   the	   researcher	   on	   the	   instruments	   through	  which	   the	   diversity	   of	   concerns	   on	   a	   particular	   issue	   are	   rendered	   into	   a	  ‘manageable’	  form	  that	  enables	  and	  coordinates	  work	  across	  multiple	  entities	  on	   specific	   component	   parts	   of	   the	   problem.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	  interconnections	  between	  mediating	  instruments	  provide	  a	  focus	  for	  studying	  the	   linking	   of	   “local	   issues	   to	   larger	   questions,	   and	   vice	   versa”	   (Miller	   and	  Napier	  1993,	  p.634),	  directing	  attention	  to	  the	  emergent	  modes	  of	  governance	  across	  the	  sustainable	  development	  agenda.	  Third,	  processes	  of	  co-­‐production	  (cf.	   Hacking	   1992)	   are	   studied	   across	   the	   three	   core	   chapters,	   offering	   a	  response	   to	   the	   argument	   that	   ‘“[s]cholars	   working	   within	   this	   [mediating	  instruments]	  framework	  [...]	  have	  only	  begun	  to	  specify	  the	  process	  by	  which	  we	  might	  study	  and	  theorise	  interactions	  between	  material	  objects	  and	  wider	  calculative	  conceptions”	  (Pollock	  and	  D’Adderio	  2012,	  p.567).	  Specifically,	  the	  processes	   of	   constructing	   and	   mobilising	   an	   instrument	   entail	   work	   that	  ‘experiments’	   and	   ‘tinkers’	   (Gooding	   1992)	   with	   ideas	   and	   instruments	   and	  through	  which	  each	  is	  adjusted	  to	  the	  other.	  Chapter	  7	  also	  identifies	  limits	  to	  the	  thesis	  and	  potential	  avenues	  for	  further	   research.	   In	   particular,	   the	   thesis	   has	   focussed	   on	   studying	   an	  emerging	   calculative	   infrastructure	   for	   enacting	   the	   two	   degrees	   target.	   Its	  conclusions	   are	   therefore	   limited	   to	   the	  processes	   through	  which	   a	   complex	  global	  problem	   is	  made	   ‘manageable’	   at	   various	  different	   levels,	   and	  not	   the	  local	   acts	   of	   strategic	   planning	   and	   policy	   formulation.	   As	   such,	   this	   thesis	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supports	  O’Sullivan	   and	  O’Dwyer’s	   call	   for	   research	   into	   “institutionalization	  processes	  at	  the	  organizational	  level”	  (O’Sullivan	  and	  O’Dwyer	  2015,	  p.51)	  of	  such	  social	  and	  environmental	  accounting	  practices.	  In	  addition,	  the	  majority	  of	   data	   collection	   pre-­‐dates	   the	   December	   2015	   adoption	   of	   the	   Paris	  Agreement.	  As	  such,	  the	  thesis	  provides	  limited	  insight	  into	  the	  influence	  of	  its	  adoption	  on	  the	  development	  of	  carbon	  accounting	  as	  it	  “unfolds”	  (Bebbington	  and	   Larrinaga-­‐González	   2008,	   p.711).	   The	   thesis	   also	   pertains	   to	   the	  instruments	   that	   begin	   to	   coordinate	   action	   across	   multiple	   entities	  specifically	   in	   the	   financial	   sector	   on	   climate	   change.	  While	   this	   responds	   to	  O’Sullivan	   and	   O’Dwyer’s	   call	   for	   studies	   of	   NGO	   movements	   around	  investment	   and	   lending	   activities	   on	   the	   issue	   of	   climate	   change	   (O’Sullivan	  and	   O’Dwyer	   2015,	   p.51),	   it	   also	   narrows	   the	   scope	   of	   the	   contribution	   to	  regarding	   the	   conditions	   that	   influence	   actions	   across	   multiple	   entities	   on	  sustainable	   development	   issues	   (cf.	   Bebbington	   and	   Larrinaga	   2014b).	  Further	   research	   could	   pursue	   a	   comparative	   study	   across	   multiple	  sustainable	  development	  issues	  by	  attending	  to,	  as	  examples,	  the	  Millennium	  Development	   Goals	   and	   Sustainable	   Development	   Goals,	   as	   initiatives	   that	  address	  multiple	  issues	  through	  the	  application	  of	  accounting,	   indicators	  and	  targets	  (as	  noted	  by	  Chenhall,	  Hall,	  and	  Smith	  2013).	  Chapter	  7	  also	  identifies	  three	  avenues	  for	  further	  research.	  First,	  the	  Paris	   Agreement	   enshrines	   a	   post-­‐Copenhagen	  mode	   of	   climate	   governance	  that	   allows	   flexibility	   in	   designing	   decentred	   responses	   that	   work	   towards	  common	   objectives	   (see	   Falkner,	   Stephan,	   and	   Vogler	   2010;	   Falkner	   2016).	  However,	   as	   Chapter	   4	   highlights,	   this	   presents	   new	   challenges	   of	  hybridisation	  (Kurunmäki	  and	  Miller	  2011)	  and	  commensuration	  (MacKenzie	  2009)	  to	  national-­‐level	  carbon	  accounting.	  These	  challenges	  are	  central	  to	  the	  Measurement,	  Reporting	  and	  Verification	  (MRV)	  UNFCCC	  work	  stream	  as	  well	  as	   the	   Capacity-­‐building	   Initiative	   for	   Transparency	   established	   under	   the	  Paris	   Agreement	   (see	   ‘UNFCCC	   MRV’	   in	   Figure	   1.1).	   This	   provides	   an	  opportunity	   to	   study	   the	   “dynamics	   of	   accounting	   systems	   of	   governance	   as	  they	   emerge”	  with	   regards	   to	   “non-­‐organisational	   entities”	   (Bebbington	   and	  Larrinaga	   2014a,	   p.207),	   and	   which	   are	   central	   to	   the	   mechanisms	   being	  developed	   to	   enact	   the	   Paris	   Agreement.	   Second,	   further	   research	   into	   the	  carbon	   accounting	   practices	   that	   render	   visible	   deviations	   from	   the	   two	  degrees	   scenario	   at	   the	   organisational-­‐level	   are	   required	   to	   study	   the	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pressures	  on	  organisations	  to	  act	  on	  those	  deviations.	  This	  relates	  to	  the	  call	  for	   studies	   of	   the	   “institutionalization	   processes	   at	   the	   organizational	   level”	  (O’Sullivan	  and	  O’Dwyer	  2015,	  p.51),	  however	  is	  not	  restricted	  to	  the	  financial	  sector.	   The	   Science	  Based	  Targets	   initiative,	   for	   example,	   provides	   a	   site	   for	  studies	  of	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	  in	  coordinating	  organization-­‐level	   action	   across	   sectors.	   Finally,	   civil	   society	   actors	   have	   been	   studied	  regarding	   the	   influence	  of	   their	   interactions	  with	  corporations	  on	  enhancing	  corporate	   accountability	   (Cooper	   and	   Owen	   2007;	   Archel,	   Husillos,	   and	  Spence	   2011;	   O’Sullivan	   and	   O’Dwyer	   2015).	   This	   thesis	   argues	   that	   civil	  society	   actors	   should	   be	   further	   studied	   as	   part	   of	   a	   regulatory	   dynamic	  between	   state	   and	   market.	   Chapter	   6,	   for	   example,	   analyses	   their	   work	   as	  being	   interwoven	   with	   the	   regulatory	   agenda	   of	   the	   state	   as	   well	   as	   the	  strategies	  of	  the	  organisations	  they	  seek	  to	  influence	  (Chandhoke	  2002).	  This	  appears	  particularly	   important	  to	  studying	  the	  regulatory	  dynamic	   in	  a	  post-­‐Copenhagen	   climate	   regime,	   where	   the	   interrelation	   and	   mutual	  reinforcement	   of	   state	   and	   market	   action	   -­‐	   referred	   to	   more	   generally	   as	  ‘policy	   feedbacks’	   (Jänicke	   2012;	   Jänicke	   2014)	   –	   are	   seen	   as	   central	   to	  strengthening	   efforts	   to	   address	   climate	   change	   (Falkner	   2016).	   Chapter	   7	  elaborates	   on	   these	   avenues	   for	   further	   research,	   while	   the	   next	   chapter	  (Chapter	   2)	   turns	   its	   attention	   to	   situating	   the	   thesis	   within	   the	   carbon	  accounting,	  sustainable	  finance	  and	  mediating	  instruments	  literatures.	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CHAPTER	  2	  –	  COORDINATION	  ON	  
CLIMATE	  CHANGE:	  SITUATING	  THE	  THESIS	  
2.0.	  INTRODUCTION	  As	  a	  key	  issue	  on	  the	  sustainable	  development	  agenda,	  climate	  change	  has	  been	  described	  as	  a	  complex	  problem7	  that	   is	  not	  created	  by	   “one	  single	  entity”,	  but	   results	   instead	   from	   the	   “combination	  of	   institutions”	   that	   frame	  the	   activities	   of	   multiple	   entities	   (Bebbington	   and	   Larrinaga	   2014b,	   p.401).	  This	   thesis	   responds	   to	   Bebbington	   and	   Larrinaga’s	   call	   for	   studies	   of	   the	  “setting	  within	  which	  organisations	  operate”	  (Ibid.)	  by	  examining	  how	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	  envisaged	  a	  future	  that	  began	  to	  reframe	  ideas	  about	  how	  the	  financial	  sector	   influences	  and	   is	   influenced	  by	  climate	  change.	   It	  specifically	  focuses	  on	  the	  reshaping	  of	  concerns	  at	  the	  intersection	  of	  climate	  change	  and	  finance	   and	   how	   the	   target	   led	   to	   a	   reconfiguration	   of	   an	   emerging	   carbon	  accounting	   standard.	   In	   particular,	   this	   attends	   to	   the	   coordination	   of	  investment	  decisions	  across	  capital	  markets	  through	  their	  reframing	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  common	  long-­‐term	  vision	  of	  addressing	  climate	  change.	  The	  investigation	  traces	   the	   linkages	   between	   the	   objective	   of	   the	   two	   degrees	   target	   and	  entities	   of	   different	   scales	   and	   scopes	   (from	   nations	   and	   sectors	   to	  organisations	  and	   investment	  portfolios),	   studying	  how	   the	  accountability	  of	  multiple	   entities	   is	   framed	   in	   terms	   of	   a	   common	   vision.	   The	   practices	   of	  carbon	   accounting	   are	   central	   to	   this	   study,	   as	   the	   tools	   through	  which	   the	  climate	   impacts	   of	   those	   entities	   are	   rendered	   visible.	   Moreover,	   the	   thesis	  focuses	   on	   four	   interconnected	   instruments	   –	   the	   two	   degrees	   target,	   the	  carbon	   budget,	   industry	   roadmaps,	   and	   the	   emergent	   carbon	   accounting	  standard	   –	   that	   link	   an	   abstract	   and	   simplified	   vision	   to	   multiple	   entities.	  These	  are	  examined	  as	  mediating	  instruments	   (Miller	  and	  O’Leary	  2007)	  that	  simultaneously	   embed	   multiple	   potentially	   conflicting	   concerns	   and	   that	  orient	  action	  towards	  a	  common	  vision	  for	  tackling	  climate	  change.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  The	   term	   ‘complex’	   refers	   to	   the	   view	   that	   climate	   change	   is	   a	   ‘wicked’	   or	   ‘super-­‐wicked’	  problem	  (Milne	  and	  Grubnic	  2011,	  p.949),	  with	  the	  former	  defying	  “resolution	  because	   of	   the	   enormous	   interdependencies,	   uncertainties,	   circularities,	   and	  conflicting	  stakeholders	  implicated	  by	  any	  effort	  to	  develop	  a	  solution”	  (Lazarus	  2008,	  p.1159)	  and	  with	  the	  latter	  adding	  that	  “time	  is	  not	  costless,	  so	  the	  longer	  it	  takes	  to	  address	  the	  problem,	  the	  harder	  it	  will	  be	  to	  do	  so”	  (Ibid.,	  p.1160).	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This	   literature	  review	  provides	  a	   foundation	   for	   this	  study	  as	  well	  as	  situating	   the	   thesis	   within	   ongoing	   debates	   regarding	   carbon	   accounting,	  sustainable	   finance	   and	   mediating	   instruments.	   Section	   2.1	   explores	   the	  rapidly	  emerging	  field	  of	  carbon	  accounting	  and	  its	  multiple	  meanings	  across	  different	   disciplines.	  While	   it	   focuses	   on	   accounting	   scholarship,	   the	   section	  also	   highlights	   the	   debates	   in	   scholarship	   on	   national	   inventories	   of	   GHG	  emissions.	   Section	   2.2	   presents	   literature	   focussed	   on	   integrating	   the	  sustainability	  agenda	  into	  the	  financial	  sector.	  Section	  2.3	  turns	  its	  attention	  to	  the	   theoretical	   framing	   of	   the	   thesis,	   attending	   to	   the	   specific	   aspects	   of	   the	  notion	  of	  mediating	  instruments	  that	  inform	  its	  analytical	  framing.	  Section	  2.4	  offers	   brief	   concluding	   remarks.	   It	   should	   be	   noted	   that	   the	   research	  presented	  in	  this	  thesis	  holds	  relevance	  to	  literatures	  beyond	  those	  detailed	  in	  this	   literature	   review.	   Indeed	   the	   contributions	   of	   Chapters	   4,	   5	   and	   6	   to	  specific	  debates	  in	  different	  literatures	  are	  highlighted	  within	  those	  chapters.	  The	  scope	  of	  this	  literature	  review,	  however,	  is	  to	  situate	  the	  thesis	  within	  the	  three	   bodies	   of	   scholarship	   that	   are	   connected	   to	   its	   overarching	   research	  programme.	  	  
2.1.	  WHAT	  IS	  CARBON	  ACCOUNTING?	  Prior	   to	   1992	   carbon	   accounting	   had	   provided	   the	   natural	   sciences	  with	   measurement,	   calculation	   and	   attribution	   tools	   for	   analysing	   GHG	  dynamics	   in	   the	   biophysical	   environment	   (Ascui	   and	   Lovell	   2011,	   p.983).	  However	  after	  the	  United	  Nations	  Framework	  Convention	  on	  Climate	  Change	  (UNFCCC) 8 	  was	   established	   in	   1992	   carbon	   accounting	   practices	   were	  developed	  for	  conducting	  ‘GHG	  Inventories’,	  accounts	  detailing	  a	  nation’s	  GHG	  emissions	   as	   well	   as	   the	   removals	   of	   GHGs	   from	   the	   atmosphere	   (see	   IPCC	  1996).	   Implementing	   such	   national-­‐level	   accounting	   has	   proved	   challenging	  particularly	   in	   developing	   nations,	   where	   a	   lack	   of	   financial	   resources	   and	  expertise	   have	   hampered	   even	   the	   data	   collection	   stage	   of	   producing	   a	  national	   GHG	   inventory	   (Fransen	   2009).	   Moreover,	   and	   as	   will	   be	   seen	   in	  Chapter	  4,	  the	  Measurement,	  Reporting	  and	  Verification	  (MRV)	  requirements	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  The	  UNFCCC	  was	  established	  as	   the	   framework	   to	  guide	   international	  negotiations	  on	  addressing	  the	  problem	  of	  global	  warming.	  The	  1992	  agreement	  on	  UNFCCC	  stated	  its	   overarching	  objective	   as	  preventing	   ‘dangerous	   anthropogenic	   interference’	  with	  the	   climate	   system.	   Subsequent	   international	   climate	   talks	   held	   under	   the	   UNFCCC	  have	   formed	   mechanisms	   for	   setting	   GHG	   reduction	   targets	   and	   guiding	   policy	  implementation	  at	  the	  national-­‐level	  (discussed	  further	  in	  Chapter	  4).	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that	   underpin	   the	   production	   of	   national	   GHG	   inventories	   in	   the	   UNFCCC	  process	   have	   been	   perceived	   as	   a	   threat	   to	   developing	   nations’	   national	  sovereignty.	   As	   such,	   the	   evolution	   of	   national-­‐level	   carbon	   accounting	  practices	   has	   sought	   to	   improve	   the	   accuracy	   of	   national	   GHG	   inventories	  while	  ensuring	  their	  requirements	  are	  sensitive	  to	  the	  concerns	  of	  developing	  nations.	  	  Carbon	   accounting	   is	   not,	   however,	   restricted	   to	   the	   measuring	   the	  GHG	   dynamics	   of	   the	   biosphere	   or	   the	   GHG	   inventory	   of	   one	   nation.	   As	  market-­‐based	  solutions	  became	  the	  focus	  of	  debates	  on	  optimal	  solutions	  for	  emissions	   reductions	   in	   the	   mid-­‐1990s,	   development	   of	   practices	   for	  producing	   organisational-­‐level	   carbon	   accounts	   was	   stimulated.	   Ascui	   and	  Lovell	   refer	   to	   this	   form	  of	  carbon	  accounting	  as	  market-­‐enabling	   (Ascui	  and	  Lovell	   2011,	   p.986),	   emphasising	   that	   corporate-­‐level	   data	  was	   produced	   to	  facilitate	  efforts	  to	  make	  carbon	  costly.	  In	  other	  words,	  as	  states	  pursued	  their	  national-­‐level	   GHG	   reduction	   targets	   by	   curbing	   GHG	   emissions	   from	  emissions	  intensive	  sectors,	  corporate-­‐level	  GHG	  disclosures	  were	  required	  to	  inform	  the	  number	  of	  emissions	  ‘permits’	  an	  organisation	  needed	  to	  purchase	  or	   the	  allocated	  permits	   it	   could	  sell.	   Indeed,	   this	   raised	   financial	  accounting	  challenges	  regarding	  the	  treatment	  of	  emissions	  permits	  (Cook	  2009;	  also	  see	  Section	  2.1.3).	  However	  the	  idea	  of	  carbon	  being	  ‘costly’	  is	  central	  to	  the	  forms	  of	   interconnected	   carbon	   accounting	   detailed	   above.	   This	   view	   takes	   carbon	  accounting	  as	  practices	  the	  enable	  mechanisms	  for	  creating	  a	  carbon	  price	  to	  integrate	  the	  need	  to	  curb	  global	  GHG	  emissions	  into	  profitability	  objectives	  at	  the	   corporate-­‐level.	   That	   is,	   where	   the	   entity	   is	   “the	   matter	   or	   activity	   for	  which	  an	  accounting	  is	  to	  occur”	  (Meyer	  1973,	  p.116),	  monetization	  through	  a	  price	  on	  carbon	  was	  seen	  as	  underpinning	  “the	  relationship	  assumed	  to	  exist	  between	  the	  entity	  and	  external	  parties”	  (Ibid.).	  Yet	  the	  monetization	  of	  GHG	  emissions	   remains	   a	   core	   challenge	   to	   the	   carbon	   accounting	   practices	  detailed	   above,	   even	   if	   the	   application	   of	   carbon	   pricing	   mechanisms	   is	  increasing	   and	   covers	   approximately	   13%	   of	   global	   GHG	   emissions	   (World	  Bank	  2016).	  	  However	   carbon	   accounting	   is	   far	   from	   being	   exclusively	   tied	   to	  enabling	   market-­‐based	  mechanisms	   for	   curbing	   GHG	   emissions.	   As	   early	   as	  the	   first	   Global	   Reporting	   Initiative	   (GRI)	   ‘G1’	   sustainability	   reporting	  guidelines,	  published	  in	  2000,	  environmental	  indicators	  included	  measures	  of	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GHG	  emissions	  (Brown,	  de	  Jong,	  and	  Lessidrenska	  2009a).	  However	  it	  was	  the	  launch	   of	   the	   GHG	   Protocol	   in	   2001,9	  a	   carbon	   accounting	   standard-­‐setting	  organisation,	   that	   would	   see	   a	   proliferation	   of	   carbon	   accounting	   practices	  (Ascui	  and	  Lovell	  2011).	  The	  GHG	  Protocol	  developed	  corporate-­‐	  and	  project-­‐level	   carbon	   accounting	   practices	   through	   multi-­‐stakeholder	   development	  projects	  that	  produced	  standards	  for	  organisations’	  (GHG	  Protocol	  2004)	  and	  supply	   chain	   emissions	   (GHG	   Protocol	   2011)	   as	   well	   as	   industry-­‐specific	  guidelines	  for	  compliance	  with	  the	  core	  standards.	  Furthermore,	  these	  are	  the	  most	   widely-­‐adopted	   carbon	   accounting	   standards,	   providing	   the	   basis	   for	  numerous	  voluntary	  and	  mandatory	  disclosure	  regimes	  (J.	  F.	  Green	  2010).	  Yet,	  in	   the	   absence	   of	   a	   carbon	   price,	   carbon	   accounting	   provides	   practices	   that	  “pronounce	   on”	   and	   “evaluate	   the	   performance	   of	   individuals	   and	  organizations”	   (Miller	   and	   Power	   2013,	   p.562)	   for	   different	   ideas	   and	  aspirations	   for	   addressing	   climate	   change.	   This	   thesis	   argues	   that	   the	   two	  degrees	  target	  is	  becoming	  one	  such	  focal	  point	  for	  addressing	  climate	  change,	  enabling	   the	   linking	   of	   numerous	   entities,	   of	   various	   scales	   and	   scopes,	   to	   a	  single	   figure	   that	   represents	   the	   long-­‐term	   objective	   for	   addressing	   climate	  change.	  	  It	  is	  in	  this	  regard	  that	  the	  thesis	  takes	  ‘carbon	  accounting’	  to	  refer	  to	  those	   practices	   that	   use	   GHG	   emissions	   as	   their	   basis	   for	   measuring,	  estimating,	   recognising,	   disclosing	   and	   verifying	   the	   climate	   impact	   of	   an	  entity’s	   activity.	   Indeed	   this	   definition	   mostly	   fits	   within	   Ascui	   and	   Lovell’s	  (2011)	   frame	   regarding	   the	   scope	   of	   carbon	   accounting.	   Their	   definition	   is	  presented	   in	   Figure	   2.1,	   and	   as	   the	   authors	   explain,	   “[b]y	   selecting	   and	  combining	   different	   terms	   within	   this	   figure,	   a	   multitude	   of	   more	   specific	  interpretations	  of	  carbon	  accounting	  may	  be	  derived”	  (Ascui	  and	  Lovell	  2011,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  The	  Greenhouse	  Gas	  Protocol	  was	  founded	  in	  2001	  by	  the	  World	  Resources	  Institute	  (WRI)	  and	  World	  Business	  Council	  for	  Sustainable	  Development	  (WBCSD).	  WRI	   is	   a	   global	   think	   tank,	   headquartered	   in	   Washington	   D.C.,	   that	   seeks	   to	   shift	  societal	  behaviour	  towards	  protecting	  the	  Earth’s	  environment	  so	  that	  is	  can	  provide	  for	  future	  generations	  (WRI	  2016b).	  Since	  its	  founding	  in	  1982	  it	  has	  avoided	  what	  it	  terms	  the	  ‘prevailing	  activist	  model’	  (WRI	  2016a)	  in	  favour	  of	  work	  that	  advances	  an	  evidence-­‐based	  understanding	  of	  sustainable	  development	  issues	  	  and	  works	  to	  bring	  this	  to	  the	  attention	  of	  decision-­‐makers	  across	  the	  public	  and	  private	  sectors.	  	  WBCSD	   was	   founded	   shortly	   before	   the	   Rio	   Earth	   Summit	   in	   1992	   in	   an	   effort	   to	  ensure	   the	   business	   voice	   was	   present	   (WBCSD	   2016),	   and	   based	   its	   work	   on	   the	  belief	   that	   business	   had	   an	   inescapable	   role	   to	   play	   in	   sustainable	   development	  (Schmidheiny	  1992).	  It	  is	  a	  CEO-­‐led	  organization	  that	  works	  to	  influence	  the	  business	  community	   towards	   creating	   a	   “sustainable	   future	   for	   business,	   society	   and	   the	  environment”	  (WBCSD	  2016).	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p.980).	   However,	   this	   thesis	   highlights	   that	   carbon	   accounting	   practices	   are	  being	   combined	   with	   economic	   and	   physical	   measurements	   to	   provide	   the	  basis	   for	   national-­‐,	   sectoral	   and	   organisational-­‐level	   planning	   and	   target	  setting.	  As	   such,	   the	  definition	  of	   carbon	  adopted	  pertains	   to	   those	  practices	  that	  fit	  within	  Ascui	  and	  Lovell’s	  definition,	  as	  well	  as	  such	  practices	  that	  have	  been	   hybridised	  with	   other	   forms	   of	  measurement	   expertise	   (cf.	  Kurunmäki	  and	  Miller	  2011).	  	  
2.1.1.	  CARBON	  ACCOUNTING	  AND	  CLIMATE	  GOVERNANCE	  	   In	   their	   chapter,	   Accounting	   and	   global	   climate	   change	   issues,	   in	  
Sustainability	  Accounting	  and	  Accountability,	  Bebbington	  and	  Larrinaga	  argue	  carbon	  accounting	  has	  not	  become	  ‘black	  boxed’	  as	  it	  is	  still	  evolving	  through	  the	  plethora	   of	   reporting	   requirements	   and	   the	  development	   of	   interlocking	  standards	  (Bebbington	  and	  Larrinaga	  2014a,	  p.207).	  This,	  they	  claim,	  provides	  accounting	  researchers	  with	  an	  opportunity	  to	  study	  a	  “process	  that	  is	  in	  play”	  (Ibid.),	  through	  which	  the	  range	  of	  efforts	  to	  integrate	  carbon	  accounting	  in	  a	  particular	  mode	  of	  climate	  governance	  may	  be	  explored.	  This	  thesis	  provides	  one	   such	   study,	   demonstrating	   how	   the	   two	   degrees	   target	   provided	   the	  foundation	   for	   civil	   society	   actors	   –	   such	   as	   think	   tanks,	   standard-­‐setters,	  campaigning-­‐NGOs	   and	   disclosure	   groups	   –	   to	   enact	   a	   mode	   of	   climate	  governance	  that	  pursues	  the	  alignment	  of	  capital	  markets	  with	  the	  transition	  to	   a	   two	   degrees	   world.	   Bebbington	   and	   Larrinaga	   further	   highlight	   the	  numerous	  contexts	  in	  which	  the	  role	  and	  nature	  of	  accounting	  for	  carbon	  may	  be	   examined,	   and	   the	   potential	   significance	   of	   such	   studies	   to	   mainstream	  accounting	   and	   interdisciplinary	   research.	   “[Global	   climate	   change]	  governance	   regimes	   create	   contexts	   in	   which	   issues	   of	   commensuration,	  marketization,	   economic	   consequences	   and	   risk	   analysis	   come	   to	   the	   fore”	  (Bebbington	   and	   Larrinaga	   2014a,	   p.206).	   Indeed,	   in	   this	   thesis	   Chapter	   4	  demonstrates	  that	  the	  historical	  emergence	  of	  the	  two	  degrees	  target,	  and	  the	  idea	   of	   a	   target-­‐based	   mode	   of	   policy	   planning,	   was	   wrought	   with	   issues	  regarding	   the	   coordination	   of	   action	   across	   multiple	   entities	   –	   from	   the	  commensuration	   of	   GHGs	   to	   setting	   ‘interim’	   targets	   to	   guide	   a	   gradual	  transition	   towards	   alignment	   with	   a	   long-­‐term	   climate	   goal.	   Larrinaga,	  introducing	   the	   2014	   carbon	   accounting	   special	   issue	   of	   Social	   and	  
Environmental	  Accountability	   Journal,	   further	   remarks	   on	   the	   role	   of	   carbon	  accounting	  in	  enabling	  both	  ‘soft	  forms	  of	  carbon	  governance’	  as	  well	  as	  ‘hard	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Figure	  2.2:	  Definition	  of	  Carbon	  Accounting	  (Ascui	  and	  Lovell	  2011,	  p.980)	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law’	   on	   the	   issue	   (Larrinaga	   2014,	   pp.2–3),	   yet	   how	   carbon	   accounting	  “remains	  contested	  in	  every	  scenario”	  (Ibid.,	  p.4).	   Indeed,	  whereas	  Chapter	  5	  shows	  how	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	  provides	  a	  basis	   for	  civil	  society	  actors	  to	  engage	  in	  ‘soft	  forms	  of	  carbon	  governance’,	  Chapter	  6	  documents	  the	  contests	  over	  carbon	  accounting	  that	   led	  to	  the	  reconfiguring	  of	  a	  standard	  towards	  a	  mode	   of	   climate	   governance	   based	   on	   aligning	   investment	   and	   lending	  activities	  with	  the	  transition	  to	  a	  two	  degrees	  scenario.	  	  On	   standards	   development,	   Bebbington	   and	   Larrinaga	   note	   that	  carbon	   accounting	   "offers	   the	   opportunity	   to	   investigate	   the	   dynamics	   of	  accounting	  systems	  of	  governance	  as	  they	  emerge"	  (Bebbington	  and	  Larrinaga	  2014a,	   p.207).	   The	   authors	   point	   to	   the	   involvement	   of	   state	   and	   non-­‐state	  actors	  in	  producing	  norms	  around	  carbon	  accounting	  (cf.	  Braun	  2009)	  and	  an	  emerging	  infrastructure	  that	  will	  become	  linked	  to	  new	  regimes	  for	  acting	  on	  climate	   change	   (cf.	   Bowen	   and	   Wittneben	   2011).	   Chapter	   6,	   in	   particular,	  demonstrates	  how	  carbon	  accounting	  was	   called	  upon	   to	   facilitate	   efforts	   to	  manage	  the	  potential	  risks	  of	  a	  two	  degrees	  scenario	  and	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  investment	   and	   lending	   activities	   support	   to	   transition	   to	   a	   low-­‐carbon	  economy.	  That	   is,	   the	  project	   shifted	   from	  producing	  an	  accounting	   focus	  on	  carbon	   footprints	   of	   investment	   and	   lending	   activities,	   to	   indicators	   for	  managing	   and	   monitoring	   alignment	   with	   a	   two	   degrees	   scenario.	   In	   this	  regard,	  the	  thesis	  demonstrates	  how	  an	  emerging	  mode	  of	  climate	  governance	  –	   based	   on	   holding	   financial	   organisations	   accountable	   for	   supporting	   the	  transition	   to	   a	   low-­‐carbon	   economy	   and	   managing	   the	   risks	   it	   presents	   –	  emerged	   (Chapter	   5)	   and	   became	   embedded	   in	   carbon	   accounting	   practices	  (Chapter	   6).	   Moreover,	   it	   does	   so	   by	   demonstrating	   a	   specific	   instance	   in	  which	   carbon	   accounting	   became	   linked	   to	   an	   emerging	   calculative	  infrastructure	  that	  refined	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	  to	  sectoral-­‐,	  corporate-­‐	  and	  portfolio-­‐level	   entities.	   To	   reiterate,	   this	   thesis	   demonstrates	   how	   a	   specific	  carbon	   accounting	   standard	   was	   reconfigured	   to	   enact	   a	   mode	   of	   climate	  governance	  based	  on	  aligning	  action	  with	  a	  two	  degrees	  scenario.	  	  This	  focus	  on	  the	  reconfiguration	  of	  an	  accounting	  standard	  away	  from	  calculating	   ‘carbon	   footprints’	   is,	   however,	   a	   contrast	   to	   calls	   for	   a	   closer	  technical	   analysis	   of	   carbon	   accounting.	   For	   example	   Lohmann	   calls	   for	  reflection	  on	  the	  "erasures,	  conflicts	  and	  exaggerated	  claims"	  (Lohmann	  2009,	  p.530)	   of	   environmental	   accounting	   techniques	   and	   “carbon	   accounting’s	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indifference	   to	  where	   or	   how	   emissions	   cuts	   are	  made	   […];	   its	   conflation	   of	  reductions	   and	   offsets	   […];	   and	   its	   focus	   on	   means	   of	   achieving	   short-­‐term	  efficiency”	   (Ibid.).	   Published	   as	   part	   of	   the	   Accounting,	   Organizations	   and	  
Society	   special	   issue	   on	   carbon	   markets,	   his	   paper	   prioritises	   the	   study	   of	  carbon	  accounting	  as	  a	  ‘market-­‐enabling’	  practice.	  Similarly,	  MacKenzie	  draws	  attention	   to	   the	   commensuration	   of	   GHGs	   as	   a	   technical	   definition	   that	  underpins	   carbon	   markets,	   arguing	   that	   it	   “precisely	   issues	   of	   this	   detailed	  kind	  that	  an	  effective,	   inter-­‐disciplinary	  analysis	  of	  carbon	  markets	  will	  need	  to	  address”	   (MacKenzie	  2009,	  p.442).	  As	  such,	   the	  representational	  accuracy	  of	  carbon	  accounting,	   regarding	  both	   its	  scientific	  basis	  and	  the	  emissions	  of	  the	  entity	  in	  question,	  is	  central	  to	  studying	  the	  practices	  in	  relation	  to	  carbon	  markets.	  Yet	  these	  studies	  also	  privilege	  the	  view	  that	  carbon	  accounting	  is	  a	  set	   of	   practices	   for	   facilitating	   emissions	   trading	   schemes	   or	   other	   market-­‐based	   mechanisms	   for	   GHG	   control.	   Rather,	   this	   thesis	   demonstrates	   how	  carbon	  accounting	  becomes	  connected	  to	  a	  new	  mode	  of	  climate	  governance.	  Specifically,	  one	  where	  civil	  society	  actors	  coordinate	  a	  range	  of	  pressures	  on	  financial	   organisations,	   pursuing	   the	   envisaged	   alignment	   of	   capital	  markets	  with	  a	  two	  degrees	  scenario.	  This	  thesis	  does,	  however,	  still	  demonstrate	  the	  influence	   of	   technical	   definitions	   on	   the	   visibilities	   created	   by	   carbon	  accounting	   –	   for	   example	   in	   Chapter	   6	   financial	   organisations’	   scenario	  planning	   is	   influenced	   by	   their	   choice	   of	   emissions	   trajectory,	   and	   several	  initiatives	   exist	   to	   facilitate	   the	   translation	   of	   industry	   roadmaps	   into	  portfolio-­‐level	  metrics.	  This	  chapter	  now	  proceeds	  to	  consider	  the	  challenges	  of	  defining	  and	  linking	  multiple	   scales	   and	   scopes	   of	   entity	   through	   the	   practices	   of	   carbon	  accounting.	  This	   is	  to	   inform	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  thesis	  on	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  two	   degrees	   target	   and	   its	   subsequent	   linking	   to	   national-­‐,	   sectoral-­‐,	  corporate-­‐,	  and	  portfolio-­‐level	  entities.	  	  
2.1.2.	  THE	  NATION	  AS	  A	  CARBON	  ENTITY	  As	   Gillenwater	   explains,	   “[a]	   GHG	   inventory	   is	   an	   accounting	   of	  anthropogenically	   produced	   GHG	   emissions	   from	   sources	   (e.g.,	   fossil	   fuel	  combustion)	   and	   removals	   through	   sinks	   (e.g.,	   managed	   forest	   growth	   or	  carbon	   sequestration)	   based	   on	   rigorous	   technical	   methodologies	   and	  detailed	   data	   collection	   on	   relevant	   activities	   (e.g.,	   fuel	   consumption)”	  (Gillenwater	   2008,	   p.195).	   Called	   upon	   by	   the	   UNFCCC,	   one	   duty	   of	   the	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Intergovernmental	   Panel	   on	   Climate	   Change	   (IPCC)10	  is	   to	   provide	   guidance	  on	  methodologies	  for	  calculating	  GHG	  inventories,	  which	  has	  been	  adopted	  as	  the	   best	   practice	   guidelines	   by	   Parties	   to	   the	   UNFCCC.	   The	   IPCC	   guidelines	  were	   first	   approved	   in	   1994	   and	   published	   in	   1995	   (IPCC	   1995a),	   being	  updated	   in	   1997,	   2000,	   2006	   and	   2014	   (IPCC	   1997;	   2000;	   2006;	   2014)	  through	  the	  IPCC	  Task	  Force	  on	  National	  Greenhouse	  Gas	  Inventories.	  	  Scholars	   have	   directed	  much	   attention	   at	   examining	   the	   accuracy	   of	  IPCC	  methods,	  comparing	  results	  from	  the	  published	  guidance	  with	  a	  range	  of	  other	  models	   for	   estimating	   specific	   aspects	   of	   national	   GHG	   inventories.	   La	  Motta	  et	  al.	  (2005),	   for	  example,	   find	  that	  while	  the	  main	  aspects	  of	  the	  IPCC	  method	  appear	  reliable,	  the	  emissions	  from	  non-­‐energy	  use	  of	  fossil	  fuels	  are	  currently	  underestimated	  (La	  Motta	  et	  al.	  2005).	  These	  results	  have	  been	  built	  upon	   in	   appeals	   for	   the	   IPCC	   standards	   to	   consider	   incorporating	   a	   wider	  range	  of	  emissions	  as	  well	  as	  adopting	  adjustments	  to	  enhance	  the	  accuracy	  of	  the	   calculations	   (Stechemesser	   and	   Guenther	   2012).	   Stechemesser	   and	  Guenther	  argue	  that	  indirect	  emissions	  should	  be	  included	  to	  produce	  a	  more	  complete	   understanding	   of	   the	   drivers	   of	   emissions,	   and	   that	   enhanced	  “regulations	  at	  all	  scales”	  (Ibid.,	  p.356)	  are	  necessary	  to	  improve	  the	  precision	  of	   GHG	   inventories.	   Through	   these	   measures,	   the	   authors	   claim,	   “national	  mitigation	   strategies	   and	   international	   agreements	   can	   be	   improved	   and	  projects	  can	  be	  better	  assessed”	  (Ibid.).	  Yet	  Chapter	  4	  highlights	  that	  following	  the	   collapse	   of	   the	   UNFCCC	   Copenhagen	   climate	   talks	   in	   2009,	   the	   UNFCCC	  mechanism	  for	  national-­‐level	  contributions	  to	  GHG	  mitigation	  has	  been	  based	  on	   a	  wider	   set	   of	  metrics	   than	   CO2,	   or	   GHG,	   data	   alone.	  While,	   for	   example,	  contributions	  based	  on	  reductions	  in	  emissions	  intensity	  of	  GDP	  may	  appear	  a	  small	  change	  from	  reductions	  in	  total	  GHG	  emissions,	  it	  requires	  standardised	  approaches	  to	  forecasting	  GDP	  growth.	  Furthermore,	  with	  China	  basing	  much	  of	  its	  proposed	  contribution	  to	  tackling	  climate	  change	  under	  the	  UNFCCC	  on	  a	  range	   of	   ‘policy	   targets’	   (such	   as,	   among	   others,	   renewable	   energy,	   energy	  efficiency,	   and	   forestry)	   a	   focus	   on	   the	   accuracy	   of	   GHG	   data	   alone	   risks	  overlooking	   how	   carbon	   accounting	   at	   the	   national-­‐level	   is	   becoming	  interconnected	  with	  a	  range	  of	  other	  strategies	  for	  mitigating	  climate	  change.	  Indeed,	   Chapter	   4	   shows	   that	   after	   the	   2009	   Copenhagen	   climate	   talks	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  The	  IPCC	  is	  an	  intergovernmental	  scientific	  body	  that	  is	  tasked,	  by	  member	  nations	  of	  the	  United	  Nations,	  with	  assessing	  the	  latest	  scientific	  view	  of	  climate	  change	  along	  with	  its	  economic	  and	  political	  impacts	  (see	  Agrawala	  1998).	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UNFCCC	  adopted	   a	  more	   flexible	   approach	   to	  national-­‐level	   target	   setting	   to	  assuage	   concerns	   regarding	   encroachment	   on	   developing	   nations’	  sovereignty.	   This	   raises	   new	   concerns	   on	   measuring	   and	   monitoring	   the	  nation	  as	  a	  climate	  entity	  –	   from	  the	  comparability	  of	  domestic	  data	  sources	  with	   other	   nations’	   contributions,	   to	   MRV	   requirements	   for	   monitoring	  national	  progress	  –	  on	  which	  carbon	  accounting	  scholars	  can	  provide	  valuable	  insight.	  This	   also	  provides	  opportunities	   for	   accounting	   scholars	   explore	   the	  application	  of	  carbon	  accounting	  to	  enact	  a	  post-­‐Copenhagen	  climate	  regime.	  	  However	  one	  of	  the	  most	  active	  debates	  in	  the	  literature	  regarding	  the	  relevant	  entity	   to	  be	  made	  accountable	   for	  GHG	  emissions	   is	   the	  question	  of	  whether	   a	   nation’s	   GHG	   inventory	   should	   reflect	   the	   emissions	   arising	   from	  
producing	   goods	   and	   services	   or	   their	   consumption.	   While	   IPCC	   methods	  follow	   a	   production-­‐based	   approach	   to	   calculate	   GHG	   inventories,	   there	   is	   a	  growing	   literature	  examining	   the	   feasibility	  and	  advantages	  of	   consumption-­‐based	   carbon	   footprints.	   In	   a	   world	   where	   trade	   is	   growing	   faster	   than	  population	  and	  GDP,	  Andrew	  et	  al.	  argue,	  the	  emissions	  embedded	  in	  imports	  (i.e.	   a	   consumption-­‐based	  approach)	  are	   increasingly	   important	   in	  designing	  effective	   national	   policies	   for	   the	   reduction	   of	   GHG	   emissions	   (R.	   Andrew,	  Peters,	  and	  Lennox	  2009).	  Take,	  for	  example,	  UK	  emissions	  between	  1992	  and	  2004.	   While	   the	   UK	   achieved	   a	   10%	   reduction	   in	   its	   production-­‐based	  emissions	  in	  this	  period,	  surpassing	  its	  Kyoto	  Protocol	  target	  ahead	  of	  time,	  a	  consumption-­‐based	  approach	  demonstrates	   that,	  when	   imports	   are	   included	  in	   the	   calculation,	   emissions	   rose	   by	   8%	   over	   the	   same	   period	   (Minx	   et	   al.	  2009;	   Wiedmann	   et	   al.	   2010).	   Challenges	   facing	   the	   consumption-­‐based	  approach,	   however,	   stem	   from	   the	   increased	   data	   and	   computational	  requirements.	  Andrew	  et	  al.	   explore	   this	   challenge	   in	   the	  Australian	   context,	  investigating	   the	   trade-­‐off	   between	   simplifying	   assumptions	   and	   the	   cost,	  timeliness	   and	   robustness	   of	   the	   approach	   (R.	   Andrew,	   Peters,	   and	   Lennox	  2009),	  highlighting	  the	  assumptions	  with	  potential	  to	  make	  the	  models	  more	  “accessible”	   (Ibid.,	   p.312;	   pp.325-­‐6).	   This	   debate	   attends	   to	   the	   question	   of	  which	   entities,	   in	   principle,	   should	  be	  made	   responsible	   for	   controlling	  GHG	  emissions;	  those	  that	  produce	  emissions,	  or	  those	  whose	  consumption	  drives	  the	  production.	  	   Yet	   literature	   on	   the	   consumption-­‐based	   approach	   sets	   aside	   the	  question	  of	   the	  conditions	   in	  which	  carbon	  accounting	   is	   configured,	   instead	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taking	   a	  more	   ideological	   approach	   to	   the	   potential	   benefits	   it	   presents.	   For	  example	   Peters	   and	   Hertwich	   (2007)	   argue	   that	   it	   would	   reduce	   the	  importance	  of	  emission	  reduction	  commitments	  for	  developing	  countries	  and	  ease	   their	   integration	   into	   international	   talks	   because	   developed	   nations	  would	  take	  a	  greater	  burden	  of	  the	  emissions	  reductions	  (Peters	  and	  Hertwich	  2007).	  However	  developing	  nations,	  as	  Chapter	  4	  will	  show,	  were	  not	  alone	  in	  their	   recalcitrance	   during	   the	   UNFCCC	   process.	   Indeed,	   the	   United	   States	   of	  America	   did	   not	   ratify	   the	   Kyoto	   Protocol,	   and	   its	   approach	   to	   the	   2009	  Copenhagen	   talks	   was	   seen	   as	   contributing	   the	   collapse	   of	   the	   negotiations	  (Christoff	  2010).	  As	  such,	  there	  appears	  little	  reason	  for	  Peters	  and	  Hertwich	  (2007)	  to	  expect	  developed	  nations	  to	  willingly	  accept	  a	  larger	  share	  of	  global	  emissions.	   This	   is	   not	   to	   set	   aside	   debates	   regarding	   a	   consumption-­‐based	  approach.	   Liu	   et	   al.,	   for	   example,	   highlight	   its	   relevance	   to	   balancing	   the	  regional	   emissions	   targets	   in	   China,	   where	   the	   current	   shift	   of	   carbon-­‐intensive	  producers	  to	  poorer	  regions	   is	  allowing	  wealthy	  regions	  to	  achieve	  their	   production-­‐based	   GHG	   reduction	   targets	   without	   implementing	   GHG	  control	   measures	   (Liu	   et	   al.	   2015).	   The	   point	   is	   that	   national-­‐level	   carbon	  accounting	   practices	   are	   configured	   through	   the	   negotiation	   of	   concerns	   in	  international	  climate	  talks.	  Whereas	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol	  was	  rigidly	  based	  on	  targets	   for	   reducing	   GHG	   emissions,	   the	   flexibility	   of	   the	   post-­‐Copenhagen	  climate	   regime	   enshrined	   in	   the	   2015	   Paris	   Agreement	   calls	   upon	   carbon	  accounting	  to	  reveal	  the	  contribution	  of	  a	  range	  of	  metrics	  to	  global	  reductions	  in	  GHG	  emissions.	  
2.1.3.	  ACCOUNTING	  AND	  EMISSIONS	  TRADING	  SCHEMES	  Bebbington	  and	  Larrinaga	   (2014b)	  argue	   that	   carbon	  accounting	  has	  “captured	  researchers’	  attention”	  because	  markets	  have	  emerged	  to	  “translate	  these	  concerns	  to	  the	  entity	   level”	  (Bebbington	  and	  Larrinaga	  2014b,	  p.401).	  	  Indeed,	  this	  reinforces	  Hopwood’s	  observation	  that	  “the	  creation	  of	  a	  market	  in	   carbon	   emissions	   is	   one	   arena	   in	  which	   accounting	   and	   the	   environment	  have	  become	   intertwined	  –	   for	  better	  or	   for	  worse”	  (Hopwood	  2009,	  p.434).	  While	   this	   thesis	   examines	   climate	   change	   through	   the	   efforts	   to	   assign	  responsibility	   for	   achieving	   the	   two	   degrees	   target	   to	   a	   various	   entities	   of	  different	   scales	   and	   scopes,	   the	   accounting	   literature	   on	   emissions	   trading	  schemes	  provides	  insight	  into	  the	  challenges	  of	  rendering	  GHG	  emissions	  into	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a	   form	   where	   accounting	   can	   coordinate	   activity	   across	   organisations	   and	  regions.	  	  	  The	   Accounting,	   Organizations	   and	   Society	   2009	   special	   issue,	  
Accounting	   and	   Carbon	   Markets,	   provided	   useful	   insights	   into	   making	   an	  organisation	  or	  facility	  the	  responsible	  entity	  for	  national-­‐level	  GHG	  reduction	  targets	  and,	   in	  doing	  so,	   the	   translation	  of	  GHG	  emissions	   into	  measurement	  and	   reporting	   practices	   for	   GHG	   accountability	   more	   broadly.	   MacKenzie	  (2009)	  focussed	  on	  identifying	  and	  examining	  the	  specific	  technical	  details	  of	  accounting	  for	  carbon	  that	  have	  significant	  consequences	  for	  economic	  action.	  For	  example,	  his	  analysis	  of	  Global	  Warming	  Potentials	  (GWPs)	  examines	  the	  “exchange	   rate”	   (Ibid.,	   p.446)	   that	   translates	   a	   GHG	   into	   its	   ‘carbon	   dioxide	  equivalent’	   (CO2e),	   providing	  policy-­‐makers	  with	   a	   form	  of	  GHG	   information	  that	  enables	  work	  on	  emissions	  with	  little	  input	  from	  scientists	  (Ibid.).	  Yet	  the	  “exchange	   rate”	   established	   for	   GWPs	   also	   determines	   the	   relative	   value	   of	  GHGs	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  number	  of	  emissions	  permits	  required	  or	  the	  number	  of	  carbon	  credits	   that	  can	  be	  generated	  through	  their	  sequestration	  or	  removal	  from	   the	   atmosphere.	   In	   particular,	   Chapter	   4	   highlights	   that	   a	   pair	   of	  workshops,	   held	   in	   Bellagio	   and	   Villach	   1987,	   proposed	   CO2e	   to	   enable	   the	  commensuration	   of	   GHGs	   and	   the	   aggregation	   of	   GHG	   emissions	   at,	   in	  particular,	  the	  national	  level.	  	   	  Furthermore,	   while	   there	   have	   been	   numerous	   studies	   of	   factors	  influencing	   the	   treatment	   of	   emissions	   permits	   (Zhang-­‐Debreceny,	   Kaidonis,	  and	   Moerman	   2009;	   McNicholas	   and	   Windsor	   2011;	   Gallego-­‐Alvarez,	  Martínez-­‐Ferrero,	  and	  Cuadrado-­‐Ballesteros	  2016),	  Mete	  et	  al.	  (2010)	  set	  out	  to	   examine	   the	   “creation	   of	   an	   economic	   phenomenon,	   a	   carbon	   permit,	  provides	   a	   unique	   opportunity	   to	   explore	   the	   construction	   of	   institutional	  meaning	   and	   the	   role	   of	   institutional	   members	   in	   creating	  meaning”	   (Mete,	  Dick,	  and	  Moerman	  2010,	  p.620).	  In	  particular	  this	  demonstrates	  how	  carbon	  accounting	  embeds	  the	  concerns	  of	  the	  conditions	  in	  which	  the	  entities	  being	  made	   responsible	   operate.	   While	   this	   thesis	   focuses	   on	   the	   embedding	   of	  concerns	   beyond	   the	   monetization	   of	   carbon	   emissions,	   these	   studies	   still	  demonstrate	  how	  carbon	  accounting	  is	  configured	  to	  establish	  a	  responsibility	  that	  is	  compatible	  with	  particular	  concerns.	  Mete	  et	  al.,	  basing	  their	  study	  on	  the	   Australian	   tax	   system,	   show	   the	   contrast	   between	   an	   ‘accounting	  treatment’,	   which	   “demonstrates	   support	   for	   a	   market	   imperative”	   (Ibid.,	  
Chapter	  2	  –	  Coordination	  on	  Climate	  Change	  
	   33	  
p.628)	   by	   centring	   on	   the	   tradable	   nature	   of	   the	   permits,	   and	   the	   ‘taxation	  treatment’,	  which	  places	  “reliance	  on	  the	  notion	  of	  regulation	  and	  compliance”	  (Ibid.).	  The	  institutional	  meaning	  created	  through	  the	  different	  treatments,	  the	  authors	   argue,	   “contributes	   to	   the	   hybrid	  mix	   of	   laissez-­‐faire	   and	   regulation	  evidenced	  in	  the	  Australian	  context”	  (Ibid.).	   In	  this	  thesis,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  Chapter	   6	   demonstrates	   how	   the	   shifting	   concerns	   regarding	   the	   way	   the	  financial	   sector	   influences	   and	   is	   influenced	   by	   climate	   change	   came	   to	  reconfigure	  carbon	  accounting	  practices.	  The	  standard	  setting	  project	  was	  not	  simply	   a	   case	   of	   pursuing	   an	   accurate	   and	   comprehensive	   representation	   of	  the	   emissions	   financed	   by	   investment	   and	   lending	   activities;	   rather,	   it	   was	  creating	   the	   practices	   that	   could	   simultaneously	   appeal	   to	   ideas	   of	   risk	  management	  and	  monitoring	  alignment	  with	  the	  two	  degrees	  target.	  	   Yet	  it	  should	  also	  be	  noted	  that	  others	  have	  argued	  the	  monetization	  of	  emissions	   is	   unethical	   and	   fails	   to	   challenge	   the	   institutional	   arrangements	  that	  caused	  –	  or	  at	  least	  enabled	  activity	  that	  caused	  –	  issues	  such	  as	  climate	  change.	  Zhang-­‐Debrency	  et	  al.	  argue	  that	  treating	  emission	  permits	  as	  an	  asset	  creates	   a	   right	   to	   emit	   (treatment	   as	   a	   liability	   similarly	   faces	   this	  inconsistency,	  as	  firms	  are	  effectively	  ‘entitled’	  to	  emit),	  which	  is	  inconsistent	  with	   the	  responsibility	  humans	  have	   to	   reduce	  emissions	   (Zhang-­‐Debreceny,	  Kaidonis,	   and	   Moerman	   2009).	   McNicholas	   and	   Windsor	   approach	   the	  question	   of	   financial	   and	   reporting	   regulation	   in	   emissions	   trading	   schemes	  from	   a	   somewhat	   different	   perspective,	   arguing	   that	   a	   system	   that	   failed	   to	  prevent	  a	  global	  financial	  crisis	  will	  do	  little	  to	  address	  GHG	  emissions	  as	  “the	  real	  problem	  that	  underlies	  global	  warming”	  (McNicholas	  and	  Windsor	  2011,	  p.1074).	  Arguing	  that	  “value	  should	  not	  be	  reductively	  monetised	  for	  the	  sake	  of	   market	   participants”	   (Ibid.,	   1089)	   the	   authors	   warn	   that	   “no	   amount	   of	  taxpayer	   funded	  bailouts	  will	   be	   able	   to	   rescue	   life	   on	  Earth”	   (Ibid.,	   p.1090)	  from	   the	   failures	  of	  	   “[n]ational	   and	   international	  public	  policy	   [that]	   is	   now	  largely	   focused	   on	   a	   risky	   experiment	   of	   emissions	   trading	   as	   a	   market	  solution	  to	  global	  warming”	  (Ibid.).	  However	  it	   is	  also	  important	  to	  note	  that	  while	   emissions	   trading	   schemes	   have	   attracted	   much	   scholarly	   and	   public	  attention	  in	  recent	  decades,	  they	  are	  far	  from	  the	  only	  mechanism	  for	  enacting	  national	  and	  international	  ideas	  of	  GHG	  control.	  In	  this	  regard	  McNicholas	  and	  Windsor	  (2011)	  overstate	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  market-­‐based	  mechanisms	  are	  being	  applied	  to	  curb	  GHG	  emissions,	  privileging	  a	  view	  of	  carbon	  accounting	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as	  practices	  for	  the	  monetization	  of	  the	  Earth’s	  atmosphere.	  This	  thesis,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  demonstrates	  how	  carbon	  accounting	   is	   called	  upon	   to	   facilitate	  an	  array	  of	  regulatory	  efforts,	  from	  the	  international	  UNFCCC	  protocols	  to	  the	  campaigning	   efforts	   of	   NGOs.	   To	   reiterate,	   this	   thesis	   demonstrates	   that	  carbon	  accounting	  is	  being	  called	  upon	  to	  “enable	  the	  diverse	  forms	  of	  carbon	  governance”	   (Larrinaga	   2014,	   p.2),	   presenting	   new	   challenges	   for	   carbon	  accounting	  in	  its	  hybridisation	  (Kurunmäki	  and	  Miller	  2011)	  with	  other	  forms	  of	  measurement	  expertise.	  	  
2.1.4.	  CARBON	  ACCOUNTING	  DISCLOSURES	  To	   examine	   the	   ideas	   that	   carbon	   accounting	   comes	   to	   embed	   it	   is	  necessary	  to	  study	  the	  range	  of	  pressures	  that	  drive	  its	  implementation,	  which	  extend	  beyond	  legal	  requirements.	  Indeed,	  while	  the	  disclosure	  of	  corporate-­‐level	  GHG	  emissions	  information	  has	  been	  mandated	  for	  certain	  organisations	  by	   some	   nations	   (DEFRA	   2012;	   Assemblée	   Nationale	   2015),	   the	   drivers	   of	  voluntary	   reporting	   of	   carbon	   information	   has	   attracted	   much	   attention,	  especially	   from	  social	  and	  environmental	  accounting	  scholars.	  This	  attention	  extends	  beyond	  carbon	  accounting	  to	  the	  drivers	  of	  social	  and	  environmental	  reporting	   requirements.	   For	   example,	   O’Sullivan	   and	   O’Dwyer	   (2015)	  demonstrating	   how	   a	   global	   network	   of	   campaigning-­‐NGOs,	   BankTrack,	  worked	   to	   enhance	   commercial	   banks’	   compliance,	   over	   time,	   with	   the	  Equator	   Principles,	   a	   set	   of	   environmental	   and	   social	   risk	   management	  guidelines	   for	   project	   finance	   (O’Sullivan	   and	   O’Dwyer	   2015).	   For	   carbon	  accounting	  scholars,	  CDP	  (formerly,	   the	  Carbon	  Disclosure	  Project)	  has	  been	  particularly	  central	  to	  such	  studies.	   	  CDP,	  as	  Kolk	  et	  al.	  explain,	   leverages	  the	  influence	  of	  institutional	  investors	  to	  gain	  insight	  into	  the	  climate	  risk	  profiles	  of	  the	  world’s	   largest	  firms	  (Kolk,	  Levy,	  and	  Pinkse	  2008,	  p.724).	  That	   is,	   the	  authors	   show	   that	   CDP	   appears	   to	   promote	   widespread	   disclosure	   of	  corporate-­‐level	   climate-­‐related	   impacts,	   based	   on	   which	   institutional	  investors	   may	   analyse	   and	  manage	   the	   long-­‐term	   risks	   that	   climate	   change	  presents.	  However	  this	  reported	  GHG	  emissions	  information	  has	  proved	  difficult	  to	  link	  to	  the	  risk	  agendas	  of	   investors.	  Indeed,	  Kolk	  et	  al.	  highlight	  that	  GHG	  emissions	   lack	   compatibility	  with	   the	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  work	  of	   investors	  and	   they	  find	  no	  evidence	  to	  suggest	  that	  such	  information	  is	  being	  used	  by	  investors	  in	  their	   decisions	   (Ibid.,	   p.741).	   Kolk	   et	   al.’s	   findings	   are	   supported	   by	   more	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recent	   accounting	   literature	   examining	   CDP’s	   influence	   on	   disclosure	  practices.	  Sullivan	  and	  Gouldson,	   for	  example,	  highlight	   that	  reported	  data	   is	  difficult	  to	  integrate	  in	  investment	  risk	  analysis	  and,	  also,	  that	  investors	  have	  paid	  little	  attention	  to	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  data	  (Sullivan	  and	  Gouldson	  2012.	  See	  also	  J.	  Andrew	  and	  Cortese,	  2011;	  Dragomir,	  2012).11	  Indeed	  Chapter	  6	  shows	  that	  this	  ‘disconnect’	  between	  GHG	  emissions	  and	  risk	  management	  appeared	  to	   stem	   from	   the	   absence	   of	   a	   price	   on	   carbon	   that	   would	   enable	   the	  monetization	  of	  the	  risks	  presented	  by	  GHG	  emissions.	  	  This	  became	  central	  to	  the	   tensions	   between	   financial	   organisations	   and	   the	   Secretariat	   of	   the	  Financed	   Emissions	   Initiative	   on	   the	   extent	   to	  which	   the	   resulting	   standard	  would	  be	  adopted.	  What	  Chapter	  6	  documents	   is	  how	  the	  carbon	  accounting	  practices	  shifted	  towards	  metrics	  for	  analysing	  industrial	  transitions	  under	  a	  two	  degrees	  scenario.	  	  These	  observations	   further	  develop	  Haigh	  and	  Shapiro’s	   insights	   into	  investors’	   motivations	   for	   environmental	   investing,	   which	   highlight	   how	  investors	  prepare	   for	   the	   future	   they	   imagine	  while	  being	  unable	   to	   connect	  corporate	   carbon	  disclosures	   to	   their	   own	   commercial	   exigencies.	   Investors,	  the	  authors	  argue,	  prepare	  their	  systems	  for	  the	  potential	  asset	  allocations	  in	  their	   imagined	   futures,	   with	   the	   predominant	   use	   of	   carbon	   disclosures	   in	  decision-­‐making	  being	  limited	  to	  assessments	  of	  corporate	  governance	  (Haigh	  and	  Shapiro	  2011).	  This	  offers	  a	  partial	  response	  to	  Kolk	  et	  al.’s	  (2008)	  call	  on	  accounting	  researchers	  to	  examine	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	   ‘incomplete’	  information	  being	   generated	   through	  CDP	  with	   the	   financial	   performance	   of	  the	   reporting	   firms.	   Indeed,	   this	   thesis	   develops	   these	   insights	   by	  documenting	  how	  the	  carbon	  accounting	  standard	  was	  reoriented	  away	  from	  a	   focus	   on	   GHG	   emissions,	   partly	   due	   to	   the	   lack	   of	   risk-­‐relevance,	   and	  towards	   a	   set	   of	   measurements	   and	   indicators	   tailored	   towards	   emerging	  notions	   of	   risk	   and	   accountability.	   This	   further	   highlights	   that	   the	  implementation	  of	  carbon	  accounting	   is	  not	  solely	  a	  matter	  of	   responding	   to	  pressures	  to	  disclosure,	  but	  also	  as	  a	  means	  for	  managing	  emerging	  concerns	  that	   stem	   from	   climate	   change.	   As	   such,	   this	   chapter	   turns	   to	   consider	   the	  application	  of	  carbon	  accounting	  as	  a	  management	  tool.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Elsewhere	   this	   incompleteness	   of	   emissions	   disclosures	   has	   been	   framed	   as	   the	  result	   of	   carbon	   accounting	   being	   a	   symbolic	   act	   to	   address	   legitimacy	   concerns	  (Liesen	  et	  al.	  2015,	  Hrasky	  2011).	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  2.1.5.	  CARBON	  MANAGEMENT	  ACCOUNTING	  	   While	  much	  carbon	  accounting	  literature	  focuses	  on	  the	  disclosure	  of	  GHG	  information,	  the	  application	  of	  carbon	  accounting	  as	  a	  management	  tool	  demonstrates	   how	   the	   practices	   become	   refined	   to	   the	   operations	   and	  strategies	   within	   and	   across	   organisations.	   Moreover,	   the	   standard-­‐setting	  project	   studied	   in	   Chapter	   6	   sought	   to	   simultaneously	   standardise	   the	  disclosure	  of	  GHG	  information	  on	  investment	  and	  lending	  activities	  as	  well	  as	  provide	  methods	  for	  analysing	  the	  risks	  and	  opportunities	  that	  climate	  change	  posed	   to	   financial	   organisations.	   In	   their	   overview	   of	   carbon	   management	  accounting	  techniques	  and	  scholarship,	  Schaltegger	  and	  Csutora	  describe	  it	  as	  “that	  part	  of	   carbon	  accounting,	  which	   supports	   companies	   in	   the	   successful	  operationalization	   and	   implementation	   of	   their	   carbon	   management”	  (Schaltegger	  and	  Csutora	  2012,	  p.7).	   In	  particular,	   the	  authors	  highlight	   that	  beyond	   calculating	   carbon	   footprints,	   indicators	   such	   as	   CO2	   emissions	   per	  Euro	  of	  sales	  enables	  the	  comparison	  of	  performance	  across	  organisations	  and	  products	   (Ibid.,	   pp.7-­‐10).	   Furthermore,	   and	   as	   Tsai	   et	   al.	   (2012)	   argue,	   this	  refinement	   of	   carbon	   accounting	   to	   the	   level	   of	   an	   individual	   product	   or	  portfolio	   exposes	   the	   most	   environmentally	   damaging	   elements	   of	   the	  production	   process	   on	   a	   more	   granular	   level,	   enabling	   targeted	   managerial	  interventions.	  	   Of	  particular	  relevance	  to	  Chapter	  6,	  Schaltegger	  and	  Csutora	  highlight	  that	   organisations	  may	   set	   goals	   based	   on	   benchmarks	   of	   their	   own	   carbon	  management	   accounting	   data	   against	   “the	   company’s	   historical	   carbon	  emissions,	   specific	   corporate	   functions	   (functional	   benchmarking),	   industry	  average	   (industry	   benchmarking),	   leading	   competitors	   (leadership	  benchmarking)	   or	   the	   goal	   of	   carbon	   neutrality”	   (Ibid.,	   p.9;	   also	   see	  Rietbergen,	   van	   Rheede,	   and	   Blok	   2015).	   However	   Chapter	   6	   focuses	  specifically	  on	   the	  value	  chain	  of	  a	   financial	  organisation.	  That	   is,	   the	  carbon	  accounting	   standard	   did	   not	   focus	   on	   the	   emissions	   originating	   from	   the	  ‘direct’	   operation	   of	   a	   bank’s	   office	   block,	   for	   example;	   rather,	   the	   standard	  initially	  sought	  to	  measure	  the	  emissions	  enabled	  by	  investment	  and	  lending	  activities.	   Supply-­‐chain	   benchmarking	   is	   detailed	   by	   Acquaye	   et	   al.,	   who	  develop	   carbon	   maps	   at	   the	   industry-­‐level,	   providing	   benchmarks	   against	  which	   the	   environmental	   sustainability	   of	   supply	   chains	   can	   be	   measured	  (Acquaye	  et	  al.	  2014).	  The	  authors	  demonstrate	  the	  value	  of	  their	  benchmarks	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in	   rendering	   visible	   the	   deviations	   of	   their	   supply	   chain	   from	   the	   industry	  map.	   This	   highlights	   ‘hot	   spots’	   that	   managerial	   attention	   can	   be	   directed	  toward.	   Chapter	   6	   expands	   on	   this	   form	   of	   benchmarking,	   highlighting	   the	  application	   of	   carbon	   accounting	   indicators	   for	   comparing	   corporate-­‐	   or	  portfolio-­‐level	   performance	   against	   emissions	   trajectories	   and	   roadmaps	   for	  industrial	   transition	   towards	   the	   two	   degrees	   target.	   In	   other	   words,	   the	  transformation	   of	   the	   two	   degrees	   target	   into	   industry	   roadmaps	   makes	   it	  possible	  to	  assess	  the	  alignment	  of	  an	  individual	  investment	  portfolio	  with	  the	  long-­‐term	  global	  climate	  objective.	  	  
2.2.	  FINANCE	  AND	  THE	  SUSTAINABILITY	  AGENDA	  In	   their	   chapter	   in	   Sustainability	   Accounting	   and	   Accountability,	  Coulson	  and	  O’Sullivan	  highlight	  the	  blurred	  margins	  between	  niche	  financial	  products	   that	   cater	   to	   demand	   for	   sustainable	   investment,	   and	   the	  mainstream	  products	  that	  have	  come	  to	  include	  social	  and	  environmental	  risk	  considerations	   in	   routine	   assessments	   (Coulson	   and	   O’Sullivan	   2014).	   A	  parallel	   shift	   is	   occurring	   in	   how	   financial	   organisations	   are	   being	   held	  accountable	   for	   the	   impact	   of	   their	   investment	   and	   lending	   activities	   on	  climate	  change.	  On	   the	  one	  hand,	  NGOs	  –	   such	  as	   the	  members	  of	   the	  global	  NGO	   network,	   BankTrack	   –	   have	   directly	   campaigned	   against	   and	   engaged	  with	  commercial	  banks	  regarding	  their	   lending	  to	  projects	  deemed	  to	  have	  a	  significant	  contribution	  to	  global	  GHG	  emissions	  (e.g.	  mountaintop	  removal	  of	  coal,	  a	  form	  of	  mining).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  this	  thesis	  (Chapter	  5	  in	  particular)	  shows	  how	  a	  range	  of	  civil	  society	  actors	  sought	  to	  influence	  investment	  and	  lending	  activities	  beyond	  the	  project	  finance	  operations	  of	  commercial	  banks,	  seeking	  to	  align	  capital	  markets	  with	  the	  two	  degrees	  target.	  Specifically,	  this	  distinguishes	   between	   a	   mode	   of	   direct	   intervention	   in	   a	   particular	   and	  tangible	   form	  of	   lending,	  and	  the	  emerging	  strategy	  of	   fostering	  expectations	  of	   a	   two	   degrees	   world	   and	   embedding	   a	   two	   degrees	   scenario	   in	   the	  accounting	   practices	   that	   frame	   investment	   and	   lending	   decisions.	   This	  section	  situates	   the	   thesis	  within	  studies	  of	  sustainable	   finance,	   focussing	  on	  financial	   organisations’	   engagement	   with	   ideas	   of	   environmental	   and	   social	  risk	   as	   well	   as	   on	   the	   dynamic	   between	   civil	   society	   actors	   and	   financial	  organisations.	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2.2.1.	  SUSTAINABLE	  FINANCE,	  RISK,	  AND	  ENVISAGING	  CARBON	  CONSTRAINTS	  A	   central	   strand	   in	   the	   sustainable	   finance	   literature	   pertains	   to	   the	  potential	   risks	   that	   climate	   change,	   along	   with	   a	   number	   of	   social	   and	  environmental	   issues,	  may	  pose	   to	   financial	  organisations.	   Indeed	   this	   thesis	  demonstrates	   how	   the	   two	   degrees	   target	   was	   mobilised	   by	   civil	   society	  actors	   as	   a	   basis	   for	   new	   ideas	   of	   climate	   risk	   (Chapter	   5),	   ideas	   that	  permeated	   into	   the	   standard-­‐setting	   project	   and	   reconfigured	   carbon	  accounting	   to	   render	   it	   compatible	   with	   financial	   organisations	   risk	  management	   systems	   (Chapter	   6).	   Focussing	   on	   the	   integration	   of	  environmental	  concerns	   into	  corporate	   financial	  strategy,	  Coulson	  and	  Dixon	  (1995)	   offer	   an	   early	   study	   of	   financial	   organisations’	   reactions	   to	   the	  environmental	  concerns	  raised	  through	  disasters	  such	  as	  the	  disastrous	  Union	  Carbide	  gas	   leak	   in	  Bhopal	  and	   the	  Exxon	  Valdez	  oil	   spill	   in	  Alaska	   (Coulson	  and	   Dixon	   1995,	   p.22).	   The	   authors	   emphasise	   the	   legislative	   response	   to	  these	   disasters	   as	   the	   link	   between	   environmental	   issues	   and	   the	   risks	   they	  pose	  to	  the	  financial	  sector.	  The	  authors	  argue	  that	  “companies	  and	  financial	  institutions	   have	   little	   excuse	   for	   ignoring	   environmental	   considerations	  within	   project	   appraisal”	   (Ibid.,	   p.28)	   considering	   this	   rapid	   increase	   in	  legislation.	  Indeed	  Coulson	  and	  Monks	  (1999)	  offer	  concrete	  examples	  of	  the	  “unforeseen	  costs”	  that	  	  “companies	  who	  fail	  to	  consider	  their	  environmental	  performance	   could	   face”	   before	   finance	   is	  made	   available	   to	   them,	   including	  “specialist	   environmental	   assessment	   or	   pollution	   abatement	   and	   clean-­‐up”	  (Coulson	  and	  Monks	  1999,	  p.9).	  In	  this	  regard	  it	  has	  been	  argued	  that	  the	  legal	  system’s	   response	   to	   environmental	   issues	   creates	   a	   ‘business	   case’	   for	  financial	   organisations	   to	   analyse	   potential	   risks	   from	   climate	   change,	   with	  Richardson	   basing	   his	   argument	   on	   the	   increasing	   regulation	   of	   GHG	  emissions	  (Richardson	  2009).	  However	  this	  thesis	  highlights,	   in	  Chapter	  5	   in	  particular,	   that	   financial	   organisations	   initially	   saw	   flaws	   in	   this	   ‘business	  case’,	   doubting	   that	   strong	   GHG	   regulations	   would	   enter	   into	   force	   and	  believing	   they	   could	   adjust	   their	   investment	   and	   lending	   strategy	   relatively	  swiftly	  if	  and	  when	  such	  regulations	  arose.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand	  this	  thesis	  demonstrates	  that	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	  provided	  the	  foundation	  for	  civil	  society	  actors	  to	  create	  a	  vision	  of	  a	  carbon-­‐constrained	   future.	   Their	   argument	   is	   that	   to	   remain	   within	   a	   two	   degrees	  scenario	   there	   is	   a	   ‘finite	   carbon	   budget’	   –	   a	   maximum	   level	   of	   cumulative	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emissions	  –	  and	  transformations	  of	  carbon-­‐intensive	  sectors	  will	  be	  required	  to	   remain	   within	   that	   budget	   (Chapter	   5).	   It	   is	   precisely	   this	   carbon	  constrained	  future	  that	  Bebbington	  and	  Larrinaga-­‐González	  (2008)	  –	   in	  their	  introduction	   to	   the	   2008	   European	   Accounting	   Review	   special	   section	   on	  
Accounting	  and	  the	  Market	  of	  Emissions	  –	  argue	  creates	  risks	  for	  investors	  that	  could	   lead	   them	   to	   require	   further	   information	   to	   inform	   their	   risk	  management	  practices	  (Bebbington	  and	  Larrinaga-­‐González	  2008,	  p.707).	  The	  authors,	  citing	  Kolk	  and	  Levy,	   (2001),	  present	   the	  example	   that	  “competitive	  risks	   arise	   from	   the	   likelihood	   that	   carbon-­‐intensive	   products	   and	   services	  become	  obsolete	  compared	  with	  low	  emission	  products	  and	  technologies.”12	  It	  is	   this	   perception	   of	   carbon	   constraints,	   and	   their	   asymmetrical	   distribution	  across	   sectors	   (cf.	   Busch	  and	  Hoffmann	  2007),	   that	   is	   central	   to	   the	   ‘climate	  risk’	  concerns	  examined	  in	  Chapter	  5.	  In	  particular,	  this	  demonstrates	  how	  the	  two	   degrees	   target	   provided	   an	   apparently	   simple	   vision	   for	   the	   future	   of	  efforts	   to	   address	   climate	   change	   upon	  which	   ideas	   and	   analyses	   of	   carbon	  constraints	   could	   be	   based.	   In	   other	   words,	   it	   is	   through	   the	   gradual	  reorientation	   of	   financial	   sector	   expectations	   towards	   a	   two	   degrees	   future	  that	   the	   idea	   of	   legal	   requirements	   to	   curb	   GHGs	   became	   perceived	   as	   a	  potential	  risk	  to	  investment	  and	  lending	  activities.	  
2.2.2.	   NGO	   INFLUENCE	   AND	   ENGAGEMENT	   ON	   SUSTAINABLE	   FINANCE	  
PRACTICES	  Chapter	  5	  also	  demonstrates	  the	  reputational	  risk	  stemming	  from	  the	  efforts	   of	   campaigning-­‐NGOs.	   Such	   reputational	   risk	   has	   become	   a	   central	  theme	   in	   the	   sustainable	   finance	   literature,	   which	   has	   attended	   to	   the	  strategies	   of	   campaigning-­‐NGOs	   to	   leverage	   the	   influence	   that	   financial	  organisations	  have	   across	   industries	   around	   the	  world.	   This	   has	   been	  noted	  since	  1995,	  with	  Coulson	  and	  Dixon	  remarking	  “Financial	  institutions	  are	  key	  stakeholders	  in	  a	  company	  and	  their	  influence	  on	  decision	  making	  should	  not	  be	   underestimated”	   (Coulson	   and	   Dixon	   1995,	   p.28).	   More	   recently,	  Richardson	   has	   argued	   that	   the	   financial	   sector	   has	   potential	   beyond	  mobilising	   finance	   for	   clean	   energy	   due	   to	   its	   influence	   for	   more	   sweeping	  changes	   across	   the	   economy	   (Richardson	   2009).	   This	   is	   a	   central	   theme	   in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Similarly,	   Busch	   and	   Hoffman	   suggest	   that	   as	   financial	   organisations	   come	   to	  recognise	  fossil	  fuel	  substitution	  as	  a	  long-­‐term	  trend	  it	  will	  come	  to	  constitute	  a	  risk	  factor	  to	  be	  integrated	  into	  their	  established	  environmental	  risk	  assessments	  (Busch	  and	  Hoffmann	  2007).	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Chapter	  6,	  which	  documents	  how	   the	   standard	  was	   reconfigured	   to	  produce	  metrics	  to	  render	  visible	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  investment	  and	  lending	  activities	  were	   supporting	   the	   transition	   to	   a	   low-­‐carbon	   economy.	   In	   Chapter	   6,	   this	  reconfiguration	  is	  driven	  by	  think	  tanks	  working	  to	  align	  capital	  markets	  with	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	  by	  rendering	  visible	  the	  deviations	  of	   investment	  and	  lending	   activities	   from	   roadmaps	   to	   a	   low-­‐carbon	   economy.	   This,	   however,	  presents	  a	  different	  strategy	  for	  creating	  reputational	  risk	  than	  that	  shown	  in	  the	   sustainable	   finance	   literature.	   Wilson,	   for	   example,	   details	   how,	   since	  2000,	   Friends	   of	   the	   Earth	   and	   Rainforest	   Action	   Network	   (RAN)	   have	  challenged	  the	   financial	   industry	  with	  high-­‐profile	  campaigns	  exposing	  cases	  where	  financial	  organisations	  had	  ‘bankrolled	  disasters’	  (Wilson	  2010,	  p.268).	  Similarly,	   Petherick	   (2012)	   examines	   RAN’s	   Bankrolling	   Climate	   Change	  report	   (Schücking	   et	   al.	   2011)	   that	   ‘named-­‐and-­‐shamed’	   the	   ‘climate	   killer’	  banks	   that	   had	   contributed	   most	   to	   the	   doubling	   of	   investments	   into	   coal	  between	  2005	  and	  2010	  (see	  Figure	  2.2).13	  	  These	   campaigning	   efforts	   had	   taken	   a	   case-­‐by-­‐case	   approach	   that	  targeted	  banks’	   financing	  of	   specific	   carbon-­‐intensive	  projects.	  Chapter	  6,	  on	  the	   other	   hand,	   demonstrates	   a	   new	   strategy	   to	   benchmark	   investment	   and	  lending	   activities	   against	   a	   trajectory	   towards	   the	   two	   degrees	   target.	   This	  draws	  a	  parallel	  to	  Coulson	  and	  O’Sullivan’s	  view	  that	  margins	  between	  niche	  ‘sustainable’	   financial	  products	  and	  mainstream	  products	   integrating	  routine	  social	   and	   environmental	   risk	   assessments	   are	   blurring	   (Coulson	   and	  O’Sullivan	   2014).	   Compared	   to	   NGO	   campaigns	   that	   target	   specific	   problem	  projects,	  this	  thesis	  highlights	  the	  combined	  strategies	  of	  multiple	  civil	  society	  actors	  behind	  efforts	  to	  render	  deviations	  from	  a	  particular	  industry	  roadmap	  visible.	   In	  doing	  so,	  deviations	  from	  that	  trajectory	  become	  visible,	  providing	  information	  to	  inform	  efforts	  to	  pressure	  financial	  organisations	  to	  align	  with	  a	   particular	   vision	   for	   addressing	   climate	   change.	   In	   other	   words,	   the	  adjudication	   of	   the	   climate	   impact	   of	   investment	   and	   lending	   decisions	   is	  becoming	  based	  on	   the	   transition	   to	   a	   low-­‐carbon	   economy,	   rather	   than	   the	  objectives	  of	  particular	  campaigning-­‐NGOs.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  Also	  see	  Waygood	  (2006)	  for	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  different	  campaigning	  strategies	  of	  NGOs	  in	  capital	  markets	  and	  a	  historical	  perspective	  on	  their	  emergence	  and	  evolution	  (Waygood	  2006).	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Figure	  2.2:	  BankTrack's	  Climate	  Killer	  Banks	  (Heffa	  Schücking	  et	  al.	  2011,	  .p15).	  Scholarly	   attention	   has	   not	   been	   restricted	   to	   the	   reputational	   risks	  posed	   by	  NGOs’	   campaigns.	   It	   has	   also	   revealed	   the	   dialogue	   between	  NGOs	  and	  financial	  organisations,	  with	  Coulson	  (2009),	   for	  example,	  examining	  the	  tensions	  that	  arise	  from	  the	  different	  ideas	  of	  environmental	  governance	  held	  by	   each	   group	   (Coulson	   2009).	   Similarly,	   in	   their	   study	   of	   the	   Equator	  Principles	  O’Sullivan	  and	  O’Dwyer	  (2009)	  highlight	  how	  NGOs	  shifted	  from	  a	  strategy	   of	   “hard	   line	   advocacy	   to	   one	   of	   engagement”	   (O’Sullivan	   and	  O’Dwyer	  2009,	  pp.555–6).	  While	  Wright	  notes	  that	  the	  support	  of	  commercial	  banks	  in	  committing	  to	  and	  endorsing	  the	  Equator	  Principles	  played	  a	  key	  role	  in	   their	   materialisation	   (Wright	   2009),	   the	   dialogue	   between	   NGOs	   and	  financial	   organisations	   is	   central	   to	   studies	   of	   the	   initiative.	   For	   example	  O’Sullivan	   and	   O’Dwyer	   highlight	   that	   the	   campaigning	   and	   engagement	  efforts	   of	   BankTrack	   –	   a	   global	   network	   of	   NGOs	   –	   has	   gradually	   enhanced	  reporting	  on	  social	  and	  environmental	  risks	   through	  closer	  adherence	  to	   the	  Equator	  Principles	  (O’Sullivan	  and	  O’Dwyer	  2015).	  Furthermore,	  the	  Equator	  Principles	  have	  been	  framed	  as	  a	  form	  of	  ‘soft	  law’,	  encouraging	  companies	  to	  adopt	  codes	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  the	  pitfalls	  of	  both	  individual	  voluntary	  actions	  and	   legal	   requirements	   (Macve	   and	   Chen	   2010).	   Indeed,	   as	   Gough	   and	  Shackeley	  note:	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“Compared	   to	   the	   single-­‐issue	   campaigning	   style	   generally	  associated	  with	  the	  approach	  of	  NGOs	  to	  environmental	  and	  public	   risk	   issues,	   climate	   change	   ushers	   in	   a	   new	   era	   of	  engagement	   and	   empowers	  NGOs	  by	   giving	   them	  a	  place	   at	  the	  negotiating	  table”	  (Gough	  and	  Shackley	  2001,	  329)	  It	   is	   in	   this	   regard	   that	  Gond	   and	  Piani	   (2013)	  draw	  attention	   to	   the	  dialogue	  between	   investors	   and	  managers.	  The	  authors	  base	   their	   argument	  on	   a	   study	   of	   the	   Principles	   for	   Responsible	   Investment	   (PRI)14	  initiative,	  framing	  it	  as	  an	  ‘enabling	  organisation’	  that	  facilitates	  collective	  action	  (Gond	  and	  Piani	  2013,	  p.66).	  In	  particular,	  they	  highlight	  how	  the	  initiative	  acts	  as	  a	  mobilizing	  structure	  that	  creates	  a	  hybrid	  organisational	  space	  (Ibid.,	  p.97)	  to	  enable	  a	   lasting	  dialogue	  between	  investors	  and	  managers.	   Indeed	  Chapter	  6	  demonstrates	   that	   the	   dialogue	   between	   financial	   organisations	   and	   civil	  society	  actors	  destabilised	  the	  Financed	  Emissions	  Initiative,	  with	  both	  groups	  perceiving	  deficiencies	  in	  a	  sole	  focus	  on	  GHG	  emissions	  information.	  This	  led	  to	   the	   reconfiguration	   of	   the	   project	   to	   embed	   the	   emerging	   concerns	   of	  carbon	   risk	   and	   alignment	   of	   investment	   and	   lending	   decisions	   with	   the	  transition	   to	   a	   low-­‐carbon	   economy.	   In	   this	   regard,	   the	   dialogue	   facilitated	  collective	   action,	  with	   the	   emerging	   concerns	   of	   each	   group	   stemming	   from	  the	   two	   degrees	   target	   and	   the	   standard	   embedding	   those	   concerns	   in	   the	  carbon	  accounting	  standard.	   In	  other	  words,	   the	  carbon	  accounting	  standard	  became	  based	  on	  creating	  a	  way	  of	   framing	  diverse	  and	  distributed	  decision	  making	  across	  the	  financial	  sector	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  two	  degrees	  target.	  As	   well	   as	   embedding	   the	   shifting	   concerns	   at	   the	   intersection	   of	  finance	  and	  climate	  change,	  this	  dialogue	  enabled	  the	  standard	  setting	  project	  to	   enhance	   the	   compatibility	   of	   carbon	   accounting	   practices	   with	   financial	  organisations’	  decision-­‐making	  processes.	  Bebbington	  and	  Larrinaga,	   in	  their	  chapter	  in	  Sustainability	  Accounting	  and	  Accountability,	  write	  “[i]t	  is	  testament	  to	   the	   ubiquity	   and	   importance	   of	   [global	   climate	   change]	   that	   financial	  market	   investors	   are	   championing	   reporting”,	   (Bebbington	   and	   Larrinaga	  2014a,	   p.206),	   while	   noting	   the	   difficulty	   of	   linking	   entity	   level	   data	   with	  investors’	   needs.	   The	   authors’	   argument	   –	   that	   carbon	   accounting	   practices	  lack	   sophistication	   to	   meet	   the	   needs	   of	   investors	   –	   resonates	   with	  observations	   that	   there	   is	   limited	   integration	   of	   GHG	   information	   into	  investors’	  decision-­‐making	  process	  (Kolk,	  Levy,	  and	  Pinkse	  2008;	  Sullivan	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  PRI	  promotes	  the	  integration	  of	  environmental,	  social	  and	  governance	  (ESG)	  issues	  into	  institutional	  investors’	  decision	  making.	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Gouldson	   2012).	   In	   the	   Japanese	   context,	   for	   example,	   Mizuguchi	   examines	  two	   reports	   from	   the	   Japanese	   Institute	   of	   Certified	   Public	   Accountants	  (JIPCA)	  on	  climate	  risk	  disclosures	  in	  companies’	  environmental	  and	  financial	  reports.	   He	   finds	   that	   disclosures	   are	   inadequate	   for	   investment	   decision	  making	  due	  to	  the	  variation	  in	  scope	  of	  emissions	  reported	  across	  companies	  (Mizuguchi	  2008).	  These	  concerns	  arose	  early	  in	  the	  standard-­‐setting	  project,	  and	   were	   partially	   resolved	   through	   the	   dialogue	   between	   financial	  organisations	   and	   civil	   society	   actors,	   combining	   multiple	   sets	   of	   expertise.	  Specifically,	   the	   carbon	   accounting	   practices	  were	   refined	   to	   simultaneously	  address	   the	   concerns	   of	   ‘carbon	   risk’	   and	   ‘climate	   performance’	   as	   well	   as	  being	  compatible	  with	  decision-­‐making	  processes	  for	  investment	  and	  lending.	  
2.3.	  MEDIATING	  INSTRUMENTS	  	   This	   thesis	   studies	   how	   the	   two	   degrees	   target	   enabled	   work	   that	  reconfigured	   how	   investment	   and	   lending	   activities	   were	   framed	   regarding	  their	   impact	   on	   climate	   change.	   It	   examines	   this	   linking	   of	   science	   and	   the	  economy	  by	  focussing	  on	  four	  instruments:	  the	  two	  degrees	  target,	  the	  carbon	  budget,	  industry	  roadmaps,	  and	  an	  emerging	  carbon	  accounting	  standard.	  It	  is	  through	   the	   interconnections	   between	   the	   four	   instruments	   that	   the	   two	  degrees	   target	   became	   linked	   to	   the	   day-­‐to-­‐day	   activities	   of	   the	   financial	  sector.	   By	   analysing	   the	   interconnections	   between	   these	   mediating	  
instruments	   (Miller	   and	   O’Leary	   2007),	   the	   thesis	   demonstrates	   how	   a	  particular	   future	   for	   addressing	   climate	   change	   was	   envisaged,	   providing	   a	  foundation	  for	  work	  that	  linked	  a	  global	  objective	  with	  decision	  making	  at	  an	  organisational-­‐	   and	   portfolio-­‐level.	   In	   doing	   so,	   it	   demonstrates	   how	   the	  “combination	   of	   institutions”	   that	   produces	   ‘unsustainable’	   activity	   across	  multiple	  entities	  is	  reconfigured	  towards	  a	  common,	  and	  less	   ‘unsustainable’,	  vision	   for	   addressing	   climate	   change	   (Bebbington	   and	   Larrinaga	   2014b,	  p.401).	  In	  particular,	  it	  highlights	  that	  it	  is	  through	  the	  different	  characteristics	  of	  each	  of	  the	  four	  mediating	  instrument	  that	  they	  interconnect	  to	  link	  climate	  science	  to	  investment	  and	  lending	  decisions,	  and	  it	   is	  to	  those	  characteristics	  that	  this	  section	  attends.	  
MEDIATING	  INSTRUMENTS	  AND	  GLOBAL	  CLIMATE	  CHANGE	  	  	   In	   their	   study	   of	   the	   microprocessor	   industry,	   Miller	   and	   O’Leary	  emphasise	   that	   Moore’s	   Law	   “modelled	   a	   strikingly	   beneficent	   relation	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between	   science	   and	   the	   economy	   at	   a	   highly	   abstract	   and	   simplified	   level”	  (Miller	  and	  O’Leary	  2007,	  p.716),	  making	  “the	  case	  that	  improvements	  in	  the	  science	   of	   integrated	   circuits	   could	   be	   crucial	   to	   the	   future	   of	   the	  semiconductor	  industry	  and	  to	  economic	  growth”	  (Ibid.,	  p.712).	  Moore’s	  Law	  envisaged	  the	  rates	  of	  increase	  in	  the	  power	  of	  semiconductor	  devices	  and	  the	  timing	   of	   those	   increases,	   envisaging	   the	   restoration	   of	   American	   pre-­‐eminence	   in	   the	   industry	   that	   would	   bolster	   the	  wealth	   and	   security	   of	   the	  nation.	   Moreover,	   this	   vision	   shaped	   expectations	   across	   sets	   of	   industries	  regarding	   the	   targets	   for	   technological	   advancement,	   linking	   diverse	   and	  distributed	   actors	   to	   a	   “common	  narrative”	   (Miller	   and	  Power	   2013,	   p.579).	  Yet	  that	  common	  narrative	  is	  not	  a	  mirroring	  of	  wealth	  and	  security	  concerns	  in	  a	   technology	  trajectory.	  Rather	   it	  stems	  from	  an	   instrument	  that	  mediates	  those	   concerns	  with	   the	   specifics	   of	   the	   semiconductor	   industry.	   Indeed,	   as	  Latour	   writes,	   mediators	   “transform,	   translate,	   distort	   and	   modify	   the	  meaning	  or	   the	  elements	   they	  are	  supposed	   to	  carry”	   (Latour	  2005,	  p.39).	   It	  was	   by	   embedding	   economic	   and	   scientific	   concerns	   in	   its	   predictions	   that	  Moore’s	   Law	   rendered	   this	   complexity	   into	   a	   form	   that	   “frame[d]	   a	  manageable	  future”	  (Jordan,	  Jørgensen,	  and	  Mitterhofer	  2013,	  p.159).	  Chapter	  4	  highlights	  how	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  long-­‐term	  target	  for	  climate	  change	  emerged	  as	  a	   means	   to	   make	   the	   future	   ‘manageable’	   by	   creating	   a	   basis	   for	   analysing	  possible	  policy	  responses.	  Furthermore,	  it	  demonstrates	  that	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	   emerged	   from	   numerous	   alternatives	   as	   a	   metric	   that	   could	   mediate	  between	  the	  definition	  of	  ‘dangerous’	  climate	  change,	  ideas	  of	  ensuring	  a	  ‘cost-­‐effective’	   response	   to	   climate	   change	   and,	   crucially,	   national	   sovereignty	  concerns.	   That	   is,	   the	   two	   degrees	   target	   rendered	   the	   complexities	   climate	  change	   into	   a	   ‘manageable’	   form	   that	   could	   mediate	   between	   the	   scientific,	  economic	  and	  political	  concerns	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  the	  international	  discourse	  on	  climate	  change.	  	   Chapter	   4	   also	   emphasises	   the	   point	   that	   the	   two	   degrees	   target	  provided	   a	   vision	   that	   made	   climate	   change	   appear	   manageable,	   while	   not	  specifying	   how	   adjustments	   towards	   alignment	   with	   the	   target	   were	   to	   be	  made.	   In	   this	   regard	   the	   target	  provides	  an	  apparently	   simple	   focal	  point	  on	  climate	   change,	   while	   providing	   flexibility	   in	   how	   it	   is	   interpreted	   by	   the	  diverse	  and	  distributed	  actors	  whose	  expectations	  it	  aligns.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  in	   the	   future	   envisaged	   by	   the	   two	   degrees	   target,	   “complex	   and	   potentially	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not	   well	   understood	   processes	   come	   to	   appear	   simple,	   imaginable	   and	  ‘manageable’”	   (Jordan,	   Mitterhofer,	   and	   Jørgensen	   2016,	   p.1).	   On	   the	   other	  hand,	  there	  is	  flexibility	  to	  its	  interpretation	  because	  it	  does	  not	  prescribe	  how	  it	   is	   to	   be	   achieved.	   Instead,	   it	   embeds	   the	   scientific,	   economic	   and	   political	  concerns	   at	   the	   centre	   of	   climate	   debates	   into	   a	   target	   that	   can	   inform	   the	  planning	   and	   strategizing	   of	   diverse	   and	   distributed	   actors	   who	   come	   to	  imagine	  the	  future	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  two	  degrees	  target.	  Indeed	  it	  is	  on	  this	  point	  that	   Chapter	   4	   contrasts	   its	   analysis	   with	   prior	   studies	   of	   the	   two	   degrees	  target	  that	  adopt	  a	  ‘boundary	  objects’	  framing	  (Randalls	  2010;	  Cointe,	  Ravon,	  and	   Guérin	   2011).	   Star	   and	   Griesemer	   define	   boundary	   objects	   as	   enabling	  communication	   and	   cooperation	   across	   different	   domains	   by	   being	   “weakly	  structured	   in	  common	  use,	  and	  become	  strongly	  structured	   in	   local	  site	  use”	  (Star	  and	  Griesemer	  1989,	  p.393).	  That	  is,	  when	  considered	  at	  a	  general	  level	  rather	   than	   their	  use	   in	  a	  specific	  context,	  boundary	  objects	  do	  not	  set	  out	  a	  particular	   imperative	   or	   vision	   of	   what	   is	   to	   be	   achieved;	   they	   remain	  ambiguous.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  boundary	  objects	  prescribe	  how	  they	  are	  to	  be	  used	   in	   specific	   situations.	   Star	   and	  Griesemer	   emphasise	   that	   this	   creates	   a	  common	   structure	   across	  multiple	   sites	   for	   the	   gathering	   of	   information.	   In	  turn,	  this	  enables	  different	  worlds	  to	  operate	  autonomously	  while	  structuring	  the	   production	   and	   circulation	   of	   information	   to	   enable	   communication	  between	   them	   (Ibid.,	   p.404).	   To	   reiterate,	   boundary	   objects	   facilitate	  cooperation	   by	   prescribing	   how	   they	   are	   to	   be	   used	   in	   order	   to	   structure	  communication.	   However	   they	   neither	   envisage	   a	   particular	   future	   nor	  reorient	   actors’	   expectations	   and	  objectives	   towards	   that	   vision.	   In	   contrast,	  the	   two	  degrees	   target	   establishes	   an	   apparently	   simple	  vision	   for	   efforts	   to	  address	   climate	   change,	   while	   not	   prescribing	   how	   that	   vision	   is	   to	   be	  achieved.	   Furthermore,	   it	   envisions	   a	   future	   that	   addresses	   the	   scientific,	  economic	   and	   political	   concerns	   at	   the	   centre	   of	   the	   climate	   debate.	   Yet	   its	  flexibility	   in	  how	   it	   is	   to	   be	   achieved	  provides	   autonomy	  across	  diverse	   and	  distributed	   actors	   to	   decide	   how	   to	   bring	   their	   particular	   activities	   into	  alignment	  with	  that	  vision.	  	  
SECTORAL-­‐IMPLICATIONS	  OF	  THE	  TWO	  DEGREES	  TARGET	  	   While	  Chapter	  4	  argues	  that	   the	  two	  degrees	  target	  rendered	  climate	  change	   into	   a	   ‘manageable’	   form	   (Jørgensen,	   Jordan,	   and	   Mitterhofer	   2012,	  p.112),	   it	  also	  recognises	  that	  the	  envisaged	  future	  was	  a	  highly	  abstract	  and	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simplified	  global	  goal.	  Chapter	  5	  analyses	   the	  carbon	  budget	  –	   the	  maximum	  level	  of	  cumulative	  emissions	  to	  remain	  within	  a	  two	  degrees	  scenario	  –	  as	  the	  ‘bridge’	   between	   the	   global	   representation	   of	   climate	   change	   as	   the	   two	  degrees	  target	  and	  the	  implications	  of	  that	  target	  for	  the	  financial	  sector	  as	  a	  whole.	   Indeed,	   Morgan	   and	   Morrison’s	   	   (1999)	   notion	   of	   mediating	  instruments	   focuses	   on	  models	   that	   bridge	   between	   theory	   and	   data.	   These	  ‘mediating	   models’	   simultaneously	   embody	   the	   higher-­‐level	   structure	   of	   a	  theory	   and	   produce	   concrete-­‐level	   data	   through	   simulations	   (Morgan	   and	  Morrison	   1999,	   p.31).	   In	   terms	   of	   the	   carbon	   budget,	   it	   forms	   a	   bridge	  between	   the	   “abstract	   and	   idealised”	   (Ibid.,	   p.30)	   two	   degrees	   target	   and	   a	  “level	  of	  concrete	  detail”	  (Ibid.)	  such	  as	  the	  carbon	  emissions	  potential	  of	  fossil	  fuel	   reserves.	  Yet	   this	   is	  unlike	   the	   industry	   roadmaps	  studied	  by	  Miller	  and	  O’Leary,	   which	   codified	   Moore’s	   Law	   into	   “key,	   generic	   aspects	   of	   product	  development”	   such	   as	   “to	   at	   least	   double	   product	   functionality	   every	   three	  years”	   and	   “seek	   manufacturing	   cost	   reductions	   per	   three	   year	   period	   of	  roughly	   65%	   (Miller	   and	   O’Leary	   2007,	   p.719).	   Rather,	   the	   carbon	   budget	  provided	  a	  more	   concrete	   rendering	  of	   the	   two	  degrees	   target	   that	   could	  be	  enrolled	  in	  arguments	  that	  tailored	  the	  implications	  of	  a	  two	  degrees	  scenario	  to	  the	  risk	  concerns	  of	  financial	  organisations	  and	  the	  capital	  market	  stability	  concerns	  of	  financial	  regulators.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  carbon	  budget	  refines	  the	  two	   degrees	   target	   from	   a	   global	   vision	   for	   tackling	   climate	   change	   into	   a	  vision	   of	   the	   vulnerability	   of	   the	   financial	   sector	   to	   a	   carbon-­‐constrained	  future.	  	   The	  two	  degrees	  target	  further	  enabled	  the	  construction	  of	  roadmaps	  for	  industrial	  transitions	  under	  different	  warming	  scenarios.	  These	  roadmaps	  set	  out	  the	  shifting	  investment	  landscape	  that	  facilitates	  a	  particular	  emissions	  trajectory;	   detailing	   the	   financing	   needs	   of	   regions,	   technologies	   and	   asset	  type	   to	   support	   a	   low-­‐carbon	   transition.	   In	   this	   regard,	   and	  borrowing	   from	  Jørgensen	  et	  al.,	  the	  roadmaps	  “convey	  an	  ideal	  picture	  of	  a	  collaboration	  […]	  and	   focus	   attention	   on	   particular	   areas	   of	   coordination”	   (Jørgensen,	   Jordan,	  and	   Mitterhofer	   2012,	   p.112).	   Yet,	   as	   Chapter	   6	   highlights,	   these	   roadmaps	  were	   in	   development	   during	   the	   standard-­‐setting	   project,	   with	   the	   most	  developed	   roadmap	   being	   for	   the	   energy	   sector.	   The	   point,	   however,	   is	   that	  the	  roadmaps	  refined	  the	  carbon	  budget	  into	  the	  adjustments	  needed	  to	  align	  investment	  and	  lending	  activities	  with	  achieving	  the	  two	  degrees	  target.	  That	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is	  not	  to	  say	  it	  prescribes	  the	  necessary	  methods	  and	  responsibilities.	  Rather	  it	  envisages	  a	  sectoral-­‐alignment	  with	  the	  two	  degrees	  target.	  This	  is	  consistent	  with	   Revellino	   and	   Mouritsen’s	   study	   of	   the	   management	   of	   innovation	  surrounding	  the	   Italian	  automated	  toll	  collection	  device,	  Telepass,	  where	  the	  authors	   argue	   “the	   technologies	   of	   managing	   […]	   never	   told	   and	   specified	  what	   the	   innovation’s	   technology	  was	   to	   be	   but	   they	   stipulated	   the	   types	   of	  alignments	   that	   had	   to	   be	   managed	   to	   make	   the	   innovation	   productive”	  (Revellino	  and	  Mouritsen	  2009,	  p.356).	  Indeed,	  the	  energy	  sector	  investment	  roadmap	   detailed	   the	   timings	   and	   scales	   of	   shifts	   for	   a	   low-­‐carbon	   finance	  transition,	  setting	  out	  a	  vision	  for	  alignment	  with	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	  while	  not	  prescribing	  necessary	  actions.	  
A	  TWO	  DEGREES	  FRAMING	  OF	  INVESTMENT	  AND	  LENDING	  ACTIVITIES	  	  	   It	   is	   in	   the	   refinement	   of	   the	   carbon	   budget	   and	   roadmaps	   through	  carbon	  accounting	   tools	   that	   the	   two	  degrees	   target	   came	   to	   reconfigure	   the	  climate	  change	  framing	  of	  portfolio-­‐level	  activity.	  That	  is,	  the	  reconfiguration	  of	   the	   standard-­‐setting	   project	   focussed	   it	   on	   creating	   carbon	   accounting	  practices	   to	   render	   visible	   deviations	   from	   a	   portfolio	   allocation	   consistent	  with	  the	  two	  degrees	  target.	  In	  Miller	  and	  O’Leary’s	  study,	  cost-­‐of-­‐ownership	  calculations	   provided	   a	   target	   for	   bringing	   the	   development	   of	   individual	  technologies	   in	   line	   with	   the	   envisaged	   markets	   for	   semiconductors.	   These	  calculations	  were	  to	  “affirm	  the	  viability	  of	  an	  extreme-­‐ultraviolet	  lithography,	  but	   also	   to	   shape	   expectations	   regarding	   cost	   and	   price	   in	   markets	   for	   the	  various	  components	  comprising	  the	  system”	  (Miller	  and	  O’Leary	  2007,	  p.728).	  Seen	   in	   this	   light,	   the	   new	   carbon	   accounting	   tools	   provided	   the	   calculative	  infrastructure	  for	  evaluating	  ‘climate	  performance’	  at	  the	  organisational-­‐	  and	  portfolio-­‐level	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   two	   degrees	   target.	   They	   did	   not	   assign	  responsibility	   for	   specific	   adjustments;	   rather,	   they	   have	   the	   potential	   to	  create	  a	  portfolio-­‐level	  visibility	  based	  on	  which	  financial	  organisations	  can	  be	  held	  accountable	  for	  their	  influence	  on	  climate	  change.	  	  Yet	  Chapter	  6	  also	  demonstrates	  that	  creating	  accounting	  practices	  to	  render	   alignment	   with	   an	   abstract	   target	   visible	   at	   the	   level	   of	   a	   single	  portfolio	   is	   wrought	   with	   difficulty.	   Indeed	   during	   the	   multi-­‐stakeholder	  standard-­‐setting	  process	  discussions	  centred	  on	  identifying	  the	  concerns	  to	  be	  addressed	  by	  the	  new	  carbon	  accounting	  tools.	  Forming	  the	  linkages	  between	  the	  carbon	  accounting	  practices,	  the	  carbon	  budget	  and	  the	  finance	  roadmaps	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entailed	  “various	  detours	  and	  experiments”	  before	  the	  project	  identified	  ways	  to	  connect	  to	  multiple	  concerns	  that	  “could	  finally	  stabilise	  its	  connections	  –	  at	  least	  for	  a	  while”	  (Mennicken	  2008,	  p.409).	  To	  reiterate,	  the	  interconnections	  between	   the	   mediating	   instruments	   studied	   in	   this	   thesis	   arose	   through	  discussions	  over	   the	  vision	  of	   the	   future	   that	  was	   to	  be	  embedded	   in	  carbon	  accounting	  practices,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  indicators	  that	  could	  render	  it	  visible.	  
CO-­‐PRODUCTION	  AND	  COORDINATING	  ACTION	  ACROSS	  MULTIPLE	  ENTITIES	  By	  tracing	  the	  interconnecting	  of	  four	  mediating	  instruments	  that	  link	  an	  envisaged	  future	  for	  addressing	  climate	  change	  to	  investment	  and	  lending	  decisions,	   this	   thesis	   examines	   efforts	   to	   orient	   the	   activities	   of	   multiple	  entities	   towards	   a	   common	   objective	   on	   climate	   change,	   as	   called	   for	   by	  Bebbington	   and	   Larrinaga	   (2014b,	   p.401).	   This	   thesis	   highlights	   how	   the	  notion	  of	  mediating	  instruments	  (Miller	  and	  O’Leary	  2007)	  may	  be	  applied	  as	  an	  analytical	  lens	  for	  such	  studies	  (cf.	  Unerman	  and	  Chapman	  2014;	  O’Dwyer	  and	   Unerman	   2016).	   As	   detailed	   earlier	   in	   this	   section,	   the	   mediating	  instruments	   framework	   places	   emphasis	   on	   the	   rendering	   of	   sustainable	  development	  issues	  into	  apparently	  simple	  and	  manageable	  visions	  of	  what	  is	  to	  be	  achieved,	  while	  allowing	  flexibility	   in	  how	  actors	  develop	  strategies	  for	  achieving	   that	   vision.	   Central	   to	   such	   an	   application	   of	   the	   mediating	  instruments	   framework	   are	   the	   processes	   of	   “assembling	   and	   adjusting	  diverse	  components	  and	  practices	  so	  that	  they	  might	  operate	  as	  a	  more	  or	  less	  stable	   and	   coherent	   working	   ensemble”	   (Miller	   and	   O’Leary	   2007,	   p.708).	  However,	   as	   Pollock	   and	   D’Adderio	   (2012)	   argue,	   applications	   of	   the	  framework	  “have	  only	  begun	  to	  specify	  the	  process	  by	  which	  we	  might	  study	  and	   theorise	   interactions	   between	   material	   objects	   and	   wider	   calculative	  conceptions”	  (Pollock	  and	  D’Adderio	  2012,	  p.567).	  The	  interactions	  that	  Pollock	  and	  D’Adderio	  refer	  to	  are	  central	  to	  the	  processes	   of	   ‘co-­‐production’	   through	   which	   “a	   body	   of	   types	   of	   theory	   and	  types	   of	   apparatus	   and	   types	   of	   analysis	   that	   are	  mutually	   adjusted	   to	   each	  other”	   (Hacking	   1992,	   p.30).	  Writing	   on	   the	  maturation	   and	   stability	   of	   the	  laboratory	  sciences,	  Hacking	  argues	  "[o]ur	  preserved	   theories	  and	   the	  world	  fit	  so	  snugly	  less	  because	  we	  have	  found	  out	  how	  the	  world	  is	  than	  because	  we	  have	   tailored	   each	   to	   the	   other"	   (Ibid.,	   p.31).	   Yet	   Pollock	   and	   D’Adderio’s	  (2012)	  concern	   is	   that	  applications	  of	   the	  mediating	   instruments	   framework	  have	   shed	   little	   light	   on	   the	   processes	   of	   co-­‐production	   through	   which	   a	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“working	   ensemble”	  may	  become	   “more	  or	   less	   stable	   and	   coherent”	   (Miller	  and	   O’Leary	   2007,	   p.708).	   This	   thesis	   offers	   a	   partial	   response	   to	   these	  concerns,	   one	   that	   focuses	   on	   the	   work	   of	   constructing	   and	   mobilising	  instruments	   to	   simultaneously	   embed	   a	   range	   of	   potentially	   conflicting	  concerns	  and	  the	   local	  specifics	  with	  which	  they	   link.	  To	  do	  so	   it	   frames	  this	  work	   as	   that	   of	   ‘experimentation’,	   gradually	   exploring	   the	   interactions	  between	   ideas	   and	   instruments	   and	   adjusting	   each	   to	   the	   other	   (Gooding	  1992,	   pp.65–66).	   Hacking	   refers	   to	   ‘ideas’	   as	   the	   “theories,	   questions,	  hypotheses,	  [and]	  intellectual	  models	  of	  apparatus”	  (Hacking	  1992,	  p.32)	  that	  are	  embedded	  in	  or	  created	  by	  “instruments	  we	  have	  engineered”	  (Ibid.,	  p.32).	  Miller	  and	  O’Leary	  equate	  this	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  ‘programmes’	  (Miller	  and	  Rose	  1990;	   Rose	   and	  Miller	   1992),	   the	   realm	   of	  which	   “was	   extensive,	   and	   could	  include	  dreams	  and	  schemes	  for	  enhancing	  output,	  analysing	  and	  encouraging	  modes	   of	   consumption,	   envisaging	   and	   designing	   audit,	   or	   inventing	   new	  forms	  of	  personal	  transport”	  (Miller	  and	  O’Leary	  2007,	  707–708).	  By	  drawing	  on	   Gooding	   (1992),	   this	   thesis	   foregrounds	   processes	   of	   tinkering	   and	  experimenting	  with	   instruments	  and	   ideas	   in	   its	  discussion	  of	   co-­‐production	  (Chapter	   7).	   Furthermore,	   this	   tinkering	   and	   experimenting	   configures	  instruments	   to	   local	   specifics	   as	   it	   draws	   on	   the	   diverse	   and	   distributed	  expertise	   of	   actors	   in	   linking	   the	   ‘working	   ensemble’	   to	   the	   activities	   of	  multiple	  entities.	  
2.4.	  CONCLUDING	  REMARKS	  Carbon	   accounting	   has	   been	   argued	   to	   provide	   the	   practices	   that	  “enable	  the	  diverse	  forms	  of	  carbon	  governance”	  (Larrinaga	  2014,	  p.2),	  and	  its	  development	   "offers	   the	   opportunity	   to	   investigate	   the	   dynamics	   of	  accounting	  systems	  of	  governance	  as	  they	  emerge"	  (Bebbington	  and	  Larrinaga	  2014a,	   p.207).	   Indeed,	   for	   its	   role	   in	   enabling	   the	   measurement	   and	  monitoring	  of	  national-­‐level	  emissions	  and	  mitigation	  efforts,	  the	  accuracy	  of	  carbon	  accounting	  has	  been	  a	  core	   line	  of	   inquiry	   in	  studies	  of	  national-­‐level	  carbon	   accounting	   (see	   La	   Motta	   et	   al.	   2005;	   Stechemesser	   and	   Guenther	  2012).	   However	   such	   studies	   appear	   to	   be	   tailored	   to	   the	   primacy	   of	   GHG	  emissions	   targets	   in	   the	   mode	   of	   climate	   governance	   under	   the	   Kyoto	  Protocol,	  while	  providing	  little	  insight	  into	  the	  challenges	  that	  the	  flexibility	  of	  the	  post-­‐Copenhagen	  climate	  regime	  enshrined	  in	  the	  Paris	  Agreement	  poses	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for	   national-­‐level	   carbon	   accounting.	   Indeed,	   Chapter	   4	   highlights	   these	  challenges	  and	  calls	  for	  further	  research	  into	  the	  hybridising	  (Kurunmäki	  and	  Miller	   2011)	   of	   national-­‐level	   carbon	   accounting	   with	   other	   forms	   of	  measurement	  expertise.	  However	  a	  key	  focal	  point	  in	  studying	  the	  role	  of	  carbon	  accounting	  in	  enabling	   different	   modes	   of	   governance	   has	   been	   the	   carbon	   markets	   that	  “translate”	  the	  programme	  of	  GHG	  mitigation	  “to	  the	  entity	  level”	  (Bebbington	  and	   Larrinaga	   2014b,	   p.401).	   Yet	   the	   sustainable	   finance	   literature	  demonstrates	  that	  GHG	  emissions	  information	  appears	  to	  have	  little	  relevance	  to	   investors	   (Kolk,	   Levy,	   and	   Pinkse	   2008)	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   a	   more	  widespread	  carbon	  price.	  Rather,	  it	  has	  been	  argued	  that	  it	  is	  the	  perception	  of	  carbon	  constraints,	  and	   the	  regulatory	  and	  competitive	  risks	   this	  raises,	   that	  leads	   investors	   to	  require	   further	   information	  on	  climate	  change	   (Busch	  and	  Hoffmann	   2007;	   Bebbington	   and	   Larrinaga-­‐González	   2008,	   p.707).	   While	  these	   studies	  highlight	   the	   risks	   that	  would	   stem	   from	  a	   carbon-­‐constrained	  future,	  little	  insight	  is	  offered	  into	  how	  financial	  organisations	  would	  come	  to	  perceive	   such	   a	   future	   beyond	   the	   introduction	   of	   carbon	   pricing	   or	   carbon	  markets.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	   dynamic	   between	   NGOs	   and	   financial	  organisations	  has	  been	   shown	   to	  drive	   the	  adoption	  of	   and	  compliance	  with	  mechanisms	  for	  social	  and	  environmental	  risk	  assessments	  on	  project	  finance	  activities	   (O’Sullivan	   and	   O’Dwyer	   2009;	   O’Sullivan	   and	   O’Dwyer	   2015).	   Yet	  O’Sullivan	   and	   O’Dwyer	   call	   for	   further	   studies	   of	   NGO	   movements	   around	  investment	  and	   lending	  activities	  specifically	  on	   the	   issues	  of	  climate	  change	  and	  human	  rights	  (O’Sullivan	  and	  O’Dwyer	  2015,	  p.51),	  and	  note	  that	  project	  finance	  “represented	  less	  than	  5	  per	  cent	  of	  commercial	  bank	  activities”	  (Ibid.,	  p.43).	  	   This	   thesis	   responds	   to	   O’Sullivan	   and	   O’Dwyer’s	   call	   by	   studying	   a	  particular	  set	  of	  interconnected	  instruments	  through	  which	  climate	  change	  is	  becoming	   linked	   to	   investment	   and	   lending	   activities	   across	   the	   financial	  sector.	   Specifically,	   by	   studying	   the	   mobilisation	   of	   the	   carbon	   budget	   as	   a	  more	  concrete	  representation	  of	  the	  two	  degrees	  target,	  Chapter	  5	  attends	  to	  the	  work	  of	  establishing	  a	  common	  vision	  of	  carbon	  constrained	  future	  and	  its	  implications	   for	   the	   financial	   sector.	   Furthermore,	   Chapter	   6	   studies	   the	  reconfiguration	   of	   a	   carbon	   accounting	   standard	   setting	   project	   to	   embed	  concerns	   stemming	   from	   the	   two	   degrees	   target	   as	   well	   as	   developing	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indicators	   to	   inform	   assessments	   of	   climate	   risk.	   It	   adopts	   a	   mediating	  instruments	   framework	   (Miller	   and	   O’Leary	   2007)	   to	   frame	   the	   analysis	   of	  four	   instruments	   –	   the	   two	   degrees	   target	   (Chapter	   4),	   the	   carbon	   budget	  (Chapter	   5),	   investment	   roadmaps	   and	   an	   emergent	   carbon	   accounting	  standard	   (Chapter	   6).	   This	   analysis	   enables	   the	   thesis	   to	   respond	   to	  Bebbington	  and	  Larrinaga’s	  call	   for	  studying	  sustainable	  development	   issues	  through	   the	   shifting	   conditions	   in	  which	  organisations	  operate	  and	  how	   this	  influences	   action	   across	  multiple	   entities	   (Bebbington	   and	   Larrinaga	   2014b,	  p.401).	   In	  particular,	   this	   thesis	  maps	   the	   interconnections	  between	   the	   four	  instruments	  to	  analyse	  how	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	  provides	  a	  basis	  for	  efforts	  to	   orient	   the	   activities	   of	   multiple	   entities	   towards	   a	   common	   objective.	   In	  doing	   so,	   this	   thesis	   also	   provides	   a	   partial	   response	   to	   Pollock	   and	  D’Adderio’s	   (2012,	   p.567)	   call	   for	   further	   insight	   into	   how	   processes	   of	   co-­‐production	  may	  be	  studied	  in	  applying	  the	  mediating	  instruments	  framework	  (Chapter	  7).	  In	  the	  next	  chapter,	  Chapter	  3,	  this	  thesis	  directs	  its	  attention	  to	  the	  research	  strategy	  underpinning	  the	  empirical	  work	  on	  which	  the	  study	  of	  these	  four	  instruments	  is	  based.	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CHAPTER	  3	  –	  STUDYING	  A	  
CALCULABLE	  VISION:	  COMBINING	  
OBSERVATIONS,	  INTERVIEWS	  AND	  
DOCUMENTS	  
3.0.	  INTRODUCTION	  The	  empirical	  core	  of	  this	  thesis	  is	  a	  participant	  observation	  of	  a	  UNEP	  FI	  and	  GHG	  Protocol	  standard-­‐setting	  project,	  initially	  known	  as	  the	  Financed	  Emissions	  Initiative.	  This	  entailed	  observation	  of	  over	  120	  hours	  of	  meetings,	  workshops	   and	   conferences	   between	   January	   2014	   and	   February	   2016,15	  ranging	   from	   ‘Technical	  Working	   Group’	   webinars	   to	   in-­‐person	  meetings	   in	  Milan,	  Washington	   D.C.	   and	   Paris,	   as	  well	   as	  workshops	   and	   conferences	   in	  London,	  New	  York	  and	  Paris.	  In	  addition,	  eighteen	  semi-­‐structured	  interviews	  were	  conducted	  and	  designed	  to	  probe	  deeper	  into	  insights	  developed	  during	  the	  participant	  observation.	  Similarly,	  to	  chart	  the	  historical	  emergence	  of	  the	  two	   degrees	   target	   over	   60	   reports	   and	   proceedings	   –	   from	   conferences,	  research	   centres,	   international	   bodies,	   NGOs	   and	   governments	   –	   as	   well	   as	  more	   than	   55	   academic	   texts	   –	   from	   climatologists	   and	   meteorologists	   to	  economists	   and	   lawyers	   –	   were	   analysed	   to	   document	   the	   controversies	  surrounding	  its	  emergence	  since	  the	  mid-­‐20th	  century.	  The	   combination	   of	   participant	   observation,	   interview	   and	  documentary	  materials	  enabled	  the	  thesis	   to	  explore	  how	  carbon	  accounting	  tools	  are	  configured	  by	  the	  conditions	  surrounding	  their	  emergence,	  as	  well	  as	  how	  they	  embed	  ideas	  and	  concerns	  from	  those	  conditions	  to	  enact	  particular	  ideas	  of	  climate	  governance.	  In	  this	  regard	  the	  thesis	  takes	  carbon	  accounting	  to	   be	   constructed	   by	   judgments	   on	   the	   issues	   that	   should	   be	  measured	   and	  reported,	  while	  also	  creating	   the	   information	   through	  which	  climate	   impacts	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  While	  February	  2016	  marked	  the	  publication	  of	  the	  third	  main	  document	  produced	  through	   the	   standard-­‐setting	   project,	   UNEP	   FI	   and	   GHG	   Protocol	   are	   currently	  exploring	  additional	  work	  that	  could	  be	  conducted	  through	  the	  project.	  In	  that	  regard,	  engagement	   with	   the	   project	   as	   a	   participant	   observer	   will	   continue,	   however	   this	  thesis	   is	   based	   on	   the	   observations	   conducted	   between	   January	   2014	   and	   February	  2016.	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across	   entities	   are	   rendered	   visible	   (cf.	   Hines	   1988).	   That	   is,	   “accounting	  information	   is	   not	   only	   socially	   constructed,	   it	   is	   also	   socially	   constructing”	  (Broadbent	   and	   Unerman	   2011,	   p.8).	   Carbon	   accounting	   translates	   the	  subjective	  matters	  of	  what	  is	  to	  be	  measured	  and	  the	  rules	  that	  prescribe	  how	  to	   conduct	   those	   measurements	   into	   numbers	   that	   appear	   to	   present	   an	  objective	  view	  of	   a	  nation,	   organisation,	  project	   or	   investment	  portfolio	   as	   a	  carbon	   entity.	   Their	   apparent	   objectivity	   stems	   from	   an	   “intersubjective	  consensus”	   (Ibid.,	   p.9)	   of	   their	   agreed	   meaning	   as	   interpretive	   schemes	  through	  which	  actors	  come	  to	  understand	  their	  own	  actions	  as	  well	  as	  those	  of	  others	   (Chua	   1986,	   pp.613–4).	   Taking	   carbon	   accounting	   as	   a	   “subjectively	  created,	   emergent	   social	   reality”	   the	   methods	   employed	   in	   this	   thesis	  investigate	   the	   “deeply-­‐embedded	   rules	   that	   structure	   the	   social	  world”	   and	  how	   “these	   typifications	   arise,	   and	   how	   [they	   are]	   sustained	   and	   modified”	  (Ibid.	   p.614).	   In	   other	  words,	   the	   thesis	   investigates	   the	   ideas	   and	   concerns	  that	   came	   to	   ‘order’	   the	   standardisation	   project	   and	   traces	   their	   emergence	  and	   evolution.	   Based	   on	   this	   methodology,	   this	   chapter	   details	   the	   design,	  challenges	   and	   limits	   of	   combining	   participant	   observation,	   semi-­‐structured	  interviews	  and	  documentary	  analysis	  into	  a	  research	  strategy.	  
3.1.	  THREE	  METHODS	  OF	  COLLECTION16	  
3.1.1.	   BEING	   A	   PARTICIPANT	   OBSERVER	   OF	   THE	   FINANCED	   EMISSIONS	  
INITIATIVE	  Participant	  observation	  as	  an	  ethnographic	  method	  has	  become	  more	  commonplace	   in	   accounting	   scholarship	   since	   early	   recognition	   and	  application	   of	   the	   method	   (Tomkins	   and	   Groves	   1983;	   Berry	   et	   al.	   1985;	  Preston	   1986)	   and	   Power’s	   call	   for	   critical	   ethnographic	   studies	   as	   “a	  more	  radical	  break	  with	   the	  scientific	  paradigm	  of	  assessment	   towards	  one	   that	   is	  more	   literary	   in	   orientation”	   (Power	   1991,	   p.338).	   It	   has	   been	   employed	   to	  investigate	   the	   creation	   and	  maintenance	  of	   a	   shared	   reality	  between	  actors	  through	  accounting	  practices,	  ranging	  from	  social	  accounting	  (Dey	  2007)	  and	  fraud	   risk	   (Power	   2013)	   to	   shop	   floor	   groups	   in	   a	   steel	   mill	   (Ahrens	   and	  Mollona	   2007)	   and	   the	   translation	   of	   international	   auditing	   standards	   at	   a	  large	  post-­‐Soviet	  audit	  firm	  (Mennicken	  2008).	  	  As	  Ahrens	  and	  Mollona	  write,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  See	  Appendix	  3A	  for	  a	  timeline	  presenting	  an	  overview	  of	  data	  collection	  activities.	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participant	   observation	   immerses	   researchers	   within	   an	   organisation,	  enabling	  them	  to	  study	  “taken-­‐for-­‐granted	  aspects	  of	  organisational	  practices	  […]	   and	   to	   exploit	   the	   revealing	   tensions	   between	   what	   organisational	  members	  say	  and	  do”	  (Ahrens	  and	  Mollona	  2007,	  p.310).	   It	  should	  be	  noted,	  however,	  that	  the	  participant	  observation	  at	  the	  core	  of	  this	  thesis	  should	  not	  be	   considered	   as	   an	   ethnographic	   study	   of	   standardisation	   in	   carbon	  accounting.	  Such	  a	  study	  would	  have	  focussed	  on	  providing	  a	  detailed	  and	  in-­‐depth	  account	  of	   the	   “multiplicity	  of	   complex	   conceptual	   structures”	   (Geertz	  1973,	   p.10)	   to	   produce	   a	   “think	   description”	   (Ibid.,	   pp.6-­‐7)	   of	   a	   particular	  action,	  process	  or	  setting.	  Rather,	  the	  participant	  observation	  sought	  to	  reveal	  potential	   conflicts	   between	   ideas	   guiding	   the	   work	   of	   creating	   a	   carbon	  accounting	   standard	   (cf.	  Chua	   1986,	   p.614).	   This	  was	   to	   focus	   the	   thesis	   on	  investigating	  the	  influences	  beyond	  the	  standard-­‐setting	  project	  that	  came	  to	  configure	   the	   carbon	   accounting	   standard,	   by	   tracing	   the	   conflicting	   ideas	  through	  semi-­‐structured	  interviews	  and	  documentary	  analysis.	  	  In	   November	   2013	   at	   the	   UNEP	   FI	   Global	   Roundtable,	   Financing	   the	  
Future	  We	  Want,	   a	   conversation	  with	   the	   President	   of	   the	  World	   Resources	  Institute,	   Dr.	   Andrew	   Steer,	   led	   to	   access	   being	   secured	   for	   a	   participant	  observation	   of	   the	   Financed	   Emissions	   Initiative	   as	   a	  member	   of	   one	   of	   the	  five	   Technical	   Working	   Groups	   (TWGs).	   The	   participant	   observation	   was	  conducted	  as	  a	  member	  of	  TWG	  4,	  which	  was	   tasked	  with	  discussing	   ‘cross-­‐cutting	  issues’	  that	  are	  relevant	  to	  the	  work	  of	  several	  TWGs.	  Covering	  a	  range	  of	   topics	   –	   accounting	   principles,	   boundary	   setting	   rules,	   target	   setting,	  performance	   metrics,	   and,	   among	   others,	   assurance	   –	   TWG	   4	   provided	   an	  ideal	   research	   site	   for	   investigating	   the	   issues	   that	   would	   underpin	   the	  standard.	  In	  contrast,	  TWGs	  1,	  2	  and	  3	  worked	  on	  guidance	  for	  specific	  types	  of	  finance:	  company	  and	  project	  finance	  guidance	  were	  considered	  by	  TWG	  1,	  government	   finance	  by	  TWG	  2,	   and	   consumer	   finance	  by	  TWG	  3.	  TWG	  5,	  on	  the	   other	   hand,	   worked	   on	   a	   ‘sister’	   guidance	   document	   dealing	   with	  measuring	  and	  understanding	  carbon	  asset	  risk,	  17	  the	  risk	  investors	  face	  as	  a	  result	   of	   new	   regulations,	   changing	   customer	   preferences,	   threats	   to	  reputation,	  and	  technological	  development.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  The	  World	  Resources	  Institute	  define	  carbon	  asset	  risk	  as	  a	  “type	  of	  financial	  risk	  is	  driven	   by	   non-­‐physical	   factors	   during	   the	   transition	   to	   the	   low-­‐carbon	   economy:	  changing	   public	   policy	   and	   private	   sector	   regulation,	   rapidly	   evolving	   technologies,	  unpredictable	  economic	  markets,	  and	  shifting	  public	  opinion”	  (WRI	  2015).	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Fieldwork	  was	  conducted	  as	  a	  “moderate	  participant”	  (Spradley	  1980,	  p.60),	   seeking	   to	   “maintain	   a	   balance	   between	   being	   an	   insider	   and	   an	  outsider,	   between	   participation	   and	   observation”.	   Initially	   the	   engagement	  focussed	   on	   observing	   the	   roles	   of	   individuals	   during	   webinars:	   the	  Secretariat	  leading	  and	  structuring	  the	  virtual	  discussion	  by	  presenting	  up	  to	  20	  PowerPoint	  slides	  over	  the	  course	  of	  90	  minutes,	  with	  certain	  participants	  interjecting	   frequently,	   others	   offering	  minor	   technical	   comments	   and	  many	  remaining	  silent	  throughout	  the	  webinar.	  As	  the	  TWG	  process	  progressed,	  the	  participant	  observation	   also	   extended	   to	   ‘subgroup’	  meetings,	   conducted	  via	  webinar,	  where	  numerous	  aspects	  of	  the	  standard	  –	  from	  boundary	  setting	  to	  performance	   metrics	   –	   were	   discussed	   and	   participants	   assisted	   in	   and	  commented	  on	  the	  drafting	  of	  those	  standards.18	  	  Researcher	  participation	  in	  TWG	  discussions	  balanced	  the	  expectation	  on	   all	   subgroup	   members	   to	   engage	   and	   contribute	   with	   caution	   to	   avoid	  influencing	  the	  purpose	  and	  content	  of	   the	  documents	  being	  drafted.	   Indeed,	  virtual	   attendance	   of	   subgroup	   meetings	   ranged	   from	   four	   to	   fifteen	  individuals	   and	  presenters	  would	  often	   speak	   to	  each	   individual	  by	  name	   to	  ask	   if	   there	  were	  any	  questions.	   In	   this	   regard	  maintaining	  an	  observer-­‐only	  role	  would	  have	  breached	  the	  ‘norms’	  of	  the	  meeting	  and	  hampered	  efforts	  to	  “gain	  some	  degree	  of	  acceptance	  from	  [other	  participants]”	  (Jorgensen	  1989,	  p.73).	   As	   such,	   participation	   was	   restricted	   to	   clarification	   questions	  regarding,	   for	   example,	   what	   the	   ‘roadtesting	   phase’	   of	   the	   Financed	  Emissions	   Initiative	   entailed	   (which	   had	   been	   remarked	   on	   without	  explanation	   during	   a	   subgroup	   meeting	   on	   boundary	   setting).	   While	   this	  approach	  was	   adopted	   to	   limit	   the	   influence	   of	   the	   research	   engagement	   on	  the	   project,	   it	   also	   restricted	   the	   roles	   that	   could	   be	   experienced	   first	   hand,	  such	   as	   leading	   a	   subgroup	   or	   presenting	   the	   work	   of	   a	   subgroup	   during	   a	  TWG	  4	  webinar	  or	  in-­‐person	  meeting.	  However	  informal	  conversations	  during	  in-­‐person	  meetings	  with	   a	   variety	   of	   participants	   provided	   opportunities	   to	  discuss	  their	  different	  views	  on	  such	  roles	  and	  the	  problems	  they	  faced.	  	  A	   similar	   limitation	   is	   with	   regards	   to	   the	   work	   of	   TWG	   5.	   While	  discussions	  in	  TWG	  4	  cut	  across	  the	  work	  of	  TWGs	  1,	  2	  and	  3	  and	  addressed	  central	   aspects	  of	   the	  Accounting	  work	   stream,	   it	   had	   little	  overlap	  with	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  See	   Appendix	   3B	   for	   details	   of	   meeting	   and	   conference	   observations	   as	   well	   as	  documentation	  from	  the	  project.	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TWG	  5	  work	  stream	  on	  Carbon	  Asset	  Risk.	  As	  such,	  observations	  of	  their	  work	  were	  limited	  to:	  their	  presentations	  during	  the	  Advisory	  Committee	  and	  TWG	  in-­‐person	  meetings;	  informal	  interactions	  with	  participants;	  as	  well	  as	  a	  draft	  document	   circulated	   in	   February	   2015	   to	   all	   TWG	   members	   for	   comment.	  While	   these	   events	   provided	   insights	   into	   stages	   of	   development	   for	   the	  ‘sister’	   guidance,	   it	   was	   not	   possible	   become	   immersed	   in	   the	   discussions	  underpinning	   the	   emergence	   of	   that	   document.	   However,	   as	   noted,	  participation	  in	  TWG	  4	  provided	  access	  to	  the	  discussions	  that	  cut	  across	  the	  carbon	   accounting	   component	   of	   the	   Financed	   Emissions	   Initiative.	   This	  ensured	  that	  such	  immersion	  was	  possible	  in	  the	  TWG	  relating	  most	  closely	  to	  the	   configuration	   of	   emergent	   carbon	   accounting	   practices,	   which	   was	   the	  primary	  focus	  for	  the	  research.	  However	   access	   was	   granted	   to	   the	   May	   2014	   Advisory	   Committee	  meeting,	   for	  which	  attendance	  was	  usually	  restricted	   to	  Advisory	  Committee	  members,	   the	  Secretariat	   and	   the	  head	  of	   each	  TWG.	   It	  was	  agreed	  with	   the	  Secretariat	  in	  advance	  of	  the	  meeting	  that	  access	  was	  only	  for	  an	  observation,	  and	  that	  participation	  in	  discussions	  during	  the	  meeting	  was	  prohibited.	  The	  Secretariat	  also	  requested	  that	   the	  purpose	  of	   the	  research	  should	  be	  briefly	  presented	   to	   attendees	   at	   the	   start	   of	   the	   two-­‐day	   meeting,	   after	   which	  permissions	   to	   record	   was	   sought	   and	   agreed	   on	   the	   grounds	   that	   quotes	  would	  only	  be	  attributed	  to	  a	  general	  category	  of	  attendee,	  such	  as	   ‘NGO	  and	  think	   tank	   community’	   or	   ‘Commercial	   bank	   community’.	   The	   Advisory	  Committee	  appeared	   familiar	  with	  meetings	  being	  observed	  under	   this	   form	  of	  anonymity,19	  and	  the	  heated	  and	  open	  exchanges	  from	  that	  meeting	  suggest	  limited	  ‘reactivity’	  among	  participants	  to	  the	  presence	  of	  an	  observer	  (Bryman	  1988,	   p.112;	   Saunders,	   Lewis,	   and	   Thornhill	   2009,	   p.195).	   Access	   to	   the	  meeting	  also	  provided	  an	  opportunity	  to	  observe	  tensions	  between	  Advisory	  Committee	   members,	   identifying	   contentious	   aspects	   of	   the	   project	   where	  different	  ideas	  came	  into	  conflict.	  It	  also	  allowed	  for	  an	  informal	  engagement	  with	   these	   individuals	   during	   breaks	   in	   the	   meeting	   and	   at	   the	   evening	  function	   on	   the	   first	   day.	   Furthermore,	   the	   researcher	   knew	   two	   Advisory	  Committee	  members	  from	  the	  UNEP	  FI	  Global	  Roundtable	  in	  November	  2013,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Indeed,	   the	  Secretariat	  remarked	  at	  both	  the	  Advisory	  Committee	  meeting	   in	  May	  2014	  and	  the	   in-­‐person	  TWG	  meeting	   in	   June	  2014	  that	  any	  comments	   they	  used	   in	  their	  meeting	  summaries	  or	  later	  presentations	  would	  only	  be	  attributed	  to	  a	  general	  category	  that	  the	  individual	  belonged	  to.	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whose	  introductions	  to	  other	  members	  assisted	  in	  ‘normalizing’	  the	  presence	  of	   a	   researcher	   in	   this	   private	   meeting	   (Jorgensen	   1989,	   pp.74–75).	   These	  informal	   interactions	   further	   assisted	   in	   clarifying	   and	   prompting	   reflection	  on	   particular	   discussions	   during	   the	   meeting,	   as	   well	   as	   serving	   as	   initial	  introduction	  to	  potential	  interviewees.	  	  A	   challenge	   throughout	   the	   participant	   observation,	   however,	   and	  especially	  during	  this	  Advisory	  Committee	  meeting,	  was	  to	  achieve	  a	   level	  of	  immersion	   as	   an	   insider,	  while	  maintaining	   the	  perspective	   of	   an	  outsider	   to	  enable	   independent	   analysis	   of	   the	   project.	   This	   challenge	  was	   addressed	   in	  two	  ways.	   First,	   the	   scheduling	   of	   field	   visits	   and	  webinars	   created	   ‘breaks’	  between	  observations,	  which	  were	  used	   to	   focus	  on	  developing	  an	  outsiders’	  perspective	   by	   reviewing	   fieldnotes	   and	   reflecting	   on	   potential	   alternative	  explanations	  and	  frameworks	  (cf.	  Dey	  2007,	  pp.431–432).	  Second,	  and	  aimed	  at	  fostering	  reflection	  while	  ‘in	  the	  field’,	  fieldnotes	  were	  kept	  as	  a	  ‘condensed	  account’	   during	   observations	   and	   time	   was	   scheduled	   after	   the	   meeting	   to	  develop	   this	   into	   an	   ‘expanded	   account’	   (Spradley	   1980,	   pp.69–70).	   For	  example,	  while	  producing	  the	  expanded	  account	  of	  observations	  from	  the	  first	  day	   of	   the	   May	   2014	   Advisory	   Committee	   meeting	   (held	   in	   Milan,	   Italy)	   it	  became	   apparent	   that	   a	   ‘regulatory	   capture’	   (Carpenter	   and	   Moss	   2013)	  perspective	   was	   guiding	   observations	   in	   the	   ‘condensed	   account’.	   Yet	   in	  reflecting	  on	  the	  comments	  from	  different	  participants,	  it	  appeared	  that	  NGOs	  shared	   the	  concerns	  of	   financial	  organisations	  yet	   couched	   these	   in	   terms	  of	  ‘accountability’	  rather	  than	  ‘workload’.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  observation	  during	  the	  second	   day	   of	   the	   meeting	   sought	   to	   identify	   commonalities	   between	  arguments	  from	  different	  actors.	  Indeed	  it	  was	  through	  this	  investigation	  that	  the	   two	   degrees	   target,	   and	   particular	   instruments	   based	   on	   that	   target,	  appeared	   as	   a	   common	   feature	   across	   the	   tensions	   emerging	   within	   the	  Financed	  Emissions	  Initiative.	  Specifically,	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	  was	  central	  to	   ideas	  of	   ‘carbon	  risk’	  and	  aligning	  capital	  markets	  with	   the	   transition	   to	  a	  low-­‐carbon	   economy.	   While	   informal	   interactions	   with	   participants	   offered	  some	  insight	  and	  reflection	  on	  the	  these	  ideas,	  semi-­‐structured	  interviews	  and	  documentary	   analysis	   provided	   a	   systematic	   approach	   to	   exploring	   their	  emergence	   and	   to	   checking	   or	   refuting	   observations	   of	   the	   standard-­‐setting	  project.	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3.1.2.	   RECONSTRUCTING	   EVENTS	   AND	   PROMPTING	   REFLECTION	   THROUGH	  
INTERVIEWS	  As	   noted,	   one	   limit	   of	   using	   participant	   observation	   was	   that	   it	  restricted	   research	   primarily	   to	   the	   standard-­‐setting	   project,	   with	   informal	  interactions	   offering	   some	   initial	   insight	   into	   the	   intersection	   of	   climate	  change	   and	   finance	   outside	   the	   Financed	   Emissions	   Initiative.	   For	   example,	  some	   participants	   argued	   that	   the	   growing	   concerns	   regarding	   ‘carbon	   risk’	  stemmed	   from	   Carbon	   Tracker’s	   2011	   work	   on	   the	   carbon	   budget,	   while	  others	   pointed	   to	   debates	   in	   the	   early-­‐2000s	   that	   stemmed	   from	   Ceres’	  reports	   that	  developed	   a	   risk	   framing	  of	   climate	   change.	  However,	   as	  noted,	  there	   are	   limits	   to	   the	   situations	   and	   events	   that	   can	   be	   accessed	   through	   a	  participant	   observation	   (Becker	   and	   Geer	   2003,	   pp.250–251),	   while	  interviews	   enable	   the	   researcher	   to	   access	   the	   ‘lived	   world’	   of	   individuals	  (Kvale	   and	   Brinkmann	   2008)	  working	   at	   the	   intersection	   of	   climate	   change	  and	  finance.	  On	  the	  one	  hand	  these	  one-­‐on-­‐one	  interviews	  created	  a	  space	  for	  a	   more	   in-­‐depth	   inquiry	   into	   apparently	   taken-­‐for-­‐granted	   concepts	   in	   the	  standard-­‐setting	   project.	   For	   example,	   in	   tailoring	   questions	   to	   foster	  interviewee	  reflection	  on	  the	  carbon	  budget,	   the	  research	  was	  able	   to	  access	  the	   points	   of	   view	   across	   interviewees	   and	   to	   unfold	   the	   meanings	   and	  experiences	  of	   ‘carbon	  risk’	  (Ibid.,	  pp.1-­‐3).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	   the	   interviews	  were	   also	   used	   to	   reconstruct	   events	   that	   preceded	   the	   participant	  observation	  (e.g.	  the	  scoping	  phase	  of	  the	  Financed	  Emissions	  Initiative)	  and	  to	  explore	   the	   evolution	   of	   particular	   actions	   and	   instruments	   (e.g.	   NGO	  strategies	   for	   applying	   pressure	   to	   commercial	   banks	   and	   institutional	  investors,	   and	   the	   creation	   and	   articulation	   of	   the	   carbon	   budget).	   For	   such	  lines	  of	  inquiry	  the	  interviews	  served	  to	  trace	  the	  ‘facts’	  (Ahrens	  and	  Chapman	  2006,	  pp.832–833.	  Also	  see	  Miller	  and	  O’Leary	  1994)	  of	   the	  standard-­‐setting	  project	  before	  the	  TWG	  phase	  –	  as	  perceived	  by	  different	  Advisory	  Committee	  members	   –	   and	   the	   emergence	   and	   development	   of	   initiatives	   at	   the	  intersection	   of	   climate	   change	   and	   finance.	   Yet,	   as	   a	   method,	   interviewing	  presents	  its	  own	  challenges	  and	  limits,	  which	  are	  discussed	  and	  addressed	  in	  this	  section	  that	  provides	  an	  account	  of	  how	  the	  method	  was	  applied.	  	  Eighteen	  semi-­‐structured	  interviews	  were	  conducted	  and	  designed	  to	  probe	   deeper	   into	   insights	   developed	   during	   the	   participant	   observation	   of	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the	  Financed	  Emissions	   Initiative.20	  The	  majority	   of	   these	   interviewees	  were	  either	  members	  of	  the	  Advisory	  Committee	  or	  the	  Secretariat	  (five	  from	  each),	  along	  with	  three	  TWG	  participants	  (note	  that,	  in	  addition	  to	  these,	  three	  of	  the	  interviewed	  Advisory	  Committee	  members	  also	  engaged	  as	  TWG	  participants	  and	  that	  Secretariat	  members	  engaged	  in	  and	  coordinated	  the	  TWG	  meetings	  and	  webinars)	   and	   five	   individuals	   who	   did	   not	   participate	   in	   the	   Financed	  Emissions	   Initiative	   but	   worked	   in	   organisations	   and	   initiatives	   at	   the	  intersection	   of	   climate	   change	   and	   finance	   (see	   Appendix	   3C).	   This	   cross-­‐section	   of	   individuals	   enabled	   the	   interviews	   to	   probe,	   confirm	   and	   refute	  observations	  through	  the	  perspectives	  of	  individuals	  at	  different	  levels	  of	  the	  standard	   setting	   project	   (cf.	   Horton,	   Macve,	   and	   Struyen	   2004,	   p.344).	   In	  addition,	   the	   Advisory	   Committee	   and	   Secretariat	   members	   were	   engaged	  with	   the	   project	   during	   its	   scoping	   phase	   in	   2012,	   providing	   a	   range	   of	  opinions	  with	  which	   events	  prior	   to	   the	  TWG	  phase	   could	  be	   reconstructed.	  Moreover,	  perspectives	  on	   the	  evolution	  of	   ideas	   that	  had	  become	  central	   to	  tensions	  within	  the	  project	  –	  such	  as	  ‘carbon	  risk’	  and	  aligning	  capital	  markets	  with	   the	   transition	   to	  a	   low-­‐carbon	  economy	  –	   could	  be	   contrasted	  between	  individuals	   that	   had	   and	   had	   not	   participated	   in	   the	   Financed	   Emissions	  Initiative.	  	  However	   questioning	   interviewees	   on	   the	   restructuring	   of	   the	  Financed	   Emissions	   Initiative	   into	   the	   Portfolio	   Carbon	   Initiative	   (a	   process	  which	  began	   in	   June	  2014)	  presented	  a	  particular	  challenge.	  This	  was	  partly	  because	   interviews	  in	  2014	  –	  that	  were	  conducted	  on	  either	  side	  of	  the	  two-­‐day	   June	   in-­‐person	   TWG	  meeting	  where	   a	   ‘landscape	   review’	   of	   the	   project	  was	   initiated	  –	  provided	   some	   insight	   into	   the	  emerging	   tensions	  within	   the	  project,	  while	  preceding	  the	  restructuring	  of	  the	  project.	  During	  interviews	  in	  2015,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   interviewees	   struggled	   to	   recollect	   specific	  discussions	   prior	   to	   the	   ‘landscape	   review’	   and,	   conversely,	   appeared	   to	  conceptualise	  the	  project	   in	  terms	  of	   its	  new	   ‘risk’	  and	   ‘alignment’	  objectives	  resulting	  in	  rather	  ‘clear’	  accounts	  of	  the	  restructuring	  process.	  Following-­‐up,	  probing	   and	   adopting	   different	  modes	   of	   questioning	   provided	   insights	   into	  the	   ‘mess’	   of	   the	   restructuring	   process.	   However	   the	   point	   is	   that	   the	  participant	  observation	  provided	  an	  account	  of	  “changes	   in	  behaviour	  over	  a	  period	   of	   time	   and	   […]	   the	   events	  which	   precede	   and	   follow	   them”	   (Becker	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  See	  Appendix	  3C	  for	  details	  of	  the	  interviews.	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and	   Geer	   2003,	   p.249)	   whereas	   interviewees	   found	   it	   difficult	   to	   articulate	  their	  “former	  actions,	  outlook,	  or	  feelings”	  (Ibid.).	   In	  this	  regard,	  the	  limits	  of	  interviewing	   –	   in	   terms	   of	   recollection,	   bias	   and	   apparent	   clarity	   –	   are	  mitigated	   through	   the	   combination	   and	   comparison	   of	   different	   sources	   of	  data	  to	  expose	  gaps,	  inconsistencies	  and	  differing	  perspectives	  (cf.	  Ahrens	  and	  Chapman	  2006,	  p.834,	  on	  triangulation).	  The	   reason	   the	   interviews	   were	   conducted	   in	   a	   ‘semi-­‐structured’	  manner	  was	  to	  explore	  these	  lines	  of	  inquiry	  in	  more	  detail,	  enabling	  the	  data	  collection	   to	   probe	   into	   interviewees’	   understandings	   of	   the	   two	   degrees	  target	  and	  in	  what	  ways,	   if	  any,	   they	  made	  sense	  of	   it	  (Kvale	  and	  Brinkmann	  2008,	   pp.133–134).	   Furthermore,	   the	   participant	   observation	   provided	   a	  valuable	   foundation	   for	   this	  style	  of	   interview.	  The	   language	  and	  concepts	  of	  the	  broader	  climate	  finance	  debate	  had	  become	  familiar,	  helping	  to	  tailor	  the	  questions	  and	  approach	  to	  conversation	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  could	  overcome	  any	  initial	   interviewee	   resistance	   (Wengraf	   2009,	   pp.64–5).	   Similarly,	   the	  participant	  observation	  highlighted	  that	  interviewees	  working	  for	  investment	  banks	  and	  corporate	  banks	  could	  be	  particularly	  cautious	   in	  discussing	   their	  organisation’s	   impacts	   on	   GHG	   emissions.	   However	   the	   relationships	   and	  rapport	   developed	   through	   the	   participant	   observation	   (Jorgensen	   1989,	  pp.69–78)	   provided	   an	   existing	   network	   of	   individuals	   who	   could	   be	  interviewed	   as	   well	   as	   provide	   introductions	   to	   potential	   interviewees.	  Furthermore	   the	   semi-­‐structured	   approach	   also	   helped	   to	   overcome	   this	  problem	  as	   it	  allowed	   the	   interviewer	   to	  create	  a	   relationship	  of	   trust	   in	   the	  early	  stages	  of	   the	   interview,	   through	  a	   flexible	  questioning	  approach,	  which	  could	   be	   followed	   by	   more	   probing	   questions	   (Flick	   2014,	   pp.208–9).	  Similarly,	  several	  interviewees	  from	  the	  finance	  community	  appeared	  to	  relax	  when,	   at	   the	   start	   of	   the	   interview,	   it	   was	   explained	   that	   comments	   would	  remain	   anonymous	   (Marginson	   2004,	   p.342).	   As	   such,	   the	   write-­‐up	   of	  interview	  materials	  contextualises	  insights	  from	  interviewees,	  while	  ensuring	  specific	  insights	  cannot	  be	  traced	  to	  the	  specific	  individual	  or	  organisation.	  In	   preparation	   for	   the	   interviews,	   background	   research	   on	   each	  interviewee	  was	   conducted	   and	   an	   interview	   protocol	  was	   drafted	   detailing	  the	  themes	  to	  be	  explored	  during	  each	  interview.	  This	  protocol	  was	  modified	  following	  interviews	  that	  either	  highlighted	  areas	  where	  the	  protocol	  needed	  to	   be	   improved	   or	   certain	   lines	   of	   inquiry	   that	   were	   potentially	   worth	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exploring	  (Marginson	  2004,	  p.333;	  Horton,	  Macve,	  and	  Struyen	  2004,	  p.341).	  These	  were	  used	  as	  a	  guide	  for	  the	  interview,	  and	  were	  comprised	  of	  a	  variety	  of	  introductory	  questions	  with	  potential	  questions	  for	  following-­‐up	  or	  probing	  on	   interviewees	   response,	   as	   well	   as	   theory-­‐driven,	   comparative	   and	   more	  confrontational	   questions	   (Kvale	   and	   Brinkmann	   2008,	   pp.134–138).	   Taken	  together,	   the	   document	   provided	   prompts	   for	   how	   to	   raise	   a	   new	   topic	   for	  discussion,	   the	   specific	   areas	   of	   that	   topic	   to	   discuss,	   and	   how	   to	   encourage	  interviewees	  to	  reflect	  on	  specific	  topics	  (Flick	  2014,	  pp.218–9).	  However	  the	  interview	  protocol	  was	  not	  followed	  bureaucratically	  (Flick	  2014,	  p.209).	  For	  instance,	  if	  a	  topic	  towards	  the	  end	  of	  the	  interview	  protocol	  was	  raised	  in	  the	  first	  minutes	  of	  an	  interview,	  questioning	  around	  this	  topic	  was	  pursued.	  This	  both	  fostered	  a	  more	  natural	  flow	  to	  the	  conversation	  and	  allowed	  questions	  to	  be	  tailored	  to	  the	  topic	  that	  was	  on	  the	  interviewees	  mind	  during	  that	  part	  of	  the	  interview.	  This	  interview	  protocol	  also	  helped	  manage	  the	  challenge	  of	  being	   the	   sole	   interviewer	   (Marginson	   2004,	   p.343).	   Specifically,	   it	   was	  possible	  to	  focus	  on	  understanding	  and	  clarifying	  interviewee	  responses	  while	  using	   prompts	   from	   the	   interview	   protocol	   as	   a	   basis	   for	   formulating	  questions.	  	  The	   challenge	   of	   being	   the	   sole	   interviewer	  was	   further	  managed	  by	  recording	   interviews.	   All	   except	   one	   interview	   were	   recorded21	  and,	   at	   the	  start	   of	   the	   interview,	   interviewees	   were	   informed	   of	   the	   rationale	   for	  recording	   the	  conversation	  and	  how	   the	   recording	  would	  be	  used,	   and	  were	  also	   asked	   for	   permission	   to	   record.	   This	   limited	   the	   amount	   of	   note	   taking	  required	  during	  the	  interview,	  allowing	  a	  greater	  focus	  on	  the	  formation	  and	  improvisation	   of	   questions	   based	   on	   interviewee	   responses.	   This	   ‘active	  listening’	   (Wengraf	   2009,	   p.132)	   is	   of	   particular	   importance	   in	   semi-­‐structured	   interviews	  as	   it	  helps	   the	   researcher	   to	  probe	   into	   specific	   topics	  and	   allows	   room	   for	   creativity	   (Ibid.,	   p.5)	   in	   tailoring	   questions	   to	   prompt	  reflection.	  Furthermore,	   the	  two	  to	  three	  hours	  following	  the	  interview	  were	  scheduled	  as	  a	  period	  for	  “self-­‐debriefing”	  (Ibid.,	  pp.142–4).	  This	  allowed	  time	  for	  written	  descriptions	  of	  the	  interview	  setting	  as	  well	  as	  observations	  from	  the	  interview.	  As	  with	  note	  taking	  for	  observations,	  a	  condensed	  account	  was	  kept	   during	   interviews	   that	   was	   developed	   into	   an	   expanded	   account	   (cf.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  One	   interview	  was	   not	   recorded	   due	   to	   stringent	   confidentiality	   requirements	   at	  the	   financial	  organisation	   the	   interviewee	  worked	  at.	  This	  was	  agreed	   in	  advance	  of	  the	  interview	  date.	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Spradley	   1980,	   pp.69–70)	   during	   this	   ‘self-­‐debriefing’.	   Recordings	   were	  subsequently	   transcribed	   by	   the	   researcher	   or	   by	   a	   transcription	   service	   –	  those	  from	  latter	  were	  checked	  for	  accuracy	  and	  consistency	  –	  with	  audio	  and	  text	  files	  being	  stored	  chronologically.	  
3.1.3.	  TRACING	  TWO	  DEGREES	  THROUGH	  DOCUMENTS	  To	   chart	   the	   emergence	   of	   the	   two	   degrees	   target	   from	   a	   range	   of	  other	  metrics	  –	  as	  well	  as	  to	  supplement	  and	  check	  interview	  and	  observation	  insights	   –	   the	   thesis	   gathered	   a	   variety	   of	   reports,	   draft	   documents,	   climate	  literature,	  press	   releases	  and	  media	   coverage.	  For	  Chapter	  6	   this	   centred	  on	  UNEP	   FI	   and	   GHG	   Protocol	   materials	   regarding	   the	   Financed	   Emissions	  Initiative	   that	   pre-­‐dated	   the	   participant	   observation,	   such	   as	   Advisory	  Committee	   meeting	   summaries,	   scoping	   workshop	   results,	   draft	   sections	   of	  the	   standard,	   correspondence,	   templates	   and	   presentation	   slides	   (See	  Appendix	   3B).	   It	   also	   included	   numerous	   draft	   documents	   and	   materials	  pertaining	  to	  the	  TWG	  process.	  In	  Chapter	  5,	  by	  contrast,	  this	  focussed	  on	  the	  documents	   that	  were	  enrolled	   in	  developing	  a	   ‘climate	   risk’	   argument	  based	  on	  the	  carbon	  budget,	  as	  well	  as	  how	  documents	  presenting	  that	  argument	  (in	  particular,	   Carbon	   Tracker’s	   Unburnable	   Carbon	   report)	   appeared	   in	   the	  financial	   sector	   discourse	   on	   climate	   change	   (e.g.	   in	   speeches,	   reports,	   and	  calls	   for	   divestment).	   However	   it	   was	   in	   Chapter	   4	   that	   the	   gathering	   and	  analysis	   of	   documentation	   formed	   the	   empirical	   core.	   Over	   60	   reports	   and	  proceedings	  –	  from	  conferences,	  research	  centres,	  international	  bodies,	  NGOs	  and	   governments	   –	   as	   well	   as	   more	   than	   55	   academic	   texts	   –	   from	  climatologists	  and	  meteorologists	  to	  economists	  and	  lawyers	  –	  were	  gathered	  as	  the	  basis	  for	  charting	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	  from	  a	  range	  of	  other	  metrics	  (see	  Appendix	  3D).	  This	   collection	   of	   documentation	   was	   initially	   guided	   by	   a	   skeleton	  timeline,	  constructed	  from	  the	  events	  identified	  by	  interviewees	  as	  part	  of	  the	  emergence	   of	   the	   two	   degrees	   target	   as	   well	   as	   a	   reading	   of	   numerous	  accounts	  from	  climate	  historians.	  Some	  of	  these	  accounts	  pertained	  to	  the	  two	  degrees	   target	   (Tol	   2007;	   Randalls	   2010)	   and	   others	   related	   to	  intergovernmental	  bodies	  such	  as	  the	  United	  Nations	  Framework	  Convention	  on	  Climate	  Change	  (Bodansky	  2001;	  Bodansky	  2010;	  Christoff	  2010)	  and	  the	  Intergovernmental	  Panel	  on	  Climate	  Change	  (Agrawala	  1998).	  A	  combination	  of	   online	   digital	   archives	   and	   physical	   resources	   were	   drawn	   on	   for	   this	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collection.	   Furthermore,	   initial	   data	   collection	   centred	   on	   what	   was	   'in'	   the	  texts	   (Prior	   2011,	   pp.94–96),	   which	   provided	   the	   basis	   for	   a	   more	  'archaeological'	  approach	  (Ibid.)	  to	  gathering	  materials	  pertaining	  to	  how	  the	  account	   came	   into	   being.	   Through	   this,	   additional	   organisations,	   individuals	  and	   targets	   were	   identified,	   which	   added	   to	   the	   timeline	   and	   extended	   the	  scope	  of	  data	  collection.	  However,	  one	  of	   the	  main	  challenges	  with	  analysing	  documents	   is	   that	   they	   do	   not	   provide	   "transparent	   representations	   of	  organisational	  routines,	  decision-­‐making	  processes,	  or	  professional	  practices"	  (Atkinson	  and	  Coffey	  2011,	  p.79).	  Yet	  rather	  than	  using	  these	  texts	  merely	  to	  gather	  ‘content’	  on	  long-­‐term	  climate	  targets,	  this	  challenge	  was	  mitigated	  by	  viewing	   the	   documents	   as	   ‘receptacles’	   of	   instructions,	   objectives,	   and	  concerns	   that	  provided	   insights	   into	  both	   the	  conditions	   in	  which	   they	  were	  produced	   as	   well	   as	   their	   wider	   mobilisation	   as	   an	   ‘ally’	   or	   ‘enemy’	   (Prior	  2003,	  p.3).	  	  In	  this	  regard,	  data	  collection	  expanded	  from	  the	  skeleton	  timeline	  to	  gathering	  materials	   to	  contextualise	   the	  documents.	  These	  related	   to,	  among	  others,	   the	   authors	   of	   reports,	   the	   remits	   of	   the	   committees	   that	   convened	  particular	  conferences	  and	  workshops,	  as	  well	  as	  particular	  movements	   that	  appeared	  influential	  over	  documents	  pertaining	  to	  the	  two	  degrees	  target.	  For	  example,	  the	  first	  appearance	  of	  two	  degrees	  Celsius	  as	  a	  target	  from	  which	  an	  economic	   analysis	   of	   policy	   responses	   to	   climate	   change	   could	   be	   based	  appeared	   in	  a	  pair	  of	  papers	  by	   the	  economist	  William	  Nordhaus	   (Nordhaus	  1975b;	  Nordhaus	  1977b).	  These	  stemmed	  from	  research	  he	  began	  during	  his	  time	  as	  a	  Research	  Scholar	  at	   the	  International	   Institute	   for	  Applied	  Systems	  Analysis	   (IIASA),	   an	   institute	   whose	   formation	   was	   shaped	   by	   influential	  members	  of	   the	  Club	  of	  Rome.22	  The	  documentation	  regarding	   the	   formation	  of	   IIASA	   enabled	   Chapter	   4	   (Section	   4.1.2)	   to	   analyse	   this	   instance	   of	  economics	   and	   climate	   change	   becoming	   connected	   in	   the	   idea	   of	   a	   target-­‐based	  mode	  of	  policy	  formation	  and	  intervention.	  	  Taken	   together	   this	  collection	  of	  documentary	  evidence	  provided	   the	  foundation	  for	  analysing	  the	  shifting	  ideas	  within	  the	  climate	  debate	  and	  how	  these	   shaped	   efforts	   to	   set	   a	   long-­‐term	   target	   for	   climate	   change.	   It	   further	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  The	  Club	  of	  Rome	  was	  founded	  in	  1968	  by	  Aurelio	  Peccei	  (with	  a	  background	  in	  the	  Italian	   automobile	   industry)	   and	   Alexander	   King	   (then	   head	   of	   science	   at	   the	  Organization	  for	  Economic	  Cooperation	  and	  Development)	  as	  an	  informal	  association	  addressing	  long-­‐term,	  global	  and	  intertwined	  problems	  (Masood	  2016,	  pp.72–75).	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shows	  how	  the	   two	  degrees	   target	  emerged	  as	  a	  central	   target	  by	  mediating	  between	   scientific,	   economic	   and	   political	   concerns.	   In	   this	   regard	   the	  gathering	  of	  documentation	  enabled	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  historical	  contingencies	  of	   the	   two	   degrees	   target,	   and	   how	   the	   target	   tied	   “local	   issues	   to	   larger	  questions,	   and	  vice	   versa”	   (Miller	   and	  Napier	  1993,	  p.634)	   in	   a	  manner	   that	  linked	  “practices	  together	  into	  a	  complex	  web”	  where	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	  “emerge[d]	  as	  central	  to	  a	  certain	  way	  of	  calculating”	  (Ibid.).	  	  
3.2.	  ITERATING	  AND	  COMBINING:	  ANALYSING	  MATERIALS	  While	  at	  times	  the	  analysis	  centred	  on	  materials	  gathered	  through	  one	  particular	   method,	   it	   most	   often	   moved	   across	   the	   different	   sources	   with	  observations,	  interviews	  and	  documentation	  being	  analysed	  together.	  Even	  in	  the	   first	   half	   of	   2014	   when	  materials	   had	   primarily	   been	   gathered	   through	  participant	  observation,	  reflection	  was	  based	  on	  fieldnotes	  and	  recordings	  as	  well	   as	   the	   documentation	   surrounding	   the	   formation	   of	   the	   Financed	  Emissions	   Initiative	   and	   the	   webinar-­‐based	   and	   Advisory	   Committee	  meetings.	  Moreover,	  the	  periods	  in	  between	  field	  visits	  as	  well	  as	  between	  the	  participant	  observation	  and	  interviews	  enabled	  data	  collection	  and	  analysis	  to	  be	  an	  iterative	  process	  (cf.	  Dey	  2007,	  pp.431–432)	  through	  which	  “collection	  and	   analysis	   [were]	   inexorably	   intertwined”	   (Marginson	   2004,	   p.332).	  Analysis	   of	   collected	   materials	   was	   central	   to	   fostering	   reflection	   and	  regaining	  an	  outsiders’	  perspective	  during	  these	  periods.	  While	  the	  ‘expanded	  accounts’	   produced	   immediately	   after	   observations	   and	   interviews	  provided	  structure	   to	   immediate	   reflection,	   the	   initial	   analysis	   conducted	   during	  periods	   away	   from	   data	   collection	   was	   to	   revisit	   both	   condensed	   and	  expanded	   accounts.	   Similarly,	   documentation	   and	  materials	   relating	   to	   their	  production	   and	   subsequent	   impact	   were	   analysed	   “as	   ‘topic’”	   (Prior	   2011,	  p.101),	   to	   explore	   the	   shifting	   ideas	   and	   concerns	   surrounding	   an	   emerging	  target-­‐based	   mode	   of	   formulating	   policy	   response.	   	   Specifically,	   this	   re-­‐reading	   of	   fieldnotes,	   transcripts	   and	   documentation	   focussed	   either	   on	  themes	   that	   had	   emerged	   during	   data	   collection	   or	   on	   identifying	   themes	  across	   the	  different	  materials.	   To	  organise	   this	   process,	   separate	  documents	  were	   created,	   populated	   and	  maintained	   for	   each	   theme,	   enabling	   a	   form	  of	  ‘data	  reduction’	  (O’Dwyer	  2004,	  p.393)	  and	  for	  excerpts	  on	  a	  particular	  theme	  from	  a	  variety	  of	  materials	  to	  be	  read	  and	  reread	  to	  explore	  different	  potential	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framings.	  These	  documents	  also	  indicated	  the	  particular	  meeting	  or	  interview	  that	  an	  excerpt	  was	  taken	  from	  as	  well	  as	  the	  category	  of	  participant	  –	  such	  as	  ‘NGO	   and	   think	   tank	   community’	   or	   ‘ratings	   agency’	   –	   that	   the	   individual	   fit	  within	  (Dent	  1991,	  p.712).	  	  These	  themes	  subsequently	   informed	  the	   inclusion	  of	  “focussed”	  and,	  eventually,	   “selective	   observations”	   (Spradley	   1980,	   pp.107–111)	   conducted	  during	   the	   engagement	   with	   the	   Financed	   Emissions	   Initiative.	   It	   similarly	  enabled	   the	   formulation	   of	   deductive	   and	   theory-­‐driven	   questions	   for	  inclusion	   in	   the	   interview	  protocol	  (cf.	  Ahrens	  and	  Chapman	  2006).	  Through	  this	   process	   the	   initial	   themes,	   over	   time,	   evolved.	   Some	   were	   set	   aside	   as	  different	   themes	   and	   explanations	   became	   the	   focus	   of	   inquiry,	   and	   some	  themes	   developed	   interconnections	   with	   others,	   prompting	   further	  investigation	   and	   analysis	   of	   those	   interconnections.	   For	   example,	   following	  the	  May	  2015	  Advisory	  Committee	  meeting,	  the	  theme	  of	  ‘regulatory	  capture’	  was	  temporarily	  set	  aside	  to	  analyse	  the	  potential	  ‘common	  basis	  of	  concerns’	  of	   the	  NGO	  and	   think	   tank	   community	   and	   commercial	  banks.	  Relatedly,	   the	  theme	  of	  ‘NGO	  pressures	  for	  adoption’	  of	  carbon	  accounting	  tools	  developed	  a	  focus	   on	   pressures	   for	   ‘realignment’	   of	   investment	   and	   lending	   activities,	  which	   appeared	   interconnected	   with	   the	   two	   degrees	   target	   as	   a	   ‘common	  basis	   of	   concerns’.	   That	   is	   not,	   however,	   to	   say	   that	   this	   iteration	   between	  collection	   and	   analysis,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   evolution	   of	   themes,	   was	   a	   smooth	  process.	  The	  above,	  for	  example,	  highlights	  that	  the	  ‘regulatory	  capture’	  theme	  was	   ‘temporarily’	  set	  aside.	  That	   is,	   the	  analysis	  did	  not	   immediately	  commit	  to	  a	  new	  theme.	  Rather	  different	  themes	  would	  frame	  particular	  return	  visits	  to	   the	   materials	   in	   an	   effort	   to	   develop	   alternative	   explanations	   and	   to	  evaluate	  which	  theme	  was,	  as	  some	  phrase	  it,	  “best-­‐fitting”	  (Klag	  and	  Langley	  2013,	   p.151).	   Indeed,	   It	   was	   only	   as	   observations	   continued	   (with	   the	  Financed	   Emissions	   Initiative	   being	   relaunched	   as	   the	   Portfolio	   Carbon	  Initiative)	  and	  compared	  with	  transcripts	  of	  the	  interviews	  conducted	  in	  2015	  (Becker	   and	   Geer	   2003,	   p.256)	   that	   the	   two	   degrees	   target	   continued	   to	  appear	  as	  a	  ‘common	  basis	  of	  concerns’	  that	  cut	  across	  many	  different	  groups	  within	  the	  project.	  Moreover,	  the	  theme	  appeared	  to	  simultaneously	  shed	  light	  on	  the	  shifting	  concerns	  within	  the	  project	  as	  well	  as	  the	  shift	  in	  focus	  from	  a	  more	  conventional	  form	  of	  carbon	  accounting	  (put	  simply,	  to	  calculate	  carbon	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footprints)	   towards	   indicators	   that	   were	   based	   on	   or	   had	   relevance	   to	   two	  instruments,	  the	  carbon	  budget	  and	  investment	  roadmaps.	  	  	  Alongside	   this	   analysis,	   the	   empirical	   material	   and	   themes	   were	  brought	   together	   in	   writing	   exercises.	   These	   ranged	   from	   short	   reflective	  pieces	   to	   papers	   that	   were	   subsequently	   presented	   at	   seminars	   and	  conferences.	   Taken	   together,	   these	   exercises	   aided	   in	   exposing,	   at	   a	   more	  refined	  level,	  where	  the	  theoretical	  framing	  of	  the	  empirical	  material	  required	  further	   consideration	   by	   returning	   to	   the	   theoretical	   literature	   for	   further	  reflection	   on	   particular	   aspects	   of	   a	   theme.	   Moreover,	   this	   informed	   the	  positioning	   of	   the	   data	   with	   regards	   to	   the	   specific	   characteristics	   of	   the	  instruments	  and	  how	  their	  interconnections	  link	  an	  abstract	  climate	  objective	  to	   the	   framing	   of	   investment	   and	   lending	   decisions.	   This	   assisted	   in	  articulating	   the	   specific	   aspects	   of	   the	   mediating	   instruments	   (Miller	   and	  O’Leary	   2007)	   framework	   that	   assisted	   in	   analysing	   how	   the	   two	   degrees	  target	   ‘infused	   action’	   (Ahrens	   and	   Chapman	   2006,	   p.830)	   across	   multiple	  entities.	  This	  analysis	  formed	  the	  basis	  for	  the	  following	  three	  chapters,	  which	  each	  emerged	  from	  themes	  cutting	  across	  the	  forms	  of	  data	  collected.	  Each	  of	  the	   three	   chapters	   does,	   however,	   place	   emphasis	   on	   a	   different	   empirical	  core.	   Chapter	   4	   draws	   primarily	   on	   documentary	   evidence	   in	   detailing	   the	  development	   of	   a	   target-­‐based	   mode	   of	   formulating	   climate	   policy	   and	  charting	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	  and	  its	  mediation	  between	  particular	  political,	  economic	  and	  scientific	  concerns.	  It	  further	  highlights	  that	  the	   two	   degrees	   target	   provided	   a	   common	   vision	   for	   addressing	   climate	  change	   that	  was	  mobilised	   in	   efforts	   to	   connect	   that	   target	   to	   the	   national-­‐,	  sectoral-­‐	  and	  organisational-­‐level.	  Indeed,	  Chapter	  5,	  which	  is	  based	  primarily	  on	  interview	  materials	  that	  are	  supplemented	  by	  the	  participant	  observation,	  examines	  how	   the	   carbon	  budget	  was	   created	  as	  a	   ‘bridge’	  between	   the	   two	  degrees	   target	  and	  the	  carbon	  constraints	   facing	   the	   financial	  sector.	  As	  well	  as	  framing	  the	  carbon	  budget	  as	  an	  instrument	  that	  ‘bridges’,	  the	  chapter	  also	  shows	   how	   it	   was	   mobilised	   to	   mediate	   between	   the	   concerns	   of	   financial	  organisations,	   regulatory	   authorities,	   and	   a	   divestment	   movement.	   In	  particular	  it	  attends	  to	  how	  the	  carbon	  budget	  was	  enrolled	  in	  arguments	  on	  the	  vulnerability	  of	  the	  financial	  sector	  under	  a	  two	  degrees	  scenario.	  Chapter	  6	   brings	   the	   reader	   inside	   the	  meeting	   rooms	   and	  webinars	   of	   the	  UNEP	   FI	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and	  GHG	  Protocol’s	  Financed	  Emissions	  Initiative	  by	  drawing	  primarily	  on	  the	  participant	   observation	   and	   supplementing	   this	   with	   interview	  materials.	   It	  demonstrates	  how	  emerging	  concerns	  stemming	  from	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	  came	  to	  permeate	  meetings	  and,	  as	  they	  came	  into	  conflict	  with	  the	  objectives	  set	  during	  the	  scoping	  phase,	  brought	  the	  project	  to	  the	  brink	  of	  collapse.	  Yet,	  relaunched	  as	  the	  Portfolio	  Carbon	  Initiative,	  the	  project	  came	  to	  connect	  the	  carbon	  accounting	  practices	  to	  a	  calculative	  infrastructure	  for	  aligning	  actions	  at	  the	  sector-­‐,	  organisation-­‐	  and	  portfolio-­‐level	  with	  the	  two	  degrees	  target.	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CHAPTER	  4	  –	  TWO	  DEGREES	  CELSIUS:	  
REPRESENTING	  CLIMATE	  CHANGE,	  
MEDIATION	  AND	  DISAGGREGATION	  
4.0.	  INTRODUCTION	  As	   the	   collapsing	   2009	   Copenhagen	   climate	   negotiations	   neared	   the	  end	   of	   its	   penultimate	   day	   on	   the	   18th	   December,	   negotiators	   attempted	   to	  salvage	  the	  talks	  and	  present	  a	  new	  vision	  for	  international	  action	  on	  climate	  change	  by	  presenting	  a	   three-­‐page	   text.	  Known	  as	   the	  Copenhagen	  Accord,	  a	  key	  feature	  of	  the	  text	  was	  the	  long-­‐term	  objective	  of	  limiting	  the	  increase	  in	  global	   average	   temperatures	   to	   two	   degrees	   Celsius	   (UNFCCC	   2009,	   p.2).	  While	  the	  2009	  talks	  had	  only	  gone	  as	  far	  as	   ‘noting’	  this	  two	  degrees	  target,	  the	   2010	   Cancun	  Agreements	   saw	  196	   nations	   commit	   to	   it	   (UNFCCC	   2010,	  p.3);	  and	  in	  the	  2015	  Paris	  Agreement	  it	  became	  the	  central	  long-­‐term	  climate	  target	   in	  the	   international	  response	  to	  climate	  change	  (UNFCCC	  2015f,	  p.22).	  The	   two	   degrees	   target,	   however,	   had	   been	   used	   as	   early	   as	   the	   1970s	   to	  analyse	   optimal	   policy	   responses	   to	   global	   warming	   (Nordhaus	   1975a;	  Nordhaus	  1977b),	  and	  throughout	  the	  following	  decades	  it	  garnered	  support	  from	  the	  European	  Union	  as	  the	  policy	  objective	  for	  efforts	  to	  curb	  greenhouse	  gas	  (GHG)	  emissions	  (European	  Environment	  Agency	  1996).23	  	  Based	   on	   the	   document	   analysis	   detailed	   in	   Chapter	   3,	   this	   chapter	  charts	   the	   emergence	   of	   the	   two	   degrees	   target	   from	   a	   range	   of	   climate	  metrics	   to	   become	   the	   internationally	   recognised	   long-­‐term	   objective	   for	  efforts	  to	  address	  climate	  change.	  In	  particular,	  it	  emphasises	  that,	  as	  a	  single	  figure	   representing	   the	   climate	   problem,	   the	   two	   degrees	   target	   provides	   a	  common	   basis	   for	   analysing	   and	   planning	   the	   regional-­‐,	   sectoral-­‐	   and	  corporate-­‐level	  implications	  of	  climate	  change.	  This	  chapter	  argues	  the	  target	  simultaneously	   envisions	   the	   prevention	   of	   ‘dangerous	   anthropogenic	  interference’	   in	   the	   climate	   system	   as	   well	   as	   enabling	   the	   construction	   of	  mechanisms	   that	   orient	   actions	   towards	   that	   vision.	   Yet	   this	   single	   figure	  should	   not	   be	   taken	   for	   granted.	   Some	   argue	   that	   2°C	   of	   warming	   permits	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  See	   Appendix	   4A	   for	   a	   timeline	   of	   events	   in	   the	   emergence	   of	   the	   two	   degrees	  target.	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severe	  global	  and	  local	  impacts	  especially	  when	  regional	  variation	  in	  warming	  is	  considered	  (Hansen	  2005;	  Hansen	  and	  Sato	  2012),	  and	  others	  point	  to	  the	  inherent	   uncertainties	   in	   translating	   warming	   targets	   into	   GHG	   emission	  targets	   (Hulme	   2012).	   It	   is	   also	   claimed	   that	   by	   committing	   to	   the	   target	  governments	  are	  merely	  masking	  their	  inaction	  on	  climate	  change	  (Victor	  and	  Kennel	  2014).	  Yet	  this	  chapter	  highlights	  that	  the	  flexibility	  of	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	   enabled	   it	   to	   simultaneously	   connect	   the	   science	   of	   climatic	   impacts,	  with	  a	  level	  of	  GHG	  control	  that	  did	  not	  jeopardise	  economic	  growth	  and	  in	  a	  manner	   that	   did	   not	   encroach	   on	   national	   sovereignty.	   The	   chapter	   argues	  that	   the	   ‘boundary	   object’	   framing	   (Star	   and	   Griesemer	   1989)	   adopted	   in	  earlier	   studies	   of	   the	   two	  degrees	   target	   (Randalls	   2010;	  Cointe,	  Ravon,	   and	  Guérin	  2011)	  is	  an	  inappropriate	  analytical	  lens.	  Rather,	  this	  chapter	  analyses	  the	  target	  as	  a	  mediating	  instrument	  (Miller	  and	  O’Leary	  2007)	  that	  envisages	  an	   apparently	   “simple,	   imaginable	   and	   ‘manageable’”	   future	   (Jordan,	  Mitterhofer,	   and	   Jørgensen	   2016,	   p.1),	   while	   being	   “flexible	   enough	   to	   be	  associated	   to	   local	   concerns	   and	   activities”	   (Jørgensen,	   Jordan,	   and	  Mitterhofer	  2012,	  p.112).	  In	  Miller	  and	  O’Leary’s	  study	  of	  the	  microprocessor	  industry,	  Moore’s	  Law	   was	   framed	   as	   a	   mediating	   instrument	   that	   shapes	   “the	   fundamental	  expectations	   of	   an	   entire	   set	   of	   industries	   about	   increases	   in	   the	  power	   and	  complexity	   of	   semiconductor	   devices,	   and	   the	   timing	   of	   these	   increases”	  (Miller	  and	  O’Leary	  2007,	  p.703).	  Amidst	  the	  vast	  complexity	  of	  technological	  advances	   in	   the	   semiconductor	   industry,	   Moore’s	   Law	   initially	   presented	   a	  apparently	   simple	   vision:	   “during	   the	   next	   decade	   there	   would	   be	   a	  thousandfold	  increase	  in	  the	  power	  of	  the	  most	  complex	  integrated	  circuit	  or	  semiconductor	  device	  available	  commercially”	   (Ibid.	  p.702).	  Revised	   in	  1975	  as	   “the	  number	  of	  electronic	  elements	  on	  a	  semiconductor	  could	  continue	   to	  be	  doubled	  approximately	  every	   two	  years”	   (Ibid.)	  Moore’s	  Law	  “modelled	  a	  strikingly	   beneficent	   relation	   between	   science	   and	   the	   economy	   at	   a	   highly	  abstract	  and	  simplified	  level”	  (Ibid.,	  p.716).	  The	  two	  degrees	  target,	  similarly,	  cuts	   through	   the	   complexities	  of	   climate	   change,	   rendering	   the	  problem	   into	  an	   apparently	   simple	   vision:	   “Holding	   the	   increase	   in	   the	   global	   average	  temperature	   to	  well	   below	   2°C	   above	   pre-­‐industrial	   levels”	   (UNFCCC	   2015f,	  p.22).	   It	   is	   the	   apparent	   simplicity	   of	   the	   target	   that	   is	   central	   to	   its	  representation	   of	   climate	   change.	   Yet	   it	   became	   a	   common	  basis	   for	   diverse	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action	   as	   it	   came	   to	  mediate	   between	   the	   scientific	   literature	   on	   severity	   of	  climatic	   impacts,	   national	   sovereignty	   concerns	   that	   hindered	   international	  climate	  negotiations,	  and	  ‘cost-­‐effective	  levels	  of	  control’	  for	  GHG	  emissions.	  	  In	   examining	   the	   stability	   of	   the	   two	   degrees	   target	   through	   its	  mediation	  of	  diverse	   concerns,	   this	   chapter	   is	   a	   contrast	   to	  Randalls’	   (2010)	  and	   Cointe,	   Ravon	   and	   Guérin’s	   (2011)	   ‘boundary	   object’	   framing	   (Star	   and	  Griesemer	  1989),	  which	  emphasises	  its	  ability	  to	  enable	  communication.	  Star	  and	   Griesemer	   define	   boundary	   objects	   as	   enabling	   communication	   and	  cooperation	  across	  different	  domains	  by	  being	  “weakly	  structured	  in	  common	  use,	   and	   become	   strongly	   structured	   in	   local	   site	   use”	   (Star	   and	   Griesemer	  1989,	  p.393).	  In	  other	  words,	  there	  is	  an	  ambiguity	  to	  boundary	  objects	  until	  considered	   in	   terms	   of	   a	   specific	   situation,	   at	   which	   point	   they	   become	  prescriptive	  regarding	  the	  linkage	  or	  action.	  Randalls	  briefly	  remarks	  that	  the	  two	   degrees	   target	   “represented	   a	   useful	   ‘boundary	   object’	   interfacing	  between	  science,	  social	  science,	  and	  policymakers”	  (Randalls	  2010,	  p.602)	   in	  debates	  where	   the	   idea	  of	   “low-­‐carbon	  societies	  was	  being	  actively	  debated”	  (Ibid.).	  Cointe	  et	  al.’s	  2011	  working	  paper,	  however,	   emphasises	   the	   ‘weakly	  structured	   in	   common	  use’	   aspect	   of	   the	  boundary	  objects	   definition,	   seeing	  the	   two	   degrees	   target	   as	   being	   “[s]ufficiently	   vague	   to	   allow	   several	  interpretations”	  (Cointe,	  Ravon,	  and	  Guérin	  2011,	  p.18).	  	  Yet	   in	   ‘common	   use’	   as	   a	   global	   objective,	   the	   two	   degrees	   target	  provides	  an	  apparently	  fixed	  objective.	  Far	  from	  being	  vague	  or	  ambiguous,	  it	  is	  presents	  a	  seemingly	  simple	  vision	  for	  addressing	  climate	  change.	  The	  two	  degrees	  target	  is,	  however,	  flexible.	  That	  is,	  it	  does	  not	  per	  se	  prescribe	  how	  it	  is	  to	  be	  implemented	  and	  the	  necessary	  actions.	  Cointe	  et	  al.	  appear	  to	  allude	  to	   this	   in	   stating	   that	   it	   ‘allows	   several	   interpretations’.	   However	   these	  interpretations	  are	  part	  of	  the	  ‘local	  site	  use’	  of	  the	  two	  degrees	  target.	  That	  is,	  rather	  than	  being	   ‘strongly	  structured’	   in	   local	  site	  use	  (prescribing	  how	  it	   is	  to	   be	   implemented	   or	   used),	   the	   two	   degrees	   target	   is	   flexible	   (allowing	  “several	  interpretations”).	  Where	  the	  definition	  of	  a	  boundary	  object	  does	  not	  appear	  to	  fit	   the	  two	  degrees	  target’s	   ‘structure’,	   the	  target	  may	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  mediating	   instrument:	  detailing	  an	  apparently	  simple	  and	  manageable	  vision	  in	  ‘common	  use’	  while	  being	  flexible	  in	  its	  implementation	  in	  ‘local	  site	  use’.	  In	  this	   regard,	   the	   two	   degrees	   target,	   viewed	   as	   a	   mediating	   instrument,	  provides	   a	   “stable	   frame	   of	   reference”	   while	   being	   “flexible	   enough	   to	   be	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associated	   to	   local	   concerns	   and	   activities”	   (Jørgensen,	   Jordan,	   and	  Mitterhofer	  2012,	  p.112).	  The	   two	   degrees	   target	   may	   be	   seen	   as	   representing	   “complex	   and	  potentially	   not	   well	   understood	   processes”	   by	   envisioning	   a	   future	   that	  appears	  “simple,	  imaginable	  and	  ‘manageable’”,	  which	  can	  guide	  the	  efforts	  of	  diverse	   actors	   (Jordan,	  Mitterhofer,	   and	   Jørgensen	   2016,	   p.1).	   However	   this	  chapter	   studies	   the	   role	   of	   two	   degrees	   target	   as	   a	   basis	   for	   developing	  instruments	   that	   link	  a	   climate	   change	   to	   concerns	  at	   the	  national-­‐,	   sectoral,	  and	   organisational-­‐level.	   In	   particular,	   it	   demonstrates	   how	   an	   apparently	  simple	   representation	   of	   a	   complex24	  issue	   provides	   the	   basis	   for	   efforts	   to	  create	   linkages	   between	   diverse	   and	   distributed	   entities.25	  	   In	   this	   regard,	  where	  Miller	  and	  O’Leary	  (2007)	  map	  the	  instruments	  –	  technology	  roadmaps	  and	   cost	   of	   ownership	   calculations	   –	   that	   linked	   Moore’s	   Law	   to	   corporate	  investment	   decisions,	   this	   chapter	   attends	   to	   how	   the	   two	   degrees	   target	  provided	  a	  basis	  for	  assembling	  and	  adjusting	  instruments	  to	  refine	  its	  vision.	  To	  reiterate,	  this	  chapter	  first	  investigates	  how	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	  became	  a	  common	  objective	  that	  mediated	  between	  economic,	  political	  and	  scientific	  concerns	   on	   addressing	   climate	   change	   (Sections	   4.1	   and	   4.2).	   It	   then	  considers	  how	  its	  apparently	  simplicity	  stimulates,	  enables	  and	  orients	  work	  to	  construct	   instruments	   that	  refine	   the	  vision	  of	   the	   target	   to	   local	  specifics	  (Section	  4.3).	  	  The	   work	   of	   constructing	   instruments	   that	   refine	   the	   two	   degrees	  target	   is	   analysed	   through	   Mary	   Morgan’s	   notion	   of	   disaggregation;26	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  The	  term	  ‘complex’	  refers	  to	  arguments	  that	  climate	  change	  is	  a	  ‘wicked’	  or	  ‘super-­‐wicked’	   problem	   (Milne	   and	   Grubnic	   2011,	   p.949).	   The	   former	   defy	   “resolution	  because	   of	   the	   enormous	   interdependencies,	   uncertainties,	   circularities,	   and	  conflicting	  stakeholders	  implicated	  by	  any	  effort	  to	  develop	  a	  solution”	  (Lazarus	  2008,	  p.1159),	   with	   the	   latter	   adding	   that	   “time	   is	   not	   costless,	   so	   the	   longer	   it	   takes	   to	  address	  the	  problem,	  the	  harder	  it	  will	  be	  to	  do	  so”	  (Ibid.,	  p.1160).	  25 	  It	   has	   been	   suggested	   that	   “the	   problems	   with	   defining	   a	   singular	   point	   of	  sustainable	   development”	   (Bebbington	   and	   Larrinaga	   2014b,	   p.396)	   have	   led	   to	   the	  pursuit	   of	   sustainable	   development	   to	   focus	   on	   moving	   “away	   from	   being	  unsustainable”	   (Ibid.).	   This	   chapter	   illustrates	   the	   problems	   of	   ‘defining’	   (or	  temporary	  stabilising)	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	  as	  a	  singular	  point	  for	  directing	  efforts	  to	   address	   climate	   change.	   Moreover	   the	   target	   is	   to	   move	   away	   from	   being	  unsustainable,	  aiming	  to	  lessen	  but	  not	  prevent	  any	  further	  climatic	  impacts.	  	  26	  Professor	  Morgan	  presented	  this	  work	  during	  an	  LSE400	  lecture	  on	  20th	  February	  2015.	  Morgan’s	  research	  on	  the	  matter	  is	  yet	  to	  be	  written	  up,	  and	  thanks	  are	  owed	  to	  her	   for	   a	   follow-­‐up	   conversation	   regarding	   the	   concepts	   of	   aggregation	   and	  
disaggregation.	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separation	  of	  a	  problem	  into	  component	  parts.	  Disaggregation	  pertains	  to	  the	  way	  a	  common	  rendering	  of	  a	  problem	  (in	  this	  chapter	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	  as	   the	   long-­‐term	   climate	  objective)	   enables	   actors	   to	   form	   linkages	  between	  their	   own	   specific	   circumstances	   –	   such	   as	   ongoing	  work,	   relationships	   and	  expertise	   –	   and	   the	   underlying	   issue.	   It	   is	   not	   that	   some	   central	   authority	  divides	   the	   rendering	   into	   components;	   rather,	   it	   is	   that	   the	   rendering	  becomes	  a	  basis	   to	   frame	  and	  configure	   the	  work	  of	  diverse	  and	  distributed	  actors.	   Indeed,	   it	   is	   this	   work	   that	   forms	   linkages	   between	   the	   underlying	  problem	   and	   entities	   of	   various	   scales	   and	   scopes.	   Climate	   change,	   this	  chapter	  argues,	  is	  made	  amenable	  to	  disaggregation	  through	  the	  two	  degrees	  target.	   For	   example,	   emissions	   trajectories	   may	   be	   calculated	   that	   are	  consistent	   with	   a	   two	   degrees	   target.	   These	   trajectories	   enable:	   the	  benchmarking	   of	   reductions	   in	   national	   GHG	   emissions,	   the	   analysis	   of	   the	  transition	   to	   low-­‐carbon	   modes	   of	   production	   in	   specific	   sectors,	   and	   the	  setting	   of	   corporate	   targets	   that	   are	   consistent	   with	   the	   global	   vision	   for	  addressing	   climate	   change.	   Section	   4.3	   illustrates	   this	   disaggregation	   of	   the	  two	  degrees	  target	  to	  highlight	  the	  influence	  of	  a	  common	  vision	  in	  orienting	  diverse	  and	  distributed	  efforts	  to	  address	  climate	  change.	  In	  particular,	   this	  disaggregation	  of	   the	   two	  degrees	   target	  highlights	  the	  new	  demands	  placed	  on	  carbon	  accounting	  as	  it	  is	  called	  upon	  to	  “enable	  the	  diverse	  forms	  of	  carbon	  governance”	  (Larrinaga	  2014,	  p.2).	  At	  the	  national	  level,	  Parties	   to	   the	  UNFCCC	  may	  base	   their	   targets	  and	  policy	   strategies	   for	  working	  towards	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	  on	  a	  wider	  set	  of	  metrics	  than	  CO2,	  or	  GHG,	   data	   alone.	   Emissions	   intensity	   targets,	   for	   example,	   require	   the	  combination	   of	   national	   GHG	   information	  with	   forecasts	   of	   GDP	   growth.	   On	  the	   other	   hand,	   ‘policy	   targets’	   (such	   as,	   among	   others,	   renewable	   energy,	  energy	   efficiency,	   and	   forestry)	   present	   a	   commensuration	   challenge	   in	  arriving	   at	   estimates	   for	  GHG	   impact	   of	   those	  policies	   that	   can	  be	   combined	  with	   other	   Parties’	   contributions	   to	   provide	   an	   aggregate	  measure	   of	   global	  emissions	  reductions.	  These	  stem	  from	  the	  post-­‐Copenhagen	  mode	  of	  climate	  governance	   that	  prioritises	   the	   flexibility	  with	  which	  Parties	  may	   contribute	  towards	   global	   climate	   objectives,	   shifting	   away	   from	  a	   the	  Kyoto	  Protocol’s	  UNFCCC-­‐determined	   GHG	   reduction	   targets	   (Falkner,	   Stephan,	   and	   Vogler	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Morgan’s	  work	   also	   attends	   to	  aggregation,	   where	   poorly	   visible	   or	   complex	   issues	  are	   brought	   together	   into	   an	   aggregate	   form	   that	   provides	   actors	   with	   a	   particular	  way	  of	  seeing	  the	  problem.	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2010;	  Falkner	  2016).	  That	  is,	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	  has	  become	  the	  common	  vision	   for	   Parties	   to	  work	   towards,	   yet	   the	   flexibility	   of	   approaches	   for	   that	  work	   present	   new	   challenges	   to	   national-­‐level	   carbon	   accounting.	   This	  chapter	  highlights	  these	  challenges,	  and	  argues	  that	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  2015	  Paris	   Agreement	   presents	   an	   opportunity	   to	   “investigate	   the	   dynamics	   of	  accounting	  systems	  of	  governance	  as	  they	  emerge”	  (Bebbington	  and	  Larrinaga	  2014a,	  p.207).	  The	  chapter	  is	  structured	  as	  follows.	  Section	  4.1	  explores	  the	  emerging	  debates	   on	   the	   costs	   of	   climate	   change	   and	   a	   variety	   of	   targets	   for	   guiding	  action	  between	  1967	  and	  1992.	  In	  particular,	  this	  traces	  the	  idea	  of	  setting	  a	  long-­‐term	  target	  for	  tackling	  climate	  change	  as	  a	  basis	  for	  economic	  analyses	  of	  cost-­‐effective	  policy	  responses.	  Section	  4.2	  investigates	  efforts	  to	  define	  the	  United	   Nations	   Framework	   Convention	   on	   Climate	   Change’s	   (UNFCCC)	  objective	   of	   preventing	   ‘dangerous	   anthropogenic	   interference’	   with	   the	  climate	   system	   as	   well	   as	   the	   growing	   support	   for	   the	   two	   degrees	   target	  between	   1992	   and	   2009.	   Specifically,	   the	   section	   highlights	   how	   the	   two	  degrees	  target	  became	  a	  central	  objective	   in	   international	  climate	  debates	  as	  its	   flexibility	   enabled	   it	   to	  mediate	   between	   science,	   politics	   and	   economics.	  Section	  4.3	  analyses	  actions	   surrounding	   the	   two	  degrees	   target	   after	   it	  was	  formally	   noted	   in	   the	   2009	   Copenhagen	   Accord.	   The	   section	   also	   illustrates	  several	   instances	   of	   disaggregation	   following	   the	   stabilisation	   of	   the	   two	  degrees	   target.	   Section	   4.4	   discusses	   the	   chapter’s	   findings,	   and	   Section	   4.5	  offers	  concluding	  remarks.	  
4.1.	   1967-­‐1992:	   TARGET-­‐BASED	   ASSESSMENTS	   OF	  
‘COST-­‐EFFECTIVE’	  GHG	  CONTROL	  STRATEGIES	  	  
4.1.1.	  CLIMATE	  SENSITIVITY:	  A	  LINK	  BETWEEN	  TEMPERATURE	  AND	  CO2	  	  The	   discovery	   of	   climate	   change	   dates	   back	   to	   1859	   when	   the	   Irish	  physicist	   John	  Tyndall	   demonstrated	   that	   several	   gases	   could	   block	   infrared	  radiation	   from	   leaving	   the	   planet	   (Weart	   2008,	   p.3).	   However	   it	   was	   the	  Swedish	  scientist	  Svante	  Arrhenius	  who,	  in	  the	  late-­‐19th	  century,	  investigated	  the	  impact	  of	  a	  doubling	  of	  atmospheric	  carbon	  dioxide	  (CO2)	  concentrations	  on	   global	   mean	   temperatures	   (Arrhenius	   1896).	   Such	   studies	   (also	   see	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Chamberlin	  1899)	   examined	  potential	   causes	  of	   the	  Prehistoric	   Ice	  Age,	   and	  were	  motivated	  by	  concerns	  of	   similar	  upcoming	  glacial	   shifts	   (Maslin	  2014,	  p.15).	  In	  1896	  Arrhenius	  calculated	  the	  Earth’s	  climate	  sensitivity	  –	  defined	  as	  the	  temperature	  responses	  to	  a	  doubling	  of	  CO2	  emissions	  –	  as	  6°C.	  However	  his	  work	  received	  little	  attention	  in	  the	  first	  half	  of	  the	  20th	  century,	  when	  the	  work	   of	   climatologists	   centred	   on	   producing	   data	  with	  which	   farmers	   could	  forecast	   crop	   yields	   and	   engineers	   could	   assess	   the	   flood	   risks	   over	   the	  lifetime	  of	  a	  bridge	  (Weart	  2008,	  p.10).	  In	  1938	  Guy	  Callendar,	  a	  British	  steam	  engineer	   and	   amateur	   climatologist,	   presented	   the	   first	   evidence	   that	   the	  planet	  had	  warmed	  to	  the	  UK’s	  Royal	  Meteorological	  Society	  (Callendar	  1938).	  His	   paper,	   The	   Artificial	   Production	   of	   Carbon	   Dioxide	   and	   its	   Influence	   on	  
Temperature,	   also	   calculated	   the	   Earth’s	   climate	   sensitivity	   as	   2°C	   (Ibid.,	  p.231).	  As	  with	  Arrhenius	  and	  Chamberlin’s	  studies,	  Callendar	  focussed	  on	  the	  causes	  and	  possible	  prevention	  of	  glacial	  shifts.	  Noting	  that	  “the	  combustion	  of	  fossil	   fuel	   […]	   is	   likely	   to	   prove	   beneficial	   to	   mankind	   in	   several	   ways”,	   he	  concludes	  that	  there	  are	  sufficient	  fossil	  fuels	  to	  produce	  “at	  least	  ten	  times	  as	  much	  carbon	  dioxide	  as	  there	  is	   in	  the	  air	  at	  present”	  and	  that	  “the	  return	  of	  the	  deadly	  glaciers	  should	  be	  delayed	  indefinitely”	  (Ibid.,	  p.236).	  	  During	   the	   Second	   World	   War	   meteorology	   became	   seen	   as	   an	  important	   source	   of	   information,	  with	  military	   strategists	   seeking	   improved	  weather	   forecasting	   to	   factor	   into	   battle	   planning	   (Weart	   2008,	   p.20).	  Following	   the	  war	  new	  courses	   in	  meteorology	   continued	   to	  be	   taught	   –	   for	  example	   at	   the	   University	   of	   Chicago	   and	   the	   Massachusetts	   Institute	   of	  Technology	  (MIT)	  –	  and	  the	  Office	  for	  Naval	  Research	  was	  established	  to	  fund	  small-­‐scale	  projects	  (Ibid.,	  p.21).	   It	  was	  based	  on	  research	  conducted	  shortly	  after	  the	  Second	  World	  War	  that	  Plass	  argued	  human	  actions	  would	  warm	  the	  planet	   by	   1.1°C	   per	   century	   (Plass	   1956).	   Research	   into	   the	   relationship	  between	  CO2	  and	  temperature	  change	  continued,	  with	  a	  meeting	  of	  ecologists,	  chemists,	   physicists	   and	   other	   experts27	  in	   1963	   suggesting	   that	   the	   current	  trends	   in	   CO2	   emissions	   could	   lead	   to	   warming	   of	   3.8°F	   (2.1°C)	   (Eichhorn	  1963,	  p.i).	  By	  the	  late-­‐1960s,	  the	  meteorologists	  Syokuro	  Manabe	  and	  Richard	  Wetherald,	  working	   in	   the	  United	   States’	   National	   Oceanic	   and	  Atmospheric	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  These	   other	   experts	   included	   an	   oceanographer	   from	   the	   US	   Fish	   and	   Wildlife	  Service,	  the	  aforementioned	  Gilbert	  Plass	  –	  then	  working	  in	  the	  Aeronautical	  Division	  of	   the	   Ford	   Motor	   Company	   –	   and	   a	   meteorologist	   from	   the	   International	  Meteorological	  Institute	  in	  Stockholm.	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Administration	   (NOAA),	   similarly	   found	   that	   climate	   sensitivity	   was	  approximately	   2°C	   (Manabe	   and	  Wetherald	  1967).	   Their	  more	   sophisticated	  1975	   model	   refined	   this	   to	   3°C	   (Manabe	   and	   Wetherald	   1975).	   Numerous	  studies	   of	   climate	   sensitivity	   emerged	   across	   the	   1960s	   and	   1970s	   as	   the	  meteorological	   community	   worked	   to	   reinforce	   warnings	   of	   changes	   to	   the	  global	   climate	   that	   could	   result	   from	   burning	   fossil	   fuels	   (Schneider	   1975,	  p.2060).	  In	  Schneider’s	  summary	  of	  these	  studies,	  he	  suggests	  that	  “a	  state-­‐of-­‐the-­‐art	   order-­‐of-­‐magnitude	   estimate	   is	   suggested	   between	   1.5	   and	   3	   K	  [Kelvin28],	   but	   that	   the	   combined	   effects	   of	   improperly	   modelled	   climatic	  feedback	  mechanisms	   could,	   roughly,	   enhance	   or	   reduce	   this	   estimate	   by	   as	  much	  as	  a	  factor	  of	  4”	  (Schneider	  1975,	  p.2061).	  Despite	   the	   range	   of	   average	   temperature	   increases	   suggested	   by	  climate	   sensitivity	  models,	   the	   studies	   prompted	   the	  United	   States’	   Office	   of	  Science	   and	   Technology	   and	   Policy	   to	   request	   the	   National	   Academy	   of	  Sciences	  to	  undertake	  a	  critical	  assessment	  of	  the	  scientific	  basis	  of	  the	  results.	  The	   request	   was	   premised	   on	   the	   “incontrovertible	   evidence	   that	   the	  atmosphere	   is	   indeed	   changing	   and	   that	   we	   ourselves	   contribute	   to	   that	  change”	   (Charney	   1979,	   p.vii)	   and	   sought	   to	   produce	   a	   foundation	   for	  assessing	   “the	   implications	  of	   this	   issue	   for	  national	  and	   international	  policy	  planning”	   (Ibid.).	   Chaired	   by	   the	   American	   meteorologist	   Jule	   Charney,	   the	  report	   adopted	   the	   climate	   sensitivity	   heuristic	   and	   found	   that	   if	   CO2	  concentration	   in	   the	   atmosphere	   doubled	   from	   current	   concentrations,	   and	  remained	   so	   until	   temperatures	   stabilised,	   then	   the	   best	   estimate	   is	   that	  “changes	   in	  global	   temperature	  of	   the	  order	  of	  3°C	  will	  occur	  and	   that	   these	  will	   be	   accompanied	   by	   significant	   changes	   in	   regional	   climatic	   patterns”	  (Charney	  1979,	  p.17),	   refined	  elsewhere	   in	   the	   report	   as	  having	   “a	  probable	  error	   of	   ±	  1.5°C”	   (Charney	   1979,	   p.2).	   Commenting	   on	   the	   findings	   in	   the	  Forward	   to	   the	   1979	  Charney	  Report	   the	   Chairman	  of	   the	   Climate	  Research	  Board	   of	   the	   National	   Research	   Council,	   Verner	   Suomi,	   stated	   “[i]f	   carbon	  dioxide	  continues	   to	   increase,	   the	  study	  group	   finds	  no	  reason	   to	  doubt	   that	  climate	  changes	  will	  result	  and	  no	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  these	  changes	  will	  be	  negligible”	  (Charney	  1979,	  p.viii).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  A	   temperature	   interval	   of	  one	  degree	  Celsius	   (°C)	   is	  equal	   to	  one	  Kelvin,	  with	   the	  range	  suggested	  in	  the	  quote	  therefore	  being	  equal	  to	  1.5°C	  to	  3°C.	  The	  conversion	  of	  
specific	  temperatures	  can	  be	  made	  using	  the	  formula	  [K]	  =	  [°C]	  +	  273.15.	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However	   before	   considering	   how	   the	   scientific	   debates	   on	   climate	  sensitivity	  featured	  in	  global	  warming	  debates	  in	  the	  1980s	  this	  chapter	  turns	  its	   attention	   to	   the	   emergence	   of	   economic	   analyses	   of	   climate	   policy,	  beginning	  with	  the	  American	  economist	  William	  Nordhaus’	  work	   in	  the	  mid-­‐1970s.	  
4.1.2.	  TARGET-­‐SETTING	  AS	  A	  BASIS	  FOR	  COST-­‐BENEFIT	  ANALYSIS	  In	   1974	   the	   33-­‐year	   old	   American	   economist	   William	   Nordhaus	  became	  a	  Research	  Scholar	  at	  the	  International	  Institute	  for	  Applied	  Systems	  Analysis	  (IIASA)	  in	  Laxenburg,	  Austria.	  IIASA	  had	  been	  established	  in	  October	  1972	  as	  a	  centre	  for	  “liaison	  between	  the	  scientists	  of	  East	  and	  West”	  (IIASA	  2013)	  with	  twelve	  member	  nations.29	  In	  negotiations	  over	  the	  IIASA’s	  agenda,	  the	   Club	   of	   Rome	   founder	   and	   first	   president,	   Aurelio	   Peccei,	   had	   been	   a	  strong	  advocate	  for	  a	  focus	  on	  interdisciplinary	  research	  on	  global	  modelling	  (Ibid).30	  This	  also	  had	  the	  support	  of	  the	  founder	  of	  the	  Canadian	  Association	  for	   the	   Club	   of	   Rome,	   J.	   Rennie	  Whitehead,	   and	   the	  Deputy	   Chairman	   of	   the	  USSR’s	  State	  Committee	  for	  Science	  and	  Technology,	  Jermen	  Gvishiani	  (also	  a	  member	   of	   the	   Club	   of	   Rome).	   However	   Lord	   Zuckerman,	   representing	   The	  Royal	  Society	  from	  the	  UK,	  was	  sceptical	  of	  application	  of	  global	  modelling	  in	  the	   Club	   of	   Rome’s	  The	   Limits	   to	  Growth	   (Meadows	   et	   al.	   1972),	   which	   had	  been	  published	   shortly	   before	   the	   IIASA	  was	   founded.	   Based	   on	   a	   computer	  simulation	  conducted	  by	  researchers	  at	  MIT,	  The	  Limits	  to	  Growth	  set	  out	  the	  argument	  that	  the	  exponential	  economic	  and	  population	  growth,	  paired	  with	  only	   linear	   technological	  advancement,	  could	  not	  be	  supported	  beyond	  2100	  (Ibid.).	   Yet	   Lord	   Zuckerman	   saw	   no	   value	   in	   applying	   a	   global	   modelling	  approach	   to	   what	   he	   saw	   as	   an	   argument	   dating	   back	   to	   the	   industrial	  revolution	   (Masood	   2016,	   p.80).	   The	   USA’s	   National	   Academy	   of	   Sciences	  “shared	  his	  dim	  view	  of	  global	  modelling”	  (Brooks	  and	  McDonald	  1997,	  p.3),	  and	   Lord	   Zuckerman	   threatened	   to	   withdraw	   The	   Royal	   Society	   from	   the	  IIASA.	   This	   resulted	   in	   an	   agreement	   that	   the	   institute	   would	   only	   host	  conferences	  to	  review	  contributions	  to	  global	  modelling	  and	  not	  conduct	  work	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  The	   12	   member	   nations,	   as	   listed	   in	   the	   IIASA’s	   1972	   Charter,	   were	   the	   USSR,	  Canada,	  the	  Czechoslovak	  Socialist	  Republic,	  France,	  the	  German	  Democratic	  Republic,	  Japan,	   the	   Federal	   Republic	   of	   Germany,	   the	   People’s	   Republic	   of	   Bulgaria,	   the	  USA,	  Italy,	  Poland	  and	  the	  UK	  (IIASA	  1972).	  30	  Global	  modelling	  entails	  the	  forecasting	  of	  current	  human	  activity	  on	  “overarching	  problems	  which	   confront	   humankind”	   (Peccei	   1982,	   p.92),	  with	   the	   Club	   of	   Rome’s	  
Limits	  to	  Growth	  being	  identified	  as	  the	  first	  global	  model	  (Meadows	  et	  al.	  1972).	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on	   the	   topic	   (IIASA	   2013).	   However	   while	   Lord	   Zuckerman	   dismissed	  pollution	   as	   a	   potential	   risk	   to	  mankind	   (Masood	   2016,	   p.80),	   research	   into	  environmental	  issues	  were	  established	  as	  a	  core	  theme	  in	  IIASA	  projects	  from	  its	  outset	  (Boehmer-­‐Christiansen	  1994).	  It	   was	   during	   his	   year	   at	   IIASA,	   conducting	   research	   into	   energy	  policies,	   that	   Nordhaus	   shared	   an	   office	   with	   a	   climatologist	   who	   first	  introduced	   him	   to	   the	   issue	   of	   global	   warming	   (Harris	   2014).	   Nordhaus	   is	  quoted	   saying	   “’My	   own	   first	   serious	   research	   on	   global	   warming	   started	  when	   I	   spent	   a	   year	   in	   Vienna	   at	   IIASA’”	   (IIASA	   2006,	   p.19),	   where	   he	  produced	   the	   first	   economic	   model	   of	   global	   warming	   as	   a	   working	   paper,	  titled	  Can	  we	  Control	  Carbon	  Dioxide?.	  Nordhaus	   thanks	   the	  physical	   chemist	  Cesare	  Marchetti	  and	   the	  meteorologist	  Allan	  Murphy	   in	   that	  working	  paper	  for	  helping	  him	  navigate	  the	  climatic	  literature	  (Nordhaus	  1975b,	  p.1),	  which	  he	  used	  to	  provide	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  cycle	  through	  which	  CO2	  emissions	  have	  effects	   on	   agricultural	   production,	   on	   production	   or	   destruction	   of	   land	   and	  capital,	   and	  on	  amenity	   (Ibid.,	  pp.	  4-­‐6).	  He	   frames	   these	   “as	   the	  effects	  of	   an	  uncontrolled	   development”	   where	   “the	   energy	   system	   and	   emissions	   of	  carbon	  dioxide	  evolve	  simply	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  economic	  forces”	  (Ibid.,	  p.6).	  “Put	  differently,”	  Nordhaus	  writes,	  “the	  externalities	  of	  carbon	  dioxide	  are	  ignored”	  (Ibid.).	  As	  such	  the	  problem	  studied	  in	  his	  working	  paper	  is	  not	  merely	  “how	  can	  we	  limit	  the	  concentration	  of	  atmospheric	  carbon	  dioxide	  to	  a	  reasonable	  level?”	  rather	  it	  is	  specifically	  addressing	  “how	  much	  would	  a	  control	  path	  cost	  if	  it	  were	  implemented	  on	  an	  efficient	  basis?”	  (Ibid.,	  p.9).	  The	  question	  was	  not	  only	  one	  of	  controlling	  carbon	  dioxide	  emissions.	  It	  was	  focused	  on	  the	  cost	  of	  controls	  in	  order	  to	  ‘efficiently’	  curb	  those	  emissions.	  To	  formulate	  the	  control	  of	  CO2	  into	  a	  problem	  amenable	  to	  economic	  analysis,	   Nordhaus	   identified	   what	   he	   referred	   to	   as	   “arbitrarily	   given	  standards”	   (Ibid.,	   p.22).	   By	   this	   he	   meant	   that	   he	   knew	   of	   “no	   attempts	   to	  suggest	   what	   might	   be	   reasonable	   standards,	   or	   limits	   to	   set	   in	   a	   planning	  
framework”	   (Ibid.,	   emphasis	   added)	   and	   so	   selected	   what	   appeared	  “reasonable”	  to	  him:	  “the	  climatic	  effects	  of	  carbon	  dioxide	  should	  be	  kept	  well	  within	   the	   normal	   range	   of	   long-­‐term	   climatic	   variation”	   (Ibid.).	   Nordhaus	  argued	   that	  most	   sources	   take	   long-­‐term	   variation	   to	   be	   ±5°C,	   and	   that	   the	  global	   climate	  was	   in	   the	  upper	  half	  of	   this	   range	   (Ibid.,	  p.23).	  Based	  on	   this	  Nordhaus	  stated:	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“If	  there	  were	  global	  temperatures	  more	  than	  2	  or	  3°C.	  above	  the	  current	  average	  temperature,	  this	  would	  take	  the	  climate	  outside	  of	   the	   range	  of	  observations	  which	  have	  been	  made	  over	  the	  last	  several	  hundred	  thousand	  years”	  (Ibid.).	  Nordhaus	   was	   attempting	   to	   convert	   the	   climatic	   literature	   into	   a	  specific	   quantified	   limit.	   This	   was	   to	   provide	   the	   basis	   for	   his	   economic	  analysis	  of	  the	  efficient	  control	  of	  CO2	  emissions.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  specified	   limit	   for	   controlling	   global	   warming	  was	   essential	   to	   an	   economic	  framing	  of	  the	  problem.	  Yet	  a	  temperature	  target	  could	  not	  be	  factored	  into	  his	  economic	  analysis.	  Rather,	  Nordhaus	  drew	  from	  the	   latest	  climate	  sensitivity	  literature,	   which	   estimated	   a	   temperature	   response	   of	   0.6	   to	   2.4°C	   to	   a	  doubling	   of	   current	   atmospheric	   CO2	   levels,	   assuming	   “a	   doubling	   of	  atmospheric	   concentration	   of	   carbon	   dioxide	   is	   a	   reasonable	   upper	   limit”	  (Ibid.,	   p.23).	   However	   it	   should	   be	   noted	   that	   this	   limit	   was	   issued	   with	   a	  strong	  caveat	  in	  the	  working	  paper:	  “The	   standards	   proposed	   here,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   reasoning	  behind	  it,	  are	  extremely	  tentative.	  It	  must	  be	  emphasized	  that	  the	  process	  of	  setting	  standards	  used	  in	  this	  section	  is	  deeply	  unsatisfactory,	  both	  from	  an	  empirical	  point	  of	  view	  and	  from	  a	  theoretical	  point	  of	  view.	  We	  can	  only	  justify	  the	  standards	  set	   here	   as	   rough	   guesses;	  we	   are	   not	   certain	   that	  we	   have	  even	  judged	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  desired	  movement	  in	  carbon	  dioxide	   correctly,	   to	   say	   nothing	   of	   the	   quantitative	   levels.”	  (Ibid.,	  p.24,	  emphasis	  in	  original)	  The	  findings	  developed	  in	  the	  working	  paper	  were	  refined	  and	  in	  1977	  
The	  American	  Economic	  Review	  published	   the	   paper,	   titled	  Economic	  Growth	  
and	  Climate:	  The	  Carbon	  Dioxide	  Problem,	   in	   an	   issue	   containing	   ‘the	   Papers	  and	   Proceedings	   of	   the	   Eighty-­‐ninth	   Annual	   Meeting	   of	   the	   American	  Economic	   Association’	   (Nordhaus	   1977b).	   Indeed,	   after	   returning	   to	   his	  Assistant	   Professorship	   at	   Yale	   University,	   Nordhaus	   presented	   his	   paper,	  
Long	   Run	   Impact	   of	   Energy	   Use	   on	   Climate,	   in	   the	   ‘Natural	   Resource	   and	  Environmental	   Constraints	   on	   Growth’	   session	   at	   the	   1976	   American	  Economic	  Association	  meeting	   in	  Atlantic	  City,	  New	  Jersey	  (Nordhaus	  1976).	  The	   chairperson	   of	   this	   session	  was	   John	  Krutilla,	   a	   pioneer	   of	   conservation	  economics	   (the	   valuation	   of	   undisturbed	   natural	   environments.	   See	   Krutilla	  1967)	  who	  was	  serving	  as	  a	  Senior	  Fellow	  at	  Resources	  for	  the	  Future,	  a	  non-­‐profit	   organisation	   conducting	   economic	   analyses	   of	   natural	   resource	   and	  environmental	   issues.	   This	   exposed	   Nordhaus’	   work	   to	   the	   early	  environmental	  economics	  movement	  beyond	  the	  confines	  of	   IIASA.	  His	  1977	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paper	  argued	   that,	  out	  of	   the	   range	   “wolf-­‐cries”	   (Nordhaus	  1977b,	  p.1)	   from	  scientists	  on	   the	  potential	   harms	  of	   future	   economic	   growth,	   climate	   change	  was	  an	  issue	  that	  “should	  be	  taken	  very	  seriously”	  (Ibid.).	  Identifying	  Manabe	  and	  Wetherald	   (1975)	   as	   the	  most	   careful	   climate	   sensitivity	   study	   to	   date,	  Nordhaus	   highlighted	   that	   an	   increase	   in	   global	   mean	   temperatures	   of	   3°C	  would	   “take	   the	   climate	  outside	  of	   any	   temperature	  pattern	  observed	   in	   the	  last	   100,000	   years”	   (Nordhaus	   1977b,	   p.342).31	  Nordhaus	   summarises	   the	  potential	   future	  temperature	   increases	  using	  the	  graph	  reproduced	  in	  Figure	  4.1,	  identifying	  2°C	  as	  the	  estimated	  maximum	  warming	  over	  the	  past	  100,000	  years.	  	   Having	   reviewed	   the	   latest	   climate	   sensitivity	   research	   and	  approximated	   that	   temperatures	   be	   held	   within	   the	   maximum	   temperature	  increase	  experienced	  over	  the	  last	  100,000	  years,	  Nordhaus	  (1997b)	  examines	  the	  costs	  of	  policy	  responses	  to	  control	  the	  level	  of	  warming.	  The	  paper	  states	  two	  key	  aspects	  of	  control	  strategies,	  the	  first	  being	  a	  feasibility	  at	  a	  scientific	  level	  and	  the	  second	  being	  “a	  way	  to	  decentralize	  the	  controls	  so	  that	  nations,	  producers,	   and	   consumers	   have	   proper	   incentives	   to	   implement	   the	   control	  strategy	   on	   an	   individual	   level”	   (Nordhaus	   1977b,	   p.342).	   To	   address	   the	  second	   aspect,	   Nordhaus	   builds	   a	   ‘carbon	   tax’	   into	   his	   mathematical	  programming	  problem.	  The	  first,	  he	  claims,	  is	  satisfied	  by	  the	  substitutability	  of	  non-­‐fossil	  fuels	  for	  fossil	  fuel	  sources	  of	  energy.	  Nordhaus,	  solving	  what	  he	  defined	  as	  an	  optimisation	  problem,	  finds	  that	  the	  cost	  of	  limiting	  the	  increase	  in	   atmospheric	   CO2	   to	   100%	   (i.e.	   a	   doubling)	   would	   be	   $87	   billion	   in	   1975	  prices	  (Ibid.,	  pp.345-­‐6)	  and	  would	  only	  require	  a	  reduction	  in	  emissions	  after	  the	   year	   2000.	   He	   concludes	   that	   an	   efficient	   programme	   for	   controlling	  carbon	   dioxide	   concentrations	   is	   feasible	   and	   “requires	   little	   change	   in	   the	  energy	   allocation	   for	   20	   to	   40	   years”	   (Ibid.).	   This,	  Nordhaus	   suggests,	   offers	  reasons	   for	   optimism	   on	   the	   potential	   of	   carbon	   dioxide	   controls,	   which	  should	  be	  guided	  by	  the	  question:	  “How	  costly	  are	  the	  projected	  changes	  in	  (or	  the	  uncertainties	  about)	  the	  climate	  likely	  to	  be,	  and	  therefore	  to	  what	  level	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  In	   1977	   Nordhaus	   also	   presented	   this	   work	   as	   a	   discussion	   paper	   at	   the	   Cowles	  Foundation	   for	   Research	   in	   Economics	   at	   Yale	   University.	   This	   discussion	   paper	  maintained	   that	   “[a]s	   a	   first	   approximation,	   it	   seems	   reasonable	   to	   argue	   that	   the	  climatic	  effects	  of	  carbon	  dioxide	  should	  be	  kept	  within	  the	  normal	  range	  of	  long-­‐term	  climatic	  variation”	  (Nordhaus	  1977a,	  p.39),	  and	  refined	  the	  limit	  as:	  “[w]ithin	  a	  stable	  climate	   regime,	   such	   as	   the	   current	   interglacial,	   a	   range	   of	   variation	   of	   2°C	   is	   the	  normal	  variation”	  (Ibid.	  p.40).	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control	   should	  we	  aspire?”	   (Ibid.,	   p.346).	   In	  other	  words,	  he	  argued	   that	   the	  specification	   of	   a	   target	   for	   ‘acceptable’	   climatic	   change	   was	   crucial	   to	  analysing	  an	  ‘optimal’	  cost-­‐effective	  response	  to	  the	  problem.	  
	  
It	  was	  in	  the	  1983	  Changing	  Climate	  report	  produced	  by	  the	  National	  Research	   Council’s	   Carbon	   Dioxide	   Assessment	   Committee	   –	   of	   which	  Nordhaus	  was	  one	  of	  nine	  members	  and	  lead	  author	  of	  one	  of	  the	  report’s	  nine	  sections	   –	   that	  Nordhaus’	  work	  was	   consolidated	  with	   research	   into	   climate	  sensitivity.	  The	  Committee	  was	   formed	  under	   the	  National	  Research	  Council	  in	  response	  to	  mounting	  Congressional	  interest	  in	  the	  United	  States	  (National	  Research	   Council	   1983,	   p.x).	   From	   1980	   to	   1983,	   it	   worked	   to	   produce	   a	  comprehensive	   assessment	   of	   climate	   science	   and	   policy	   advice	   on	   climate	  change,	  which	  it	  presented	  in	  its	  1983	  report.	  It	  maintained	  that	  policymakers	  would	  be	  wise	  to	  be	  concerned	  about	  any	  “prospective	  change	  in	  some	  major	  index	  of	   climate,	   like	   the	  mean	   annual	   global	   atmospheric	   temperature,	   that	  goes	   beyond	   the	   boundary	   of	   values	   believed	   to	   have	   been	   experienced	  throughout	   the	   history	   of	   civilization”	   (National	   Research	   Council	   1983,	  p.455).	  	  	  
Figure	  4.1:	  “Past	  and	  projected	  global	  mean	  temperature,	  relative	  to	  1880-­‐84	  mean.	  Solid	  curve	  up	  to	  1970	  is	  actual	  temperature.	  Broken	  curve	  from	  1970	  on	  is	  projection	  using	  1970	  actual	  as	  a	  base	  and	  adding	  the	  estimated	  increase	  due	  to	  uncontrolled	  buildup	  of	  atmospheric	  carbon	  dioxide”	  (Nordhaus	  1977a,	  p.3).	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Moreover,	   the	   report	   develops	   a	   framework	   for	   assessing	   and	  selecting	   policies,	   and	   was	   intended	   to	   “lend	   itself	   to	   different	   levels	   of	  universality”	   and	   “be	   susceptible	   of	   disaggregation”	   (National	   Research	  Council	   1983,	   p.457).	   That	   is,	   it	   would	   set	   out	   the	   possible	   responses	   to	  climate	  change	  so	  as	  to	  render	  the	  problem	  into	  a	  form	  amenable	  to	  control	  by	  diverse	   and	   distributed	   actors.	   A	   similar	   ‘disaggregation’	   was	   seen	   as	  desirable	  in	  models	  of	  the	  energy	  system,	  centring	  on	  the	  idea	  that	  “experts	  in	  individual	   areas	   (such	   as	   analysts	   specializing	  only	   in	   the	  U.S.	   economy	  or	   a	  particular	   fuel	   source)	   can	   evaluate	   the	   detailed	   forecasts	   and	   assumptions”	  (Ibid.,	   p.161).	   In	   other	   words,	   the	   models	   referred	   to	   in	   the	   report	   went	  beyond	   overarching	   analyses	   of	   energy	   supply,	   demand	   and	   prices	   when	  facing	  CO2	  constraints.	  They	  also	  provided	  data	  on	  their	  component	  parts	  and	  were	   “flexibly	   designed”	   (Ibid.)	   to	   enable	   their	   application,	   evaluation	   and	  refinement	   across	   a	   diversity	   of	   distributed	   efforts	   to	   factor	   global	  warming	  into	  planning	  and	  policy-­‐making.	  Borrowing	  from	  accounting	  terminology,	  the	  report	   similarly	   proposed	   that	   frameworks	   for	   evaluating	   policy	   choices	  should	  not	  stipulate	  “some	  ‘bottom	  line.’	  	  There	  will	  be	  as	  many	  bottom	  lines	  as	   there	   are	   users	   of	   the	   framework,	   according	   to	   their	   interests	   and	  responsibilities	   over	   space,	   time,	   and	   people”	   (National	   Research	   Council	  1983,	   p.463).	   As	  with	   Nordhaus’	   view	   of	   establishing	   a	   target	   as	   a	   common	  basis	  for	  economic	  analyses,	  the	  framework	  was	  to	  simultaneously	  enable	  and	  align	  efforts	  across	  various	  policy-­‐making	  entities	  to	  develop	  local	  responses	  to	  the	  global	  problem.	  	  In	   addition	   to	   identifying	   climatic	   impacts	   at	   different	   levels	   of	  warming	   –	   such	   as	   reduction	   in	   quality	   and	   quantity	   of	   water	   resources	   in	  western	  United	  States	  at	  2°C	  (Ibid.,	  pp.421-­‐2)	  and	  sea	  level	  rise	  of	  about	  70cm	  at	   3°C	   to	   4°C	   (Ibid.,	   pp.435-­‐6)	   –	   the	   report	   details	   the	   timing	   of	   necessary	  emissions	   limits	   to	  remain	  below	  certain	  concentrations	  of	  atmospheric	  CO2.	  Nordhaus	  acts	  as	  the	  lead	  author	  in	  this	  section,	  synthesising	  recent	  research	  on	  the	  economy,	  energy	  and	  CO2	  emissions	  to	  further	  inform	  the	  “likely	  costs	  and	  benefits	  of	  alternative	  CO2	  control	  or	  adaptation	  strategies”	  (Ibid.,	  p.181).	  In	   particular	   he	   draws	   together	   the	   research	   to	   construct	   “action	   initiation	  times”	  (Ibid.,	  p.168),	  the	  years	  when	  reductions	  in	  the	  use	  of	  fossil	  fuels	  would	  need	   to	   begin	   in	   order	   to	   limit	   CO2	   in	   the	   atmosphere	   at	   different	  concentrations,	   depending	   on	   the	   initial	   growth	   rate	   of	   annual	   carbon	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emissions.	  From	  his	  assessment	  he	  draws	  severe	  warnings	  regarding	  current	  efforts	   to	   understand	   the	   intersection	   of	   climate	   change,	   economics	   and	  energy	  policy:	  “There	   is	  not	  one	  U.S.	   long	  range	  global	  energy	  or	  economic	  model	   that	   is	   being	   developed	   and	   constantly	   maintained,	  updated	  with	  documentation,	  and	  usable	  by	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  groups.	   […]	   Efforts	   to	   evaluate	   the	   effectiveness	   for	   CO2	  control	   of	   energy	  policies	   of	   particular	   nations	   or	   groups	  of	  nations	   in	   a	   globally	   consistent	   framework	   have	   been	  lacking”	  (National	  Research	  Council	  1983,	  p.173).	  	  	   Nordhaus	   hails	   the	   “considerable	   progress”	   (National	   Research	  Council	  1983,	  p.181)	  made	  by	  the	  scholars	  whose	  research	  was	  synthesised	  in	  his	   contribution,	   calling	   for	   “a	   strong	   fundamental	   research	   program”	   in	  economic	   and	   energy	   modelling	   as	   a	   prerequisite	   for	   the	   international	  response	   to	   climate	   change.	   Defining	   a	   target	   concentration	   of	   atmospheric	  CO2,	   according	   to	   the	   1983	  Changing	  Climate	  report,	   should	   be	   the	   basis	   for	  determining	   the	   most	   cost-­‐effective	   energy	   policy	   to	   enable	   the	   transition	  away	  from	  fossil	  fuels	  (Ibid.).	  This	  section	  now	  turns	  to	  demonstrate	  how	  the	  target-­‐based	  approach	  to	  policy	  appraisal	  of	  the	  Changing	  Climate	  report	  came	  to	  shape	  the	  idea	  of	  addressing	  climate	  change	  as	  it	  rose	  on	  political	  agendas.	  
4.1.3.	  A	  TARGET-­‐BASED	  APPROACH	  TO	  CONTROLLING	  CLIMATE	  CHANGE	  
CLIMATE	   SCIENCE	   CONFERENCES	   AND	   THE	   CONCEPT	   OF	   TARGET-­‐BASED	  
MANAGEMENT	  By	   the	   late-­‐1970s	   and	   early-­‐1980s,	   evidence	   on	   climate	   change,	  through	   the	   array	   of	   reports	   and	   conferences	   on	   the	   issue,	   had	   raised	  awareness	   at	   an	   international	   level	   (Agrawala	   1998,	   p.614).	   The	   World	  Meteorological	  Organisation	  (WMO)	  –	  seeking	  to	  extend	  its	  expertise	  beyond	  forecasts	   of	   natural	   and	   man-­‐made	   climatic	   changes	   and	   to	   include	   the	  formulation	   of	   policy	   responses	   –	   convened	   the	   First	   World	   Climate	  Conference	   in	  1979	   (Ibid.).	   	  Bringing	   together	  experts	   in	   science,	  economics,	  industry,	  agriculture	  and	  government,	  the	  WMO	  requested	  that	  the	  conference	  “review	   and	   approve	   an	   International	   Plan-­‐of-­‐Action	   for	   the	   study	   of	   the	  impacts	   of	   climate	   upon	   society”	   (Ibid.,	   p.9).	   The	   conference,	   however,	   set	  aside	   the	   “interesting	   and	   important	   questions	   of	   goals”	   (WMO	   1979,	   p.24),	  while	   noting	   that	   international	   co-­‐operation	   on	   climate	   change	   must	   be	  developed	   as	   an	   essential	   element	   in	   addressing	   the	   issue.	   The	   conference	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carved	   out	   four	   elements	   of	   a	   research	   agenda	   (Ibid.,	   p.715)	   that	   would	  reinforce	   the	   evidence	   of	   climatic	   change	   and	   its	   relevance	   to	   policymakers:	  assessing	   relative	   roles	   of	   natural	   and	   anthropogenic	   influences	   on	   climate	  change;	   developing	   climatic	   data,	   including	   “climate-­‐related	   geophysical,	  biological	   and	   socio-­‐economic	   data.”	   (Ibid.,	   p.719);	   creating	   methods	   for	  applying	   knowledge	   of	   the	   climate	   system	   to	   planning,	   development	   and	  management	  in	  the	  food,	  water,	  energy	  and	  health	  sector;	  and	  the	  translation	  of	   climate	   variability	   and	   changes	   into	   their	   impacts	   on	   human	   activities.	  Taken	   together,	   this	   creation	   of	   data	   and	   methods	   sought	   to	   provide	   a	  framework	   for	   planning	   decisions	   that,	   the	   report	   stated,	   “are	   of	   great	  importance	  for	  economic	  development,	  particularly	  in	  the	  developing	  nations”	  (Ibid.,	  p.728).	  Furthermore,	  “the	  basic	  objective”	  of	  applying	  this	  data	  was	  “to	  assist	  societies	  to	  improve	  their	  capabilities	  to	  carry	  out	  various	  activities,	  and	  
to	   obtain	   maximum	   economic	   and	   social	   benefit	   under	   different	   climatic	  conditions	  while	  maintaining	  environmental	  integrity.”	  (Ibid.,	  p.729,	  emphasis	  added).	  	  Building	   on	   the	   foundations	   created	   at	   the	   First	   World	   Climate	  Conference,	   the	   International	   Council	   of	   Scientific	   Unions	   (ICSU),	   United	  Nations	   Environment	   Programme	   (UNEP)	   and	   the	   WMO	   held	   a	   series	   of	  conferences	  in	  Villach,	  Austria,	  in	  1980,	  1983	  and	  1985.	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  1981	  marked	  the	  start	  of	  the	  Reagan	  Administration	  in	  the	  US,	  which	  deemed	  research	   into	   carbon	   dioxide	   as	   unnecessary	   and	   moved	   to	   cut	   related	  funding.	   In	   this	   regard,	   resistance	   to	   global	   warming	   as	   a	   political	   issue	  provided	  the	  backdrop	  to	  the	  Villach	  conferences,	  especially	  in	  the	  US	  (Weart	  2008,	   pp.140–142).	   However	   understanding	   of	   potential	   climatic	   changes	  developed	  significantly	   through	  these	  conferences,	  with	  the	  1985	  conference	  statement	  reading:	  “in	  the	   first	  half	  of	   the	  next	  century	  a	  rise	  of	  global	  mean	  temperature	  would	  occur	  which	  is	  greater	  than	  any	  in	  man’s	  history”	  (World	  Climate	  Programme	  et	  al.	  1986,	  p.1).	   	  In	  that	  same	  year,	  and	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  ensure	   follow-­‐up	   on	   conclusions	   from	   the	   Villach	   1985	   conference,	   ICSU,	  UNEP	  and	  WMO	  created	  the	  Advisory	  Group	  on	  Greenhouse	  Gases	  (AGGG)	  to	  conduct	   biennial	   reviews	   of	   research	   on	   GHGs	   and	   to	   assess	   the	   rates	   and	  impacts	  of	   increases	   in	  concentrations	  of	  CO2	   (Potter	  1986).	  While	  Agrawala	  documents	  the	  “crucial	  shortcomings”	  of	  the	  AGGG	  (Agrawala	  1998,	  p.610),	  it	  was	  central	  to	  a	  pair	  of	  conferences	  in	  1987	  that	  began	  developing	  long-­‐term	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goals	  for	  tackling	  climate	  change	  and	  responded	  to	  conclusions	  reached	  at	  the	  1985	  Villach	  conference.	  Funded	   in	  part	  by	   the	  Rockefeller	  Brothers	  Fund	  and	   the	  Rockefeller	  Foundation, 32 	  a	   two-­‐stage	   workshop	   process	   was	   designed	   to	   provide	   a	  synthesis	   of	   the	   latest	   evidence	   of	   climatic	   change.	   The	   first	   workshop	   was	  based	   on	   the	   impact	   of	   increased	   concentrations	   of	   GHGs	   –	   discussed	   from	  28th	  September	  to	  2nd	  October	  1987	  in	  Villach	  –	  in	  order	  to	  inform	  the	  second	  workshop,	   which	   explored	   “policy	   steps	   that	   should	   be	   considered	   for	  implementation	   in	   the	   near	   term”	   (Jäger	   1988,	   p.iii)	   –	   discussed	   from	   9th	   to	  11th	  November	  in	  Bellagio,	  Italy.	  Forty-­‐eight	  scientists	  and	  technical	  experts	  –	  including	  two	  representatives	  from	  both	  IIASA	  and	  Resources	  for	  the	  Future	  –	  attended	   the	   October	   Villach	   workshop,	   while	   twenty-­‐four	   participants	  attended	   the	   November	   Bellagio	   workshop	   and	   ranged	   from	   scientists	   and	  technical	   experts	   to	   representatives	   of	   government	   agencies,	   NGOs,	   and	  development	   funds	   from	   around	   the	   world	   (Ibid.,	   pp.43-­‐7).	   Discussions	   on	  long-­‐term	  environmental	  targets	  were	  central	  to	  discussions,	  with	  the	  report	  from	   these	   workshops	   stated	   that	   “planning	   and	   decision-­‐making	   could	   be	  facilitated	  by	  the	  use	  of	  long-­‐term	  environmental	  targets”	  (Ibid.,	  p.v)	  and	  that	  there	  was	  a	  need	  for	  “detailed	  comparisons	  of	  the	  costs	  of	  various	  strategies”	  (Ibid.).	  On	  the	  latter,	  the	  conference	  suggested	  a	  framework	  for	  assessing	  the	  relative	  costs	  of	  limiting	  and	  adapting	  to	  climatic	  changes	  as	  well	  as	  resulting	  externalities,	  and	  that	  these	  should	  be	  assessed	  across	  three	  policy	  scenarios:	  business	  as	  usual,	  moderate	  efforts,	  and	  concerted	  efforts	  (Jäger	  1988,	  pp.28–9.	   Also	   see	   Appendix	   4B).	   Furthermore,	   the	   report	   recommended	   that	   cost	  comparisons	  be	  made	  at	  the	  national-­‐	  and	  local-­‐levels.	  This	  reflected	  the	  view	  that	   limitation	   strategies	  would	   be	   negotiated	   at	   the	   international	   level	   and	  implemented	   at	   the	   national	   level,	   while	   adaptation	   strategies	   would	   be	  implemented	  at	  a	  local	  level	  due	  to	  the	  regional	  specificity	  of	  climate	  impacts	  (Ibid.,	  p.30).	  	  On	   long-­‐term	   environmental	   targets,	   the	   Villach-­‐Bellagio	   report	   (the	  summary	  of	  discussions	  and	  recommendations	   from	  the	  conferences	  written	  by	   Jill	   Jäger)	   can	   be	   thought	   of	   as	   identifying	   three	   interconnected	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32 	  Funding	   was	   also	   provided	   by	   the	   United	   Nations	   Environment	   Programme	  (UNEP),	  The	  German	  Marshall	  Fund	  of	  the	  US,	  The	  Austrian	  Ministry	  for	  Environment,	  Youth	   and	   Family,	   the	   Swedish	   Energy	   Research	   Commission,	   and	   the	   US-­‐based	  W.	  Alton	  Jones	  Foundation.	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coordination	  problems	  and	  suggesting	  avenues	  for	  further	  research	  to	  remedy	  these. 33 	  The	   first	   coordination	   issue	   was	   to	   develop	   “some	   procedural	  mechanism	   […]	   to	   guide	   planning	   and	   decision-­‐making”	   (Ibid.,	   p.21).	  Specifically	  relating	   to	  such	  a	  mechanism,	   the	  report	  states,	   “the	  use	  of	   long-­‐term	   environmental	   targets,	   such	   as	   the	   rate	   of	   temperature	   change	   or	   sea-­‐level	  change,	  would	  be	  extremely	  advantageous	  as	  a	  management	  tool”	  (Ibid.).	  In	  this	  regard,	  where	  the	  National	  Research	  Council’s	  Changing	  Climate	  report	  concluded	   that	   a	   long-­‐term	   target	  would	   provide	   the	   basis	   for	   planning	   and	  policy-­‐making,	   the	   Villach-­‐Bellagio	   workshops	   concluded	   that	   such	   a	   target	  could	  also	  guide	  planning	  across	  regulatory	  authorities.	  	  A	  goal	  of	   limiting	  warming	   to	  0.1°C	  per	  decade	  was	  proposed	  on	   the	  basis	   of	   observations	   that	   natural	   ecosystems	   and	   societies	   have	   limited	  capacity	   to	  successfully	  adapt	   to	  higher	   rates	  of	  warming	   (Ibid.,	  p.25).	  While	  the	   0.1°C	   per	   decade	   target	  was	   the	   focus	   of	   the	   Villach-­‐Bellagio	   report,	   the	  conference	   also	   recognised	   historical	   experience	   of	   adaptation	   was	   in	   the	  range	   of	   2cm	   to	   3cm	   sea	   level	   rise	   per	   decade,	   although	   it	   noted	   that	   this	  occurred	   during	   periods	   of	   approximately	   0.1°C	  warming	   per	   decade	   (Ibid.,	  p.22).	   It	   further	   stated	   that	   these	   ‘rate	   of	   change’	   targets	   “could	   be	  supplemented	   with	   absolute	   limits	   on	   temperature	   […]	   since	   unlimited	  warming	  at	  any	  rate	  much	  sooner	  or	   later	  become	  problematic”	  (Ibid.,	  p.21).	  As	  such,	  establishing	  a	  long-­‐term	  target	  would	  both	  enable	  analyses	  of	  policy	  responses	  to	  global	  warming	  and	  ensure	  that	  the	  basis	  for	  policy	  responses	  at	  the	  national-­‐	  and	  local-­‐levels	  were	  guided	  in	  a	  similar	  direction.	  The	   second	  coordination	   issue	  was	  managing	  a	  period	  of	   adjustment	  to	  bring	  efforts	   into	   alignment	  with	   the	   long-­‐term	   target,	   rather	   than	   calling	  for	  regulations	  that	  sought	  to	  immediately	  constrain	  activities	  and	  bring	  them	  in	  line	  with	  a	  rate	  of	  change	  target.	  In	  other	  words	  the	  delegates	  envisioned	  a	  more	   gradual	   alignment	   that	   avoided	   ‘shocks’	   to	   the	   regulated	   industries.	  Interim	  targets	  were	  suggested	  as	  a	  way	  to	  guide	  this	  adjustment	  phase.	  These	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  However	  it	  should	  be	  recognised	  that	  the	  Villach-­‐Bellagio	  report	  primarily	  set	  out	  ideas	   for	   developing	   an	   international	   mechanism	   to	   guide	   efforts	   to	   limit	   GHG	  emissions	   and	   adapt	   to	   climatic	   impacts.	   For	   example,	   on	   the	   question	   of	  differentiated	   targets	   for	   developed	   and	   developing	   countries,	   while	   the	   report	  declared	   “It	   is	   obvious	   that	   the	   developed	   countries	   have	   greater	   possibilities	   for	  controlling	  emissions.	  […]	  It	  might	  be	  appropriate	  to	  set	  different	  emissions	  goals	  for	  the	   developed	   and	   developing	   countries”	   (Ibid.,	   p.25),	   this	   remained	   a	   matter	   for	  future	  deliberation.	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can	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  a	  constraint	  compared	  to	  the	  ‘business	  as	  usual	  scenario’,	  which	  would	   gradually	   be	   strengthened	   until	   regulations	  were	   aligned	  with	  the	  long-­‐term	  environmental	  target.	  Moreover,	  the	  conference	  concluded	  that	  advances	   in	   scientific	   knowledge	   and	   economic	   analyses	   of	   policy	   options	  were	   likely.	   Interim	   targets	   were	   seen	   as	   a	   way	   to	   increase	   the	   pace	   of	  adjustment	  as	  such	  developments	  were	  made,	  being	  adjusted	  to	  reflect	  these	  advances	  where	  it	  was	  “justifiable	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  estimated	  costs	  of	  achieving	  the	   required	   emission	   goals”	   (Ibid.,	   p.26).	   To	   reiterate,	   while	   a	   long-­‐term	  climate	   target	   was	   viewed	   as	   essential	   for	   cost-­‐effective	   control	   of	   climate	  change,	   economic	   shocks	   would	   be	   avoided	   by	   a	   gradual	   transition	   of	  economies	   towards	   alignment	   with	   the	   target.	   As	   such,	   economic	   feasibility	  was	   embedded	   in	   the	   target-­‐based	   management	   of	   climate	   change	   in	   these	  early	  climate	  workshops,	  both	  in	  analysing	  the	   ‘optimal’	   level	  of	  GHG	  control	  and	  in	  the	  timeline	  for	  adjustments.	  	  The	   third	   challenge	   of	   coordination	  was	   that	   the	  warming	   effects	   of	  each	   GHG	   were	   different,	   increasing	   the	   complexity	   of	   assessments	   across	  GHGs.	  While	   it	   was	   possible	   to	   set	   a	   target	   based	   on	   an	   absolute	   or	   rate	   of	  change	   in	   temperature,	  an	  agreement	  was	  required	  on	  how	  to	  convert	   these	  temperature	  targets	  into	  a	  GHG	  target.	  The	  conference	  had	  concluded	  that	  the	  former	   could	   be	   based	   on	   observations	   of	   natural	   variations	   in	   the	   climate	  system	   and	   pace	   at	   which	   natural	   systems	   could	   adapt;	   however	   the	  conversion	   into	   GHG	   targets	   was	   necessary	   for	   analysing	   control	   strategies	  and	  implementing	  policies.	  The	  Villach-­‐Bellagio	  report	  recommended	  that	  “all	  GHGs	  must	  be	  made	   intercompatible”	  (Ibid.,	  p.33)	  through	  a	  concept	  such	  as	  ‘CO2	  equivalent’	  (CO2e)34	  to	  “allow	  a	  total	  emissions	  picture	  to	  be	  obtained	  in	  warming	  terms”	  (Ibid.).	  	  The	   conference	   had	   identified	   potential	   coordination	   problems	   and	  concluded	   with	   avenues	   for	   research	   and	   negotiations	   to	   overcome	   these	  issues.	   In	  doing	  so	  the	  Villach-­‐Bellagio	  workshops	  sought	  to	  enable	  the	  three	  management	   steps	   envisaged	   as	   the	   ideal	   process	   for	   guiding	   strategies	   to	  control	  climatic	  changes:	  “first,	   determine	   the	   target	   (e.g.	   rate	   of	   global	   surface	  temperature	   change)	   that	   should	   be	   reached	   if	   large-­‐scale	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  This	  is	  detailed	  in	  the	  report	  as	  “expressing	  the	  amount	  of	  each	  GHG	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  amount	  of	  CO2	  that	  would	  produce	  the	  same	  radiative	  effect”	  (Jäger	  1988,	  p.33).	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environmental	   and	   social	   problems	   are	   to	   be	   avoided;	  second,	   specify	   the	   changes	   of	   rates	   of	   GHG	   emissions	   that	  would	   be	   needed	   to	   reach	   this	   target;	   third,	   regulate	   GHG	  emissions	   so	   that	   the	   environmental	   target	   can	  be	   reached”	  (Ibid.,	  p.33).	  It	  is	  necessary	  to	  note	  two	  observations	  regarding	  the	  Villach-­‐Bellagio	  workshops.	   First,	   as	   with	   Nordhaus’	   work	   and	   the	   1983	   Changing	   Climate	  report,	   defining	   a	   long-­‐term	   climate	   target	   was	   central	   to	   rendering	   the	  problem	   of	   global	   warming	   ‘manageable’.	   Specifically,	   setting	   a	   target	   was	  seen	  as	  providing	  a	  basis	  for	  analyses	  of	  policy	  options,	  and	  in	  doing	  so	  could	  simultaneously	   guide	   national-­‐	   and	   local-­‐level	   policy	   towards	   a	   common	  global	  direction.	  Second,	  the	  conference	  mapped	  out	  three	  management	  steps	  to	   implementing	   regulations	   that	   would	   guide	   actions	   towards	   a	   long-­‐term	  target,	   identifying	   coordination	   challenges	   and	   suggesting	   potential	   avenues	  for	  research	  to	  resolve	  these.	  As	  such,	  the	  conference	  not	  only	  established	  the	  idea	  of	  coordination	  towards	  a	  common	  long-­‐term	  target,	   it	  also	  envisaged	  a	  decentred	   response	   to	   this	   target	   through	  national-­‐	   and	   local-­‐level	  planning.	  However,	   as	   noted,	   the	   Villach-­‐Bellagio	   workshops	   set	   out	   ideas	   for	  responding	  to	  global	  warming.	  It	  was	  in	  the	  late-­‐1980s,	  to	  which	  this	  section	  now	   turns,	   that	   questions	   of	   developing	   international	   treaties	   on	   climate	  change,	   deciding	   on	   the	   appropriate	   long-­‐term	   environmental	   target,	   and	  creating	   mechanisms	   such	   as	   those	   proposed	   at	   the	   Villach-­‐Bellagio	  conference	  would	  appear	  on	  the	  political	  agenda.	  
CLIMATE	  CHANGE	  ON	  THE	  INTERNATIONAL	  POLITICAL	  AGENDA	  The	   Toronto	   Conference,	   The	   Changing	   Atmosphere:	   Implications	   for	  
Global	  Security,	  coincided	  with	  an	  intense	  heat	  wave	  in	  North	  America	  during	  the	   summer	   of	   1988,	   capturing	   the	   attention	   of	   the	   media	   that	   had	  increasingly	  connected	  severe	  weather	  events	  to	  climate	  change	  during	  1987	  and	   early-­‐1988	   (Torrance	   2006,	   pp.45–6). 35 	  Co-­‐sponsored	   by	   UNEP	   and	  hosted	   by	   the	   Canadian	   Government,	   The	   Toronto	   conference	   “attracted	   so	  many	  reporters	  that	  extra	  press	  rooms	  had	  to	  be	  added	  to	  handle	  the	  hordes	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  Agrawala	   (1998)	   notes	   “The	   years	   1987	   and	   1988	   were	   marked	   by	   severe	   heat	  waves	   in	   North	   America,	   Hurricane	   Gilbert	   struck	   the	   Caribbean	   and	   caused	   more	  than	  $1	  billion	   in	  damage,	   there	  was	  a	   freak	  hurricane	   in	   the	  English	  Channel	  and	  a	  chunk	  of	   ice	  approximately	  100	  miles	   long	  and	  25	  miles	  wide	  broke	  off	   the	  coast	  of	  Antarctica.	   These	   events	   contributed	   to	   heightened	   public	   concern	   both	   on	   the	  possibility	  of	  warming	  trends	  and	  the	  possibility	  of	  increased	  risk	  to	  extreme	  climatic	  events”	  (Agrawala	  1998,	  p.608).	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of	   descending	   journalists”	   (Schneider	   1989,	   p.194).36	  Moreover,	   Agrawala	  credits	   the	   former	   head	   of	   the	   Canadian	   Meteorological	   Service,	   Howard	  Ferguson,	   with	   generating	   “high	   level	   political	   participation	   including	   a	   few	  heads	   of	   state”	   (Agrawala	   1998,	   p.610).37	  In	   its	   powerful	   framing	   of	   the	  problems	   facing	   the	   world,	   the	   conference	   statement	   begins:	   “Humanity	   is	  conducting	  an	  unintended,	  uncontrolled,	  globally	  pervasive	  experiment	  whose	  ultimate	   consequences	   could	   be	   second	   only	   to	   a	   global	   nuclear	  war”	   (F.	   K.	  Hare	   1988,	   p.292).	   The	   conference	   also	   expressed	   support	   for	   the	  Intergovernmental	   Panel	   on	   Climate	   Change	   (IPCC)	   –	   which	   had	   been	  developed,	   following	   a	   1987	   WMO	   Executive	   Council	   resolution	   (Agrawala	  1998,	  p.612),	  by	  the	  WMO	  and	  UNEP	  and	  set	  up	  with	  the	  mandate	  “to	  examine	  climate	   science,	   impacts,	   and	   response	   strategies”	   (Ibid.,	   p.616)	   38 	  –	   to	  continue	   assessments	   of	   scientific	   results	   and	   initiate	   discussions	   between	  governments	  on	  responses	  and	  strategies	  (F.	  K.	  Hare	  1988,	  p.298).	  	  The	  first	  highlight	  from	  the	  Toronto	  conference	  was	  the	  ‘Toronto	  goal’	  to	  “[r]educe	  CO2	  emissions	  by	  approximately	  20%	  of	  1988	  levels	  by	  the	  year	  2005	   as	   an	   initial	   global	   goal”	   (Ibid.,	   p.296).	   The	   final	   conference	   statement	  provided	  no	  supporting	  analysis	  for	  this	  goal,	  however	  Levy	  et	  al.	  (2001)	  claim	  that	   at	   the	   time	   “there	  was	   a	   crude	  notion	   that	   a	  50	  percent	   carbon	  dioxide	  reduction	   would	   have	   some	   effect	   in	   stabilising	   CO2	   concentrations	   in	   the	  atmosphere,	  but	  50	  percent	  was	  clearly	  too	  ambitious	  in	  political	  terms”	  (M.	  A.	  Levy	  et	  al.	  2001,	  p.99).	  The	  authors	  go	  on	  to	  argue	  that	  instead	  of	  a	  50%	  goal,	  “NGOs	  chose	  a	  pragmatic	  target	  for	  CO2	  reductions	  of	  20	  percent	  to	  be	  met	  by	  the	  year	  2000”	   and	   that	   “[m]ost	   saw	   the	  20	  percent	   target	  only	   as	   an	   initial	  step”	   (Ibid.).	  Following	   the	  conference	   the	  Toronto	  goal	  primarily	   influenced	  target	  setting	  at	  the	  municipal	  level	  (Ibid.,	  pp.99-­‐101),	  having	  little	  impact	  on	  national-­‐level	  GHG	  targets	  partly	  because	  several	  nations,	  including	  the	  United	  Kingdom,	   dismissed	   the	   goal	   as	   “arbitrary”	   and	   “formulated	   primarily	   by	   a	  group	  of	  NGOs”	   (Ibid.,	   p.101).	  The	  authors	   argue,	  however,	   that	   the	  Toronto	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  Levy	   et	  al.	   (2001)	   similarly	   note	   the	  media	   coverage	   of	   “the	  North	   American	   hot	  summer	   of	   1988”,	   while	   also	   highlighting	   that	   “400	   members	   of	   the	   international	  press	  who	  had	  come	  to	  Toronto	  to	  cover	  the	  G7	  meeting	  [in	  the	  week	  prior]	  stayed	  on	  to	  cover	  the	  Toronto	  Conference	  on	  Climate	  Change”	  (M.	  A.	  Levy	  et	  al.	  2001,	  p.100).	  37	  Two	   heads	   of	   state	   attended	   the	   1988	   Toronto	   conference	   (Krause,	   Bach,	   and	  Koomey	   2013,	   p.6),	   the	   Prime	   Ministers	   of	   Norway	   (Gro	   Harlem	   Brundtland)	   and	  Canada	  (Martin	  Brian	  Mulroney).	  38	  For	   a	   detailed	   account	   of	   the	   IPCC’s	   emergence	   refer	   to	   the	   insightful	   work	   of	  Shardul	  Agrawala	  (1998).	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goal	  broadened	  the	  climate	  debate.	  They	  attribute	  this,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  to	  the	  mobilisation	  of	  the	  Toronto	  goal	  by	  advocates	  at	  the	  domestic-­‐level,	  who	  used	  it	  to	  initiate	  debates	  on	  measures	  for	  meeting	  the	  goal.	  The	  authors	  also	  argue,	  on	   the	   other	   hand,	   that	   the	   goal	   stimulated	   assessments	   of	   alternative	  measures	   for	   addressing	   global	   warming	   at	   the	   national	   level,	   such	   as	  reducing	   GHGs	   other	   than	   CO2	   and	   the	   potential	   to	   remove	   CO2	   from	   the	  atmosphere	  (Ibid.).	  	  The	   second	   highlight	   from	   the	   conference	   was	   for	   governments	   to	  “[i]nitiate	   the	   development	   of	   a	   comprehensive	   global	   convention	   as	   a	  framework	   for	   protocols	   on	   the	   protection	   of	   the	   atmosphere”	   (F.	   K.	   Hare	  1988,	   p.297).	   This	   ‘global	   convention’	  would	   provide	   a	   regular	  meeting	   and	  guidelines	   for	   developing	   and	   negotiating	   an	   intergovernmental	   mechanism	  for	   addressing	   climate	   change.	   In	   other	   words,	   where	   earlier	   talks	   had	  developed	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  long-­‐term	  target	  and	  the	  mechanisms	  for	  orienting	  policies	  towards	  that	  target,	  the	  global	  convention	  would	  provide	  a	  forum	  for	  states	   to	  negotiate	   the	  specifics	  of	  an	   international	   response	   to	   the	  problem.	  The	   conference	   statement	   recommended	   that	   this	   should	   be	   “vigorously	  pursued”	  at	  high-­‐level	  conferences	   in	  1989	  and	  1990	  “with	  a	  view	  to	  having	  the	  principles	  and	  components	  of	  such	  a	  convention	  ready	  for	  consideration	  at	  the	   Intergovernmental	   Conference	   on	   Sustainable	   Development	   in	   1992”	  (Ibid.,	  pp.298).	  	  
4.1.4.	  CLIMATE	  CHANGE	  THRESHOLDS	  AND	  A	  GLOBAL	  CLIMATE	  CONVENTION	  In	   1989,	   building	   on	   the	   Toronto	   conference,	   the	   first	   high-­‐level	  intergovernmental	   talks	   on	   climate	   change	   took	   place	   at	   the	   Noordwijk	  ministerial	   meeting	   (Bodansky	   2001),	   organised	   by	   the	   Government	   of	   the	  Netherlands,	   UNEP	   and	  WMO.	   The	   Noordwijk	  Ministerial	   Declaration	   –	   that	  was	   adopted	   by	   67	   countries	   in	   November	   1989	   –	   stated,	   "[s]tabilizing	   the	  atmospheric	   concentrations	   of	   greenhouse	   gases	   is	   an	   imperative	   goal”	  (Noordwijk	  Declaration	  1989,	  p.10).	   It	   emphasised	   that	   a	   stronger	  goal	   than	  the	   20%	   by	   2005	   from	   1988	   levels	   proposed	   in	   Toronto	   was	   required	   for	  stabilization:	   “Some	   currently	   available	   estimates	   indicate	   that	   this	   could	  require	   a	   reduction	   of	   global	   anthropogenic	   greenhouse	   gas	   emissions	   by	  more	  than	  50%”	  (Ibid.).	  The	  Declaration	  further	  called	  on	  the	  IPCC	  “to	  report	  the	  best	  scientific	  knowledge	  as	   to	   the	  options	   for	  containing	  climate	  change	  within	  tolerable	  limits”	  (Ibid.).	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In	   its	   First	   Assessment	   Report,	   the	   IPCC	   synthesised	   the	   latest	  research	  into	  climatic	  changes,	  producing	  a	  foundation	  for	  policy	  discussions	  (IPCC	  1990,	  p.vi)	  and	  centring	  on	  responses	  in	  the	  period	  up	  to	  2010.	  Indeed	  this	   report	   focussed	   on	   assessing	   the	   latest	   climate	   science	   to	   provide	   an	  authoritative	   scientific	   basis	   for	   policy	  making.	  However	  work	   on	   long-­‐term	  goals	   fell	  outside	   the	   IPCC’s	  scope,	   leaving	   the	  calls	   from	  the	  Villach-­‐Bellagio	  conference	   for	   research	   into	   target	   setting	   unanswered.	   The	   research	   of	   the	  second	  working	   group	   (WG2)	   of	   the	   AGGG,	   however,	   had	   “grown	   out	   of	   the	  results	  of	  the	  two-­‐stage	  workshop	  process	  held	  in	  Villach	  and	  Bellagio	  in	  late	  1987”	   (Rijsberman	  and	  Swart	  1990,	  p.iii)	  and	  sought	   to	  drive	   this	  agenda.	   It	  attempted	  to	  do	  so	  by	  providing	  supporting	  material	   to	  the	  IPCC	  that	  was	  to	  be	  incorporated	  in	  its	  assessment	  of	  the	  latest	  research	  on	  climate	  change.	  To	  reiterate,	   the	   IPCC’s	   initial	   work	   was	   a	   response	   to	   concerns	   regarding	   the	  scientific	  basis	  for	  climate	  change.	  As	  such,	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  climate	  debate	  was	  shifting	  away	  from	  target	  setting	  as	  a	  basis	  for	  guiding	  GHG	  limitation	  policies.	  This,	  however,	  was	  central	  to	  the	  work	  of	  AGGG’s	  WG2.	  Stating	  their	  concern	  that	   the	   IPCC’s	   work	   did	   not	   balance	   the	   need	   to	   simultaneously	   advance	  scientific	  knowledge	  and	  implement	  GHG	  control	  policies,	  the	  report	  reads:	  “Although	   important	   scientific	   uncertainties	   remain,	   they	  should	   not	   keep	   us	   from	   implementing	   policies	   that	   would	  help	   achieve	   the	   targets	   identified	   here.	   Rather,	   the	  uncertainties	   should	   be	   used	   as	   a	   reason	   to	   periodically	  review	  and	  adjust	  targets”	  (Ibid.,	  p.iii)	  AGGG’s	   WG2	   specifically	   investigated	   “the	   utility	   and	   feasibility	   of	  incorporating	   long-­‐term	   objectives	   into	   national	   and	   international	   climate	  policy”	  (Ibid.,	  p.iv),	  arguing	  “it	  is	  now	  time	  to	  define	  long-­‐term	  environmental	  goals	   as	   a	   basis	   for	   short-­‐term	   emission	   targets”	   (Ibid.).	   The	   authors	   stated	  that	  while	  the	  “underlying	  objective	  of	  all	  climate	  policies	  is	  to	  limit	  effects	  or	  impacts	  of	   climatic	  change	  on	  society	   to	  socially	  acceptable	   levels	   […]	   [s]uch	  general	  objectives	   […]	  are	  difficult	   to	  define	  clearly	  and	  provide	  no	  basis	   for	  implementation”	  (Ibid.,	  p.vii).	  As	  such,	  the	  report	  –	  which	  AGGG	  presented	  as	  supporting	   material	   for	   the	   IPCC’s	   assessments	   of	   latest	   research	   –	   details	  three	   sets	   of	   indicators	   based	   upon	   which	   targets	   could	   be	   set	   to	   guide	  planning	  and	  policy	  implementation.	  The	  first	  indicators	  were	  aimed	  at	  protecting	  coral	  reefs	  and	  avoiding	  the	   complete	   submersion	  of	   island	  states	   such	  as	   the	  Maldives.	  The	  working	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group	   recommended	   that	   sea-­‐level	   rise	   should	   be	   held	   to	   between	   20	   and	  50mm	  per	  decade	  as	  well	  as	  a	  target	  for	  absolute	  sea-­‐level	  rise	  of	  between	  0.2	  and	  0.5m	  above	  the	  1990	  global	  mean	  sea	  level	  (Ibid.,	  pp.54-­‐6).	  The	  second	  set	  of	  indicators	  was	  with	  regard	  to	  increases	  in	  mean	  global	  temperature.	  While	  the	   working	   group	  maintained	   the	   Villach-­‐Bellagio	   conference	   decision	   that	  the	  maximum	  rate	  of	  change	  should	  be	  0.1°C	  per	  decade,	  it	  also	  included	  two	  targets	   for	   total	   temperature	  change	   (Ibid.,	  p.viii).	   “A	  maximum	  temperature	  increase	  of	  1.0°C	  above	  pre-­‐industrial	  global	  mean	  temperature”	  (Ibid.,	  p.72)	  was	  recommended	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  beyond	  this	   level	  “unpredictable	  and	  non-­‐linear	   ecological	   responses	   may	   occur,	   leading	   to	   extensive	   ecosystem	  damage”	   (Ibid.).	   However	   should	   temperatures	   increase	   beyond	   this	   point,	  “[a]n	   absolute	   temperature	   limit	   of	   2°C	   can	   be	   viewed	   as	   an	   upper	   limit	  beyond	   which	   the	   risks	   of	   grave	   damage	   to	   ecosystems,	   and	   of	   non-­‐linear	  responses,	  are	  expected	  to	  increase	  rapidly”	  (Ibid.).	  	  CO2	   concentration	  was	   recommended	   as	   a	   third	   indicator	   that	   could	  translate	   these	   two	   temperature	   limits,	   with	   a	   330	   to	   400ppm	   (parts	   per	  million)	   maximum	   CO2e	   for	   the	   1°C	   target	   and	   400	   to	   560ppm	   for	   the	   2°C	  target.	  In	  this	  regard,	  CO2	  concentration	  targets	  primarily	  provided	  a	  means	  of	  converting	   temperature	   targets	   into	   GHG	   targets	   that	   could	   inform	   policy	  making,	   as	   per	   the	   outcome	  of	   the	  Villach-­‐Bellagio	   conference.	   In	   particular,	  the	   report	   represented	   these	   temperature	   and	   CO2	   concentration	   targets	  through	   a	   ‘traffic-­‐light’	   system	   of	   their	   associated	   risks	   (see	   Figure	   4.2),	  emphasising	   the	   risk	   levels	   associated	   with	   these	   different	   targets.	   This	   is	  noteworthy	  because	  prior	  studies	  had	  articulated	  2°C	  of	  warming	  as	  a	  target	  that	   was	   within	   the	   natural	   variation	   of	   the	   climate	   system.	   	   In	   contrast,	  AGGG’s	  WG2	  report	  emphasised	  that	  warming	  beyond	  2°C	  placed	  ecosystems	  at	   ‘High	   Risk’.	   While	   this	   was	   still	   based	   on	   analysis	   of	   the	   vulnerability	   of	  ecosystems	  to	  historic	   temperature	  changes,	   it	  attempted	  to	  reframe	  the	  2°C	  as	  a	  point	  beyond	  which	  the	  risk	  of	  damage	  to	  ecosystems	  is	  expected	  to	  rise	  rapidly	   and	   risked	   an	   increase	   in	   ‘nonlinear’	   climatic	   change	   (i.e.	   ‘chaotic’	  responses).	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  The	   AGGG’s	   submission	   of	   supporting	  materials	   to	   the	   IPCC	   claimed	  that	   the	   “underlying	   objective	   of	   all	   climate	   policies	   is	   to	   limit	   effects	   or	  impacts	  of	  climatic	  change	  on	  society	  to	  socially	  acceptable	  levels”	  (Ibid.,	  p.vii).	  However	   negotiations	   to	   establish	   an	   overarching	   objective	   for	   addressing	  global	   warming	   were	   central	   to	   the	   formation	   of	   a	   global	   convention	   on	  climate	   change.	   This	   global	   convention	   was	   established	   at	   the	   1992	   United	  Nations	  Conference	  on	  Environment	  and	  Development	   ‘Earth	  Summit’	   in	  Rio	  di	   Janeiro.	   Named	   the	   United	   Nations	   Framework	   Convention	   on	   Climate	  Change	  (UNFCCC),	  it	  was	  an	  international	  framework	  to	  guide	  negotiations	  on	  climate	   change	   treaties	   (Oppenheimer	  and	  Petsonk	  2005).	  When	  opened	   for	  signature	  on	  the	  4th	  of	  June	  1992,	  154	  nations	  signed	  the	  UNFCCC,	  committing	  in	  principle	   to	  participate	   in	  efforts	   to	  reduce	  atmospheric	  concentrations	  of	  GHGs.	   The	   specifics	   of	   these	   efforts	   were	   to	   be	   negotiated	   at	   climate	   talks	  (known	  as	  ‘Conferences	  of	  the	  Parties’	  (COPs),	  with	  a	  ‘Party’	  being	  a	  signatory	  of	   the	   UNFCCC),	   with	   those	   negotiations	   being	   guided	   by	   the	   framework	  established	   in	   the	  UNFCCC.	  However	  an	  overarching	  objective	  was	  agreed	   in	  1992,	   and	   efforts	   to	   reduce	   atmospheric	   concentrations	   of	   GHGs	   were	   to	  pursue	  this	  objective:	  
Figure	  4.2:	  Proposed	  targets	  for	  absolute	  temperature	  change	  and	  CO2-­‐equivalent	  concentrations	  (Rijsberman	  and	  Swart	  1990,	  p.ix)	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“The	   ultimate	   objective	   of	   this	   Convention	   and	   any	   related	  legal	   instruments	   that	   the	   Conference	   of	   the	   Parties	   may	  adopt	   is	   to	   achieve,	   in	   accordance	   with	   the	   relevant	  provisions	  of	  the	  Convention,	  stabilization	  of	  greenhouse	  gas	  concentrations	   in	   the	   atmosphere	   at	   a	   level	   that	   would	  
prevent	   dangerous	   anthropogenic	   interference	   with	   the	  
climate	  system.	  Such	  a	  level	  should	  be	  achieved	  within	  a	  time	  frame	   sufficient	   to	   allow	   ecosystems	   to	   adapt	   naturally	   to	  climate	   change,	   to	   ensure	   that	   food	   production	   is	   not	  threatened	  and	  to	  enable	  economic	  development	  to	  proceed	  in	   a	   sustainable	   manner”	   (UNFCCC	   1992,	   p.4,	   emphasis	  added).	  	  However	   the	   interpretation	   of	   ‘dangerous’,	   the	   target	   concentration	  for	  stabilising	  atmospheric	  GHGs,	  and	  how	  to	   ‘enable	  economic	  development	  in	   a	   sustainable	   manner’	   were	   not	   defined	   in	   1992.	   Rather,	   these	   would	  become	  the	  focus	  of	  target-­‐setting	  debates	  that	  sought	  to	  balance	  the	  various	  ideas	   and	   concerns.	   It	   is	   to	   the	  disagreements	   in	   the	   late-­‐20th	   and	   early-­‐21st	  century	   over	   the	   definition	   of	   ‘dangerous	   anthropogenic	   interference’	   and	  GHG	  stabilisation	  targets	  that	  this	  chapter	  now	  turns.	  
4.2.	  1992	  –	  2009:	  MEDIATING	  BETWEEN	  SCIENCE,	  
ECONOMICS	  AND	  POLITICS	  
4.2.1.	  EARLY	  EFFORTS	  TO	  INTERPRET	  ‘DANGEROUS’	  CLIMATE	  CHANGE	  Sparked	  by	  the	  agreement	  of	  the	  UNFCCC	  in	  1992,	  debates	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1990s	   grappled	   with	   interpretations	   of	   ‘dangerous	   anthropogenic	  interference’.	   Particularly	   prominent	   was	   the	   Second	   Assessment	   Report	   of	  the	   IPCC	   released	   in	   1995,	  whose	   synthesis	   report	   (summarising	   the	   output	  across	   all	   three	   of	   its	   working	   groups)	   dedicated	   an	   18-­‐page	   section	   to	   the	  “Synthesis	  of	  Scientific-­‐Technical	  Information	  Relevant	  to	  Interpreting	  Article	  2	   of	   the	  UN	  Framework	  Convention	   on	  Climate	   Change”	   (IPCC	  1995b,	   pp.1–18).	   These	   18	   pages	   outline	   the	   likely	   impacts	   of	   climate	   change	   across	  ecosystems,	   society	   and	   economies.	   In	   particular,	   under	   the	   section	   heading	  ‘Economic	  Development	  to	  Proceed	  in	  a	  Sustainable	  Manner’	  the	  report	  states:	  “The	  UNFCCC	  notes	   that	   responses	   to	   climate	   change	   should	  be	   coordinated	  with	  social	  and	  economic	  development	  in	  an	  integrated	  manner	  with	  a	  view	  to	  avoiding	  adverse	  impacts	  on	  the	  latter”	  (Ibid.,	  p.15.).	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  IPCC	  sought	   to	   balance	   economic	   and	   climatic	   impact	   concerns	   in	   producing	   a	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scientific	   basis	   for	   discussions	   on	   the	   level	   of	   anthropogenic	   interference	   in	  the	  climate	  system	  that	  would	  be	  ‘dangerous’.	  In	  this	  section	  of	  the	  synthesis	  report,	   it	   is	   suggested	   that	   cost-­‐effective	   policies	   will	   depend	   on	   economic	  instruments	  and	  incentives,	  paired	  with	  appropriate	  long-­‐run	  signals	  to	  allow	  consumers	  and	  producers	  to	  adapt	  in	  a	  similarly	  ‘cost-­‐effective’	  manner	  (Ibid.,	  p.17).	   Three	   different	   scenarios	   are	   presented	   in	   their	   summary,	   with	  warming	   of	   1°C	   by	   2100	   in	   the	   lowest	   emission	   scenario	   with	   low	   climate	  sensitivity,	  2°C	  in	  the	  mid-­‐range	  emissions	  scenario	  with	  a	  best	  estimate	  value	  of	  climate	  sensitivity,	  and	  3.5°C	  in	  a	  high	  emissions	  scenario	  with	  high	  climate	  sensitivity	   (Ibid.,	   p.5).	   While	   the	   report	   makes	   no	   attempt	   to	   categorise	  damages	  at	  different	  levels	  of	  warming,	  it	  notes	  that	  beyond	  3°C	  incidences	  of	  malaria	  would	   increase	  by	  10-­‐15%	  (Ibid.,	  p.8)	  and	   that	   research	  quantifying	  damages	  between	  2-­‐3°C	  of	  warming	  “tend	  to	  be	  a	  few	  per	  cent	  of	  world	  GDP,	  with,	   in	   general,	   considerably	   higher	   estimates	   of	   damage	   to	   developing	  countries	  as	  a	  share	  of	  their	  GDP”	  (Ibid.,	  p.15).	  Specifically	   within	   the	   UNFCCC	   process,	   the	   German	   Government	  hosted	  the	  first	  Conference	  of	  the	  Parties	  to	  the	  UNFCCC39	  (COP1)	  in	  Berlin	  in	  1995.	   In	   preparation	   for	   COP1,	   the	   German	   Government	   established	   the	  Scientific	   Advisory	   Council	   on	   Global	   Change	   (Wissenschaftlicher	   Beirat	   der	  Bundesregierung	  Globale	  Umweltveränderungen,	  or	  WBGU)	  in	  1992.	  As	  with	  the	   Villach-­‐Bellagio	   1987	   conference	   and	   the	   1990	   report	   of	   AGGG’s	   WG2,	  WBGU’s	  research	  adopted	  an	  “inverse	  scenario”	  or	  “backwards	  mode”	  (WBGU	  1995,	  p.1)	  of	  deriving	  CO2	   reduction	   targets.	  This	   first	   identified	  a	   “tolerable	  window”	   (Ibid.)	   for	   the	   maximum	   ecologically	   and	   economically	   bearable	  stress	   levels	   of	   climate	   change	   and	   then	   determined	   emissions	   profiles	   that	  would	  keep	   the	  climate	   system	  within	   that	  window.	  The	  1995	  WBGU	  report	  reasoned	   that	   a	   tolerable	   temperature	   window	   could	   be	   defined	   by	   the	  variations	   observed	   during	   the	   geological	   epoch	   shaping	   the	   present-­‐day	  environment	   (Ibid.,	  p.7).	  This	   range	  was	   from	  a	  mean	  minimum	  of	  10.4°C	   in	  the	   last	   ice	   age,	   to	   a	   mean	   maximum	   of	   16.1°C	   during	   the	   last	   interglacial	  period	  (Ibid.).	  The	  report	  further	  stated,	  without	  offering	  its	  reasoning,	  that	  “If	  
we	  extend	  the	  tolerance	  range	  by	  a	  further	  0.5°C	  at	  either	  end,	  then	  the	  tolerable	  
temperature	  window	  extends	  from	  9.9°C	  to	  16.6°C”	  (Ibid.,	  emphasis	  in	  original).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  The	  Conference	  of	  the	  Parties	  to	  the	  UNFCCC	  (or	  COP)	  refers	  to	  the	  annual	  climate	  talks	   where	   representatives	   of	   each	   nation	   that	   has	   signed	   the	   UNFCCC	   meet	   to	  negotiate	  climate	  treaties.	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With	   the	   1995	   mean	   global	   temperature	   at	   15.3°C,	   this	   implied	   that	   the	  tolerable	  16.6°C	  maximum	  was	  only	  1.3°C	  higher	  (Ibid.).	  This	  was	  equivalent	  to	  2°C	  above	  pre-­‐industrial	  temperatures	  (as	  reiterated	  in	  WBGU	  1997,	  pp.13–14).	  	   The	  1995	  WBGU	  report	  also	  noted	  that	  warming	  should	  be	  limited	  to	  an	   increase	   of	   0.2°C	   per	   decade	   in	   order	   to	   limit	   adaptation	   costs	   to	   5%	   of	  Gross	   Global	   Product,	   which	   the	   authors	   took	   to	   be	   the	  maximum	   tolerable	  limit	  on	  global	  society	  based	  on	  economic	  analyses	  of	  the	  level	  at	  which	  severe	  social	  and	  economic	  disruptions	  would	  occur	  (Ibid.,	  p.8).	  However	   this	   ‘rate-­‐of-­‐increase’	  target	  made	  no	  appearance	  in	  the	  Council	  of	  the	  European	  Union’s	  1996	  statement	  on	  the	  Community	  Strategy	  on	  Climate	  Change,	  which	  instead	  supported	   a	   long-­‐term	   climate	   target	   of	   limiting	   warming	   to	   2°C. 40	  Recognising	   the	   Second	   Assessment	   Report	   of	   the	   IPCC	   as	   the	   principle	  reference	  document	  (Council	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  1996,	  para.4),	  the	  Council	  noted	   that	   a	   doubling	   of	   CO2	   concentrations	   above	   pre-­‐industrial	   levels	  was	  likely	  to	  result	  in	  a	  2°C	  increase	  in	  global	  average	  temperatures	  above	  the	  pre-­‐industrial	   level	   (Ibid.,	   para.5).	   Its	   statement	   on	   the	   long-­‐term	   climate	   target	  reads:	   “Given	   the	   serious	   risk	   of	   such	   an	   increase	   and	   particularly	  the	  very	  high	  rate	  of	  change,	  the	  Council	  believes	  that	  global	  average	   temperatures	   should	   not	   exceed	   2	   degrees	   above	  pre-­‐industrial	   level	   and	   that	   therefore	   concentration	   levels	  lower	   than	   550ppm	   CO2	   should	   guide	   global	   limitation	   and	  reduction	   efforts.	   This	   means	   that	   the	   concentrations	   of	   all	  greenhouse	   gases	   should	   also	   be	   stabilized.”	   (Council	   of	   the	  European	  Union	  1996,	  para.6)	  However	   IPCC’s	   Second	   Assessment	   Report	   faced	   criticism	   from	  climate	   campaigners	   as	   well	   as	   fossil	   fuel	   lobbies.	   Notably,	   the	   Global	  Commons	   Institute41	  and	   the	   World	   Energy	   Council42	  claimed	   that	   the	   IPCC	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  While	   the	   1987	   Villach-­‐Bellagio	   workshops	   had	   proposed	   the	   0.1°C	   per	   decade	  objective,	   they	  made	   no	   reference	   to	   the	   study	   supporting	   this	   claim.	   Rather,	   it	   has	  been	  suggested	  that	  this	  was	  based	  on	  observations	  of	  plant	  life	  on	  a	  North	  American	  lake	  that	  were	  mentioned	  during	  the	  1987	  conference	  (see	  Tol	  2007,	  p.424).	  Yet	  the	  European	  Council	  offered	  no	  explanation	  for	  the	  omission	  of	  a	  rate	  of	  change	  target.	  41	  The	  Global	  Commons	   Institute	   is	  a	  London-­‐based	  policy	   think	   tank,	  co-­‐founded	   in	  1990	  by	  climate	  campaigners	  Aubrey	  Meyer	  and	  Penny	  Kemp.	  It	  worked	  to	  promote	  a	  ‘contraction	  and	  convergence’	  approach	  to	  emissions	  reductions,	  entailing	  a	  reduction	  of	   emissions	   by	   bringing	   per	   capital	   emissions	   to	   the	   same	   level	   across	   all	   nations	  (http://www.gci.org.uk/Documents/OrigStatement2.pdf).	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was	   “’yielding	   to	   pressure	   from	   industry	   to	   foresee	   yet	   higher	   atmospheric	  pollution	   as	   acceptable’”	   and	   called	   on	   governments	   “not	   to	   accept	   IPCC	  recommendations”	   on	   the	   grounds	   that	   it	   had	   been	   biased	   by	   “academics	  seeking	   to	   attract	   funding	   for	   their	   work”	   from	   fossil	   fuel	   lobbies	   (Newell	  2006,	   p.112).	   Indeed,	   Newell	   highlights	   that	   fossil	   fuel	   lobbies,	   such	   as	   the	  Climate	  Council,	  Mobil	  Oil	  and	  the	  National	  Coal	  Association,	  were	  reviewers	  of	   the	   IPCC’s	  Working	  Group	  1	  reports	   (Ibid.,	  pp.111-­‐112),	  while	  also	  noting	  procedural	   battles	   with	   these	   groups	   over	   their	   tactics	   to	   delay	   the	   IPCC’s	  work.	   These	   lobbies	   similarly	   accused	   two	   lead	   authors	   of	   the	   Second	  Assessment	  Report	  of	  deleting	  passages	  pertaining	  to	  uncertainties	  regarding	  the	   climate	   threat,	   leading	   the	   New	   York	   Times	   and	  Wall	   Street	   Journal	   to	  report	  on	  impropriety	  in	  the	  IPCC	  process	  (Ibid.,	  p.82).	  	  While	   facing	   criticism,	   the	   Second	   Assessment	   report	   continued	   to	  feed	  into	  policy	  discussions,	  and	  was	  noted	  in	  a	  1996	  European	  Environment	  Agency	  thematic	  assessment	  of	  climate	  change	  that	  supported	  a	  two	  degrees	  target	  (European	  Environment	  Agency	  1996,	  p.3).	  Indeed,	  from	  this	  point	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	  began	  to	  feature	  more	  prominently	  in	  the	  work	  of	  WBGU.	  As	  noted	  by	  Jaeger	  and	  Jaeger	  (2011)	  –	  based	  on	  their	  interactions	  with	  WBGU	  members	   –	   it	   was	   under	   the	   chairmanship	   of	   Professor	   Hans-­‐Joachim	  Schellenhuber	   from	   1996	   that	   WBGU	   would	   begin	   to	   convince	   the	   German	  Minister	  for	  the	  Environment,	  Angela	  Merkel,	  of	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	  (Jaeger	  and	   Jaeger	   2011,	   p.S17).	   WBGU’s	   1997	   report	   emphasises	   that	   their	  interpretation	   of	   Article	   2	   of	   the	  UNFCCC	   is	   that	  warming	   of	  more	   than	   2°C	  above	   the	   pre-­‐industrial	   level	   would	   “constitute	   climate	   changes	   that	   are	  absolutely	   intolerable”	   (WBGU	   1997,	   p.14).	   However	   in	   the	   mid-­‐1990s	   the	  intergovernmental	   UNFCCC	   climate	   talks	   were	   focussed	   on	   developing	   “a	  protocol	   or	   another	   legal	   instrument”	   (UNFCCC	   1995,	   p.4)	   to	   guide	  international	   efforts	   to	  prevent	  dangerous	  anthropogenic	   interference	   in	   the	  climate	   system.	   As	   such,	   the	   question	   of	   a	   long-­‐term	   target	   was	   not	   on	   the	  agenda,	   with	   the	   UNFCCC	   focussing	   on	   developing	   a	   ‘protocol	   or	   legal	  instrument’	   (terms	   used	   by	   the	   UNFCCC)	   that	   established	   mechanisms	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  The	   World	   Energy	   Council,	   founded	   in	   1923,	   is	   a	   the	   largest	   global	   network	   of	  energy	  practitioners,	  working	  to	  advance	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  sustainable	  energy	  system	  through	   research	   into	   increasing	   social	   benefit	   and	   reducing	   the	   environmental	  impact	   of	   energy,	   holding	   international	   conferences	   and	   acting	   as	   a	   lobby	   group	   to	  represent	  its	  membership	  (Newell	  2006,	  p.112).	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coordinate	   international	  reductions	   in	  GHG	  emissions.	  This	   ‘protocol	  or	   legal	  instrument’	  was	  to	  be	  created	  no	  later	  than	  the	  1997	  COP	  in	  Kyoto,	  to	  which	  this	  chapter	  now	  turns.	  
4.2.2.	  THE	  KYOTO	  PROTOCOL:	  CENTRALLY-­‐DETERMINED	  EMISSIONS	  TARGETS	  When	   the	   UNFCCC	   entered	   into	   force	   in	   1994	   it	   required	   Annex	   I43	  Parties	   to	   the	   UNFCCC	   to	   produce	   national	   inventories	   of	   GHG	   emissions	   –	  accounts	   of	   GHG	   emissions	   released	   into	   the	   atmosphere	   by	   sources	   and	  removed	   by	   ‘sinks’	   –	   on	   an	   annual	   basis.	   As	   such,	   the	   measurement	   and	  reporting	  practices	  for	  GHGs	  at	  a	  national	  level	  were	  developed	  from	  the	  early	  stages	   of	   the	   UNFCCC,	   who	   also	   requested	   that	   the	   IPCC	   provide	   guidance	  (IPCC	  1996).	  Prior	  to	  1997,	  Parties	  had	  also	  been	  invited	  to	  submit	  plans	  and	  targets	   for	   emissions	   reductions,	   however	   this	   was	   not	   a	   UNFCCC	  requirement.	  Yet	  this	  invitation	  prompted	  little	  policy	  intervention	  directed	  at	  reducing	  GHG	  emissions	   (Oberthür	  and	  Ott	  1999,	  p.123).	  Responding	   to	   this	  lack	  of	  action	  by	  Parties,	  the	  UNFCCC	  placed	  emissions	  reduction	  targets	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  negotiations	   for	  COP3	  in	  Kyoto	   in	  1997.	  These	  were	  to	  be	  made	  by	  Annex	   I	   nations	   that,	   under	   the	   UNFCCC’s	   principle	   of	   common	   but	  differentiated	   responsibilities,	   had	   benefited	   from	   the	   industrialization	   that	  drove	   increasing	   concentrations	   of	   GHGs	   and	   would	   therefore	   take	   greater	  responsibility	   for	   reducing	   emissions	   (see	   Appendix	   4C	   for	   targets).	   Under	  Article	  3	  of	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol,	  Annex	  I	  nations	  would	  be	  required	  to	  reduce	  their	  overall	  emissions	  of	  GHGs	  “by	  at	   least	  5	  per	  cent	  bellow	  1990	   levels	   in	  the	  commitment	  period	  2008	  to	  2012”	  (UNFCCC	  1998,	  p.3).	  Each	  of	  the	  Annex	  I	  nations	   faced	  different	   emissions	   reductions	   (see	  Appendix	  4B)	   that,	   taken	  together,	  would	  amount	  to	  an	  overall	  reduction	  of	  five	  per	  cent.	  	  Yet	   such	   ‘requirements’	   would	   only	   enter	   into	   force	   for	   Parties	   that	  had	  ratified	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol	  and	  if	  the	  minimum	  ratification	  threshold	  of	  55	  countries	  accounting	  for	  55	  per	  cent	  of	  developed	  country	  emissions	  had	  been	  met	  (UNFCCC	  1998,	  p.18).	  Customary	  international	   law,	  general	  principles	  of	  international	   law,	   and	   the	   1969	   Vienna	   Convention	   on	   the	   Law	   of	   Treaties	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  It	   is	   important	   to	   note	   that	   at	   this	   time	   in	   the	   UNFCCC	   process	   industrialized	  nations	   were	   expected	   to	   lead	   in	   cutting	   emissions,	   as	   they	   were	   the	   primary	  historical	  source	  of	  GHG	  emissions.	  These	  nations	  were	  classified	  as	  Annex	  I	  Parties.	  	  Non-­‐Annex	  I	  Parties	  refer	  to	  the	  developing	  nations	  that	  had	  signed	  the	  UNFCCC,	  and	  they	  faced	  different	  requirements	  under	  the	  agreements	  and	  protocols	  emerging	  from	  the	  series	  of	  COPs.	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(VCLT)	   govern	   international	   treaties,	   such	   as	   the	   Kyoto	   Protocol	   and	   the	  UNFCCC.	   Ratification	   is	   central	   to	   this	   because	   by	   ratifying	   a	   treaty	   a	   Party	  consents	   to	   the	   requirements,	   which	   become	   domestic	   law44	  under	   the	   rule	  
pacta	   tertiis	   nec	   nocent	   nec	   prosunt.45	  Under	   the	   rule	   pacta	   sunt	   servanda,	   a	  ratifying	  nation	  cannot	  use	  their	  domestic	  law	  to	  justify	  non-­‐compliance	  with	  the	  treaty	  (Hyvarinen	  et	  al.	  2012).	   In	  the	  case	  of	  UNFCCC	   ‘legal	   instruments’,	  COPs	  serve	  as	  the	  forum	  for	  monitoring	  compliance.	  For	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol,	  a	  Compliance	   Committee	   was	   formed	   under	   the	   Marrakesh	   Accords	   of	   COP7,	  detailed	  later	  in	  this	  section.	  The	  Kyoto	  Protocol	  was	  not	  without	  controversy.	  The	  Kyoto	  target	  of	  a	  5.2%	   reduction	   in	   overall	   emissions	   (Oberthür	   and	  Ott	   1999,	   p.273)	   fell	   far	  short	  of	  the	  Toronto	  goal	  of	  reducing	  CO2	  emissions	  to	  20%	  below	  1990	  levels	  by	  2005,	  which	  had	  been	  “adopted	  by	  almost	  all	  environmental	  NGOs”	  (Ibid.,	  p.115)	   in	   the	   mid-­‐1990s.	   Further	   criticism	   emerged	   as	   the	   United	   States’	  position	  broke	  from	  the	  agreement	  in	  the	  Berlin	  Mandate	  that	  emissions	  limits	  would	   only	   apply	   to	   Annex	   I	   nations.	   Instead,	   the	   United	   States	   entered	  negotiations	   with	   demands	   (under	   the	   US	   Senate’s	   Byrd-­‐Hagel	   Resolution)	  that	  ‘meaningful	  participation’	  of	  key	  developing	  counties	  was	  required	  before	  the	   Senate	   would	   consider	   ratifying	   any	   agreement	   from	   the	   Kyoto	   COP	  (Gupta	   2010,	   p.645).	   Indeed,	   while	   President	   Clinton	   signed	   the	   Kyoto	  Protocol,	   it	  was	  never	  ratified	  by	  the	  United	  States;	  and	  President	  Bush	   later	  withdrew	  US	  support	  of	  the	  agreement	  (Ibid.,	  p.646).	  With	  the	  US	  contributing	  36%	  of	  global	  GHG	  emissions	  in	  1996	  (Jamieson	  2014,	  p.47),	  their	  withdrawal	  represented	   a	   major	   obstacle	   to	   ratifying	   the	   Kyoto	   Protocol	   that,	   under	  Article	  25,	  required	  ratification	  from	  Annex	  I	  nations	  that	  account	  in	  total	  for	  “at	   least	   55	   per	   cent	   of	   the	   total	   carbon	   dioxide	   emissions	   for	   1990	   of	   the	  Parties	  included	  in	  Annex	  I”	  (UNFCCC	  1998,	  p.18)	  before	  it	  enters	  into	  force.	  As	   noted	   by	   Oberthür	   and	   Ott,	   however,	   the	   Kyoto	   Protocol	  represented	  a	  “watershed	  in	  international	  climate	  and	  environmental	  policy”	  (Oberthür	   and	   Ott	   1999,	   p.136–7).	   Specifically,	   it	   designed	   mechanisms	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  The	  procedure	   for	   an	   international	   treaty	   to	   become	  part	   of	   domestic	   law	  differs	  between	  nations,	  and	  for	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  process	  see	  Hyvarinen	  et	  al.	  (2012).	  45	  Article	  34	  of	  the	  VCLT	  pertains	  to	  the	  sovereignty	  and	  independence	  of	  states,	  with	  
pacta	  tertiis	  nec	  nocent	  nec	  prosunt	  stating	  “treaties	  are	  binding	  only	  upon	  those	  who	  are	  Parties	  to	  them,	  and	  cannot	  impose	  obligations	  on	  third-­‐party	  States”	  (Hyvarinen	  et	  al.	  2012,	  CLIB	  1).	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support	  the	  ‘binding’	  targets	  placed	  on	  Parties	  that	  ratified	  UNFCCC	  protocols	  and	  agreements.	  This	  represented	  the	  UNFCCC’s	  vision	  of	  international	  action	  on	  climate	  change	  at	  the	  time:	  national-­‐level	  targets	  that	  were	  determined	  at	  UNFCCC	   talks	   and	   imposed	   on	   Parties,	   and	   that	   these	   targets	   cumulatively	  aligned	   with	   a	   global	   emissions	   trajectory	   for	   avoiding	   ‘dangerous’	   climate	  change.	  However	  the	  enforcement	  mechanism	  for	  these	  binding	  targets	  was	  to	  be	   shaped	   through	   subsequent	   COPs.	   It	   was	   through	   the	   2001	   Marrakesh	  Accords	   of	   COP7	   that	   a	   Compliance	   Committee	   was	   established	   (Wang	   and	  Wiser	   2002,	   p.189).	   It	   is	   important	   to	   note	   that	   this	   was	   split	   into	   two	  branches,	   “facilitative”	   and	   “enforcement’”.	   The	   ‘facilitative’	   branch	  emphasized	   the	   need	   to	   offer	   technical	   expertise	   and	   capacity	   building	  assistance	   to	   Parties	   in	   order	   to	   assist	   in	   their	   compliance	   efforts	   (Ibid.,	  p.191).	  Such	  compliance	  entailed	  three	  steps:	  reporting,	  review	  and	  assessing	  compliance.	   The	   reporting	   rules	   developed	   in	   the	  Marrakesh	  Accords	  would	  continue	   to	   be	   developed	   on	   the	   principles	   of	   transparency,	   comparability,	  completeness	  and	  accuracy	  of	   information	  (Ibid.	  pp.188-­‐9),	  while	   the	  review	  process	  provided	  a	  forum	  for	  Parties	  to	  seek	  assistance	  at	  an	  early	  stage	  and	  subsequently	   conducted	   a	   technical	   assessment	   of	   policy	   implementation	  against	  a	  Party’s	  commitments	  (Ibid.	  pp.188-­‐9).	  These	  assessments	  were	  to	  be	  conducted	  by	  ‘expert	  review	  teams’	  operating	  under	  the	  UNFCCC.	  The	  second,	   ‘enforcement’,	  branch	  would	  review	  compliance	  with	  the	  emissions	   targets.	   Where	   a	   Party	   was	   in	   excess	   of	   its	   target,	   its	   excess	  emissions	   would	   be	   deducted	   from	   subsequent	   commitment	   periods’	  emissions	   reductions	   targets	   (i.e.	   after	   the	   initial	   2008-­‐2012	   commitment	  period)	  at	  a	  deduction	  rate	  of	  1.3	  to	  1	  (Ibid.,	  p.196).	  In	  other	  words,	  for	  every	  ton	   of	   CO2e	   in	   excess	   of	   an	   Annex	   I	   Party’s	   2008-­‐2012	   emissions	   target,	   its	  target	  in	  subsequent	  commitment	  periods	  will	  be	  reduced	  by	  1.3	  tons	  of	  CO2e.	  However	   two	   shortcomings	   of	   this	   ‘deduction’	   approach	   were	   widely	  recognized	   (Ibid.).	   The	   first	   shortcoming	  was	   that	   a	   Party	   could	   continue	   to	  miss	   its	   targets	   in	   subsequent	   periods	   unless	   an	   additional	   means	   of	  ‘enforcement’	   ensured	   the	  Party	   complied	  with	   its	   reduced	  emissions	   target.	  The	  second	  was	  that	  Parties	  might	  negotiate	   less	  stringent	  emissions	   targets	  for	   subsequent	   periods	   to	   “accommodate	   for	   the	   deduction”	   (Ibid.).	   Despite	  recognition	   of	   these	   shortcomings,	   the	   compliance	   system	   was	   adopted	  because,	   while	   Annex	   I	   parties	   acknowledged	   the	   need	   for	   a	   compliance	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system	  to	  support	  the	  binding	  emissions	  targets,	  they	  were	  unwilling	  to	  agree	  a	   system	   for	   punishing	   non-­‐compliance	   that	   involved	   “financial	   penalties	   or	  trade	   measures”	   (Ibid.).	   In	   this	   regard	   the	   so-­‐called	   ‘enforcement’	   branch	  established	   under	   the	   Marrakesh	   Accords	   primarily	   monitored	   compliance	  with	   targets,	   while	   having	   a	   limited	   mandate	   and	   few	   mechanisms	   for	  punishing	  non-­‐compliance.	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	   in	   the	   late-­‐1990s	   and	   early-­‐2000s,	   the	   Kyoto	  protocol	   stimulated	   development	   of	   economic	   instruments,	   from	   emissions	  trading	   schemes	   to	   financial	   support	   for	   low-­‐carbon	   development	   in	   non-­‐Annex	   I	   countries	   (Gupta	   2010).	   These	   were	   key	   features	   across	   numerous	  COPs	  as	  the	  details	  of	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol	  continued	  to	  be	  negotiated.	  Indeed,	  the	  inclusion	  of	  Certified	  Emissions	  Reductions	  in	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol	  had	  been	  central	  to	  the	  Clinton	  Administration’s	  demands	  (MacKenzie	  2009.	  pp.442-­‐3),	  allowing	  carbon	  credits	  to	  be	  surrendered	  to	  gain	  emissions	  allowances.	  This	  increased	   the	   flexibility	   with	   which	   Parties	   could	   achieve	   their	   emissions	  targets,	   and	   emissions	   trading	   schemes	   were	   developed	   as	   a	   potential	  mechanism	   for	   trading	   carbon	   credits.	   Indeed,	   by	   proposing	   the	   European	  Union	  Emissions	  Trading	  Scheme	  (EU	  ETS)	  in	  1998,	  the	  EU	  Commission	  added	  to	  the	  flurry	  of	  activity.	  This	  followed	  abandoned	  attempts	  to	  introduce	  a	  EU-­‐wide	   tax	   on	   carbon	   emissions	   in	   1992	   and	   1995,	  which	   did	   not	   achieve	   the	  unanimous	  approval	  from	  the	  Council	  of	  Finance	  Ministers	  required	  for	  fiscal	  policies	   (Braun	  2009,	   p.473).	  However,	   outside	   the	  debates	   on	   shorter-­‐term	  emissions	   reduction	   targets	   and	   their	   corresponding	   instruments,	  temperature	   thresholds	   and	   GHG	   concentration	   targets	   continued	   to	   be	  discussed	  by	  scientists,	  policymakers	  and	  economists	  in	  pursuit	  of	  a	  long-­‐term	  limit	   to	   define	   ‘dangerous	   anthropogenic	   interference’.	   It	   is	   to	   these	  discussions	  that	  the	  chapter	  now	  turns.	  
4.2.3.	  TEMPERATURE	  CHANGE	  BECOMES	  THE	  INDEX	  FOR	  CLIMATE	  IMPACTS	  By	   1998	   economists	   had	   applied	   Nordhaus’	   cost-­‐benefit	   analyses	   of	  policy	   choices	   –	   optimizing	   emissions	   control	   strategies	   based	   on	   climate	  thresholds	  –	  to	  the	  UNFCCC’s	  core	  objective.	  Azar’s	  (1998)	  assessment	  of	  this	  literature	   highlights	   that	   some	   economists,	   Nordhaus	   included,	   argued	   that	  the	  high	  costs	  of	  controlling	  GHG	  emissions	  meant	  that	  the	  ‘optimal’	  would	  be	  to	  allow	  GHG	  emissions	  to	  increase.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  a	  “growing	  number	  of	  studies”	  (Azar	  1998,	  p.302)	  argue	  such	  control	  measures	  are	  not	  as	  costly	  as	  
Chapter	  4:	  Two	  Degrees	  Celsius	  
	   101	  
suggested	  and	  that	  reducing	  emissions	  to	  30%	  below	  the	  current	  levels	  would	  be	   ‘optimal’.	  Azar	  uses	  his	  assessment	  of	   the	   literature	  to	  argue	  such	  models	  should	  not	  be	  seen	  as	  “truth	  machines”	  because	  “cost-­‐benefit	  analysis	  is	  not	  a	  value-­‐free	   tool”	   (Ibid.	   p.311.	   Emphasis	   in	   original).	   Rather	   than	   trying	   to	  uncover	   some	   ‘optimal’	   level	   of	   climate	   change,	   he	   argued	   that	   research	  should	  focus	  on	  analysing	  potential	  strategies	  “related	  to	  the	  realisation	  of	  the	  UNFCCC’s	  main	  objective”	  (Ibid.,	  p.312).	  	  Elsewhere	   it	   was	   argued	   that	   when	   analysing	   the	   UNFCCC,	   a	  reasonable	   starting	   point	   is	   a	   threshold	   based	   on	   natural	   variations	   in	   the	  climate	   (Azar	   and	   Rodhe	   1997,	   p.1818).	   While	   the	   analysis	   concurs	   with	  Nordhaus’	  earlier	  suggestions	   that	   to	  remain	  within	  such	  thresholds	   it	   is	  not	  necessary	   to	   cut	   emissions	   in	   the	   “next	   decade	   or	   so”	   (Ibid.,	   p.1819),	   the	  authors	  rebutted	  the	  idea	  that	  no	  immediate	  action	  was	  required.	  They	  argued	  that	   the	  envisaged	  “rapid	  departure	   from	  business-­‐as-­‐usual	  emissions”	  (Ibid.	  p.1819)	   required	   the	   adoption	  of	  policies	  well	   in	   advance	  of	   the	   subsequent	  emissions	   reductions.	   Specifically,	   the	   authors	   noted	   that	   investments	   in	  “long-­‐lived	  carbon-­‐intensive	  technologies”	  should	  be	  discouraged	  to	  enable	  a	  sharp	  decrease	  in	  emissions	  at	  a	  future	  date.	  The	  authors	  also	  suggested	  that,	  until	   the	   definition	   of	   ‘dangerous’	   is	   “settled	   in	   the	   political	   arena”	   (Ibid.,	  p.1818),	   2°C	   should	   be	   used	   as	   a	   maximum	   temperature	   increase,	  accompanied	  by	  350	   to	  400ppmv46	  as	   the	  corresponding	   level	  at	  which	  GHG	  concentrations	   should	   be	   stabilized.	   These	   limits,	   the	   authors	   note,	   would	  provide	  a	  basis	  for	  cost-­‐benefit	  analyses	  of	  ‘dangerous’	  climate	  change.	  	  This	   method	   of	   inferring	   concentration	   levels	   from	   temperature	  targets	  was	  not,	  however,	  a	  practice	  adopted	  by	  all	  groups	  considering	   long-­‐term	   climate	   targets.	   In	   2000	   the	   Royal	   Commission	   on	   Environmental	  Pollution	   (RCEP)	   recommended	   that	   the	  UK	   should	   support	   an	   international	  agreement	   to	   prevent	   “carbon	   dioxide	   emissions	   in	   the	   atmosphere	   from	  exceeding	   550ppmv”	   (RCEP	   2000,	   p.2).	   Their	   decision	   was	   based	   on	   “[t]he	  principle	   that	   concentrations	  of	  greenhouse	  gases	   should	  be	  prevented	   from	  rising	   to	   a	   dangerously	   high	   level	   is	   enshrined	   in	   international	   law”	   (Ibid.,	  p.52).	   Furthermore,	   the	   design	   of	   policy	   responses	   required	   a	   decision	   on	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  The	   change	   in	   notation	   from	   earlier	   “ppm”	   or	   “parts	   per	   million”	   to	   “ppmv”	   or	  “parts	  per	  million	  volume”	  refer	  to	  the	  same	  levels	  of	  GHG	  concentration,	  however	  the	  latter	  is	  the	  more	  accurate	  description	  and	  became	  more	  common	  around	  this	  time.	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what	  constitutes	  a	  dangerous	  GHG	  concentration	  and	  the	  design	  of	  actions	  for	  stabilization	   at	   that	   level	   (Ibid.,	   p.52-­‐3).	   In	   other	   words,	   RCEP	   saw	   the	  necessity	   of	   concentration	   targets	   for	   policy-­‐making	   and	   also	   saw	   it	   as	   a	  metric	  that	  had	  been	  recognised	  by	  international	  law.	  Temperature	  targets,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  were	  neither	  directly	  relevant	  to	  policy	  making,	  as	  they	  had	  to	  first	  be	  converted	   into	  concentration	  targets,	  nor	  recognised	  by	  any	  UNFCCC	  agreements	   to	   date.	   While	   noting	   that	   550ppmv	   as	   the	   ‘dangerous’	  concentration	  level	  was	  disputed,	  the	  RCEP	  report	  writes	  that	  the	  “EU	  Council	  of	   Environment	   Ministers	   has	   proposed	   that	   stabilisation	   below	   550	   ppmv	  should	  guide	  global	   limitation	  and	  reduction	  efforts”	  and	  that	  “[o]n	  the	  basis	  of	   current	   scientific	   knowledge	   about	   human	   impact	   on	   climate,	  we	   support	  the	   proposal	   that	   an	   atmospheric	   concentration	   of	   550	   ppmv	   of	   carbon	  dioxide	   should	   be	   regarded	   as	   an	   upper	   limit	   that	   should	   not	   be	   exceeded”	  (Ibid.,	   p.52).	   RCEP’s	   support	   for	   the	   targeted	   was	   based	   on	   550ppmv	   CO2e	  having	  been	  recognised	  by	  international	  law	  and	  its	  compatibility	  with	  policy	  making.	  	  However,	  in	  2001,	  the	  Third	  Assessment	  Report	  of	  the	  IPCC	  turned	  its	  attention	   to	   temperature	   targets.	   They	   were	   to	   be	   used	   as	   a	   means	   of	  assessing	   climate	   impacts	   that	   would	   constitute	   ‘dangerous	   anthropogenic	  interference’.	   While	   the	   report	   did	   not	   seek	   to	   define	   a	   single	   limit	   beyond	  which	  climate	  impacts	  became	  ‘dangerous’,	  it	  assessed	  “the	  state	  of	  knowledge	  concerning	  Article	  2	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  Framework	  Convention	  on	  Climate	  Change	  (UNFCCC)”	  (Smith	  et	  al.	  2001,	  p.915).	   In	   this	  regard	  the	  IPCC’s	  Third	  Assessment	   Report	   was	   to	   provide	   the	   scientific	   basis	   for	   discussions	  regarding	   the	   definition	   of	   ‘dangerous	   anthropogenic	   interference’.	   Five	  ‘reasons	   for	   concern’	   were	   identified	   to	   “enable	   readers	   to	   evaluate	   the	  relationship	   between	   increases	   in	   global	   mean	   temperature	   and	   impacts”	  (Ibid.).	  These	  five	  categories	  of	  impacts	  were:	  damage	  to	  or	  irreparable	  loss	  of	  unique	  and	  threatened	  systems,	   the	  distribution	  of	   impacts,	  global	  aggregate	  damages	  (primarily	  measured	   in	  terms	  of	   impact	  on	  GDP),	   the	  probability	  of	  extreme	   weather	   events,	   and	   the	   probability	   of	   large-­‐scale	   singular	   events	  such	   as	   the	   breakup	   of	   the	   West	   Antarctic	   Ice	   Sheet	   or	   the	   collapse	   of	   the	  North	  Atlantic	  thermohaline	  circulation	  (Ibid.,	  p.917).	  	  The	  authors	  considered	  five	  indicators	  as	  the	  basis	  for	  their	  analysis	  –	  GHG	  emission	  levels,	  atmospheric	  GHG	  concentration	  levels,	  changes	  in	  global	  
Chapter	  4:	  Two	  Degrees	  Celsius	  
	   103	  
mean	   temperature	   and	   sea-­‐level	   rise,	   changes	   in	   regional	   climate	   variables,	  and	   changes	   in	   the	   intensity	   or	   frequency	   of	   extreme	   events	   –	   and	   assessed	  the	   problems	   of	   adopting	   each.	   Using	   atmospheric	   GHG	   concentrations	   or	  emissions	   levels	   as	   the	   indicator	   was	   deemed	   inappropriate	   as	   “published	  estimates	  of	  time	  frames	  for	  stabilizing	  GHG	  atmospheric	  concentration	  levels	  tend	  to	  assume	  such	  levels	  will	  not	  be	  stabilized	  until	  after	  the	  end	  of	  the	  21st	  century”,	  while	  “most	  of	  the	  impact	  literature	  examines	  potential	  impacts	  only	  as	   far	   as	   2100”	   (Ibid.,	   p.918).	   The	   IPCC	  was	   assessing	   this	   impact	   literature	  and	  so	  needed	  to	  base	  its	  assessment	  on	  stabilisation	  within	  the	  21st	  century.	  As	  a	  result,	  while	  GHG	  concentrations	  had	  been	  favoured	  for	  their	  relevance	  to	  policy-­‐making,	   the	   indicator	   was	   incompatible	   with	   the	   IPCC’s	   assessment.	  Conversely,	   most	   impact	   literature	   was	   “based	   on	   scenarios	   of	   specific	  changes	   in	  global	  mean	  or,	  more	  typically,	   regional	  climate	  variables	  such	  as	  temperature	   or	   precipitation”	   (Ibid.).	   Furthermore,	   ‘changes	   in	   global	   mean	  temperature’	  was	  a	  useful	  index	  because	  general	  circulation	  models	  (GCMs)	  –	  the	   most	   common	   form	   of	   modelling	   used	   in	   climate	   research	   –	   provided	  estimates	   of	   change	   in	   terms	   of	   global	   mean	   temperatures	   (Ibid.).47	  In	   this	  regard,	   global	   mean	   temperature	   provided	   a	   suitable	   basis	   for	   the	   IPCC’s	  assessment	  of	  the	  impact	  literature.	  However	  the	  problem	  with	  this	  indicator	  (as	   well	   as	   the	   regional	   climate	   variables	   and	   frequency	   of	   extreme	   events	  indicators)	   was	   that	   it	   was	   “more	   difficult	   to	   work	   back	   to	   defining	  atmospheric	  concentrations	  of	  GHGs,	  as	  required	  by	  Article	  2	  of	  the	  UNFCCC”	  (Ibid.).	   However,	   of	   the	   alternatives	   to	   GHG-­‐based	   indicators,	   ‘changes	   in	  global	  mean	  temperature’	  “can	  be	  used	  most	  readily	  to	  relate	  GHG	  emissions	  (and	   emissions	   control)	   to	   changes	   in	   climate	   and	   impacts”	   (Ibid.).	   Through	  this	  decision	  temperature	  thresholds	  became	  the	  indicator	  that	  would	  connect	  the	   objective	   of	   ‘dangerous	   anthropogenic	   interference’	   with	   the	   climate	  system	   to	   a	   stabilization	   target	   for	   atmospheric	   concentrations	   of	   GHGs.	   To	  reiterate,	   temperature	   thresholds	   were	   to	   provide	   the	   link	   between	   the	  abstract	  UNFCCC	  objective	  and	   the	  emissions	  reductions	  required	   to	  achieve	  that	   objective.	  Moreover,	   the	   risks	   of	   climate	   change	  were	   to	   be	   assessed	   in	  the	   IPCC	   assessment	   reports	   of	   the	   latest	   climate	   science	   using	   changes	   in	  global	  mean	  temperature	  as	  its	  index.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47	  The	   report	   also	  highlighted	   that	   studies	  based	  on	  other	   forms	  of	  modelling	   could	  easily	  be	  related	  to	  global	  mean	  temperatures	  (Smith	  et	  al.	  2001,	  p.918).	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Summarising	   their	   56-­‐page	   synthesis	   of	   the	   latest	   research,	   the	  authors	   produced	   a	   heat	   map	   (see	   Figure	   4.3)	   resembling	   the	   ‘traffic	   light’	  system	  adopted	  by	  AGGG’s	  WG2	   in	   its	  1990	   report.	   Simplifying	   temperature	  increases	  into	  three	  levels	  –	  ‘small’	  (as	  much	  as	  2°C),	  ‘medium’	  (2	  to	  3°C)	  and	  ‘large’	  (more	  than	  3°C)	  –	  the	  authors	  conclude:	  “Adverse	  impacts	  are	  estimated	  to	  occur	  in	  three	  reasons	  for	  concern	  even	  at	  a	  small	  increase	  in	  temperature:	  unique	  and	  threatened	   systems,	   extreme	   weather	   events,	   and	  distributional	   impacts.	   For	   the	   other	   two	   reasons	   for	  concern—adverse	   impacts	   and	   large-­‐scale	   discontinuities—adverse	   impacts	   begin	   at	   the	   medium	   level	   of	   temperature	  increase	  for	  the	  former	  and	  a	  large	  temperature	  increase	  for	  the	  latter”	  (Ibid.,	  p.959).	  Following	  the	  IPCC’s	  Third	  Assessment	  Report,	  a	  range	  of	  studies	  and	  reports	   emerged	   calling	   for	   the	   increase	   in	   global	  mean	   temperatures	   to	   be	  held	   to	   2°C.	   A	   2003	   conference	   focussing	   on	   species	   loss,	   Global	   Climate	  
Change	  and	  Biodiversity,	   held	   at	   the	  University	  of	  East	  Anglia	   concluded	   it	   is	  “imperative	   that	   global	   warming	   is	   contained	   to	   2°C	   by	   the	   end	   of	   this	  century”	  (R.	  E.	  Green	  et	  al.	  2003,	  p.34).	  Having	  commissioned	  a	  special	  report	  to	   summarise	   present	   knowledge	   on	   climate	   impacts	   and	   how	   these	   may	  constitute	   ‘dangerous’	   anthropogenic	   interference	   with	   the	   climate	   system	  (W.	  Hare	  2003),	  WBGU	  argued	   that	   an	   increase	   in	   global	  mean	   temperature	  above	  pre-­‐industrial	   levels	  of	  more	   than	  2°C	  would	  have	   serious	   impacts	  on	  ecosystems	  and	  biodiversity.	  	  Further	   support	   for	   the	   two	   degrees	   target	   (outside	   of	   UNFCCC	  negotiations	  and	  IPCC	  assessments)	  came	  from	  the	  International	  Taskforce	  on	  Climate	  Change,	  a	  newly	  formed	  collaboration	  between	  the	  UK’s	  Institute	  for	  Public	   Policy	   Research,	   the	   US	   Centre	   for	   American	   Progress,	   and	   The	  Australia	  Institute	  that	  was	  co-­‐Chaired	  by	  the	  UK’s	  Rt	  Hon.	  Stephen	  Bryers	  MP	  and	  US	  Senator	  Olympia	  Snowe	  (ICCF	  2005,	  p.vii).48	  The	  Taskforce	  saw	  a	  long-­‐term	   climate	   target	   as	   an	   essential	   component	   of	   upcoming	   negotiations	  under	  the	  UNFCCC.	  Based	  on	  submissions	  from	  the	  three	  founding	  think	  tanks,	  their	   report	   stated	   “[t]he	   Taskforce	   is	   agreed	   that	   establishing	   a	   long-­‐term	  climate	   objective	   is	   necessary	   to	   ensure	   the	   adequacy	   of	   the	   next	   round	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	  There	   were	   15	   members	   of	   this	   task	   force,	   ranging	   from	   MPs	   and	   a	   Harvard	  Professor	  of	  Environmental	  Policy	  to	  Programme	  Directors	  of	  prominent	  think	  tanks	  and	   senior	   figures	   in	   environmental	   NGOs.	   For	   details	   of	   each	   of	   the	   15	   taskforce	  members	  see	  ICCF	  (2005,	  pp.19-­‐20).	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commitments	   under	   the	   UN	   global	   climate	   negotiations,	   as	   well	   as	   that	   of	  domestic	   climate	   policies	   and	   the	   decisions	   of	   businesses	   and	   institutional	  investors”	  (Ibid.,	  p.3).	  As	  well	  as	  guiding	  policy	  makers,	  a	  long-­‐term	  target	  was	  seen	   as	   necessary	   for	   providing	   ‘certainty’	   to	   businesses	   and	   institutional	  investors.	   Setting	   a	   target	   would,	   according	   to	   the	   Taskforce,	   enable	  corporate-­‐	  as	  well	  as	  national-­‐level	  planning	  for	  addressing	  climate	  change.	  It	  further	   recommended	   that	   emissions	   reductions	   “should	   aim	   to	   achieve	  greenhouse-­‐gas	   concentration	   levels	   by	   the	   end	   of	   the	   century	   compatible	  with	   limiting	   global	   average	   temperature	   rise	   to	   2°C”	   (Ibid.,	   p.4).	   That	   same	  year,	  2005,	  also	  saw	  the	  Council	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  reaffirm	  their	  support	  
for	   the	   two	   degrees	   target.	   Restating	   its	   1996	   position,	   the	   Council	   of	   the	  European	   Union	   argued	   that,	   to	  meet	   the	   UNFCCC	   objective,	   “overall	   global	  annual	  mean	  surface	  temperature	  increase	  should	  not	  exceed	  2°C	  above	  pre-­‐industrial	  levels”	  (CEU	  2005,	  p.2).	  It	  also	  added	  that	  whereas	  in	  1996	  it	  stated	  that	   a	   GHG	   atmospheric	   concentration	   of	   550ppmv	   could	   meet	   this	  temperature	  target,	  recent	  IPCC	  findings	  suggest	  that	  this	  should	  be	  amended	  to	   a	   “stabilisation	   of	   concentrations	   well	   below	   550	   ppmv	   CO2	   equivalent”	  (Ibid.,	  p.4).	  	  
Figure	  4.3:	  “Impacts	  of	  or	  risks	  from	  climate	  change,	  by	  reason	  for	  concern.	  Each	  row	  corresponds	  to	  a	  reason	  for	  concern;	  shades	  correspond	  to	  severity	  of	  impact	  or	  risk.	  White	  means	  no	  or	  virtually	  neutral	  impact	  or	  risk,	  light	  grey	  means	  somewhat	  negative	  impacts	  or	  low	  risks,	  and	  dark	  grey	  means	  more	  negative	  impacts	  or	  higher	  risks.	  Global	  average	  temperatures	  in	  the	  20th	  century	  increased	  by	  0.6°C	  and	  led	  to	  some	  impacts.	  Impacts	  are	  plotted	  against	  increases	  in	  global	  mean	  temperature	  after	  1990.	  This	  figure	  addresses	  only	  how	  impacts	  or	  risks	  change	  as	  thresholds	  of	  increase	  in	  global	  mean	  temperature	  are	  crossed,	  not	  how	  impacts	  or	  risks	  change	  at	  different	  rates	  of	  change	  in	  climate.	  Temperatures	  should	  be	  taken	  as	  approximate	  indications	  of	  impacts,	  not	  as	  absolute	  thresholds”	  (Smith	  et	  al.	  2001,	  p.958).	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However	   the	   two	   degrees	   target	   was	   not	   without	   its	   critics.	   In	   an	  Editorial	   for	   Climatic	   Change,	   the	   prominent	   climatologist	   James	   Hansen	  argued	   that	   it	   was	   unlikely	   that	   the	   Earth	  was	   ever	  more	   than	   1°C	  warmer	  than	  2005	  levels	  during	  “recent	   interglacials”	  (Hansen	  2005,	  p.276),	  and	  this	  corresponded	   with	   a	   several-­‐meter	   increase	   in	   sea	   levels	   (Ibid.).	   Warming	  beyond	   1°C	   above	   pre-­‐industrial	   levels,	   he	   continued,	   constitutes	   dangerous	  anthropogenic	   interference	   with	   the	   climate	   system,	   and	   “the	   2°C	   scenario	  cannot	  be	  recommended	  as	  a	  responsible	   target,	  as	   it	  almost	  surely	   takes	  us	  well	  into	  the	  realm	  of	  dangerous	  anthropogenic	  interference	  with	  the	  climate	  system”	   (Ibid.,	   p.277).	   Similarly,	   one	  of	   the	  most	   comprehensive	   (Jaeger	   and	  Jaeger	  2011,	  p.S20)	  cost-­‐benefit	  analyses	  of	  climate	  change,	  the	  Stern	  Review	  (Stern	   2006),	   conducted	   an	   economic	   assessment	   of	   limiting	   GHG	  concentrations	  to	  450-­‐550ppmv.	  However,	  while	  the	  Stern	  Review	  noted	  the	  uncertainties	   in	   converting	   GHG	   concentrations	   into	   levels	   of	   warming,	   it	  represented	  the	  average	  of	  this	  range	  as	  roughly	  a	  2	  to	  3°C	  increase	  in	  global	  average	   temperature	   (Ibid.,	  p.v).	  What	   the	  Stern	  Review	  demonstrates	   is	   the	  centrality	   of	   GHG	   concentration	   levels	   for	   economic	   analysis	   of	   policy	  responses	  and	  the	  difficulty	  of	  converting	  this	  into	  an	  assessment	  of	  the	  likely	  temperature	  change	  and	  resulting	  impacts.	  It	   was	   at	   COP13,	   held	   in	   Bali	   in	   2007,	   that	   Parties	   to	   the	   UNFCCC	  agreed	  that	  a	  shared	  vision	  for	  long-­‐term	  action	  on	  climate	  change	  should	  be	  developed	   and	   tabled	   for	   discussion	   at	   the	   2009	   COP15	   in	   Copenhagen	  (UNFCCC	  2007).	  However	  little	  progress	  was	  made	  in	  two	  years	  leading	  up	  to	  Copenhagen.	   Parties	   merely	   restated	   their	   positions	   in	   international	  negotiations	   (Christoff	  2010),	  with	   the	  exception	  of	   the	  2009	  G8	  declaration	  that	  recognised	  “the	  broad	  scientific	  view	  that	   the	   increase	   in	  global	  average	  temperature	   above	   pre-­‐industrial	   levels	   ought	   not	   to	   exceed	   2°C”	   (G8	   2009,	  p.65).	  It	  is	  to	  the	  2009	  Copenhagen	  talks	  that	  this	  chapter	  now	  turns.	  
4.2.4.	   TWO	   DEGREES	   AND	   ASSUAGING	   CONCERNS	   OF	   NATIONAL	  
SOVEREIGNTY	  	  COP15,	   the	   2009	  UNFCCC	   talks	   held	   in	   Copenhagen,	   saw	   the	   coming	  together	   of	   two	   major	   tracks	   of	   work	   in	   international	   climate	   negotiations.	  First,	   the	   2005	   Montreal	   talks	   had	   formed	   the	   ‘Kyoto	   Track’	   –	   conducted	  through	   the	   Ad	   Hoc	   Working	   Group	   on	   Further	   Commitments	   for	   Annex	   I	  Parties	  under	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol	  –	  to	  discuss	  targets	  for	  industrialized	  nations	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after	  the	  initial	  2008-­‐2012	  commitment	  period	  of	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol	  (UNFCCC	  2006).	  Second,	   the	  2007	  Bali	  Action	  Plan	   formed	  the	  Ad	  Hoc	  Working	  Group	  on	  Long-­‐Term	  Cooperative	  Action	  under	  the	  UNFCCC,	  which	  was	  to	  develop:	  a	  shared	  long-­‐term	  vision;	  mitigation	  actions	  for	  both	  developed	  and	  developing	  nations;	   financial	   and	   technology	   transfer	   from	   developed	   to	   developing	  nations;	   and	  a	   system	   for	  measurement,	   reporting	  and	  verification	   (MRV)	  of	  emissions	  reductions	  (UNFCCC	  2007).	  Both	  of	  these	  Ad	  Hoc	  Working	  Groups	  were	  to	  complete	  their	  work	  at	  the	  2009	  Copenhagen	  Conference,	  and	  it	  was	  for	   this	   ambitious	   agenda	   that	   COP15	   was	   referred	   to	   as	   “Hopenhagen”	  accompanied	  by	  the	  unofficial	  slogan	  “Seal	  the	  deal”	  (Bodansky	  2010,	  p.230).	  However	   the	   negotiations	   that	   took	   place	   from	   the	   7th	   to	   the	   19th	  December	   2009	   in	   Copenhagen	   are	   widely	   regarded	   as	   a	   serious	  disappointment	   in	   the	   UNFCCC	   process	   (Christoff	   2010;	   Jaeger	   and	   Jaeger	  2011).	  While	   it	   was	   hoped	   that	   the	   US,	   under	   leadership	   of	   the	   Democrats,	  would	  take	  a	  leading	  role	  in	  the	  negotiations,	  President	  Obama	  faced	  domestic	  constraints	  that	  stemmed	  from	  climate	  change	  being	  perceived	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  US	  economy	  (Christoff	  2010,	  p.638).	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  global	  financial	  crisis	  had	  drawn	  political	  resources	  away	   from	  the	   issue.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  without	   a	   super-­‐majority	   in	   the	   US	   Senate,	   the	   Obama	   Administration	   was	  unable	   to	   challenge	   the	   “still	   popular	   Bush-­‐era	   doctrine”	   (Ibid.,	   p.650)	   that	  saw	   climate	   agreements	   as	   threats	   to	   the	   US	   economy.	   Indeed,	   the	   Senate’s	  1997	   Byrd-­‐Hagel	   resolution	   still	   required	   the	   commitment	   of	   China	   to	  “substantial,	   binding	   and	   verifiable	   emissions	   reduction	   measures”	   (Ibid.)	  before	   the	   US	   would	   ratify	   a	   UNFCCC	   agreement	   framed	   under	   the	   Kyoto	  Protocol.	   Similarly,	   with	   China’s	   emissions	   exceeding	   those	   of	   the	   United	  States	  in	  2007,	  its	  diplomatic	  manoeuvres	  at	  COP15	  hampered	  progress	  on	  the	  inclusion	   of	   developing	   nations	   in	   the	   agreement.	   Bound	   by	   domestic	  pressures	   pursuing	   strong	   economic	   growth	   to	   sustain	   political	   and	   social	  stability,	   China	   pressed	   for	   legal	   commitments	   from	   industrialized	   nations	  through	   further	   commitments	   under	   the	  Kyoto	  Protocol	  while	   avoiding	  new	  MRV	   requirements	   on	   their	   own	   emissions	   reductions	   (Ibid.,	   p.645–9).	  Moreover,	   China	   resisted	   any	   inclusion	   of	   “significant	   targets”	   that	   “defines	  and	   restricts	   China’s	   future	   ‘emissions	   space’”	   –	   including	   a	   percentage	   for	  global,	   developing,	   or	   Annex	   I	   GHG	   emissions	   reductions	   –	   seeing	   this	   as	   “a	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potential	   ‘external	   threat’	   to	   its	   sovereign	   right	   to	   define	   its	   energy	   path	   to	  development”	  (Ibid.,	  p.648).	  In	   addition,	   as	   early	   as	   the	   8th	   December,	   developing	   nations	   had	  become	   aware	   of	   the	   so-­‐called	   ‘Danish	   text’,	   a	   draft	   text	   for	   a	   Copenhagen	  Agreement	  developed	  by	  a	  small	  group	  of	  countries	  –	   including	  the	  UK,	  USA,	  Australia	  and	  Denmark	  –	   that	  was	   leaked	   to	  The	  Guardian	   (Vidal	  2009).	  The	  Danish	  text,	  dated	  27th	  November	  2009	  (Danish	  Text	  2009),	  was	  downplayed	  by	  the	  UNFCCC	  Executive	  Secretary,	  Yvo	  de	  Boer,	  and	  the	  Danish	  Ministry	  of	  Climate	  and	  Energy,	  arguing	  it	  was	  part	  of	  the	  common	  practice	  of	  developing	  informal	   texts	   or	   working	   papers	   during	   UNFCCC	   negotiations	   (Vidal	   and	  Milmo	   2009;	   Gray	   2009).	   The	   Sudanese	   chairman	   of	   the	   ‘G77	   plus	   China’	  group,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  commented:	  “The	  text	  robs	  developing	  countries	  of	  their	   just	   and	   equitable	   and	   fair	   share	   of	   the	   atmospheric	   space.	   It	   tries	   to	  treat	  rich	  and	  poor	  countries	  as	  equal”	  (Vidal	  and	  Milmo	  2009).	  	  By	   the	   final	   day	   of	   COP15,	   when	   heads	   of	   state	   returned	   to	  Copenhagen,	  Parties’	  negotiators	  had	  made	   little	  progress	  on	  a	  draft	   text	   for	  agreement.	   Through	   a	   side	  meeting	   of	   28	   Parties	   and	   a	   subsequent	   smaller	  meeting	   of	   five	   Parties	   (the	   United	   States,	   China,	   Brazil,	   India	   and	   South	  Africa)	   an	   outline	   for	   the	   Copenhagen	   Accord	   emerged	   (Bodansky	   2010,	  p.234).	  The	  final	  text	  totalled	  a	  mere	  three	  pages.	  While	  numerous	  long-­‐term	  targets	   for	   stabilising	   emissions	   concentration	   and	   reducing	   emissions	   had	  been	  developed	  through	  the	  Bali	  Action	  Plan,	  developing	  countries	  objected	  to	  emissions	   reduction	   targets	   that	   implied	   constraints	  on	   their	  own	  emissions	  (Bodansky	   2010,	   p.235).	   On	   GHG	   emissions,	   the	   text	   only	   noted	   that	   “deep	  cuts	   in	   global	   emissions	   are	   required	   according	   to	   science”	   (UNFCCC	   2009,	  p.2).	   However	   the	   proposal	   for	   a	   long-­‐term	   temperature	   threshold	  was	  met	  with	  more	  support,	  with	  the	  final	  text	  recognising	  the	  “scientific	  view	  that	  the	  increase	  in	  global	  temperature	  should	  be	  below	  2	  degrees	  Celsius”	  (Ibid.,	  p.1)	  and	   that	   reductions	   in	   global	   emissions	   should	   be	   “to	   hold	   the	   increase	   in	  global	   temperature	   below	   2	   degrees	   Celsius”	   (Ibid.,	   p.2).	   It	   was	   also	   agreed	  that	  an	  assessment	  of	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  Accord	  was	  to	  be	  completed	  by	   2015,	   and	   that	   “[t]his	   would	   include	   consideration	   of	   strengthening	   the	  long-­‐term	   goal	   referencing	   various	   matters	   presented	   by	   the	   science,	  including	   in	   relation	   to	   temperature	   rises	  of	  1.5	  degrees	  Celsius”	   (Ibid.,	   p.3).	  This	   final	   statement	   of	   the	   Accord,	   Bodansky	   argues,	  was	   a	   response	   to	   the	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Maldives	   and	   small	   island	   states	   (Bodansky	   2010,	   p.235)	   who	   believed	   the	  two	   degrees	   target	   would	   see	   a	   disastrous	   sea-­‐level	   rise	   for	   their	   low-­‐lying	  territories.	  	  The	   recognition	  of	   the	   two	  degrees	   target	   in	   the	  Copenhagen	  Accord	  represents	   the	   outcome	   of	   negotiations	   that	   sought	   to	   define	   a	   long-­‐term	  target	  while	  assuaging	  national	  sovereignty	  concerns.	  These	  last-­‐minute	  talks	  set	   aside	   the	   question	   of	   short-­‐term	  national-­‐level	   targets,	   focussing	   instead	  on	   specifying	   an	   objective	   that	   embedded	   the	   scientific	   basis	   of	   climatic	  impacts	  and	  a	  cost-­‐effective	  or	  ‘optimal’	  level	  of	  climate	  change.	  That	  is,	  where	  emissions-­‐based	   targets	   were	   more	   prescriptive	   in	   constraining	   a	   future	  ‘emissions	  space’	  for	  developing	  nations,	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	  established	  a	  threshold	   for	   ‘dangerous	   anthropogenic	   interference’,	   while	   leaving	   the	  matter	  of	  constraints	  for	  discussion	  at	  future	  COPs.	  In	  this	  regard,	  at	  the	  2009	  Copenhagen	   talks,	   the	   two	   degrees	   target	   emerged	   as	   a	   long-­‐term	   climate	  objective	   that	   could	   mediate	   between	   science,	   economics	   and	   politics;	  representing	   ‘dangerous’	   climate	   change	   in	   a	   single	   figure	   that	   neither	  jeopardised	  economic	  development	  nor	  encroached	  on	  national	  sovereignty.	  	  On	  further	  commitments	  from	  industrialized	  nations	  under	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol,	  the	  Copenhagen	  Accord	  notes	  “Annex	  I	  Parties	  commit	  to	  implement	  individually	   or	   jointly	   the	   quantified	   economy-­‐wide	   emissions	   targets	   for	  2020”	  (UNFCCC	  2009,	  p.2).	  To	  clarify,	  each	  Annex	  I	  Party	  was	  to	  define	  its	  own	  targets	   for	   the	   post-­‐2012	   commitment	   period	   and	   submit	   these	   to	   the	  UNFCCC.	   Furthermore,	   the	   “[d]elivery	   of	   reductions	   and	   financing	   by	  developed	   countries	   will	   be	   measured,	   reported	   and	   verified	   […]	   and	   will	  ensure	   that	   accounting	   of	   such	   targets	   and	   finance	   is	   rigorous,	   robust	   and	  transparent”	   (Ibid.).	   In	   other	   words,	   implementation	   of	   the	   nationally	  determined	   emission	   reduction	   targets	   would	   be	   scrutinised	   as	   part	   of	   the	  UNFCCC	  process.	  Mitigation	  actions	  of	  Non-­‐Annex	  I	  Parties,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  would	  be	  “subject	  to	  their	  domestic	  measurement,	  reporting	  and	  verification”	  (Ibid.,	   emphasis	   added)	   and	   reported	   through	   ‘national	   communications’	  every	   two	   years.	   International	   scrutiny,	   through	   consultations	   and	   analysis,	  would	   be	   conducted	   “under	   clearly	   defined	   guidelines	   that	   will	   ensure	   that	  national	   sovereignty	   is	   respected”	   (Ibid.).	  Taken	   together	   this	  was	   a	  marked	  difference	  from	  the	  centrally	  determined	  targets	  imposed	  on	  Parties	  under	  the	  Kyoto	   Protocol.	   The	   Copenhagen	   Accord	   envisaged	   emissions	   reductions	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targets	  being	  set	  independently	  by	  each	  nation	  and	  subject	  to	  some	  degree	  of	  scrutiny	   on	   the	   international	   stage.	   This	   shift	   was	   provoked	   by	   the	  recalcitrance	   of	   Parties,	   especially	   the	   US	   and	   China,	   to	   become	   subject	   to	  targets	   determined	   outside	   their	   own	   jurisdictions.	   By	   allowing	   nations	   to	  submit	   domestically-­‐determined	   targets	   to	   the	   UNFCCC,	   the	   new	   vision	  was	  ‘sensitive’	  to	  shifting	  “domestic	  political	  and	  economic	  circumstances”	  of	  each	  Party	  (Ibid.,	  p.653),	  while	  setting	  out	  that	  the	  short-­‐term	  targets	  set	  by	  Parties	  were	   to	   be	   assessed	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   long-­‐term	   two	   degrees	   target.	   Yet	   the	  mechanism	   to	   enact	   this	   vision	   was	   a	   matter	   for	   further	   negotiation	   at	  subsequent	   COPs,	   with	   the	   three-­‐page	   Copenhagen	   Accord	   limiting	   itself	   to	  outlining	   the	  new	  concept	  of	   the	   international	  mechanism	   for	   responding	   to	  climate	   change.	  Moreover,	   it	   left	   future	  COPs	  with	   the	   task	  of	   committing	   to	  and	  agreeing	  a	   long-­‐term	  objective,	   as	   the	   two	  degrees	   target	  had	  only	  been	  ‘recognised’	  under	  the	  Accord.	  
4.3.	  DISAGGREGATING	  THE	  TWO	  DEGREES	  TARGET	  
4.3.1.	   BUILDING	   IMPLEMENTATION	   MECHANISMS	   FOR	   THE	   COPENHAGEN	  
ACCORD	  In	   December	   2010	   the	   196	   Parties	   to	   the	   UNFCCC	   committed	   to	  limiting	   the	   increase	   in	   global	   average	   temperatures	   to	   two	   degrees	   Celsius	  (UNFCCC	   2011,	   p.3).	   This	   agreement	   of	   COP16	   –	   held	   in	   Cancun,	   Mexico	   –	  appears	   almost	   identical	   to	   the	   long-­‐term	   objective	   contained	   within	   the	  Copenhagen	  Accord.	  The	  difference,	  however,	   is	  that	  the	  Cancun	  Agreements	  were	   ‘adopted’	   at	   COP16	   (whereas	   the	   Copenhagen	   Accord	   had	   only	   been	  ‘noted’	  during	  COP15)	  thereby	  constituting	  a	  commitment	  to	  the	  two	  degrees	  target.	  The	  Cancun	  Agreements	  read:	  “[COP16]	   [f]urther	   recognizes	   that	   deep	   cuts	   in	   global	  greenhouse	  gas	  emissions	  are	  required	  according	  to	  science,	  and	  as	  documented	   in	   the	  Fourth	  Assessment	  Report	  of	   the	  Intergovernmental	   Panel	   on	  Climate	  Change,	  with	   a	   view	   to	  reducing	   global	   greenhouse	   gas	   emissions	   so	   as	   to	   hold	   the	  increase	   in	   global	   average	   temperature	   below	   2°C	   above	  preindustrial	   levels,	   and	   that	   Parties	   should	   take	   urgent	  action	   to	   meet	   this	   long-­‐term	   goal,	   consistent	   with	   science	  and	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   equity;	   also	   recognizes	   the	   need	   to	  consider	   […]	   strengthening	   the	   long-­‐term	  global	  goal	  on	   the	  basis	  of	   the	  best	   available	   scientific	   knowledge,	   including	   in	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relation	   to	   a	   global	   average	   temperature	   rise	   of	   1.5°C”	  (UNFCCC	  2011,	  p.3).	  The	   32-­‐page	   Cancun	   Agreements	   also	   elaborate	   on	   many	   aspects	   of	  the	  Copenhagen	  Accord	  vision,	  building	  mechanisms	   through	  which	  UNFCCC	  aspirations	   may	   be	   implemented.	   In	   particular	   it	   agreed	   a	   new	   work	  programme	   for	   developing	   “modalities	   and	   guidelines”	   (Ibid.,	   p.11)	   for	  measurement,	   reporting	   and	   verification	   (MRV)	   of	   “nationally	   appropriate	  mitigation	   actions”.	   The	   MRV	   challenges	   primarily	   stemmed	   from	   the	  emissions	  and	  mitigation	  actions	  of	  non-­‐Annex	   I	  Parties.	  Annex	   I	  nations,	  on	  the	   other	   hand,	   prepared	   annual	   inventories	   using	   IPCC	   GHG	   national	  emissions	  inventory	  methods	  that	  was	  subject	  to	  expert	  review	  to	  assess	  the	  methods	   applied,	   identify	   gaps	   in	   the	   inventory,	   suggest	   improvements	   and	  potentially	   recommend	   a	   revised	   estimate.	   Non-­‐Annex	   I	   nations,	   however,	  were	   only	   required	   to	   communicate	   emissions	   inventories	   as	   part	   of	   their	  national	   communications	   to	   the	  UNFCCC,	   and	  not	   on	   a	   “frequent	   or	  uniform	  basis”	   (Fransen	   2009,	   p.5).	   Use	   of	   IPCC	   methods	   was	   not	   compulsory	  (although	   were	   commonly	   used	   in	   practice)	   and	   deadlines	   for	   the	   reports	  were	  dependent	  on	  when	  funding	  was	  received	  for	  completing	  the	  inventory	  and	  were	   not	   subject	   to	   expert	   review.	  Without	   expert	   review	   non-­‐Annex	   I	  nations	   received	   little	   feedback	   on	   improving	   the	   inventory,	   hampering	   so-­‐called	   ‘capacity-­‐building’	   (Ibid.,	   p.6).	   Under	   the	   2010	   Cancun	   Agreements,	  non-­‐Annex	  I	  nations	  were	  required	  to	  submit	  Biennial	  Update	  Reports	  (BURs)	  “containing	   updates	   of	   national	   greenhouse	   gas	   inventories,	   including	   a	  national	   inventory	   report	   and	   information	   on	  mitigation	   actions,	   needs	   and	  support	   received”	   (UNFCCC	   2011,	   p.11).	   These	   BURs	   would	   be	   subject	   to	  international	   consultations	   and	   analysis	   “in	   a	   manner	   that	   is	   non-­‐intrusive,	  non-­‐punitive	   and	   respectful	   of	   national	   sovereignty”	   (Ibid.).	   This	   sought	   to	  further	   ‘capacity	   building’	   for	   non-­‐Annex	   I	   Parties,	   working	   to	   ameliorate	  issues	  regarding	  the	   lack	  of	  activity	  data	  as	  a	  basis	   for	  emissions	   inventories	  and	  the	  selection	  of	  appropriate	  emission	  factors49	  for	  national	  circumstances.	  Shortly	  after	  the	  talks,	  a	  member	  of	  one	  of	  the	  leading	  national	  delegations	  is	  quoted	   as	   saying	   “It’s	   incremental	   progress,	   but	   progress	   nonetheless”	  (Stavins	  2010).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  Emission	  factors	  are	  coefficients	  applied	  to	  particular	  units	  of	  activity	  that	  calculate	  the	  range	  of	  GHG	  emissions	  from	  that	  activity.	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The	  UNFCCC	  process	  continued	   to	  build	  on	   the	  Copenhagen	  Accord’s	  vision,	  with	   the	   2011	   talks	   in	  Durban,	   South	  Africa,	   establishing	   the	  Ad	  Hoc	  Working	   Group	   on	   the	   Durban	   Platform	   for	   Enhanced	   Action	   (ADP).	   ADP’s	  mandate	  was	  “to	  develop	  a	  protocol,	  another	   legal	   instrument50	  or	  an	  agreed	  outcome	   with	   legal	   force	   under	   the	   Convention	   applicable	   to	   all	   Parties”	  (UNFCCC	  2012,	  p.2).	  It	  was	  to	  complete	  this	  work	  “no	  later	  than	  2015	  in	  order	  to	  adopt	  [it]	  at	  the	  twenty-­‐first	  session	  of	  the	  Conference	  of	  the	  Parties	  and	  for	  it	  to	  come	  into	  effect	  and	  be	  implemented	  from	  2020”	  (Ibid.).	  Specifically,	  four	  dimensions	  would	  constitute	  the	  legal	  character	  of	  any	  protocol	  or	  instrument	  developed	  through	  ADP:	  “the	  legal	  form	  of	  the	  agreement,	  […];	  the	  legal	  form	  of	  commitments	  within	  that	  agreement;	  the	  prescriptive	  nature	  and	  content	  of	  these	   commitments;	   and	   the	   procedures	   and	   institutions	   set	   up	   under	   the	  agreement	   to	   hold	   its	   parties	   accountable	   for	   complying	   with	   their	  commitments”	  (WRI	  2011).	  Put	  differently,	  the	  ADP	  was	  to	  develop	  a	  protocol	  to	  guide	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  Copenhagen	  Accord’s	  vision,	  and	  this	  was	  to	   be	   negotiated	   no	   later	   than	   COP21	   in	   2015.	   As	  with	   the	   UNFCCC,	   a	   state	  would	   only	   be	   bound	   by	   such	   a	   ‘legal	   instrument’	   if	   it	   chose	   to	   ratify	   the	  corresponding	  UNFCCC	  agreement	  or	  protocol,	   thereby	  providing	  its	  consent	  to	   be	   bound	   by	   the	   treaty	   as	   part	   of	   international	   law.	   This	   does	   not	  necessarily	  imply	  international	  enforcement	  mechanisms	  would	  be	  created	  or,	  if	  created,	  be	  enacted.	  Rather,	  the	  ratifying	  nation	  could	  not	  use	  its	  own	  laws	  as	  a	  justification	  for	  failure	  to	  comply.	  ‘Enforcement’	  of	  the	  legal	  instrument’s	  requirements,	  however,	  could	  be	  achieved	  through	  the	  domestic	  legal	  system	  (Hyvarinen	  et	  al.	  2012).	  	  By	  COP18	  in	  Doha,	  Qatar,	  in	  2012,	  the	  first	  commitment	  period	  of	  the	  Kyoto	   Protocol	  was	   coming	   to	   a	   close.51	  However	   the	   ‘legal	   instrument’	   that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  The	   idea	   of	   a	   ‘legally	   binding’	   international	   agreement	   has	   been	   explained	   as	  follows:	   “Under	   international	   law,	  a	  binding	  agreement	  or	  commitment	  represents	  a	  country’s	   or	   countries’	   express	   consent	   to	   be	   bound,	   and	   its	   willingness	   to	   be	   held	  accountable	  by	  other	  parties	  for	  its	  compliance	  with	  its	  obligations”(WRI	  2011).	  	  However	  the	  notion	  of	   ‘legally	  binding’,	   it	  has	  been	  argued,	  may	  have	  little	  relevance	  to	   a	  Party’s	   decision	   to	   comply	  with	   a	   treaty.	  Nations	   “sign	  onto	   agreements	   and	   to	  take	   action	   to	   comply	  with	   those	   agreements	   for	   any	  number	  of	   reasons	   relating	   to	  self-­‐interest,	   public	   pressure,	   reputation,	   horse-­‐trading	   –	   in	   effect,	   political	   reasons.	  The	  ‘legally	  binding’	  nature	  of	  the	  obligation	  is	  simply	  not	  likely	  to	  be	  a	  significant	  one	  of	  those	  reasons”	  (Chang	  2010).	  51 	  A	   later	   report	   would	   find	   that	   developed	   nations	   had	   complied	   with	   their	  commitments	   for	   this	   first	   commitment	   period,	   achieving	   “low-­‐carbon	   growth	   […]	  explained	   by	   better	   primary	   energy-­‐mix,	   the	   continued	   expansion	   of	   the	   service	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would	   succeed	   the	  Kyoto	  Protocol,	  which	  was	  being	  developed	  by	  ADP,	  was	  only	  scheduled	  to	  enter	  into	  force	  in	  2020.	  To	  bridge	  this	  gap,	  negotiations	  at	  COP18	   centred	   on	   agreeing	   a	   second	   commitment	   period	   to	   the	   Kyoto	  Protocol.	   The	   talks	   produced	   the	   Doha	   Amendment	   to	   the	   Kyoto	   Protocol,	  detailing	   emissions	   reduction	   targets	   for	   Annex	   I	   nations	   and	   guidance	   on	  voluntary	  mitigation	   actions	   for	   non-­‐Annex	   I	   nations	   during	   the	   2013-­‐2020	  commitment	   period.	   Specifically	   for	   Annex	   I	   nations,	   emissions	   were	   to	   be	  reduced	  “by	  at	  least	  18	  per	  cent	  below	  1990	  levels	  in	  the	  commitment	  period	  2013	  to	  2020”	  (UNFCCC	  2013,	  p.10).52	  The	   introduction	   of	   intended	   nationally	   determined	   contributions	  (INDCs)	   at	  COP	  19	   in	  Warsaw,	  Poland,	   in	  2013	  brought	   a	  new	  dimension	   to	  ADP’s	  work	  on	  a	   legal	   instrument.	  All	  Parties	  were	   invited	   to	  prepare	   INDCs	  that,	   as	  explained	   in	   the	  conference	   text	   (UNFCCC	  2014a,	  p.4),	  detailed	   their	  planned	   level	   of	   emissions	   reductions	   and	   associated	   implementation	  strategy.	  These	  were	   to	  be	  completed	   “in	   the	  context	  of	  adopting	  a	  protocol,	  another	   legal	   instrument	   or	   an	   agreed	   outcome	   with	   legal	   force	   under	   the	  Convention	   applicable	   to	   all	   Parties	   towards	   achieving	   the	   objective	   of	   the	  Convention	  as	  set	  out	  in	  its	  Article	  2”	  (Ibid.).	  That	  is,	  INDCs	  should	  represent	  the	   targets	  and	  plans	   for	  emissions	  reductions	  under	  a	   legal	   instrument	   that	  would	   come	   into	   force	   in	   2020	   and	   which	   were	   prepared	   with	   a	   view	   to	  preventing	   dangerous	   anthropogenic	   interference	   with	   the	   climate	   system.	  Yet,	  crucially,	  the	  INDCs	  allowed	  flexibility	  in	  the	  types	  of	  short-­‐term	  targets	  a	  Party	   could	   adopt,	   including	   a	   percentage	   reduction	   in	   GHG	   emissions	  compared	  to	  a	  particular	  ‘base	  year’,	  a	  similar	  reduction	  in	  emissions	  intensity	  of	  GDP,	  and	  policy	   targets	  (such	  as,	  among	  others,	  renewable	  energy,	  energy	  efficiency,	   and	   forestry).	   MRV	   tools	   for	   percentage	   reductions	   in	   GHG	  emissions	  could	  be	  based	  on	  IPCC	  methods	  developed	  for	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol	  targets;	   however,	   comparability	   issues	   arose	   regarding	   reductions	   in	   GHG	  intensity	  of	  GDP	  as	  these	  were	  typically	  based	  on	  domestic	  data	  sources	  that	  vary	   between	   nations	   (Levin	   2015).	   There	   was	   also	   a	   lack	   of	   UNFCCC	  standardized	  methods	  for	  measuring	  the	  GHG	  impacts	  of	  policy	  commitments.	  Furthermore,	   due	   to	   “differences	   in	   data	   availability,	   methods,	   and	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  sector,	  declining	  GHG	  intensity	  of	  industries	  and	  outsourcing	  the	  production	  of	  goods	  overseas”	  (Morel	  and	  Shishlov	  2014,	  p.1).	  52	  At	  the	  time	  of	  writing	  70	  countries	  have	  ratified	  the	  Doha	  Amendment.	  Ratifications	  from	  144	  countries	  are	  required	  for	  it	  to	  enter	  into	  force.	  (UNFCCC	  2016a).	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diversity	   of	   policy	   commitments,	   the	   results	   of	   such	   assessments	   cannot	   be	  easily	  compared	  across	  countries”	  (Ibid.).	  	  In	   this	   regard,	   while	   INDC	   submissions	   were	   invited	   by	   early	   2015	  with	  a	  view	  to	  providing	  an	  overall	  view	  of	  pledged	  reductions	  in	  advance	  of	  COP21,	   there	   remained	   many	   MRV	   issues	   to	   resolve	   (UNFCCC	   2014a,	   p.4).	  ADP	   swiftly	   developed	   guidance	   for	   the	   production	   of	   INDCs,	   with	   its	   July	  2014	   draft	   text	   noting	   that	   INDCs	   should	   “enhance	   the	   understanding	   of	  whether	  the	  aggregate	  effect	  of	  all	  the	  Parties’	  efforts	  is	  adequate	  to	  hold	  the	  increase	   in	   global	   average	   temperature	   below	   2°C	   or	   1.5°C	   above	   pre-­‐industrial	  levels”	  (ADP	  2014,	  pp.1–2).	  In	  other	  words,	  INDCs	  were	  to	  disclose	  how	   their	   national-­‐level	   efforts	   contributed	   to	   the	   international	   target	   of	  limiting	   warming	   to	   two	   degrees.	   In	   this	   regard	   Parties	   were	   made	  responsible	   for	   disaggregating	   the	   two	   degrees	   target	   to	   their	   own	   specific	  circumstances,	  for	  which	  plans	  and	  policy	  implementation	  had	  to	  be	  reported	  back	  to	  the	  UNFCCC.	  ADP’s	   July	  2014	  draft	   text	  detailed	  the	   information	  that	  should	  accompany	  a	  Party’s	  INDC	  submissions	  (such	  as	  choice	  of	  ‘base	  year’,53	  methods	   for	   projecting	   carbon	   intensity	   of	   GDP,	   and	   additional	   mitigation	  action	  should	  support	  be	  provided),	  which	  would	  be	  made	  public	  and	  provide	  the	  basis	  for	  the	  UNFCCC	  secretariat	  to	  “summarize,	   in	  a	  technical	  paper,	  the	  aggregated	  effect	  of	   the	  contributions	  relative	  to	   the	  2°C	  goal,	   the	   fairness	  of	  their	  relative	  efforts	  and	  the	  level	  of	  ambition	  of	  the	  contributions”	  (Ibid.,	  p.2).	  	  COP20	  in	  Lima,	  Peru,	  saw	  an	  intensification	  of	  efforts	  to	  agree	  a	  draft	  negotiating	   text	   for	   the	   highly	   anticipated	   2015	   Paris	   talks	   at	   COP21.	   The	  ‘Lima	   Call	   for	   Climate	   Action’	   agreed	   the	   rules	   for	   INDC	   submissions,	   and	  requested	   that	   the	   UNFCCC	   Secretariat	   “[p]repare	   by	   1	   November	   2015	   a	  synthesis	  report	  on	  the	  aggregate	  effect	  of	  the	  intended	  nationally	  determined	  contributions	  communicated	  by	  Parties	  by	  1	  October	  2015”	   (UNFCCC	  2015a,	  p.3).	   It	   further	   reiterated	   the	   invitation	   for	   Parties	   to	   communicate	   their	  INDCs	  by	  the	  first	  quarter	  of	  2015	  (Ibid.).	  A	  new	  climate	  action	  portal	  was	  also	  launched	  as	  part	  of	  the	  Lima	  Climate	  Action	  Agenda,	  “to	  increase	  the	  visibility	  of	  the	  wealth	  of	  climate	  action	  among	  cities,	  regions,	  companies	  and	  investors,	  including	  those	  under	  international	  cooperative	  initiatives”	  (UNFCCC	  2014b).	  Named	   the	  Non-­‐State	  Actor	   Zone	   for	   Climate	  Action	   (Nazca),	   the	   portal	  was	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  53	  A	   ‘base	   year’	   is	   the	   year	   against	   which	   changes	   in	   national	   GHG	   emissions	   are	  measured.	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“designed	  to	  inject	  additional	  momentum	  into	  the	  process	  through	  to	  Paris	  by	  demonstrating	  the	  wealth	  of	  non-­‐state	  action”	  (Ibid.).	  Showcasing	  cooperative	  initiatives	  and	  commitments	  made	  by	  individual	  organisations	  was	  central	  to	  this	  display	  of	  non-­‐state	  support.	  Indeed,	  before	  turning	  to	  COP21,	  it	  is	  worth	  exploring	  how	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	  was	  being	  disaggregated	  to	  the	  sectoral-­‐	  and	   corporate-­‐levels	   in	   non-­‐state	   actor	   initiatives	   outside	   the	   UNFCCC	  process.	  
4.3.2.	   NON-­‐STATE	   ACTORS	   AND	   DISAGGREGATING	   THE	   TWO	   DEGREES	  
TARGET	  Efforts	  to	  disaggregate	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	  from	  a	  global	  objective	  to	   a	  more	   refined	   level	  was	  not	   restricted	   to	   the	  UNFCCC	   focus	  on	  national-­‐level	   GHG	   mitigation.	   By	   2011	   the	   Carbon	   Tracker	   Initiative,	   launched	   by	  Investor	  Watch,54	  had	  released	  its	  report	  that	  calculated	  that	  remaining	  within	  two	   degrees	   of	   warming	   meant	   that	   80%	   of	   fossil	   fuels	   currently	   listed	   on	  stock	   exchanges	   were	   ‘unburnable’	   (Carbon	   Tracker	   2011).	   Taking	   the	   two	  degrees	   target	   as	   its	   foundation,	   the	   report	   identified	   a	   corresponding	  cumulative	   level	   of	   emissions	   that	   could	   be	   compared	   to	   the	   potential	  emissions	  of	  fossil	  fuel	  reserves	  held	  by	  oil,	  gas	  and	  coal	  companies	  listed	  on	  stock	   exchanges.	  With	   the	   valuation	   of	   those	   companies	   partially	   depending	  on	   these	  supposedly	   ‘unburnable’	   fossil	   fuel	   reserves,	   the	  report	  argued	   that	  there	   was	   a	   ‘carbon	   bubble’	   in	   capital	   markets	   due	   to	   the	   overvaluation	   of	  these	   companies.	   This	   disaggregation	   of	   the	   two	   degrees	   target	   into	   one	  potential	   issue	   for	   the	   financial	   sector	   is	   central	   to	   Chapter	   5,	   which	  documents	  this	  disaggregation	  in	  detail.	  However,	  while	  Chapter	  5	  focuses	  on	  the	   financial	   sector,	   this	   section	   highlights	   that	   two	   degrees	   target	   was	  adopted	  as	  a	  foundation	  for	  a	  wider	  array	  of	  work.	  	  Indeed,	   by	   2013	   the	   consulting	   firm	   BSR	   (Business	   for	   Social	  Responsibility),	   founded	  in	  1992,	  55	  placed	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	  at	   the	  core	  of	  their	   ‘Business	  in	  a	  Climate-­‐Constrained	  World’	  initiative	  (Cameron	  2013).	  Its	  2014	  report	  cited	   the	  Copenhagen	  Accord	  as	  demonstrating	   the	  scientific	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  54	  Investor	  Watch	  was	  founded	  in	  2009	  to	  “promote	  socially	  responsible	  investment”	  through	  the	  “incorporation	  of	  the	  principles	  of	  social	  and	  environmental	  sustainability	  into	  the	  governance	  operation	  of	  capital	  markets”	  (Companies	  House	  2009,	  p.1).	  55	  BSR	  was	  founded	  by	  members	  of	  the	  Social	  Value	  Network	  (a	  network	  of	  “socially-­‐minded”	   entrepreneurs	   that	   emerged	   in	   the	   late-­‐1980s)	   as	   a	   lobby	   for	   socially	  responsible	  business	  in	  US	  policy-­‐making	  (BSR	  2016).	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and	  political	  consensus	  on	  the	  need	  to	  limit	  temperature	  increase	  to	  2°C	  above	  pre-­‐industrial	   levels	   (BSR	   2014,	   p.7).	   The	   report	   claims	   that	   their	   services	  translate	   climate	   risks	   and	   emissions	   pathways	   into	   “a	   menu	   of	   tangible,	  actionable	   steps”	   (Ibid.,	   p.10)	   for	   reducing	   emissions	   in	   line	   with	   the	   two	  degrees	  target.	  It	  claims	  that	  while	  the	  “current	   debate	   on	   climate	   and	   business	   […]	   focuses	   on	  aggregate,	   cumulative	   risks	   and	   consequences	   that	   few	  businesses	   can	   relate	   to.	   Our	   translation	   addresses	   this	  problem	  by	  downscaling	  climate	  risks	   for	  specific	   industries	  and	   individual	   companies	   in	   a	   manner	   that	   highlights	  concrete	  impacts	  on	  business	  operations	  and	  strategy”	  (Ibid.	  p.27).	  	  The	  report	  proposes	  the	  adaptation	  of	  Pacala	  and	  Socolow’s	  notion	  of	  ‘stabilization	  wedges’	  (Pacala	  and	  Socolow	  2004)	  to	  split	  the	  GHG	  reductions	  required	   for	   a	   ‘2°C	   pathway’	   into	   ‘wedges’	   across	   eight	   ‘industry	   clusters’,56	  with	   each	   wedge	   detailing	   emissions	   reduction	   options	   for	   a	   particular	  activity,	   such	   as	   land	   use	   and	   energy	   mix.	   Here,	   however,	   BSR	   offer	   only	   a	  short	  example	  and	  noted	  that	  “further	  research	  will	  be	  needed	  to	  identify	  the	  full	  suite	  of	  wedges	  and	  each	  one’s	  mitigation	  potential”	  (Ibid.,	  p.34).	  The	  point	  is	   that	   BSR	   was	   working	   to	   split	   emissions	   reductions	   into	   separate	   work	  streams,	   which	   would	   each	   separately	   map	   steps	   towards	   an	   emissions	  pathway	  consistent	  with	  the	  two	  degrees	  target.	  Corporate	   target-­‐setting	   initiatives	   also	   began	   to	   translate	   the	   two	  degrees	   target	   into	   specific	   goals	   for	   businesses.	   The	   Science-­‐Based	   Targets	  initiative	  was	  launched	  by	  CDP	  (formerly	  the	  Carbon	  Disclosure	  Project),57	  the	  United	   Nations	   Global	   Compact	   (UNGC),58	  WRI	   and	   the	  Worldwide	   Fund	   for	  Nature	   (WWF).59	  The	   initiative	   was	   launched	   with	   the	   overarching	   goal	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  56	  The	  proposed	  clusters	  were	  food,	  beverage,	  and	  agriculture,	  energy	  and	  extractives,	  information	   and	   communications	   technology,	   health	   care,	   financial	   services,	  transportation	  and	  logistics,	  and	  travel	  and	  tourism.	  57	  CDP	   was	   launched	   in	   2000,	   and	   is	   a	   GHG	   disclosure	   organisation	   that	   gathers	  information	   through	   annual	   questionnaires.	   It	   was	   formerly	   known	   as	   the	   Carbon	  Disclosure	   Project	   and	   changed	   its	   name	   to	   the	   abbreviation	   CDP	   to	   reflect	   their	  expansion	  into,	  in	  particular,	  water	  reporting.	  (For	  more	  detail	  on	  CDP	  see:	  Kolk,	  Levy,	  and	  Pinkse	  2008;	  Matisoff,	  Noonan,	  and	  O’Brien	  2013)	  58	  UNGC	  was	  launched	  in	  2000	  as	  a	  United	  Nations	  initiative	  to	  foster	  the	  adoption	  of	  corporate	   social	   responsibility	   practices,	   in	   particular	   UN	   projects	   such	   as	   the	  Millennium	  Development	  Goals	  and	  the	  Sustainable	  Development	  Goals.	  59	  WWF	  is	  an	  international	  NGO	  founded	  in	  1961,	  working	  “to	  stop	  the	  degradation	  of	  the	   planet’s	   natural	   environment	   and	   to	   build	   a	   future	   in	   which	   humans	   live	   in	  harmony	  with	  nature”	  (WWF	  2016).	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raising	   “the	   ambition	   of	   corporate	   GHG	   reduction	   targets	   to	   support	   a	  transition	   to	   a	   low-­‐carbon	   economy	   and	   keep	   the	   planet	   below	   a	   2°C	  temperature	  rise”	  (CDP	  et	  al.	  2015,	  p.8).	  A	   ‘science-­‐based	  target’	   is	  explained	  as	   one	   that	   aims	   to	   reduce	   corporate	   GHG	   emissions	   to	   “the	   level	   of	  decarbonization	  required	  to	  keep	  global	  temperature	  increase	  well	  below	  2°C	  compared	   to	   pre-­‐industrial	   temperatures,	   as	   described	   in	   the	   assessment	  reports	   of	   the	   IPCC.”	   (Ibid.,	   p.10).	   Their	   draft	   manual	   for	   target	   setting	  identifies	  three	  stages	  (see	  Figure	  4.4).	  	  
	  First,	   an	   emissions	   scenario	   consistent	   with	   2°C	   of	   warming	   is	  identified	   from	   a	   subset	   of	   IPCC	   or	   International	   Energy	   Agency	   (IEA)	  scenarios	  (Ibid.,	  p.17).	  Second,	  the	  scenario	  is	  split	  into	  components	  to	  identify	  the	  relevant	  regional	  or	  sectoral	  emission	  pathway	  within	  that	  scenario	  (Ibid.,	  p,18).	  For	  example	  an	  energy	  producer	  in	  an	  Annex	  I	  nation	  would	  identify	  the	  Annex	   I	   or	   power	   sector	   emissions	   trajectory	   within	   their	   chosen	   2°C	  emissions	  scenario.	  Finally,	  the	  corporation	  must	  decide	  on	  whether	  it	  will	  set	  targets	   for	   its	   ‘intensity’	   of	   production	   or	   ‘absolute’	   emissions	   reductions.	  Intensity	   targets	  would	   focus	   efforts	   on	   converging	  with	   a	   sectoral	   intensity	  average	  that	  was	  consistent	  with	  the	  two	  degrees	  target,	  or	  on	  maintaining	  the	  same	  rate	  of	  decrease	  for	  intensity	  (compression)	  as	  other	  companies	  in	  their	  sector	   or	   region.	   Absolute	   targets,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   would	   require	   a	  contraction	   of	   GHG	   emissions	   at	   the	   same	   rate	   as	   companies	   in	   the	   same	  sector	  or	  region.	  Through	  this	  process	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	  is	  disaggregated	  
Figure	  4.4:	  Three	  stages	  of	  setting	  a	  science-­‐based	  target	  (CDP	  et	  al.	  2015,	  p.20).	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into	  corporate-­‐level	  targets	  that	  are	  aligned	  with	  either	  a	  sectoral	  or	  regional	  two	  degrees	  trajectory	  (Ibid.,	  pp.18-­‐19).	  By	  COP21	  114	  companies	  –	  including	  Ikea	  Group,	  Coca-­‐Cola	  Enterprises,	  Walmart	  and	  Kellogg	  –	  had	  committed	   to	  set	  science-­‐based	  targets.	  As	  noted,	  this	  section	  set	  out	  to	  highlight	  how	  the	  two	  degrees	  target,	  as	   the	   emerging	   long-­‐term	   target	   for	   addressing	   climate	   change,	   provided	   a	  foundation	  for	  efforts	  to	  disaggregate	  the	  climate	  problem	  to	  the	  industry-­‐	  and	  corporate-­‐level.	   Furthermore,	   the	   organisations	   highlighted	   had	   worked	   on	  climate	   issues	   for	   many	   years.	   Yet	   the	   two	   degrees	   target,	   appearing	   as	   a	  politically	  and	  scientifically	  supported	  objective	  (by	  the	  UNFCCC	  and	  the	  IPCC,	  respectively),	  was	  mobilised	  as	  a	  foundation	  for	  their	  work	  to	  align	  industry-­‐	  and	  corporate-­‐level	  activity	  with	  a	  vision	  for	  addressing	  climate	  change.	  This	  creation	  of	  linkages	  between	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	  and	  local	  specifics	  will	  be	  explored	  in	  depth	  later	  in	  the	  thesis.	  This	  section	  now	  turns	  to	  recognise	  that	  while	  the	  businesses	  and	  initiatives	  highlighted	  in	  this	  section	  claimed	  that	  the	  science	  supporting	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	  was	   ‘clear’,	  scientific	  scepticism	  of	  the	  target	  was	  rife.	  	  
4.3.3.	  SCIENTISTS	  STATE	  SCEPTICISM	  OF	  THE	  TWO	  DEGREES	  TARGET	  Reflecting	  on	   the	   “disappointing	  Copenhagen	  conference”,	   Jaeger	  and	  Jaeger60	  (2011,	   p.S15)	   remark	   that	   it	   “could	   lead	   to	   a	   healthy	   rethinking	   of	  major	  assumptions	  often	  taken	  for	  granted	  in	  climate	  policy.”	  Expectations	  on	  international	   climate	  policy	  may	   lower,	   they	  argue,	  while	  actions	   that	   run	   in	  parallel	  to	  processes	  such	  as	  the	  UNFCCC	  may	  be	  stimulated	  as	  a	  result.	  “Often,	  international	   diplomacy	   needs	   gestation	   periods	   of	   many	   years	   in	   order	   to	  prepare	  a	  next	  breakthrough.	  The	  opportunity	  for	  such	  breakthroughs	  in	  turn	  may	  depend	  on	  actions	  taking	  place	  in	  other	  arenas”	  (Jaeger	  and	  Jaeger	  2011,	  p.S15).	   The	   authors	   note	   that	   the	   two	   degrees	   target	   “might	   help	   to	   orient	  both	  international	  climate	  policy	  and	  other	  actions”	  (Ibid.).	  In	  this	  regard	  the	  authors	  present	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	  as	  enabling	  work	  in	  arenas	  beyond	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  60	  Jill	  Jaeger	  (Ph.D.	  in	  Climatology	  from	  University	  of	  Colorado	  in	  1972)	  compiled	  the	  report	  from	  the	  1987	  Bellagio	  and	  Villach	  conferences	  (Jäger	  1988)	  and	  continued	  to	  work	  and	   joined	  IIASA	  as	  Deputy	  Director	   in	  1994.	  Her	  research	  themes	  range	   from	  energy	   and	   climate	   to	   linkages	   between	   knowledge	   and	   action	   for	   sustainable	  development	   (ESF	   2016).	   Carlo	   Jaeger	   (Ph.D.	   in	   Economics	   from	   J.W.	   Goethe	  University	   in	  1979)	   is	   an	  economist	  working	  on	   the	   issue	  of	   climate	   change	  and	  co-­‐Founder	   of	   the	   Global	   Climate	   Forum,	   which	   focuses	   on	   economic	   approaches	   to	  managing	  climate	  risk.	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UNFCCC,	   and	   that	   by	   disaggregating	   the	   common	   basis	   of	   the	   two	   degrees	  target	   the	   different	   work	   streams	   may	   come	   to	   be	   mutually	   reinforcing.	  	  However	   this	   optimistic	   view	   of	   the	   two	   degrees	   target	   was	   hardly	  commonplace	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  Copenhagen	  talks.	  Compared	   to	   Jaeger	   and	   Jaeger’s	   view	  of	   the	   two	  degrees	   target	   as	   a	  stimulus	  and	  guide	  for	  further	  climate	  action,	  Hulme	  (2012)61	  emphasises	  four	  characteristics	   of	   the	   two	   degrees	   target	   –	   universality,	   ambiguity,	   doubtful	  achievability	   and	   questionable	   legitimacy	   –	   that,	   he	   argues,	   challenge	   the	  usefulness	  of	  the	  target.	  He	  suggests	  using	  wider	  range	  of	  climate	  goals	  rather	  than	  a	  single	  ‘universal’	  index.	  Rather,	  he	  argues	  that	  targets	  should	  be	  based	  on	   factors	   such	   as	   GHG	   emissions	   instead	   of	   an	   ‘ambiguous’	   output	   of	   the	  climate	  system	  that	  corresponds	  with	  numerous	  input	  scenarios	  (Hulme	  2012,	  pp.123–4).	  The	  two	  degrees	  target	  is	   ‘unattainable’,	  Hulme	  argues,	  because	  it	  presupposes	   an	   ability	   to	   control	   planetary	   system,	   for	   which	   he	   believes	  humans	   are	   unlikely	   to	   possess	   the	   necessary	   knowledge	   (Ibid.,	   p.124).	  Moreover,	   the	   two	  degrees	   target	   lacks	   legitimacy	  because,	  on	   the	  one	  hand,	  politicians	   claim	   it	   represents	   the	   scientific	   consensus	   on	  dangerous	   climate	  change,	  while	  the	  scientific	  community	  believe	  any	  such	  target	  to	  be	  a	  value-­‐laden	  judgment	  and	  not	  a	  matter	  of	  scientific	  enquiry	  (Ibid.,	  pp.124-­‐5).	  Indeed,	  Seager’s	   feminist	   analysis	   of	   the	   two	  degrees	   target	   reinforces	   the	   view	   that	  the	   two	  degrees	   target	   is	  not	   a	   geophysical	   threshold.	   It	   is	   the	  outcome,	   she	  argues,	   of	   an	   international	   political	   process	   that	   represents	   a	   point	   “when	  global	  warming	  comes	  ‘home’	  to	  the	  rich	  world”	  (Seager	  2012,	  p.16).	  Perhaps	   the	   most	   damning	   assessment	   of	   the	   two	   degrees	   target	   is	  Victor	  and	  Kennel’s	  (2014)	  Climate	  policy:	  Ditch	  the	  2°C	  warming	  goal.	  Arguing	  that	  the	  two	  degrees	  target’s	  “[b]old	  simplicity	  must	  now	  face	  reality”	  (Victor	  and	   Kennel	   2014,	   p.30),	   the	   authors	   claim	   that	   it	   allows	   governments	   to	  “pretend	   they	   are	   taking	   serious	   action	   to	  mitigate	   climate	   change,	  when	   in	  reality	   they	   have	   achieved	   almost	   nothing”.	  Moreover,	   they	   claim	   that	   there	  are	   more	   “scientifically	   meaningful”	   measures	   of	   anthropogenic	   climate	  impacts	  and	  that	  without	  such	  measures	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  explain	  how	  government	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  Mike	  Hulme	  (Ph.D.	   ‘Secular	  variations	  in	  Sudan	  rainfall	  and	  water	  resources’	   from	  University	  College	  Swansea	  in	  1985)	  served	  on	  the	  IPCC	  from	  1995	  to	  2001.	  His	  2009	  book,	  Why	  we	  Disagree	  About	  Climate	  Change,	  emphasizes	  that	  climate	  change	  should	  not	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  problem	  waiting	  for	  a	  solution,	  but	  a	  catalyst	  for	  reshaping	  how	  we	  think	  about	  humanity’s	  place	  on	  Earth	  (Hulme	  2009).	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policies	   “deliver	   tangible	   results”	   (Ibid.).	   The	   authors	   further	   point	   to	   the	  target’s	   “heroic	  assumptions”	  (Ibid.),	   such	  as	  “immediate	  global	  cooperation”	  and	  availability	  of	  scalable	  carbon	  capture	  and	  storage	  methods	  that	  underpin	  simulations	  showing	  emissions	  can	  be	  reduced	  to	  meet	  the	  two	  degrees	  target.	  They	  also	  argue	  that	  temperature	  targets	  are	  “related	  only	  probabilistically	  to	  emissions	  and	  policies”	  (Ibid.,	  p.31),	  offering	  little	  guidance	  for	  the	  actions	  of	  individuals	   and	   governments.	   Moreover,	   the	   “planet’s	   average	   temperature	  has	   barely	   risen	   in	   the	   past	   16	   years”	   (Ibid.).	   Focussing	   on	   temperature	  ignores	  that,	   for	  example,	  oceans	  absorb	  93%	  of	  energy	  added	  to	  the	  climate	  system,	   which	   drives	   sea	   level	   rise	   and	   other	   climatic	   impacts	   (Ibid.).	   “The	  best	   indicator	   has	   been	   there	   all	   along”	   (Ibid.),	   the	   authors	   proclaim,	   “the	  concentrations	  of	  CO2	  and	  the	  other	  greenhouse	  gases”	  are	  well-­‐measured	  and	  more	   easily	   translated	   into	   policy	   efforts.	   While	   the	   authors	   note	   that	   new	  indicators	  would	  not	   be	   ready	   for	   the	   2015	  Paris	   talks,	   they	   argue	   the	   talks	  should	  agree	  “a	  path	  for	  designing	  them”	  (Ibid.).	  While	   the	   Victor	   and	   Kennel	   (2014)	   comment	   piece	   prompted	  numerous	  press	  articles	   investigating	  the	  scientific	  basis	   for	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	   (see,	   for	   example,	   Vaughan	   2014;	   Naik	   2015),	   it	   faced	   a	   swift	   and	  detailed	   rebuttal	   from	   prominent	   names	   in	   climate	   science	   (W.	   Hare,	  Schleußner,	   and	   Schaeffer	   2014).	   The	   rebuttal	   attempted	   to	   dismantle	   the	  comment	  piece,	  paragraph-­‐by-­‐paragraph.	  Addressing	  what	  they	  see	  as	  Victor	  and	   Kennel’s	   two	   core	   arguments	   (that	   it	   is	   no	   longer	   feasible	   to	   limit	  warming	   to	   two	   degrees	   and	   that	   temperature	   targets	   are	   not	   translatable	  into	  emission	  limits),	  the	  authors	  highlight	  how	  the	  IPCC	  assess	  that	  “limiting	  warming	  below	  2°C	   limit	   is	   technically	  and	  economically	   feasible,	  and	  at	   low	  to	  modest	  cost”	  (Ibid.,	  p.2)	  and	  that	   the	  two	  degrees	   target	  has	  already	  been	  translated	   into	   a	   policy	   debate	   on	   reducing	   the	   current	   emissions	   trajectory	  (Ibid.).	   They	   do	   not	   deny	   that	   achieving	   the	   two	   degrees	   target	   will	   be	  politically	   difficult.	   They	   do,	   however,	   argue	   that	   increased	   pressures	  stemming	   from	   the	   existence	   of	   the	   two	   degrees	   target	   have	   triggered	  “considerable	  political	  action	  at	  the	  national,	  regional,	  and	  global	  level”	  (Ibid.,	  p.3).62	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  62	  Also	  see	  Tschakert	  (2015),	  who	  argues	   that	  debates	  on	  the	  scientific	  basis	   for	   the	  two	  degrees	  target	  are	  no	  longer	  the	  crux	  of	  the	  matter.	  Rather,	  it	  is	  more	  important	  to	  examine	   the	   role	  of	   the	   two	  degrees	   target	   in	   the	  primary	  challenge	  of	   “overcoming	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Beyond	   these	   debates	   in	   the	   academic	   community,	   the	   two	   degrees	  target	  appeared	  throughout	  the	  IPCC’s	  Fifth	  Assessment	  Report,	  published	  in	  2014.	  For	  example,	   the	   likelihood	  of	  exceeding	  2°C	  of	  warming	  at	   the	  end	  of	  the	   21st	   century	   is	   assessed	   under	   the	   IPCC’s	   four	   ‘Representative	  Concentration	   Pathways’,	   which	   describe	   different	   scenarios	   for	   GHG	  emissions	   and	   atmospheric	   concentrations	   (IPCC	   2014b,	   p.10).	   Similarly,	  numerous	   ‘key	   risks’	   across	   different	   sectors	   are	   analysed	   at	   long-­‐term	  warming	  of	   2°C	   and	  4°C	   (Ibid.,	   pp.70-­‐1),	   and	   risks	   at	   different	   temperatures	  are	  organised	  under	  the	  IPCC’s	  five	  ‘reasons	  for	  concern’	  (Ibid.,	  pp.72-­‐3).	  The	  IPCC	  also	  produced	  a	  chart	  that	  mapped	  the	  way	  risks	  from	  climate	  change,	  at	  different	  levels	  of	  warming,	  depend	  on	  cumulative	  CO2	  emissions	  since	  1870.	  These,	   in	   turn,	   depend	   on	   annual	   GHG	   emissions	   in	   the	   coming	   decades	  (Figure	  4.5).	  Put	  differently,	  the	  chart	  allows	  the	  percentage	  change	  in	  annual	  GHG	   emissions	   by	   2050	   to	   be	   mapped	   onto	   the	   global	   mean	   temperature	  change,	   which	   is	   translated	   into	   the	   ‘heat	   map’	   for	   the	   risks	   from	   climate	  change	   at	   different	   levels	   of	   temperature	   change.	   The	   report	   also	   notes	   that	  the	   Cancun	   Pledges	   (comprised	   of	   plans	   for	   controlling	   GHGs	   that	   many	  countries	   submitted	   in	   2010)	   “are	   broadly	   consistent	   with	   cost-­‐effective	  scenarios	  that	  are	  likely	  to	  limit	  temperature	  change	  to	  below	  3°C	  relative	  to	  pre-­‐industrial	   levels”	   (Ibid.,	   p.85).	  Moreover,	   it	   states	   that	   further	  mitigation	  actions	   are	   required	   to	   hold	   emissions	   within	   the	   range	   of	   “cost-­‐effective	  scenarios	  that	  are	  likely	  to	  about	  as	  likely	  as	  not	  to	  limit	  warming	  to	  less	  than	  2°C	  this	  century	  relative	  to	  pre-­‐industrial	  levels”	  (Ibid.,	  p.84).	  Amidst	   the	   scepticism	   surrounding	   the	   two	   degrees	   target	   and	   the	  IPCC’s	   analysis	   of	   its	   associated	   risks	   and	   requirements	   for	   emissions	  reductions,	  the	  inclusion	  of	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	  in	  the	  final	  COP21	  text	  was	  far	   from	  certain.	  However	  with	   the	  memory	  of	  Copenhagen	   still	   fresh	   in	   the	  minds	  of	  actors	  across	  the	  climate	  change	  debate,	  the	  atmosphere	  leading	  up	  to	  Paris	  was	  described	  by	  some	  as	  “cautiously	  optimistic”	  (DECC	  2015).	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   value	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   responsibility,	   and	   finance”	  (Tschakert	  2015,	  p.10).	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2015b,	   p.8).	   Taken	   together	   the	   submitted	   INDCs	   suggest	   aggregate	   GHG	  emissions	  will	   exceed	   those	   of	   the	   least-­‐cost	   2°C	   scenarios	   by	   19%	   in	   2025	  and	  by	  15.1%	  in	  2030	  (Ibid.,	  p.37).	  	  
Commenting	   on	   the	   synthesis	   report,	   Christiana	   Figueres,	   then	  Executive	  Director	  of	  the	  UNFCCC,	  remarked	  “[t]he	  INDCs	  have	  the	  capability	  of	  limiting	  the	  forecast	  temperature	  rise	  to	  around	  2.7°C	  by	  2100,	  by	  no	  means	  enough	   but	   a	   lot	   lower	   than	   the	   estimated	   four,	   five,	   or	   more	   degrees	   of	  
Figure	  4.5:	  “The	  relationship	  between	  risks	  from	  climate	  change,	  temperature	  change,	  cumulative	  carbon	  dioxide	  (CO2)	  emissions	  and	  changes	  in	  annual	  greenhouse	  gas	  (GHG)	  emissions	  by	  2050.	  Limiting	  risks	  across	  Reasons	  For	  Concern	  (a)	  would	  imply	  a	  limit	  for	  cumulative	  emissions	  of	  CO2	  (b)	  which	  would	  constrain	  annual	  GHG	  emissions	  over	  the	  next	  few	  decades	  (c).	  Panel	  a	  reproduces	  the	  five	  Reasons	  For	  Concern	  {Box	  2.4}.	  Panel	  b	  links	  temperature	  changes	  to	  cumulative	  CO2	  emissions	  (in	  GtCO2)	  from	  1870.	  They	  are	  based	  on	  Coupled	  Model	  Intercomparison	  Project	  Phase	  5	  (CMIP5)	  simulations	  (pink	  plume)	  and	  on	  a	  simple	  climate	  model	  (median	  climate	  response	  in	  2100),	  for	  the	  baselines	  and	  five	  mitigation	  scenario	  categories	  (six	  ellipses).	  Details	  are	  provided	  in	  Figure	  SPM.5.	  Panel	  c	  shows	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  cumulative	  CO2	  emissions	  (in	  GtCO2)	  of	  the	  scenario	  categories	  and	  their	  associated	  change	  in	  annual	  GHG	  emissions	  by	  2050,	  expressed	  in	  percentage	  change	  (in	  percent	  GtCO2-­‐eq	  per	  year)	  relative	  to	  2010.	  The	  ellipses	  correspond	  to	  the	  same	  scenario	  categories	  as	  in	  Panel	  b,	  and	  are	  built	  with	  a	  similar	  method”	  (IPCC	  2014,	  p.18).	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warming	  projected	  by	  many	  prior	  to	  the	  INDCs”	  (UNFCCC	  2015c).	  The	  French	  government	   had	   also	   expressed	   its	   hopes	   that	   the	   Paris	   conference	   would	  establish	   a	   regular	   review	   process	   through	   which	   INDC	   pledges	   could	   be	  ‘ratcheted’	  (Harvey	  2015).	  Earlier	  in	  2015	  a	  20-­‐page	  draft	  agreement	  text,	  negotiated	  by	  Parties’	  representatives	  through	  the	  ADP	  process,	  had	  been	  produced	  (ADP	  2015),	  and	  the	  US	  and	  China	  had	  issued	  a	  joint	  presidential	  statement	  outlining	  a	  shared	  vision	   for	   the	  Paris	   talks.	  The	   latter	  built	  on	  President	  Obama	  and	  President	  Xi’s	  November	  2014	   announcement	   on	  post-­‐2020	   targets	   (The	  White	  House	  2014) 63 	  and	   underscored	   the	   need	   for	   Parties	   to	   develop	   mid-­‐century	  strategies	  “for	  the	  transition	  to	  low-­‐carbon	  economies,	  mindful	  of	  the	  below	  2	  degrees	  Celsius	  global	  temperature	  goal”	  (The	  White	  House	  2015).	  Moreover,	  the	  announcement	  emphasised	  that	  efforts	  over	  the	  longer	  term	  should	  “ramp	  up	  over	  time	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  greater	  ambition”	  (Ibid.).	  The	  availability	  of	  a	  draft	   agreement	   text	   that	  had	  been	  negotiated	   through	   the	  ADP	  process	  and	  the	   apparent	   willingness	   of	   the	   United	   States	   and	   China	   to	   push	   for	   an	  agreement	   at	  COP21	   stood	   in	   contrast	   to	   the	   challenges	   encountered	  during	  the	  2009	  Copenhagen	  talks.	  On	   the	   first	   day	  of	   COP21,	   heads	  of	   state	   and	  government	   from	  over	  150	   nations,	   the	   largest	   number	   ever	   for	   a	   UN	   event,	   gathered	   in	   Paris	  (UNFCCC	   2015e).	   While	   security	   in	   Paris	   had	   been	   tightened	   and	   climate	  marches	   banned	   following	   the	   mid-­‐November	   terrorist	   attacks	   (Neslen	   and	  Harvey	   2015),	   it	   was	   suggested	   that	   this	   also	   encouraged	   more	   leaders	   to	  attend	   as	   an	   expression	   of	   solidarity	   (McGrath	   2015a).	   The	   French	  Government	   invited	  heads	  of	  state	  and	  government	  to	  attend	  the	   first	  day	  of	  the	   conference,	   before	   leaving	   the	   talks	   and	   the	   “messy	   business	   of	  hammering	   out	   a	   deal	   to	   their	   representatives”	   (Stefanini	   2015).	   However	  through	   the	   negotiations	   between	   Parties’	   representatives	   from	   the	   30th	   of	  November	  to	  the	  11th	  of	  December	  2015,	  several	  obstacles	  had	  emerged.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  63	  The	  announcement	  stated	  the	  following	  targets:	  “the	  Presidents	  of	  the	  United	  States	  and	   China	   announced	   their	   respective	   post-­‐2020	   actions	   on	   climate	   change,	  recognizing	  that	  these	  actions	  are	  part	  of	  the	  longer	  range	  effort	  to	  transition	  to	  low-­‐carbon	  economies,	  mindful	   of	   the	   global	   temperature	   goal	   of	   2°C.	  The	  United	   States	  intends	   to	   achieve	   an	   economy-­‐wide	   target	   of	   reducing	   its	   emissions	   by	   26%-­‐28%	  below	  its	  2005	  level	  in	  2025	  and	  to	  make	  best	  efforts	  to	  reduce	  its	  emissions	  by	  28%.	  China	  intends	  to	  achieve	  the	  peaking	  of	  CO2	  emissions	  around	  2030	  and	  to	  make	  best	  efforts	   to	  peak	  early	  and	   intends	   to	   increase	   the	  share	  of	  non-­‐fossil	   fuels	   in	  primary	  energy	  consumption	  to	  around	  20%	  by	  2030”	  (The	  White	  House	  2014).	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In	  particular,	  Article	  4.4	  of	  the	  text	  would	  have	  required	  the	  US	  to	  seek	  ratification	  approval	   from	  the	  Senate,	  stating	   that	  developed	  countries	   ‘shall’	  undertake	  economy-­‐wide	  absolute	  emission	  reduction	  targets.	  ‘Shall’	  indicates	  a	  legal	  requirement,	  which	  on	  the	  matter	  of	  emissions	  reduction	  targets	  would	  have	  forced	  the	  US	  to	  seek	  approval	  from	  the	  Senate	  before	  ratifying	  the	  Paris	  Agreement	   (Norton	   Rose	   Fulbright	   2015).	   Replacing	   the	   term	   with	   ‘should’	  (i.e.	  removing	  the	  legal	  requirement),	  while	  apparently	  the	  intention	  when	  the	  text	  was	  being	  produced,	  would	  not	  be	  supported	  by	  many	  developing	  nations	  including	   China	   (Vidal	   2015).	   However	   the	   French	   presidency	   of	   COP21	  declared	   that	   a	   typographical	   error	   had	   been	   made,	   attributing	   this	   to	   the	  “sleep	  deprived	  negotiating	   team	  doing	   the	  drafting”	   (Norton	  Rose	  Fulbright	  2015),	  allowing	  the	  matter	  to	  be	  dealt	  with	  as	  a	  technical	  matter.	  In	  addition,	  the	  Nicaraguan	  delegation	  remained	  as	   the	  only	  Party	  refusing	   to	   ‘agree’	   the	  text,	  arguing	  that	  it	  failed	  to	  take	  sufficient	  action	  to	  protect	  the	  climate.	  While	  some	   suggest	   a	   personal	   plea	   from	   the	   Pope	   influenced	   the	   Nicaraguan	  delegation	  (Harrabin	  2015;	  Seidler	  2015),	  other	  reports	  suggest	  that	  Laurent	  Fabius,	  the	  French	  foreign	  minister	  and	  president	  of	  the	  summit,	  briefly	  spoke	  with	   the	   delegation	   before	   announcing	   “I	   am	   looking	   at	   the	   room,	   I	   see	   the	  reaction	   is	   positive,	   the	   Paris	   climate	   accord	   is	   accepted”	   (Stothard	   and	  Chassany	  2015)	  and	  bringing	  down	  the	  gavel	  to	  mark	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  Paris	  Agreement.	  One	  particular	  highlight	  of	   the	  Paris	  Agreement	  was	   the	   temperature	  target	  of	  1.5°C	  being	   included	   in	   the	  statement	  on	   long-­‐term	  climate	   targets.	  The	   Paris	   Agreement	   states	   that	   it	   strengthens	   the	   global	   response	   to	   the	  threat	  of	  climate	  change	  by:	  “Holding	   the	   increase	   in	   the	   global	   average	   temperature	   to	  well	   below	   2°C	   above	   pre-­‐industrial	   levels	   and	   to	   pursue	  efforts	  to	   limit	  the	  temperature	  increase	  to	  1.5°C	  above	  pre-­‐industrial	   levels,	   recognizing	   that	   this	   would	   significantly	  reduce	   the	   risks	   and	   impacts	   of	   climate	   change”	   (UNFCCC	  2015f,	  p.22).	  Beyond	   reinforcing	   that	   2°C	   must	   be	   seen	   as	   an	   upper	   limit	   on	  warming	  through	  the	  wording	  “well	  below	  2°C”,	  this	  statement	  represents	  the	  negotiating	   efforts	   of	   the	   so-­‐called	   ‘high-­‐ambition	   coalition’	   that	   pushed	   for	  the	   1.5°C	   target	   to	   be	   included.	   In	   a	   speech	   following	   COP21,	   Miguel	   Arias	  Cañete,	  EU	  Climate	  Commissioner,	  explained	  that	  the	  EU	  had	  started	  to	  work	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with	   other	   Parties	   behind	   the	   scenes	   following	   the	   2009	   Copenhagen	   talks.	  This	   was	   in	   an	   effort	   to	   push	   big	   emitters	   towards	   stronger	   emissions	  reduction	   targets	   (Arias	   Cañete	   2015).	   Through	   numerous	   discreet	   talks	  during	  the	  years	  between	  Copenhagen	  and	  Paris,	  the	  ‘ambition	  coalition’	  grew,	  with	   more	   Parties	   joining	   during	   COP21.	   After	   79	   African,	   Caribbean	   and	  Pacific	  nations	  joined	  on	  the	  8th	  December	  2015,	  the	  US	  (who	  had	  been	  in	  talks	  with	  the	  coalition	  since	  the	  start	  of	  the	  conference)	  formally	  joined	  on	  the	  9th,	  from	   which	   point	   it	   became	   the	   ‘high-­‐ambition	   coalition’	   (Ibid.).	   It	   was	  through	   this	   coalition	   that	   Tony	   de	   Brum,	   foreign	   minister	   of	   the	   Marshall	  Islands,	  pushed	   for	   “strong	   recognition	  of	   the	  below	  1.5-­‐degree	   temperature	  goal”	   (McGrath	  2015b),	  with	   the	  US	   lead	  negotiator,	  Todd	  Stern,	   echoing	  his	  calls.	   The	   Paris	   Agreement	   also	   states	   that	   “Parties	   aim	   to	   reach	   global	  peaking	  of	  greenhouse	  gas	  emissions	  as	  soon	  as	  possible	  […]	  so	  as	  to	  achieve	  a	  balance	  between	  anthropogenic	  emissions	  by	  sources	  and	  removals	  by	  sinks	  of	  greenhouse	  gases	  in	  the	  second	  half	  of	  this	  century”	  (UNFCCC	  2015f,	  p.22).	  By	  stating	  a	  long-­‐term	  objective	  of	  achieving	  a	  ‘balance’	  of	  emissions,	  the	  Paris	  Agreement	  allows	   for	   the	  use	  of	  negative	  emissions	  technologies	   in	  reducing	  GHG	   emissions.	   In	   other	   words,	   technologies	   that	   capture	   GHGs	   from	   the	  atmosphere	   are	   recognised	   under	   the	   Paris	   Agreement	   as	   part	   of	   the	   long-­‐term	   strategy	   for	   reducing	   GHG	   emissions.	   While	   the	   precise	   definition	   of	  ‘balance’	  is	  unclear,64	  it	  is	  believed	  that	  the	  term	  will	  be	  clarified	  in	  subsequent	  meetings	   and	   that	   it	   broadly	   relates	   to	   the	   notion	   of	   ‘net-­‐zero’	   emissions	  (Evans	  and	  Yeo	  2015).	  As	  such,	  it	  is	  worth	  noting	  GHGs	  need	  to	  be	  net-­‐zero	  to	  achieve	   any	   temperature	   goal.	   The	   difference	   between	   temperature	   goals	   is	  how	  quickly	  emissions	  need	  to	  be	  reduced	  to	  net-­‐zero	  (Allen	  2015).	  ‘Balance’	  in	   the	   second	   half	   of	   this	   century	   is	   aligned	   with	   the	   emissions	   reductions	  required	   for	   a	   2°C	   scenario;	   however	   a	   1.5°C	   scenario	   requires	   ‘balance’	   at	  some	  point	  between	  2030	  and	  2050	  (Ibid.).	  Returning	   to	   the	   synthesis	   of	   INDCs	   that	   suggests	   the	   existing	  emissions	   targets	   would	   result	   in	   2.7°C	   of	   warming	   by	   2100,	   the	   Paris	  Agreement	  also	  establishes	  a	   ‘ratchet’	  mechanism	  to	   increase	  the	  strength	  of	  emissions	   reduction	   pledges	   over	   time.	   This	   is	   detailed	   in	   Article	   4,	   which	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  64	  Debates	  on	  this	  Article	  of	  the	  Paris	  Agreement	  earlier	  considered	  “GHG	  neutrality”	  (Evans	  and	  Pidcock	  2015).	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states	   that	   Parties	   “shall	   [emphasis	   added]	   prepare,	   communicate	   and	  maintain”	   successive	   INDCs,	   pursue	  mitigation	  measures	   towards	   the	   stated	  objectives,	  and	  ensure	  that	  each	  successive	  INDC	  “represent[s]	  a	  progression	  beyond	   the	   Party’s	   then	   current	   nationally	   determined	   contribution	   and	  reflect	   its	   highest	   possible	   ambition”	   (UNFCCC	   2015e,	   p.22).	   Furthermore,	  Parties	  were	  required	  to	  submit	  an	  INDC	  for	  a	  UNFCCC	  ‘stocktake’	  every	  five	  years	   (Ibid.,	   p.23),	   through	   which	   progress	   towards	   the	   goals	   of	   agreement	  may	   be	   assessed.	   Taken	   together	   this	   requires	   Parties	   that	   ratify	   the	   Paris	  Agreement	  to	  submit	  and	  work	  towards	  their	  INDCs,	  as	  well	  as	  communicate	  new	  INDCs	  every	  five	  years	  that	  strengthen	  targets	  and	  plans	  communicated	  in	  their	  preceding	  INDC.	  It	  has	  been	  suggested	  that	  this	  ratchet	  mechanism	  is	  part	  of	  a	   recognition	   that	   learning,	   innovation	  and	   technological	  deployment	  occurring	   between	   stocktakes	   will	   reduce	   the	   cost	   of	   more	   ambitious	  emissions	   reductions	   (Bailey	   2015).	   Similarly,	   others	   suggest	   that	   as	  awareness	  of	  climate	  change	  increases	  and	  private	  sector	  support	  grows	  for	  a	  stable	  policy	  environment	  that	  tackles	  climate	  change,	  the	  political	  feasibility	  of	   further	   emissions	   reductions	   is	   improved	   (Grantham	   Research	   Institute	  2015).	   The	   Paris	   Agreement	   also	   contains	   provisions	   for	   enhanced	  transparency	  regarding	  Parties’	  carbon	  emissions	  data.	  The	  EU	  and	  the	  US,	  in	  particular,	  pushed	  for	  enhanced	  MRV	  requirements	  at	  COP21	  and	  secured	  an	  agreement	  within	  the	   	   ‘high-­‐ambition	  coalition’	  that	  transparency	  was	  a	  core	  demand	  (McGrath	  2015b).	   It	   is	  reported	  that	  this	   focus	  on	  transparency	  was	  to	  ensure	  developing	  nations,	  especially	  China,	  faced	  similar	  levels	  of	  scrutiny	  on	  the	  progress	  made	  towards	  their	   individual	  contributions	  (Evans	  and	  Yeo	  2015).	   Indeed,	   opposition	   to	   these	   demands	   for	   transparency	   came	   from	  China	   –	   seeing	   the	  move	   to	   implement	  different	   data	   gathering	   and	   analysis	  systems	   as	   an	   encroachment	   on	   their	   sovereignty	   –	   as	   well	   as	   many	  developing	  nations,	  which	  argued	  they	  lacked	  the	  resources	  to	  implement	  the	  enhanced	   requirements	   (Grantham	   Research	   Institute	   2015).	   However	   the	  final	  text	  requires	  Parties	  to	  submit	  national	  GHG	  inventories	  to	  the	  UNFCCC	  (that	   detail	   levels	   and	   sources	   of	   emissions)	   as	   well	   as	   “[i]nformation	  necessary	  to	  track	  progress	  made	  in	  implementing	  and	  achieving	  its	  nationally	  determined	   contribution”	   (UNFCCC	   2015f,	   pp.28–9).	   In	   addition,	   the	   Paris	  Agreement	   established	   the	   Capacity-­‐building	   Initiative	   for	   Transparency,	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through	   which	   developing	   nations	   will	   be	   assisted	   in	   improving	   their	  measurement	  and	  reporting	  practices	  for	  national	  emissions	  inventories.	  As	   with	   the	   Kyoto	   Protocol,	   however,	   the	   Paris	   Agreement	   will	   not	  enter	   into	   force	   until	   it	   is	   ratified	   by	   “at	   least	   55	   Parties	   to	   the	   Convention	  accounting	   in	   total	   for	   at	   least	   an	   estimated	   55	   percent	   of	   the	   total	   global	  greenhouse	   gas	   emissions”	   (Ibid.,	   p.31).	   The	   signing	   ceremony	   for	   the	   Paris	  Agreement	   took	   place	   on	   the	   22nd	   April	   2016	   in	   New	   York.	   A	   record	   175	  Parties	  signed	  the	  Paris	  Agreement,	  indicating	  their	  support	  for	  the	  deal,	  with	  15	   countries	   also	   submitting	   their	   instruments	   of	   ratification	   (UNFCCC	  2016b).	   Furthermore,	   the	   US	   and	   China	   called	   on	   Parties	   to	   ratify	   the	   Paris	  Agreement	  as	  early	  as	  possible,	  with	  a	  view	  to	  bringing	  the	  Paris	  Agreement	  into	   force	   before	   the	   initial	   target	   date	   of	   2020	   and	   potentially	   during	   the	  Obama	  Administration	  (Goldenberg	  2016).	  At	  the	  time	  of	  writing,	  191	  Parties	  have	  signed	  and,	  moreover,	  61	  Parties	  representing	  48%	  of	  global	  emissions	  have	  ratified	  the	  Paris	  Agreement.65	  
4.4.	  DISCUSSION	  
4.4.1.	  THE	  TWO	  DEGREES	  TARGET	  AS	  A	  MEDIATING	  INSTRUMENT	  In	  their	  study	  of	  the	  semiconductor	  industry	  Miller	  and	  O’Leary	  (2007)	  conceptualise	  Moore’s	   Law	   (that,	   after	   being	   revised	   in	  1975,	   predicted	   that	  every	  two	  years	  the	  number	  of	  electronic	  elements	  on	  a	  semiconductor	  would	  approximately	  double)	  as	  a	  mediating	  instrument.	  Moore’s	  Law	  held	  promise	  not	   just	   for	   technological	   development;	   but	   for	   technological	   development	  that	  would	  restore	  the	  pre-­‐eminence	  of	  an	  American	  strategic	  industry	  at	  risk,	  the	   US	   semiconductor	   industry,	   which	   had	   fallen	   behind	   its	   Japanese	  counterpart	   (Miller	   and	  O’Leary	  2007,	  p.715).	  The	  pursuit	   of	  his	  predictions	  became	  significant	  beyond	  the	  future	  of	  one	  particular	  industry,	  and	  appealed	  to	  the	  future	  of	  US	  wealth	  and	  security.	  While	  Moore’s	  predictions	  were	  highly	  abstract	  and	  simplified,	  it	  modelled	  a	  beneficent	  relationship	  between	  science	  and	  the	  economy	  that	  support	  from	  the	  broader	  political	  environment	  would	  strive	  to	  enact	  (Ibid.,	  p.716).	   Indeed	   it	   is	   through	   its	  apparent	  simplicity	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  65	  For	  updated	  figures,	  see	  the	  World	  Resources	  Institute’s	  ‘Paris	  Agreement	  Tracker’	  (www.cait.wri.org/source/ratification/).	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the	   two	   degrees	   target	   renders	   the	   complexities	   of	   climate	   change	   into	   a	  common	  vision	  for	  addressing	  the	  issue.	  	  Yet	   as	   well	   as	   envisaging	   a	   seemingly	   “simple,	   imaginable	   and	  ‘manageable’”	   future	   (Jordan,	  Mitterhofer,	   and	   Jørgensen	  2016,	  p.1),	   it	   is	   the	  flexibility	   (cf.	   Revellino	   and	   Mouritsen	   2009;	   Jørgensen,	   Jordan,	   and	  Mitterhofer	  2012,	  p.112)	  of	   the	   two	  degrees	   target	   that	   enabled	   it	   to	  embed	  scientific,	   political,	   and	   economic	   concerns	   regarding	   long-­‐term	   action	   on	  climate	   change.	   Moreover,	   this	   chapter	   shows	   that	   new	   ideas	   and	   concerns	  were	  elicited	  through	  discussions	  regarding	  potential	  targets	  in	  new	  domains.	  The	  assembling	  of	  these	  ideas	  and	  concerns	  and	  their	  embedding	  in	  the	  target	  were	   central	   its	   the	   stability	   and	   coherence.	   That	   is,	   as	   Gooding	   writes,	  “recalcitrances”	   came	   to	   the	   fore,	   which	   “indicate	   a	   discrepancy	   between	  theory,	   instrumentation,	   practice	   and	   results”	   and	   that	   assist	   in	   identifying	  “the	   assumptions	   that	   matter	   in	   the	   world	   as	   engaged	   in	   that	   particular	  laboratory”	  (Gooding	  1992,	  p.69,	  emphasis	  in	  original).	  This	  section	  discusses	  the	   two	  degrees	   target	  as	  a	  mediating	   instrument	  –	   framed	  as	  an	  apparently	  simple	  and	  manageable	  vision	  that	  is	  flexible	  in	  implementation	  –	  and	  argues	  that	   it	   is	   unsuited	   to	   the	   ‘boundary	   object’	   framework	   adopted	   elsewhere	  (Randalls	  2010;	  Cointe,	  Ravon,	  and	  Guérin	  2011).	  Section	   4.1	   studied	   the	   efforts	   to	   establish	   a	   long-­‐term	   target	   for	  addressing	  climate	  change	  from	  1975	  to	  1992,	  which	  centred	  setting	  a	  single	  threshold	   based	   on	   which	   economic	   analyses	   of	   ‘optimal’	   policy	   responses	  could	   be	   conducted.	   The	   efforts	   pursued	   a	   concretion	   of	   the	   complexities	   of	  climate	   change,	   which	   rendered	   it	   into	   a	   form	   amenable	   to	   analyses	   at	  different	  scales.	  Where	  Cointe	  et	  al.	  (2011)	  frame	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	  as	  a	  vague	  and	  ambiguous	  boundary	  object	  that	   is	   ‘weakly	  structured	  in	  common	  use’,66	  Section	  4.1	   shows	   that	   efforts	   to	   create	   a	   long-­‐term	   target	   for	   climate	  change	   were	   aimed	   precisely	   at	   establishing	   an	   apparently	   fixed	   point	   that	  represented	   a	   complex	   issue.	   Defining	   a	   long-­‐term	   target	   was	   seen	   as	  fundamental	   in	   the	   report	   from	   the	   1987	   Bellagio-­‐Villach	  workshops	   (Jäger	  1988)	   to	   addressing	   coordination	   challenges	   on	   controlling	   GHG	   emissions	  and,	   the	   report	   stated,	   “would	  be	   extremely	   advantageous	   as	   a	  management	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  66 	  Star	   and	   Griesemer	   see	   boundary	   objects	   as	   enabling	   communication	   and	  cooperation	  across	  different	  domains,	  and	  define	  them	  as	  being	  “weakly	  structured	  in	  common	  use,	   and	  become	  strongly	   structured	   in	   local	   site	  use”	   (Star	   and	  Griesemer	  1989,	  p.393).	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tool.”	   (Ibid.,	   p.21).	   Yet	   the	   report	   also	   recognised	   that	   such	   a	   target	   should	  allow	   for	   a	   smooth	   economic	   transition,	   guided	   by	   interim	   targets,	   through	  which	  gradual	  adjustments	  towards	  alignment	  with	  the	  long-­‐term	  target	  could	  occur.	   Setting	   a	   target	  was	   central	   to	   rendering	   climate	   change	  manageable	  through	  policy	  analysis,	  and	  that	  analysis	  as	  well	  as	  the	  transition	  towards	  the	  target	  was	  to	  be	  ‘cost-­‐effective’	  and	  avoid	  economic	  shocks.	  Regarding	   the	   link	   between	   the	   two	   degrees	   target	   and	   climate	  science,	  the	  2001	  Third	  Assessment	  Report	  of	  the	  IPCC	  analysed	  the	  ‘reasons	  for	  concern’	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  costs	  of	  different	  temperature	  changes	  as	  well	  as	  producing	   ‘cost-­‐effective’	  emissions	  trajectories	  for	  the	  two	  degrees	  target.	   It	  is	   important	   to	   note	   that	   concentration	   targets	   for	   atmospheric	   GHGs	   were	  also	  strong	  contenders	  as	  metrics	  for	  the	  IPCC	  analysis.	  However	  most	  of	  the	  literature	   being	   assessed	   only	   studied	   climatic	   impacts	   up	   to	   2100,	  whereas	  published	   timeframes	   for	   stabilizing	   atmospheric	   GHG	   concentrations	  assumed	  stabilisation	  after	  the	  21st	  century.	  Conversely,	  the	  impact	  literature	  was	  often	  based	  on	  temperature	  or	  precipitation	  variables.	  Similarly,	  common	  forms	   of	   climate	   modelling	   –	   such	   as	   general	   circulation	   models	   –	   produce	  estimates	   in	   terms	   of	   changes	   in	   global	   mean	   temperature.	   In	   this	   regard,	  temperature	  thresholds	  were	  compatible	  with	  the	  literature	  being	  assessed	  as	  well	  as	  the	  common	  approaches	  to	  modelling	  the	  climate	  system.	  It	  was	  the	  IPCC’s	  focus	  on	  temperature	  increase	  that	  later	  provided	  the	  apparent	  scientific	  justification	  for	  adopting	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	  as	  a	  long-­‐term	   objective	   for	   the	   UNFCCC	   (UNFCCC	   2009).	   Moreover,	   the	   target	   was	  defendable	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  IPCC	  emissions	  scenarios	  showed	  that	  limiting	  warming	  to	  2°C	  was	  still	  possible	  at	  a	  ‘reasonable	  cost’	  (W.	  Hare,	  Schleußner,	  and	  Schaeffer	  2014).	  Yet	  it	  was	  the	  flexibility	  of	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	  that	  led	  to	  it	  being	  ‘noted’	  in	  the	  2009	  Copenhagen	  Accord.	  Indeed,	  one	  component	  of	  Cointe	  et	  al.’s	  (2011)	  argument	  is	  that	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	  is	  “[s]ufficiently	  vague	   to	   allow	   several	   interpretations”	   (Cointe,	   Ravon,	   and	   Guérin	   2011,	  p.18).	  While	  this	  chapter	  highlights	  that	  ‘vague’	  is	  an	  inaccurate	  description	  of	  the	   two	   degrees	   target,	   it	   also	   recognises	   that	   there	   is	   flexibility	   in	   how	  linkages	   form	  between	   it	  and	  different	  entities.	   In	  this	  regard	  the	  target	  may	  be	  seen	  as	  ‘allowing	  several	  interpretations’,	  as	  Cointe	  et	  al.	  suggest.	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Yet	  this	  flexibility	  also	  highlights	  that	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	  does	  not	  prescribe	  how	  it	  is	  to	  be	  implemented	  and	  used;	  rather	  linkages	  with	  the	  two	  degrees	   target	   may	   be	   configured	   to	   the	   specifics	   of	   a	   particular	   entity	   or	  entities.	  That	   is,	   the	   target	   is	  not	   “strongly	   structured	   in	   local	   site	  use”	   (Star	  and	  Griesemer	  1989,	  p.393).	  This	  was	  central	   to	   the	   target’s	  adoption	   in	   the	  Copenhagen	  Accord.	  Whereas	  GHG-­‐based	  targets	  were	  seen	  as	  encroaching	  on	  national	   sovereignty	   by	   restricting	   developing	   nations’	   ability	   to	   chart	   their	  own	  path	   to	  development,	   the	   two	  degrees	   target	  did	  not	  prescribe	  a	   ‘future	  emissions	  space’	  or,	  per	  se,	  how	  it	  was	  to	  be	  achieved.	  Taken	  together	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	  provides	  a	  fixed	  point	  that	  envisions	  an	  apparently	  simple	  and	  manageable	   future	   for	   addressing	   climate	   change,	   while	   the	   flexibility	   in	  linking	   it	   to	   the	   local	   specifics	   of	   different	   entities	   enables	   it	   to	   mediate	  between	  multiple	  and	  potentially	  conflicting	  ideas.	  
4.4.2.	  CONTRIBUTION	  TO	  STUDIES	  OF	  THE	  2°C	  TEMPERATURE	  THRESHOLD	  In	   his	   2007	   paper,	   Tol	   “reviews	   the	   scientific	   literature	   that	   may	  substantiate,	  perhaps	  even	  justify	  a	  2°C	  target”	  (Tol	  2007,	  p.425)	  that	  the	  EU	  supported	   as	   international	   and	   long-­‐term	   climate	   goal.	   He	   concludes	   that	  Germany,	  the	  Netherlands	  and	  the	  UK	  relied	  on	  unrepresentative	  studies	  and	  ignored	   contradictory	   results	   in	   a	   “lackadaisical	   attitude	   to	   setting	   targets”	  (Tol	   2007,	   p.429).	   He	   ventures	   explanations,	   ranging	   from	   the	   two	   degrees	  target	   being	   an	   aspiration	   to	   “make	   the	   public	   feel	   good	   about	   their	  government,	  not	  to	  be	  met”	  (Ibid.)	  to	  it	  being	  a	  starting	  point	  for	  negotiations,	  albeit	   “too	   strong”	   (Ibid.)	   for	   other	   nations	   to	   engage.	   He	   argues	   that	   his	  analysis	  demonstrates	  that	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	  is	  not	  justified	  by	  scientific	  findings	  or	  cost-­‐benefit	  analyses	  (Ibid.,	  p.430).	  Shaw	  (2013)	  further	  notes	  that	  there	  is	  an	  "evolving	  body	  of	  climate	  science	  [that]	  is	  highlighting	  how	  unsafe	  two	  degrees	  of	  warming	  will	   be"	   (Shaw	  2013,	  p.569)	  and	  argues	   that	  public	  discourses	   should	   focus	   on	   a	   more	   "honest	   depiction"	   (Ibid.)	   of	   scientific	  definitions	  of	  dangerous	  climate	  change.	  This	  chapter	  does	  not	  refute	  that	  the	  scientific	  basis	  for	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	  is	  contested.	  Rather	  it	  suggests	  that	  closer	  attention	  to	  international	  climate	  negotiations	  and	  the	  mode	  of	  climate	  governance	   being	   developed	   reveals	  more	   about	   the	   prominence	   of	   the	   two	  degrees	   target	   than	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   achieve	   by	   examining	   its	   scientific	  justification	  alone.	  Specifically,	   the	  target	  emerged	  as	  a	  central	   feature	   in	  the	  climate	  debate	  as	  it	  came	  to	  mediate	  between	  political,	  economic	  and	  scientific	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concerns	   on	   climate	   change.	   Moreover,	   as	   part	   of	   the	   decentred	   climate	  regime	   enshrined	   in	   the	   2015	   Paris	   Agreement,	   the	   two	   degrees	   target	  provides	   the	   common	   objective	   towards	   which	   nationally	   determined	  strategies	  and	  targets	  for	  addressing	  climate	  change	  must	  be	  oriented.	  Jaeger	   and	   Jaeger’s	   (2011)	   and	   Tschakert’s	   (2015)	   studies	   provide	  further	  insights	  into	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	  in	  international	  climate	  talks.	  Both	  remark	  on	  the	  usefulness	  of	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	  in	  the	  UNFCCC	  process,	  with	  Tschakert	  offering	  a	  close	  assessment	  of	  the	  UNFCCC’s	  ‘structured	  expert	  dialogues’	  in	  the	  early	  2010s.	  She	  concludes	  that	  “it	  is	  in	  the	  utmost	   interest	  of	  a	   large	  number	  of	  countries	   to	  pursue	   the	  1.5°C	   target,	  as	  ambitious	   or	   idealistic	   it	   may	   appear	   to	   date,	   and	   to	   see	   it	   anchored	   as	   a	  binding	  goal	  in	  the	  next	  agreement”	  (Tschakert	  2015,	  p.9).	  This	  is	  both	  due	  to	  the	   vulnerability	   of	   small	   island	   states	   and	   other	   developing	   nations	   to	  temperature	  rises.	  Jaeger	  and	  Jaeger	  (2011),	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  argue	  that	  the	  two	   degrees	   target	   provides	   a	   focal	   point	   for	   initial	   efforts	   that	   “gather	   the	  necessary	  experience”	  (Jaeger	  and	  Jaeger	  2011,	  p.S25)	  to	  inform	  the	  evolution	  of	  a	  global	  regime	  on	  climate	  change.	  They	  remark:	  “no	  other	  possible	  target	  has	  achieved	  similar	  salience”	  as	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	  (Ibid.,	  p.S23).	  Further,	  the	  authors	  argue,	   temperature	  has	  more	   “intuitive	  appeal	   than,	   say,	  ppm	  of	  some	   molecule	   equivalents”	   	   (Ibid.),	   and	   with	   further	   experience,	   the	   focal	  point	  may	  be	  redefined	  as	  the	  global	  climate	  regime	  evolves	  (Ibid.,	  p.S25).	  	  However,	  while	   Jaeger	  and	   Jaeger	   (2011)	  and	  Tschakert	   (2015)	  shed	  light	   on	   the	   two	   degrees	   target	   as	   part	   of	   the	   UNFCCC	   process,	   they	   largely	  overlook	   the	   mode	   of	   climate	   governance	   envisioned	   in	   the	   Copenhagen	  Accord	   and	   developed	   through	   COPs	   between	   2010	   and	   2015.	   INDCs,	   in	  particular,	  have	  become	  central	  to	  enacting	  the	  emerging	  voluntary,	  decentred	  and	   incremental	   approach	   to	   pursuing	   national-­‐level	   emissions	   reductions.	  Indeed,	   in	   contributing	   to	   earlier	   studies	   through	   its	   analysis	   of	   the	   Paris	  Agreement,	   this	   chapter	   highlights	   the	   mechanisms	   –	   from	   emissions	  scenarios	  and	  global	  stocktakes	  to	  emerging	  MRV	  requirements	  –	  that	  centre	  on	   ‘ratcheting’	   emissions	   reductions	   to	   limit	   the	   increase	   in	   global	   average	  temperatures	  to	   ‘well	  below’	  2°C.	  The	  two	  degrees	  target	  not	  only	  addresses	  concerns	  of	  economic	  growth,	  national	  sovereignty,	  and	  the	  scientific	  basis	  for	  ‘dangerous’	   climate	   change,	   it	   is	   amenable	   to	   disaggregation	   through	  
Chapter	  4:	  Two	  Degrees	  Celsius	  
	   132	  
instruments	  that	  embed	  a	  post-­‐Copenhagen	  mode	  of	  climate	  governance.	  It	  is	  to	  such	  disaggregation	  that	  this	  chapter	  now	  turns.	  
4.4.3.	  DISAGGREGATING	  THE	  TWO	  DEGREES	  TARGET	  The	   two	   degrees	   target	   provides	   a	   single	   figure	   that	   envisages	   an	  apparently	   simple	   and	  manageable	   future	   for	   addressing	   climate	   change.	   In	  this	  regard,	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	  renders	  climate	  change	  into	  a	  form	  where	  diverse	  and	  distributed	  actors	  can	  split	  the	  underling	  problem	  into	  component	  parts,	  a	  process	  that	  Mary	  Morgan	  terms	  disaggregation.	  Moreover,	  it	  provides	  a	  flexible	  basis	  for	  linking	  the	  underlying	  climate	  problem	  to	  multiple	  entities	  of	  different	  scales	  and	  scopes,	  enabling	  the	  creation	  of	  mechanisms	  that	  orient	  actions	   towards	   the	   ‘two	   degrees	   vision’.	   As	   Bebbington	   and	   Larrinaga	  (2014b)	   note,	   issues	   within	   the	   sustainable	   development	   agenda,	   such	   as	  climate	   change,	   are	   not	   caused	   by	   a	   single	   entity.	   Rather,	   the	   actions	   of	  multiple	  entities	  produce	  these	  issues.	  In	  illustrating	  instances	  where	  the	  two	  degrees	   target	   is	   disaggregated	   –	   within	   the	   UNFCCC	   process	   as	   well	   as	  through	   linkages	   with	   sectoral-­‐	   and	   corporate-­‐entities	   –	   Section	   4.3	  highlighted	   that	   the	   two	   degrees	   target	   provided	   a	   basis	   for	   linking	   climate	  change	   to	   the	   local	   specifics	   at	   the	   national-­‐,	   sectoral-­‐,	   and	   organisational-­‐level.	  	   INDCs,	  for	  example,	  represent	  a	  mechanism	  for	  disaggregating	  the	  two	  degrees	   target	   to	   the	  national-­‐level,	   linking	   it	   to	   the	   targets	  and	  strategies	  of	  Parties	   to	   the	   Paris	   Agreement.	   Parties	   that	   ratify	   the	   Paris	   Agreement,	   if	   it	  comes	   into	   force,	  will	  be	   required	   to	  develop	  and	  communicate	   INDCs	  every	  five	   years	   that	   represent	   their	   nation’s	   targets	   and	   plans	   for	   reducing	   GHG	  emissions	  to	  a	  level	  consistent	  with	  the	  objectives	  in	  the	  Paris	  Agreement.	  As	  such,	   the	   two	   degrees	   target	   has	   become	   a	   guiding	   objective	   for	   climate	  planning	  at	  the	  national	  level.	  However	  the	  emphasis	  on	  flexibility	  in	  the	  post-­‐Copenhagen	  mode	   of	   climate	   governance	   enshrined	   in	   the	   Paris	   Agreement	  has	  enabled	  Parties	  to	  base	  their	  targets	  on	  a	  wider	  set	  of	  metrics	  than	  CO2,	  or	  GHG,	   data	   alone.	   This	   poses	   new	   challenges	   for	   national-­‐level	   carbon	  accounting.	  For	  example,	  targets	  based	  on	  emissions	  intensity	  of	  GDP	  require	  carbon	   accounting	   to	   be	   combined	   with	   approaches	   to	   forecasting	   GDP	  growth.	  Similarly,	  ‘policy	  targets’	  allow	  Parties	  to	  detail	  their	  contributions	  to	  international	  efforts	  to	  address	  climate	  change	  through	  specific	  strategies	  on,	  among	   other	  matters,	   renewable	   energy,	   energy	   efficiency,	   and	   forestry.	   Yet	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how	   the	   contributions	   of	   these	   policy	   targets	   will	   be	   made	   commensurable	  and	  aggregated	  into	  a	  measure	  of	  global	  progress	  on	  climate	  change	  remains	  a	  challenge	  for	  the	  UNFCCC.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  carbon	  accounting	  literature	  on	  the	  accuracy	  of	  national-­‐level	  GHG	  data	  is	  misplaced	  (La	  Motta	  et	  al.	  2005;	  Stechemesser	  and	  Guenther	  2012).	  Rather,	   it	  highlights	   that	   the	   flexibility	   that	   is	   central	   to	   the	  post-­‐Copenhagen	   mode	   of	   climate	   governance	   presents	   new	   challenges	   to	  carbon	   accounting.	   It	   is	   now	   called	   upon	   to	   “enable	   the	   diverse	   forms	   of	  carbon	   governance”	   (Larrinaga	   2014,	   p.2)	   that	  may	   be	   adopted	   by	   different	  Parties	   to	   the	   UNFCCC,	   and	   to	   enable	   the	   commensuration	   of	   these	   varied	  approaches	   into	   an	   aggregate	   measure	   of	   global	   progress	   towards	   the	  objectives	   of	   the	   Paris	   Agreement.	   The	   chapter	   highlights	   these	   challenges,	  which	  are	   central	   to	   the	  MRV	  UNFCCC	  work	   stream	  as	  well	   as	   the	  Capacity-­‐building	   Initiative	   for	   Transparency	   established	   under	   the	   Paris	   Agreement.	  As	   such,	   the	   chapter	   argues	   that	   the	   adoption	   of	   the	   2015	   Paris	   Agreement	  presents	  an	  opportunity	  to	  “investigate	  the	  dynamics	  of	  accounting	  systems	  of	  governance	   as	   they	   emerge”	   (Bebbington	   and	  Larrinaga	  2014a,	   p.207).	   Such	  studies	  would	  provide	  insights	  into	  the	  accounting	  practices	  underpinning	  the	  UNFCCC’s	  ‘pledge	  and	  review’	  mechanisms	  for	  INDCs,	  which	  are	  central	  to	  the	  Paris	   Agreement’s	   ‘ratchet’	   mechanism	   for	   strengthening	   the	   targets	   set	   by	  Parties.	  	  	  Beyond	   the	   UNFCCC,	   the	   IPCC	   has	   analysed	   the	   emissions	   scenarios	  consistent	   with	   a	   2°C	   increase	   in	   temperatures,	   producing	   a	   trajectory	   of	  emissions	  between	  the	  present	  and	  a	  future	  point	  in	  time	  at	  which	  emissions	  are	   reduced	   to	   net-­‐zero.	   This	   provides	   a	   benchmark	   against	  which	   progress	  towards	   the	   two	   degrees	   target	   may	   be	   monitored.	   The	   UNFCCC	   INDC	  synthesis	  report	  is	  one	  example	  of	  this	  (UNFCCC	  2015d),	  highlighting	  that	  the	  pre-­‐COP21	   pledges	  were	   only	   consistent	   with	   limiting	  warming	   to	   2.7°C.	   In	  this	  regard	  the	  IPCC	  disaggregated	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	  into	  a	  trajectory	  of	  annual	   emissions,	   providing	   a	   benchmark	   against	  which	  deviations	   between	  Parties’	  pledges	  and	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	  may	  be	  rendered	  visible.	  Indeed	  a	  similar	   method	   is	   adopted	   by	   initiatives	   such	   as	   Science-­‐Based	   Targets,	  instead	  using	  2°C	  emissions	  scenarios	   to	  set	  corporate-­‐level	  emissions	  goals.	  Those	  goals	  could	  be	  based	  on	  metrics	  that	  had	  already	  been	  developed,	  such	  as	   carbon	   accounting	   practices	   for	   GHG	   emissions	   or	   the	   conversion	   of	   that	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accounting	   into	   GHG	   intensity	   indicators	   (i.e.	   emissions	   per	   unit	   of	   output).	  That	   is,	   by	   mobilising	   the	   two	   degrees	   target,	   it	   became	   possible	   to	   frame	  corporate	   activity	   in	   terms	   of	   its	   deviation	   from	   the	   pathway	   to	   addressing	  climate	  change.	  	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  IPCC	  scenarios	  capture	  all	  aspects	  of	  the	  climate	  change	   represented	   in	   the	   two	   degrees	   target.	   Indeed,	   the	   chapter	   has	  demonstrated	  the	   inherent	  uncertainties	   in	  translating	  between	  temperature	  changes	   and	   atmospheric	  GHG	   concentrations.	  Rather	   the	   chapter	   highlights	  that	  diverse	  and	  distributed	  groups	  already	  working	  on	  a	  particular	  aspect	  of	  climate	   change	   (e.g.	   the	   IPCC	   on	   emissions	   trajectories,	   or	   CDP,	   UNGC,	  WRI	  and	  WWF	   on	   promoting	   the	   adoption	   of	   corporate	   sustainability	   practices)	  come	  to	  apply	  their	  own	  expertise	  and	  resources	  to	  a	  particular	  aspect	  of	  two	  degrees	   target.	   Seen	   as	   a	   mediating	   instrument	   that	   provides	   the	   basis	   for	  disaggregation,	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	  reorients	  expectations	  and	  aspirations	  towards	   its	   vision	   of	   the	   future,	   stimulating	   and	   orienting	   work	   to	   develop	  instruments	   that	   align	   the	  actions	  of	  multiple	  entities	  of	  different	   scales	  and	  scopes	  with	  that	  vision.	  As	  Chapters	  5	  and	  6	  will	  show,	  the	  linking	  of	  the	  two	  degrees	   target	   to	   the	   sectoral-­‐,	   corporate-­‐	   and	   investment	   portfolio-­‐levels	  depends	   on	   the	   interconnected	  work	   of	  multiple	   actors	   whose	   expectations	  have	  been	  reoriented	  towards	  the	  vision	  of	  a	  two	  degrees	  future.	  
4.5.	  CONCLUSION	  This	   chapter	   has	   charted	   the	   emergence	   of	   the	   two	   degrees	   target	  from	  the	  range	  of	  climate	  metrics	  applied	  in	  monitoring	  and	  analysing	  climate	  change	  as	  early	  as	  the	  1960s.	  It	  initially	  focussed	  on	  efforts	  between	  1975	  and	  1992	   to	   call	   for	   a	   long-­‐term	   objective	   for	   climate	   change	   that	  would	   enable	  economic	   analyses	   of	   cost-­‐effective	   responses	   to	   the	   climate	   problem.	  Following	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  UNFCCC	  in	  1992	  with	  the	  objective	  to	  prevent	  ‘dangerous	  anthropogenic	   interference’	  with	   the	   climate	   system,	   the	   chapter	  demonstrated	   how	   the	   flexibility	   of	   the	   two	   degrees	   target	   enabled	   it	   to	  mediate	   between	   the	   literature	   on	   climate	   impacts,	   concerns	   of	   national	  sovereignty	  and	  ‘cost-­‐effective’	  GHG	  controls.	  This	  flexibility	  was	  central	  to	  its	  inclusion	  as	   the	   ‘noted’	   long-­‐term	  climate	  objective	   in	   the	  2009	  Copenhagen	  Accord.	   With	   the	   apparent	   backing	   of	   the	   scientific	   community	   and	   the	  UNFCCC,	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	  provided	  a	  foundation	  for	  disaggregating	  the	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climate	   problem	   into	   component	   parts.	   The	   chapter	   illustrates	   such	  disaggregation	  across	  regional,	  sectoral	  and	  corporate	  entities	  between	  2009	  and	  2016.	   Indeed	  Chapters	  5	  and	  6	  will	   further	   investigate	  the	  emergence	  of	  linkages	   that	   refine	   the	   two	   degrees	   target	   to	   local	   specifics	   of	   the	   financial	  sector.	  	  The	  two	  degrees	  target	  was	  framed	  as	  a	  mediating	  instrument	  (Miller	  and	  O’Leary	  2007)	  that	  provided	  an	  apparently	  simple	  and	  manageable	  vision	  for	   long-­‐term	   efforts	   to	   address	   climate	   change	   (Jørgensen,	   Jordan,	   and	  Mitterhofer	   2012),	  while	  maintaining	   a	   flexibility	   in	   forming	   linkages	   across	  multiple	   entities	   of	   different	   scales	   and	   scopes	   (Revellino	   and	   Mouritsen	  2009).	  The	   chapter	   contends	   that	   the	   ‘boundary	  object’	   (Star	   and	  Griesemer	  1989)	   framing	   adopted	   in	   other	   studies	   (Randalls	   2010;	   Cointe,	   Ravon,	   and	  Guérin	  2011)	  is	  unsuitable	  with	  regards	  to	  the	   ‘structure’	  of	  the	  two	  degrees	  target,	   as	   it	   is	   strongly	   (rather	   than	  weakly)	   structured	   in	   common	   use	   and	  weakly	   (rather	   than	   strongly)	   structured	   in	   local	   site	   use.	   Building	   on	   this	  analysis,	  the	  chapter	  demonstrates	  how	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	  became	  a	  basis	  for	   reshaping	   the	   “setting	   within	   which	   organisations	   operate”	   (Bebbington	  and	   Larrinaga	   2014b,	   p.401).	   Indeed	   this	   is	   a	   theme	   that	   runs	   through	   the	  thesis.	  This	  chapter	  shows	  how	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	  came	  to	  represent	  the	  complexity	   of	   climate	   change	   through	   a	   single	   figure,	   and	   how	   that	   single	  figure	  began	  to	  underpin	  a	  diversity	  of	  distributed	  efforts	  to	  develop	  linkages	  between	  climate	  change	  and	  national,	  sectoral	  and	  organisational	  entities.	  The	  thesis	  now	  directs	  its	  attention	  to	  the	  mobilisation	  of	  the	  ‘carbon	  budget’	  –	  the	  maximum	  level	  of	  cumulative	  GHG	  emissions	  from	  2000-­‐2050	  to	  remain	   within	   2°C	   of	   warming	   –	   as	   a	   more	   concrete	   rendering	   of	   the	   two	  degrees	  target.	  Specifically,	  it	  examines	  how	  the	  carbon	  budget	  was	  mobilised	  to	   emplace	   ideas	   of	   climate	   risk	   and	   potential	   threats	   to	   financial	   stability.	  Taken	   together,	   Chapter	   5	   demonstrates	   how	   the	   financial	   sector	   discourse	  was	   reshaped	   as	   the	   vision	   of	   a	   two	   degrees	   future	  was	   translated	   into	   the	  implications	  of	  that	  future	  for	  global	  capital	  markets.	  Where	  Chapter	  5	  focuses	  on	  the	  refinement	  and	   linking	  of	   the	  two	  degrees	  target	  to	  the	  sectoral-­‐level,	  Chapter	  6	  brings	  the	  reader	  inside	  the	  meeting	  rooms	  of	  the	  UNEP	  FI	  and	  GHG	  Protocol’s	   Financed	   Emissions	   Initiative,	   focussing	   on	   linkages	   between	   the	  two	  degrees	  target	  and	  corporate-­‐	  and	  portfolio-­‐level	  investment	  and	  lending	  decisions.	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CHAPTER	  5	  –	  CIVIL	  SOCIETY	  AS	  A	  	  
QUASI-­‐REGULATOR:	  	  
MOBILISING	  THE	  CARBON	  BUDGET	  
5.0.	  INTRODUCTION	  Chapter	   4	   charted	   the	   emergence	   of	   the	   two	   degrees	   target	   as	   a	  guiding	   vision	   and	   long-­‐term	   objective	   for	   efforts	   to	   tackle	   climate	   change.	  This	   chapter	   shows	   that	   the	   ‘carbon	   budget’	   –	   the	   maximum	   amount	   of	  cumulative	   GHG	   emissions	   that	   limits	   the	   probability	   of	   exceeding	   2°C	   of	  warming	   to	   20%	   –	   provided	   a	  more	   concrete	   rendering	   of	   the	   two	   degrees	  target	  and	  was	  mobilised	  to	  reshape	  the	  financial	  sector	  discourse	  on	  climate	  change.	  It	  is	  based	  on	  a	  participant	  observation	  of	  a	  UNEP	  FI	  and	  GHG	  Protocol	  standard-­‐setting	   project,	   insights	   from	   which	   were	   investigated	   further	  through	   18	   semi-­‐structured	   interviews.	   Framing	   the	   carbon	   budget	   as	   a	  mediating	   instrument	  (Miller	  and	  O’Leary	  2007),	   the	  chapter	  argues	  that	   the	  two	   degrees	   target	   was	   rendered	   into	   a	   more	   concrete	   form	   (Morgan	   and	  Morrison	   1999)	   and	   that	   it	   was	   mobilised	   to	   mediate	   between	   ideas	   of	  investment	   risk,	   financial	   stability	   and	  divestment	   (Wise	  1988).	  The	   chapter	  specifically	  builds	  on	  O’Sullivan	  and	  O’Dwyer’s	   (2015)	   study	  of	  how	  an	  NGO	  movement,	  over	   time,	  enhanced	  social	   responsibility	  and	  reporting	  practices	  in	  project	  finance	  activities.	  In	  particular,	  this	  chapter	  shows	  how	  civil	  society	  actors	   –	   such	   as	   think	   tanks,	   campaigning-­‐NGOs,	   disclosure	   groups	   and	  standard	   setters	   –	   envisaged	   a	   carbon-­‐constrained	   future	   (cf.	   Busch	   and	  Hoffmann	  2007;	  Bebbington	  and	  Larrinaga-­‐González	  2008,	  p.707)	  through	  the	  carbon	  budget,	  generating	  concerns	  of	  the	  vulnerability	  of	  capital	  markets	  to	  the	  transition	  to	  a	  low-­‐carbon	  economy.	  Prior	   sustainable	   finance	   literature	   has	   explored	   the	   intersection	   of	  the	   sustainability	   agenda	  with	   the	   financial	   sector,	  with	   academic	   studies	   in	  the	   1990s	   investigating	   how	   investment	   appraisals	   responded	   to	  environmental	   legislation	   (Coulson	   and	   Dixon	   1995;	   Coulson	   and	   Monks	  1999).	  Recent	  attention	  has	  been	  directed	  at	  the	  influence	  of	  NGO	  campaigns	  in	  driving	  sustainability	   issues	   into	  capital	  markets	  (Waygood	  2006;	  Coulson	  2009;	  Wilson	  2010)	  and	   the	  dialogue	  between	  NGOs	  and	   investors	   (Coulson	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2009;	  Gond	  and	  Piani	  2013).	  In	  particular,	  within	  this	  stream	  of	  research,	  the	  Equator	  Principles	  became	  a	  prime	  site	   for	   investigating	  how	  NGOs	  pressure	  financial	  organisations	  to	  adhere	  to	  environmental	  and	  social	  criteria	  in	  their	  project	   finance	  activities	  (Wright	  2009;	  O’Sullivan	  and	  O’Dwyer	  2009;	  Macve	  and	   Chen	   2010;	   Meyerstein	   2011;	   O’Sullivan	   and	   O’Dwyer	   2015).	   However	  this	  focus	  on	  the	  Equator	  Principles	  has	  focussed	  research	  on	  project	  finance,	  which	   constitutes	   a	   small	   portion	   of	   investment	   and	   lending	   activities.67	  Moreover,	  O’Sullivan	  and	  O’Dwyer	  (2015)	  call	  for	  research	  into	  the	  evolution	  of	   the	   NGO	  movement	   surrounding	   the	   Equator	   Principles,	   specifically	   with	  regards	  to	  the	  integration	  of	  human	  rights	  and	  climate	  change	  into	  investment	  and	  lending	  activity	  (O’Sullivan	  and	  O’Dwyer	  2015,	  p.51).	  	  This	   chapter	   responds	   to	   O’Sullivan	   and	   O’Dwyer’s	   (2015)	   call	   by	  examining	  the	  movements	  influencing	  discourses	  at	  the	  intersection	  of	  climate	  change	   and	   finance.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   the	   chapter	   demonstrates	   how	  BankTrack	   –	   the	   global	   network	   of	   campaigning-­‐NGOs	   studied	   by	  O’Sullivan	  and	   O’Dwyer	   –	   maintained	   pressure	   on	   commercial	   banks	   to	   develop	   and	  implement	   reporting	   practices	   for	   GHG	   emissions	   (Section	   5.3.2.).	   This	   is	  consistent	  with	  O’Sullivan	  and	  O’Dwyer’s	  argument	  that,	  over	  time,	  BankTrack	  achieved	  deeper	  concessions	  on	  social	  responsibility	   from	  commercial	  banks	  (Ibid.,	   p.50)	   and	   supports	   their	   nuancing	   of	   Archel	   et	  al.	   (2011),	   who	   argue	  that	   civil	   society	   actors	   can	   only	   achieve	   second-­‐order	   concessions.	   On	   the	  other	   hand,	   this	   chapter	   highlights	   an	   emerging	   strategy	   adopted	   by	   civil	  society	  actors	  to	  enrol	   the	  carbon	  budget	   in	  arguments	  of	  risks	  and	  financial	  stability	   to	   establish	   a	   vision	   of	   a	   carbon-­‐constrained	   future	   (Busch	   and	  Hoffmann	   2007;	   Bebbington	   and	   Larrinaga-­‐González	   2008,	   p.707).	  Furthermore,	   their	   efforts	   frame	   climate	   change	   as	   a	   systemic	   threat	   across	  investment	  and	  lending	  activities.	  In	  particular,	  Carbon	  Tracker68	  and	  Ceres69	  mobilised	   the	   carbon	   budget	   and	   framed	   it	   as	   posing	   impairment	   risk	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  67	  O’Sullivan	  and	  O’Dwyer	  (2015)	  notes	  that	  project	  finance	  “represented	  less	  than	  5	  per	  cent	  of	  commercial	  bank	  activities”	  (O’Sullivan	  and	  O’Dwyer	  2015,	  p.43).	  68	  Carbon	   Tracker	   is	   a	   London-­‐based	   non-­‐profit	   think	   tank,	   launched	   in	   2009,	   that	  produces	  reports	  on	  the	  risks	  of	  climate	  change	  to	  the	  financial	  sector.	  69 	  Ceres	   is	   a	   non-­‐profit	   sustainability	   advocacy	   organisation	   that	   aims	   to	   bring	  together	  businesses,	  financial	  organisations	  and	  public	  interest	  groups	  to	  develop	  and	  promote	   the	   adoption	   of	   sustainable	   business	   practices.	   Initiating	   the	   Global	  Reporting	  Initiative	  (GRI)	  is	  among	  its	  major	  accomplishments,	  as	  well	  as	  founding	  the	  Investor	  Network	  on	  Climate	  Risk,	  made	  up	  of	  100	  leading	  institutional	  investors.	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investments	  in	  carbon-­‐intensive	  sectors	  (Section	  5.3.1.)	  as	  well	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  financial	  stability	  (Section	  5.4.).	  	  As	  such,	  where	  Archel	  et	  al.	  (2011)	  and	  O’Sullivan	  and	  O’Dwyer	  (2015)	  focus	   on	   civil	   society	   actors	   that	   engage	   in	   enhancing	   corporate	   reporting	  (also	  see	  Cooper	  and	  Owen,	  2007),	  this	  chapter	  shows	  how	  civil	  society	  actors	  worked	   to	   mobilise	   the	   carbon	   budget	   as	   the	   foundation	   for	   discourse	  centring	   on	   the	   vulnerability	   of	   capital	   markets	   to	   climate	   change.	   In	  particular,	  it	  highlights	  that	  the	  work	  of	  civil	  society	  actors	  is	  interwoven	  with	  state-­‐backed	   objectives	   (i.e.	   the	   two	   degrees	   target)	   as	   well	   as	   their	  relationships	  with	  market	   participants	   (Chandhoke	  2002).	  On	   the	   one	   hand,	  they	  build	  upon	  the	  2010	  UNFCCC	  commitment	  to	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	  and	  shape	  the	  agendas	  of	   financial	  regulatory	  authorities;	  and	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  they	  mobilise	  the	  carbon	  budget	  through	  a	  risk	  and	  financial	  stability	  framing	  in	   attempts	   to	   appeal	   to	   the	   concerns	   of	   financial	   sector	   actors.	   It	   is	   in	   this	  regard	   that	   civil	   society	   actors	   take	   on	   a	   quasi-­‐regulatory	   role:	   shaping	  regulatory	   conditions	   to	   catalyse	   pre-­‐emptive	   adaptation	   to	   the	   envisaged	  regulatory	  agenda	  of	  the	  state	  and	  to	  prompt	  a	  realignment	  of	  capital	  markets	  by	  rendering	  an	  abstract	  and	  complex	  issue	  into	  a	  form	  to	  be	  integrated	  into	  the	   existing	   strategies	   of	   financial	   organisations	   and	   regulators.	   To	   develop	  this	   contribution	   to	   the	   ongoing	   debate	   (Cooper	   and	   Owen	   2007;	   Archel,	  Husillos,	   and	   Spence	   2011;	   O’Sullivan	   and	   O’Dwyer	   2015),	   the	   chapter	  analyses	   the	   carbon	   budget	   as	   a	   mediating	   instrument	   (Miller	   and	   O’Leary	  2007),	   which	  was	  mobilised	   by	   civil	   society	   actors	   as	   it	   became	   enrolled	   in	  arguments	  that	  climate	  change	  poses	  a	  systemic	  threat	  to	  capital	  markets.	  Analysing	   the	   carbon	   budget	   as	   a	   mediating	   instrument	   (Miller	   and	  O’Leary	   2007)	   frames	   it	   as	   a	   relatively	   fixed	   and	   common	   vision	   of	   the	  constraints	   under	   a	   two	   degrees	   scenario,	   towards	   which	   expectations	   and	  actions	   are	   aligned.	   The	   carbon	   budget	   embeds	   ideas	   of	   investment	   risk,	  financial	   stability	   and	   the	   imperative	   for	   climate	   action,	   providing	   financial	  organisations	  and	  regulators	  as	  well	  as	  grassroots	  climate	  movements	  with	  a	  common	  vision	  of	  a	   carbon-­‐constrained	   future	   that	   is	   seen	   through	  different	  lenses	   by	   each.	   However	   this	   chapter	   examines	   how	   the	   carbon	   budget	  “[came]	   to	   embed	   distinct	   and	   possibly	   competing	   ideas	   into	   an	   operating	  ensemble”	  (Kurunmäki	  and	  Miller	  2011,	  p.222).	  Indeed,	  where	  earlier	  studies	  have	  examined	   the	  maintenance	  of	  mediation	   in	  practice	   (Jordan,	   Jørgensen,	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and	  Mitterhofer	  2013;	  Jordan,	  Mitterhofer,	  and	  Jørgensen	  2016),	  this	  chapter	  examines	  the	  construction	  of	  an	  instrument	  and	  its	  mediating	  role	  through	  the	  work	  of	  civil	  society	  actors.	  In	  this	  regard	  it	  also	  nuances	  the	  finding	  that	  there	  is	   a	   “preference	   to	   select	   the	   known	   and	   the	   mundane	   as	   mediating	  instruments”	   (Thomson,	   Grubnic,	   and	   Georgakopoulos	   2014,	   p.471)	   by	  emphasising	   the	   work	   involved	   in	   framing	   the	   carbon	   budget	   in	   a	   manner	  familiar	   to	   financial	   organisations	   and	   regulators	   as	   well	   as	   grassroots	  activists.	   Where	   Thomson	   et	   al.	   (2014)	   focus	   on	   the	   influences	   shaping	  ‘selection’	  of	  mediating	  instruments,	  this	  chapter	  focuses	  on	  the	  work	  through	  which	  mediating	  instruments	  are	  connected	  to	  the	  concerns	  of	  diverse	  actors.	  Through	  this,	  the	  chapter	  argues	  that	  civil	  society	  actors	  produced	  a	  vision	  of	  climate	  change	  that	  posed	  a	  systemic	  threat	  to	  capital	  markets,	  and	  that	  their	  work	  was	  based	  on	   the	   foundation	  of	   the	   carbon	  budget	  as	  a	  more	   concrete	  representation	  of	  the	  two	  degrees	  target.	  	  This	   chapter	   analyses	   the	   carbon	   budget	   is	   in	   two	   stages.	   First,	   the	  carbon	   budget	   constructed	   by	   Carbon	   Tracker	   forms	   a	   bridge	   between	   the	  “abstract	  and	  idealised”	  (Morgan	  and	  Morrison	  1999,	  p.30)	  two	  degrees	  target	  and	  a	  “level	  of	  concrete	  detail”	  (Ibid.),	  such	  as	  the	  carbon	  emissions	  potential	  of	   fossil	   fuel	   reserves.	   This	   enabled	   Carbon	   Tracker	   to	   compare	   the	  achievement	  of	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	  with	  the	  ‘potential’	  carbon	  emissions	  of	  proven	  fossil	  fuel	  reserves	  and	  to	  show	  that	  only	  20%	  of	  those	  reserves	  could	  be	  burned	  to	  remain	  within	  the	  carbon	  budget.	  Second,	  the	  carbon	  budget	  was	  enrolled	   in	   arguments	   tailored	   to:	   financial	   organisations	   that	   the	   future	  impairment	  of	  fossil	  fuel	  reserves	  posed	  investment	  risks	  (Sections	  5.2.1.	  and	  5.3.1.);	   financial	   regulators	   that	   the	   current	   mispricing	   of	   this	   risk	   posed	   a	  threat	  to	  capital	  market	  stability	  (Section	  5.4.);	  and	  grassroots	  activists	  that	  a	  divestment	  campaign	   to	  oppose	   the	   fossil	   fuel	   industry	  was	   ‘urgent’	   (Section	  5.3.3.).	   While	   each	   group	   came	   to	   see	   the	   future	   envisaged	   by	   the	   carbon	  budget	   through	   different	   lenses	   (cf.	  Wise	   1988),	   each	   began	   applying	   their	  expertise	   to	  potential	  responses	   to	  a	   two	  degrees	  scenario.	  The	  work	  of	  civil	  society	  actors	  is,	  in	  this	  regard,	  seen	  as	  assembling	  and	  adjusting	  instruments	  and	   ideas	  (Hacking	  1992)	  to	   link	  an	  abstract	   issue	  such	  as	  climate	  change	  to	  the	   concrete	   level	   of	   investment	   decisions.	   Furthermore,	   by	   applying	   the	  mediating	  instruments	  concept	  to	  analyse	  the	  concretion	  of	  a	  specific	  issue	  on	  the	   sustainability	   agenda,	   the	   chapter	   responds	   to	   Unerman	   and	   Chapman’s	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(2014)	  call	  for	  further	  theoretical	  development	  in	  this	  arena	  “characterized	  by	  added	   layers	   of	   complexity	   and	   unpredictability	   on	   top	   of	   the	   already	   very	  complex	  economically-­‐focused	  accounting	  practices”	  (Unerman	  and	  Chapman	  2014,	  pp.386–387.	  Also	  see	  O’Dwyer	  and	  Unerman	  2016).	  This	  chapter	  proceeds	  as	  follows.	  Section	  5.1	  examines	  the	  refinement	  of	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	  into	  a	  set	  of	  emission	  budgets	  that	  can	  be	  compared	  to	   the	   carbon	  potential	   of	   proven	   fossil	   fuel	   reserves.	   Section	  5.2	   focuses	  on	  Carbon	   Tracker’s	   notion	   of	   the	   ‘carbon	   budget’,	   its	   framing	   as	   posing	  investment	  risks,	  and	  how	  this	  compared	  to	  prior	  notions	  of	  climate	  risk	  in	  the	  financial	  sector.	  Section	  5.3	  addresses	  the	  mobilisation	  of	  the	  carbon	  budget	  as	  one	  of	   the	  pressures	  on	   financial	  organisations	   to	   integrate	  a	  climate	  change	  framing	   in	   their	   investment	   and	   lending	   decisions.	   Section	   5.4	   details	   the	  response	   of	   financial	   regulators	   to	   the	   idea	   of	   climate	   risk,	   and	   Section	   5.5	  provides	  a	  discussion	  before	  Section	  5.6	  concludes	  the	  chapter.	  
5.1.	   EMISSION	   BUDGETS	   FOR	   2°C	   AND	   THE	   CARBON	  
POTENTIAL	  OF	  FOSSIL	  FUEL	  RESERVES	  In	   2009	   Nature	   published	   Meinshausen	   et	   al.’s	   attempt	   to	   quantify	  “GHG	   emission	   budgets	   for	   the	   2000–50	   period	   that	   would	   limit	   warming	  throughout	   the	   twenty-­‐first	   century	   to	  below	  2°C”	   (Meinshausen	  et	  al.	  2009,	  p.1158).	  2°C	  was	  selected	  as	   the	   threshold	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  “[m]ore	   than	  100	  countries	  [had]	  adopted	  a	  global	  warming	  limit	  of	  2°C	  or	  below	  (relative	  to	  pre-­‐industrial	  levels)	  as	  a	  guiding	  principle	  for	  mitigation	  efforts	  to	  reduce	  climate	   change	   risks,	   impacts	   and	   damages”	   (Ibid.).	   	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   the	  study	  set	  out	   to	  enhance	   the	   limited	  scientific	  knowledge	  regarding	   the	  GHG	  emissions	  corresponding	  to	  warming	  targets.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	   the	  authors	  sought	  to	  compare	  the	  GHG	  emissions	  potential	  of	  proven	  fossil	  fuel	  reserves70	  with	  efforts	   to	   limit	  warming	   to	  2°C	  or	  below.	  However	   the	   former	  had	  only	  been	   quantified	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   cumulative	   CO2	   emissions	   from	   “burning	   all	  proven	   fossil	   fuel	   reserves”	   (Ibid.,	   p.1160).	   By	   calculating	   emission	   budgets,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  70	  The	  study	  defines	  proven	  fossil	  fuel	  reserves	  as	  “the	  fraction	  of	  fossil	  fuel	  resources	  that	  is	  economically	  recoverable	  with	  current	  technologies	  and	  prices”	  (Meinshausen	  et	  al.	  2009,	  p.1160).	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the	   authors	   bridge	   between	   warming	   targets	   and	   fossil	   fuel	   usage,	  representing	  2°C	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  maximum	  levels	  of	  cumulative	  GHG	  emissions.	  However	  the	  emission	  budgets	  are	  far	  from	  mirrors	  of	  the	  two	  degrees	  target.	  Rather,	  they	  are	  based	  on	  particular	  models	  of	  the	  climate	  system	  that	  enable	   the	   rendering	   of	   the	   two	   degrees	   target	   into	   a	   type	   of	   information	  compatible	  with	  analyses	  of	  fossil	  fuel	  reserves.	  Indeed,	  such	  models	  had	  been	  developed	   through	   research	   into	   ‘carbon	   budgets’	   as	   early	   as	   the	   1980s,	  where	   the	   term	   ‘carbon	   budget’	   pertained	   to	   the	   levels	   of	   GHGs	   in	   the	  atmosphere,	   oceans	   and	   land	   (Bouwman	   1989).	   By	   studying	   the	   sources	   of	  emissions	  and	  the	  ‘sinks’	  that	  absorbed	  them,	  this	  literature	  sought	  to	  enhance	  predictions	  of	  future	  concentrations	  of	  greenhouse	  gases	  and	  their	  impact	  on	  the	  rate	  and	  extent	  of	  climate	  change	  (R.	  A.	  Houghton	  2007).	  Meinshausen	  et	  
al.	   note	   the	   “wide	   variety	   of	   modelling	   approaches”	   (Ibid.,	   p.1158)	   used	   in	  studies	   of	   the	   climate	   response	   to	   GHG	   emissions,	   presenting	   19	   published	  climate	  sensitivity	  probability	  distributions	   to	   illustrate	   this	  (see	  Figure	  5.1).	  “For	   illustrative	   purposes”	   the	   authors	   select	   one	   approach	   as	   their	   default,	  which	   “closely	   resembles	   the	   [IPCC’s	   Fourth	   Assessment	   Report]	   estimate	  (best	  estimate,	  3°C;	   likely	  range,	  2.0-­‐4.5°C)”	  (Ibid.)	  and	   is	  presented	  as	  being	  nested	  among	  the	  other	  18	  approaches	  (see	  Figure	  5.1).	  	  Second,	  rather	  than	  presenting	  a	  single	  figure	  for	  the	  emission	  budget	  for	  2°C,	   the	  uncertainties	   inherent	   in	   climate	  modelling	  necessitate	  emission	  budgets	  for	  different	  probabilities	  of	  exceeding	  2°C.	  Furthermore,	  cumulative	  emission	  budgets	  are	  calculated	  for	  both	  CO2	  as	  well	  as	  the	  wider	  set	  of	  gases	  covered	   by	   the	   Kyoto	   Protocol	   (CO2,	   methane,	   nitrous	   oxide,	  hydrofluorocarbons,	  perfluorocarbons	  and	  SF6),	  with	  the	  non-­‐CO2	  Kyoto	  gases	  estimated	   to	   constitute	   approximately	  one-­‐third	  of	   total	   emissions	  over	   first	  half	   of	   the	   twenty-­‐first	   century	   (Ibid.	   p.1158).	   Tabulating	   their	   results	   for	  emissions	  budgets	  (see	  Figure	  5.2),	  the	  authors	  also	  include	  the	  probabilities	  of	   exceeding	   2°C	   for	   levels	   of	   annual	   Kyoto-­‐gas	   emissions	   at	   both	   2020	   and	  2050.	   In	   this	   regard	   the	   table	   presents	   an	   overall	   limit	   to	   cumulative	   GHG	  emissions	  alongside	  waypoints	  at	  2020	  and	  2050	  for	  annual	  emissions	  levels	  that	  are	  consistent	  with	  different	  probabilities	  for	  exceeding	  2°C	  of	  warming.	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Figure	  5.1:	  “Joint	  and	  marginal	  probability	  distributions	  of	  climate	  sensitivity	  and	  transient	  climate	  response.	  a,	  Marginal	  probability	  density	  functions	  (PDFs)	  of	  climate	  sensitivity;	  b,	  marginal	  PDFs	  of	  transient	  climate	  response	  (TCR);	  c,	  posterior	  joint	  distribution	  constraining	  model	  parameters	  to	  historical	  temperatures,	  ocean	  heat	  uptake	  and	  radiative	  forcing	  under	  our	  representative	  illustrative	  priors”	  (Meinshausen	  et	  al.	  2009,	  p.1159).	  Having	   quantified	   the	   CO2	   emission	   budgets,	   the	   authors	   framed	   the	  impact	   of	   burning	   proven	   fossil	   fuel	   reserves	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   two	   degrees	  target.	   Based	   on	   existing	   literature,	   the	   authors	   derived	   a	   mid-­‐estimate	   for	  burning	   all	   proven	   fossil	   fuel	   reserves	   of	   2,800Gt	   (Gigatons)	   CO2	   emissions,	  with	   a	   corresponding	   uncertainty	   range	   of	   2,541	   to	   3,089	   Gt	   CO2	   (Ibid.,	  p.1160).	   Comparing	   this	   to	   the	   CO2	   emission	   budgets,	   the	   authors	   conclude	  that	   “[e]mitting	   the	   carbon	   from	   all	   proven	   fossil	   fuel	   reserves	   would	  therefore	  vastly	  exceed	  the	  allowable	  CO2	  emission	  budget	   for	  staying	  below	  2°C”	   (Ibid.).	   This	   is	   stated	   somewhat	   more	   cautiously	   in	   their	   introduction	  where	   they	   write	   that	   (after	   subtracting	   the	   234	   Gt	   CO2	   emitted	   between	  2000-­‐06	  from	  the	  emission	  budgets)	  “less	   than	  half	   the	  proven	  economically	  recoverable	   oil,	   gas	   and	   coal	   reserves	   can	   still	   be	   emitted	   up	   to	   2050	   to	  achieve	  such	  a	  goal	  [the	  two	  degrees	  target]”	  (Ibid.,	  p.1158).	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  Figure	  5.2:	  Probabilities	  of	  exceeding	  2°C	  and	  corresponding	  emission	  budgets	  (Meinshausen	  et	  al.	  2009,	  p.1161).	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The	   carbon	   budget,	   as	   a	   more	   concrete	   representation	   of	   the	   two	  degrees	   target,	  made	   it	  possible	   to	  analyse	   the	  potential	   implications	   for	   the	  fossil	   fuel	   industry	   of	   a	   carbon-­‐constrained	   future.	   Rather	   than	   an	   abstract	  goal	   for	  the	  21st	  century,	   the	  budgets	  detail	  various	   limits	  on	  cumulative	  and	  annual	  GHG	  emissions	  for	  remaining	  within	  a	  two	  degrees	  scenario.	  However	  while	   the	   Meinshausen	   et	   al.	   (2009)	   analysis	   provided	   a	   scientific	   bridge	  between	  the	  two	  degrees	   target	  and	  the	  GHG	  potential	   fossil	   fuel	  reserves,	   it	  was	   the	   adoption	   of	   a	   single	   figure	   as	   the	   ‘carbon	   budget’	   that	   provided	   a	  seemingly	   simple	   foundation	   for	   arguments	   on	   the	   vulnerability	   of	   the	  financial	   sector	   to	   the	   transition	   to	   a	   low-­‐carbon	   economy.	   It	   is	   to	   this	  simplification	   and	   mobilisation	   of	   emission	   budgets	   that	   this	   chapter	   now	  turns.	  
5.2.	  CONNECTING	  EMISSION	  BUDGETS	  TO	  FINANCE	  The	   following	   two	   sections	   (Sections	   5.2	   and	   5.3)	   focus	   on	   the	  refinement	  of	  emission	  budgets	  into	  the	  carbon	  budget,	  and	  how	  its	  apparent	  simplicity	   was	   central	   to	   arguments	   on	   the	   investment	   risks	   and	   threats	   to	  financial	   stability	   posed	   by	   efforts	   to	   tackle	   climate	   change.	   Particular	  attention	  is	  paid	  to	  the	  work	  of	  civil	  society	  actors	  in	  constructing	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  carbon-­‐constrained	  future	  and	  its	  implications	  both	  for	  financial	  organisations	  and	   financial	   regulatory	   authorities.	   This	   is	   in	   contrast	   to	   Section	  5.1,	  which	  framed	   emissions	   budgets	   as	   technical	   bridges	   between	   the	   two	   degrees	  scenario	   and	   the	   more	   concrete	   matter	   of	   fossil	   fuel	   reserves.	   This	   section,	  Section	  5.2,	  centres	  on	  ‘the	  carbon	  budget’;	  the	  use	  of	  one	  figure	  drawn	  from	  Meinshausen	  et	  al.’s	  (2009)	  emission	  budgets	  to	  analyse	  the	  investment	  risks	  of	  a	  two	  degrees	  scenario.	  Furthermore,	  it	  attends	  to	  how	  arguments	  based	  on	  the	  carbon	  budget	  were	  tailored	  to	  the	  concerns	  of	  financial	  organisations	  and	  regulators.	   Section	   5.3	   turns	   its	   attention	   to	   the	   initiatives	   that	   enrolled	   the	  carbon	   budget	   in	   movements	   to	   integrate	   climate	   change	   into	   existing	   risk	  management	  systems	  and	  new	  regulations	  in	  the	  financial	  sector.	  
5.2.1.	  THE	  CARBON	  BUDGET	  In	   2011	   the	   Carbon	   Tracker	   Initiative	   (hereafter	   Carbon	   Tracker),	   a	  London-­‐based	   non-­‐profit	   think	   tank,	   released	   what	   would	   become	   their	  landmark	   report,	   Unburnable	  Carbon:	   are	   the	   world's	   financial	   markets	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carrying	   a	  carbon	  bubble?	   (Carbon	   Tracker	   2011).	   Carbon	   Tracker	   was	   the	  first	  project	  of	  the	  non-­‐profit	  company	  Investor	  Watch,	  which	  was	  founded	  in	  2009	   with	   the	   mission	   to	   “align	   the	   capital	   markets	   with	   efforts	   to	   tackle	  climate	  change”	  (YourSRI	  2016).	  With	  finance	  from	  The	  Rockefeller	  Brothers	  Fund	   –	   a	   philanthropic	   foundation	   established	   in	   1940	   to	   coordinate	   the	  Rockefeller	   Family’s	   charitable	   efforts	   –	   Carbon	   Tracker	   set	   out	   to	   “provide	  the	   financial	   and	   regulatory	   analysis	   to	   ensure	   that	   the	   risk	   premium	  associated	   with	   fossil	   fuels	   is	   correctly	   priced”	   (Carbon	   Tracker	   Initiative	  2015).	   Senior	   individuals	   at	   Carbon	   Tracker71	  presented	   themselves	   as	   ‘ex-­‐bankers’	   and	  economists	  with	   the	   technical	   skills	   to	  produce	   robust	   reports.	  Climate	  change,	  to	  their	  team,	  was	  a	  problem	  to	  be	  tackled	  through	  economic	  transition;	  a	  transition	  away	  from	  carbon-­‐intensive	  modes	  of	  production	  and	  towards	   investment	   in	   emerging	   low-­‐carbon	   technologies.	   Reconfiguring	  capital	   markets	   to	   support	   this	   transition	   was	   central	   to	   the	   arguments	  presented	  in	  their	  2011	  Unburnable	  Carbon	  report:	  	  “[T]oday’s	   financial	   architecture	   is	   not	   fit	   for	   purpose	   to	  manage	  the	  transition	  to	  a	   low-­‐carbon	  economy	  and	  serious	  reforms	   are	   required	   to	   key	   aspects	   of	   financial	   regulation	  and	   practice	   firstly	   to	   acknowledge	   the	   carbon	   risks[ 72 ]	  inherent	   in	   fossil	   fuel	   assets	   and	   then	   take	   action	   to	   reduce	  these	   risks	   on	   the	   timeline	   needed	   to	   avoid	   catastrophic	  climate	  change.”	  (Carbon	  Tracker	  2011,	  p.i)	  This	   2011	   Unburnable	   Carbon	   report	   based	   its	   analysis	   of	   a	   carbon-­‐constrained	   future	   on	   the	   Meinshausen	   et	   al.	   (2009)	   findings.	   It	   further	  reinforced	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	  as	  a	  long-­‐term	  objective	  for	  climate	  change	  by	   opening	   its	   analysis	   with:	   “The	   Cancun	   Agreement	   in	   December	   2010	  captured	  an	  international	  commitment	  to	  limit	  global	  warming	  to	  two	  degrees	  Celsius	  (°C)	  above	  pre-­‐industrial	  levels”	  (Carbon	  Tracker	  2011,	  p.6).	  However	  the	  Unburnable	  Carbon	   report	  did	  not	  analyse	   the	  range	  of	  emission	  budgets	  calculated	   by	   the	  Meinshausen	   et	   al.	   study.	   Rather	   it	   focussed	   solely	   on	   the	  budget	   for	   limiting	  the	  chance	  of	  exceeding	  two	  degrees	  of	  warming	  to	  20%,	  which	   it	   termed	   the	   ‘carbon	  budget’.	   It	   did	   not	  mention	   the	   other	   three	   CO2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  71	  As	   a	   participant	   observer	   of	   the	   UNEP	   FI	   and	   GHG	   Protocol’s	   standard-­‐setting	  project,	   the	   Financed	   Emissions	   Initiative,	   there	   were	   multiple	   opportunities	   to	  engage	  with	  two	  senior	  individuals	  at	  Carbon	  Tracker.	  72 This	   chapter	   refers	   to	   ‘climate	   risk’	   regarding	   the	   range	   of	   physical,	   legal,	  reputational	   and	  market	   risks	   stemming	   from	   climate	   change.	   ‘Carbon	   risk’,	   on	   the	  other	  hand,	  is	  a	  term	  that	  started	  to	  be	  used	  specifically	  for	  the	  risks	  stemming	  from	  future	  carbon	  constraints	  (this	  latter	  term	  features	  more	  prominently	  in	  Chapter	  6).	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budgets	  in	  the	  Meinshausen	  et	  al.	  study	  or	  that	  the	  study	  had	  adopted	  20%	  as	  the	   ‘illustrative	   default’	   for	   the	   8-­‐37%	   probability	   range	   of	   exceeding	   2°C.	  Instead,	   the	   foundation	   of	   the	   report	   was	   conveyed	   through	   the	   simple	  statement:	   “To	   reduce	   the	   chance	   of	   exceeding	   2°C	   warming	   to	   20%,	   the	  global	   carbon	   budget	   for	   2000-­‐2050	   is	   886	   [gigatons	   of	   carbon	   dioxide	  (GtCO2)]”	  (Carbon	  Tracker	  2011,	  p.2).	  It	  was	  complicated	  only	  to	  highlight	  that	  more	  than	  a	  third	  of	  that	  had	  already	  been	  emitted:	  “Minus	  emissions	  from	  the	  first	   decade	   of	   this	   century,	   this	   leaves	   a	   budget	   of	   565	   GtCO2	   for	   the	  remaining	  40	  years	  to	  2050”	  (Ibid.).	  This	  image,	  portrayed	  at	  the	  outset	  of	  the	  
Unburnable	   Carbon	   report,	   envisioned	   a	   carbon-­‐constrained	   future	   that	  conveys	   the	   two	   degrees	   scenario	   through	   the	   more	   concrete	   form	   of	   565	  GtCO2.	  	  Following	   the	   Meinshausen	   et	   al.	   (2009)	   argument,	   the	   Unburnable	  
Carbon	   report	   notes	   that	   “the	   Earth’s	   known	   fossil	   fuel	   reserves	   comes	   to	  2795	  GtCO2	  […]	  equivalent	  to	  nearly	  5	  times	  the	  carbon	  budget	  for	  the	  next	  40	  years”	  (Carbon	  Tracker	  2011,	  p.2).	  However	  it	  refines	  this	  figure	  into	  the	  fossil	  fuel	   reserves	   held	   by	   listed	   oil,	   gas	   and	   coal	   companies	   to	   increase	   its	  compatibility	  with	  financial	  analysis	  of	  capital	  markets:	  	  “The	   fossil	   fuel	   reserves	   held	   by	   the	   top	   100	   listed	   coal	  companies	   and	   the	   top	   100	   listed	   oil	   and	   gas	   companies	  represent	  potential	  emissions	  of	  745	  GtCO2.	  […]	  On	  top	  of	  this	  further	  resources	  are	  held	  by	  state	  entities.	  Given	  only	  20%	  of	   the	  total	  reserves	  can	  be	  used	  to	  stay	  below	  2°C,	   if	   this	   is	  applied	   uniformly,	   then	   only	   149	   of	   the	   745	   GtCO2	  held	   by	  listed	   companies	   can	   be	   used	   unabated.”	   (Carbon	   Tracker	  2011,	  p.2)	  The	   construction	   of	   these	   two	   figures	   –	   the	   carbon	   budget	   and	   the	  carbon	  potential	  of	  reserves	  held	  by	  major	  listed	  oil,	  gas	  and	  coal	  companies	  –	  creates	  a	  point	  of	  comparison	  between	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	  and	  listed	  fossil	  fuel	  reserves.	  Yet	  the	  implications	  of	  this	  comparison	  for	  investment	  hinges	  on	  the	  crucial	  assumption	  that	  policies	  are	  designed	  and	  implemented	  to	  achieve	  the	  two	  degrees	   target.	  Briefly	  noting	  this	  assumption	  before	  stating	   its	  bold	  conclusion,	  the	  report	  reads:	  “If	   the	   2°C	   target	   is	   rigorously	   applied,	   then	   up	   to	   80%	   of	  declared	  reserves	  owned	  by	  the	  world’s	  largest	  listed	  coal,	  oil	  and	   gas	   companies	   and	   their	   investors	  would	   be	   subject	   to	  impairment	   as	   these	   assets	   become	   stranded.”	   (Carbon	  Tracker	  2011,	  p.2.	  Emphasis	  added.)	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By	  assuming	  a	  ‘rigorous	  application’	  of	  the	  two	  degrees	  target,	  Carbon	  Tracker	  argues	  that	  regulations	  to	  restrict	  the	  burning	  of	  fossil	  fuels	  to	  remain	  within	  the	  carbon	  budget	   ‘will’	  result	   in	   impairment	  of	  those	  reserves	  and	  of	  investments	  in	  companies	  whose	  valuations	  are	  based	  on	  their	  reserves.	  This	  assumption	   was	   stated	   at	   a	   time,	   as	   Chapter	   4	   has	   shown,	   when	   the	   two	  degrees	   target	   was	   challenged	   on	   grounds	   that	   ranged	   from	   its	   scientific	  feasibility	  to	  the	  likelihood	  of	  policy	  implementation	  to	  achieve	  it.	  The	  report,	  however,	   sets	   this	   question	   aside	   and	   focuses	   on	   the	   three	   steps	   through	  which	  they	  build	  their	  idea	  of	  climate	  risk:	  to	  achieve	  the	  two	  degrees	  target,	  there	   is	   a	   finite	   carbon	   budget,	  which	   exceeds	   the	   carbon	   potential	   of	   fossil	  fuel	  reserves.	  	  However	   this	   is	   not	   to	   say	   that	   Carbon	   Tracker’s	   logic	   went	  unchallenged.	   In	   presentations	   during	   the	   Financed	  Emissions	   Initiative	   and	  those	   at	   major	   climate	   conferences	   (such	   as	   the	   2013	   UNEP	   FI	   Global	  Roundtable	  and	  the	  2015	  Investor	  Climate	  Summit	  held	  during	  Paris	  Climate	  Week,	  among	  others73)	  questions	  ranged	   from	  the	   impact	  of	  Carbon	  Capture	  and	   Storage	   (CCS)74	  on	   the	   percentage	   of	   reserves	   that	   could	   be	   used	   to	   the	  carbon	  budget	  for	  a	  three	  degrees	  scenario.	  From	  the	  responses	  observed,	  the	  Carbon	   Tracker	   team	   argue	   that	   from	   their	   investigations	   current	   CCS	  technology	   would	   make	   a	   negligible	   difference	   and	   that	   in	   a	   three	   degrees	  scenario	  more	  of	  the	  reserves,	  but	  by	  no	  means	  all,	  can	  be	  used.	  Furthermore,	  the	  team	  frames	  their	  chosen	  numbers	  as	  prudent	  because,	  they	  argue,	  states	  are	  likely	  to	  burn	  their	  own	  reserves	  while	  regulating	  the	  use	  of	  those	  held	  by	  private	  companies.	  The	  point	   is	   that,	  while	   it	   is	   impossible	   to	  know	  whether	  the	   two	   degrees	   target	   will	   be	   achieved,	   Carbon	   Tracker	   argued	   that	   their	  analysis	   of	   climate	   risk	   applies	   to	   different	   variations	   of	   the	   transition	   to	   a	  low-­‐carbon	   economy.	   In	   doing	   so,	   the	   Unburnable	   Carbon	   report	   creates	   a	  foundation	   for	   arguments	   stemming	   from	   the	   climate	   risks	   that	   capital	  markets	  overlook.	  As	  an	  Executive	  Director	  at	  a	  large	  ratings	  agency	  remarked	  when	  reflecting	  on	  why	  their	  clients	  started	  asking	  about	  climate	  risk:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  73	  See	  Appendix	  3B	  for	  details	  of	  participant	  observation	  conducted	  at	  climate	  events	  outside	  the	  Financed	  Emissions	  Initiative.	  74	  CCS	   refers	   to	   technologies	   designed	   to	   capture	   CO2	   emissions	   produced	   from	   the	  use	  of	   fossil	   fuels,	  preventing	  the	  gases	   from	  entering	  the	  atmosphere.	  The	  captured	  carbon	  is	  then	  stored,	  for	  example,	  in	  depleted	  oil	  and	  gas	  fields.	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“To	   be	   honest	   there	   is	   a	   big	   marketing	   thing	   to	   the	   way	  thematic	   issues	   emerge.	   There	   is	   a	   messaging	   angle,	   and	   if	  the	  message	   is	   convoluted	   then	   you	   don’t	   get	   traction	   from	  people.	   And	   if	   don’t	   get	   traction	   from	   people	   you	   don’t	   get	  traction	   from	   institutions	   […]	  The	   thing	   that	  happened	  with	  climate	   that	   broke	   a	   lot	   of	   this	   open	   is	   the	   Carbon	   Tracker	  work	   on,	   you	   know:	   ‘there’s	   a	   finite	   carbon	   budget,	   our	  reserves	   exceed	   that	   budget,	  what’s	   going	   to	   happen	   to	   the	  rest?’	  It’s	  like	  putting	  numbers	  to	  a	  bit	  of	  very	  clean	  narrative.	  When	   you	   try	   it	   out	   with	   something	   social	   like	   global	  inequality	   it’s	   really	   complex	   and,	   you	   know,	   there	   isn’t	   a	  simple	   enough	   narrative	   that	   just	   immediately	   grabs	  someone.”	  (Interview:	  Eag1516)	  The	   above	   interview	   was	   conducted	   in	   2015,	   and	   the	   interviewee	  acted	  as	   if	   rehearsing	  an	  old	  argument	  with	  her	   line	   “’there’s	  a	   finite	   carbon	  budget,	  our	  reserves	  exceed	  that	  budget,	  what’s	  going	  to	  happen	  to	  the	  rest?’”	  It	   should	  be	  noted	   that	  by	  2015	  there	  was	  already	  widespread	  awareness	  of	  the	  Unburnable	  Carbon	  report,	   so	   it	   is	   perhaps	   unsurprising	   the	   interviewee	  felt	  it	  almost	  unnecessary	  to	  repeat	  the	  argument.	  Yet	  this	  highlights	  the	  point	  that	   the	   apparent	   simplicity	   of	   the	   argument	   and	   firmness	   of	   the	   carbon	  budget	   became	   mutually	   reinforcing.	   Following	   up	   on	   how	   the	   interviewee	  would	  think	  about	  climate	  change	  if	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  two	  degrees	  scenario	  didn’t	  exist,	  the	  Executive	  Director	  responded:	  “[…]	  To	   actually	  do	   something	   about	   [an	   issue],	   it	   has	   to	  be	  quantifiable,	   and	   I	   think	   there	  has	   to	  be	   a	   story	  or	   a	   link	   to	  risk	   and	   opportunity	   for	   it	   to	   really	   catch	   on.	   […]	   I	   mean	  finance	  doesn’t	  model	   sentences	  and	  paragraphs	  and	  essays	  and	   opinions.	   You	   need	   finite	   assumptions	   that	   are	  quantitative	   in	   nature	   to	   anchor	   an	   argument	   or	   to	   do	   a	  scenario	  test.	  So	  with	  the	  two	  degrees	  scenario	  piece,	  I	  don’t	  think	  anyone	  cares	  what	   the	  actual	  number	   is	   for	   the	  global	  carbon	   budget.	   It	   could	   be	   like	   800	   gigatons	   or	   it	   could	   be	  920,	  I	  don’t	  know,	  but	  it	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  is	  a	  framing	  of	  it	  that	  helps.”	  (Interview:	  Eag1516)	  The	   interviewee	   starts	   out	   by	   stating	   that	   both	   a	   narrative	   and	   a	  quantitative	   base	   are	   needed	   to	   talk	   about	   an	   issue.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   the	  narrative	   is	   not	   compatible	   with	   the	   models,	   which	   is	   why	   numbers	   are	  needed.	  On	   the	  other	  hand,	   the	  narrative	  of	   the	  conversation	   is	  anchored	  by	  the	   existence	   of	   a	   number.	   The	   two	   appear	   as	   co-­‐constitutive,	   with	   the	  narrative	   being	   unanchored	  without	   a	   number,	   and	   the	   number	   requiring	   a	  narrative	  to	  “catch	  on”.	  It	  is	  the	  combination	  of	  the	  carbon	  budget	  and	  a	  logic	  of	  climate	  risk	  that	  renders	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	  into	  a	  type	  of	  information	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that	   can	   connect	   specifically	   to	   the	   investment	   strategy	   of	   a	   financial	  organisation.	   Furthermore,	   as	   a	   conference	   presenter	   during	   the	   May	   2015	  Paris	   Climate	  Week	   noted,	   the	  Unburnable	   Carbon	   report	   (to	   restate	   its	   full	  title:	   Unburnable	  Carbon:	   are	   the	   world's	   financial	   markets	   carrying	  
a	  carbon	  bubble?)	  was	  built	  on	  a	  post-­‐financial	  crisis	  lexicon.	  A	  senior	  manager	  at	  a	  US	  sustainability	  coalition	  of	  investors	  echoed	  this	  sentiment:	  “Whoever	   it	  was	  who	   first	   came	  up	  with	   the	   concept	   of	   the	  carbon	  budget	   […]	  couldn’t	  have	  come	  up	  with	   it	  at	  a	  better	  time	  because,	   at	   least	   in	   the	  US,	   the	  2008	  collapse	   is	   still	   so	  fresh	   in	   people’s	   consciousness.	   This	   idea	   of	   having	   these	  assets	   that	  no	  one	  really	  understands	  how	  to	  value	  and	  are,	  in	  a	  sense,	  hidden	  –	  not	  only	   in	   the	  metaphoric	  way	  but	  are	  also	   hidden	   underground	   –	   is	   something	   that	   I	   think	   really	  captured	  people’s	  imagination	  and	  really	  was	  something	  that	  they	  could	  rally	  around”	  (Interview:	  Eag1522).	  The	   narrative	   of	   the	   carbon	   budget	   was	   not	   only	   about	   risks	   to	  investments,	   it	   was	   also	   about	   potentially	   systemic	   risks	   (i.e.	   a	   ‘carbon	  bubble’)	   that	   had	   been	   overlooked	   by	   financial	   organisations	   as	   well	   as	  financial	  regulatory	  authorities.	  Yet	  the	  role	  of	  Carbon	  Tracker	   in	  developing	  the	  notion	  of	  climate	  risk	  must	  not	  be	  overstated.	  The	  idea	  of	  climate	  risk	  pre-­‐dated	   Carbon	   Tracker’s	   Unburnable	   Carbon	   report,	   and	   one	   of	   the	  organisations	  at	  the	  core	  of	  climate	  risk	  debates	  since	  the	  early-­‐2000s,	  Ceres	  (the	   Coalition	   for	   Environmentally	   Responsible	   Economies),	   came	   to	  collaborate	  with	  Carbon	  Tracker	  to	  mobilise	  its	  new	  arguments	  about	  climate	  risk.	  
5.2.2.	  CERES	  AND	  CLIMATE	  RISK	  IN	  THE	  EARLY-­‐2000S	  “I	  mean	  to	  be	  honest	  we	  feel	  like	  we	  coined	  the	  term	  climate	  risk.	   That	   was	   around	   2002	   […]	   We	   really	   tried	   to	   lay	   out	  climate	   change	   much	   more	   from	   an	   economic	   and	   risk	  standpoint	  than	  had	  been	  done	  before,	  and	  yeah	  it	  resonated	  pretty	  well.	  We	  managed	  to	  get	  a	   lot	  of	  media	  attention	  and	  we	  worked	  with	  a	  bunch	  of	  investors”	  (Interview:	  Eag1523)	  The	   director	   quoted	   above,	   from	   a	   prominent	   US-­‐based	   non-­‐profit	  organisation,	   presented	   their	   role	   in	   rendering	   climate	   change	   into	   an	  economic	   and	   risk	   register	   as	   a	   pioneering	   move.	   Appearing	   proud	   that	   “it	  resonated	  pretty	  well”,	  his	  NPO	  benefited	  from	  the	  traction	  of	  their	  argument	  with	  both	  the	  media	  as	  well	  as	  investors.	  While	  Ceres	  was	  founded	  in	  1989,	  its	  work	  on	  creating	  an	  economic	  and	  risk	  framing	  of	  climate	  change	  began	  in	  the	  early	  2000s,	  with	  2001	  seeing	  the	  publication	  of	  their	  first	  climate	  risk	  report,	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Value	   at	   Risk:	   Climate	   Change	   and	   the	   Future	   of	   Governance	   (Ceres	   and	  Innovest	  2002).	  At	  this	  time	  “staff	  at	  Ceres	  [were	  thinking]	  about	  the	  different	  issues	   that	   investors	   and	   Ceres	   could	   work	   on”	   (Interview:	   Eag1515),	   and	  through	   discussions	   with	   investors,	   “climate	   change	   came	   up	   as	   one	   of	   the	  most	   important	   serious	   issues	   and	   one	   that	   has	   financial	   effects,	   risks	   and	  opportunities	  for	  investors”	  (Interview:	  Eag1515).	  Working	  at	  the	  interface	  of	  sustainability	  and	  finance,	  climate	  risk	  presented	  an	  opportunity	  for	  Ceres	  to	  engage	   with	   financial	   organisations	   on	   developing	   sustainable	   business	  practices.	  Climate	  change	  was	  an	  issue	  that	  could	  be	  rendered	  into	  a	  language	  of	  risk	  and	  opportunity,	  with	  Ceres’	  Value	  at	  Risk	  report	  reframing	  the	  issue	  in	  terms	   of	   its	   physical	   risks	   –	   either	   directly	   to	   operations	   or	   through	   more	  widespread	   disruption	   –	   and	   the	   potential	   risks	   of	   any	   future	   mitigation	  policies	   aimed	   at	   reducing	   GHG	   emissions	   –	   such	   as	   cap-­‐and-­‐trade	  mechanisms	  or	  carbon	  taxation	  schemes.	  However,	  in	  the	  early	  2000s,	  the	  idea	  of	  climate	  risk	  was	  in	  its	  infancy	  and	  many	  investors	  were	  uninterested	  in	  the	  issues	  or	  “just	  didn’t	  know	  what	  to	  do	  with	   this	   information”	  (Interview:	  Eag1515).	  Even	  those	   investors	   that	  engaged	  with	  the	  discussion	  “ten	  years	  ago	  were	  just	  thinking	  ‘Does	  this	  affect	  my	  investment	  decisions	  in	  any	  way,	  can	  I	  get	  external	  managers	  who	  manage	  money	  for	  me	  to	  consider	  this	   issue?’”	  (Interview:	  Eag1515).	  The	  main	  point	  that	   investors	   were	   interested	   in	   was	   “which	   particular	   industries	   are	  vulnerable	  and	  maybe	  even	  which	  regions	  of	  the	  country	  are	  vulnerable”.	  Yet	  uncertainty	   over	   the	   timing,	   location	   and	   magnitude	   of	   physical	   impacts	   of	  climate	   change,	   as	  well	   as	   the	   possible	  mitigation	   policies	   for	   reducing	   GHG	  emissions,	  meant	  these	  questions	  were	  difficult	  to	  answer.	  As	  such,	  the	  client	  advice	  offered	  by	   investment	   advisory	   firms	   “was	   really	   about	  being	   ethical,	  not	  about	  managing	  long-­‐term	  risk	  […]	  [because]	  there	  was	  less	  awareness	  or	  less	   acceptance	   that	   these	   factors	   impacted	   investments	   in	   a	   material	   way”	  (Interview:	   Eag1516).	   This	   interviewee’s	   organisation,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	  “was	   really	   about	   [a]	   materiality	   driven	   approach,	   which	   in	   the	   early	   year-­‐2000s	   people	   thought	   was	   silly.”	   Indeed,	   while	   Ceres	   was	   a	   leading	  organisation	   in	   the	   climate	   risk	   discourse	   in	   the	   early-­‐2000s,	   the	   idea	  primarily	  had	  traction	  and	  was	  developed	  through	  their	  working	  relationships	  with	   investors.	   This	   was	   coordinated	   through	   their	   newly	   formed	   Investor	  Network	  on	  Climate	  Risk	  (INCR):	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“In	  the	  early	  2000s	  Ceres	  came	  up	  with	  the	  idea	  of	  founding	  the	  Investor	  Network	  on	  Climate	  Risk	  and	  doing	  an	  investor	  summit	  with	  the	  United	  Nations.	  […]	  Their	  investor	  summits	  helped	  a	  lot,	  and	  investors	  also	  learned	  through	  working	  with	  Ceres.	   Participating	   on	   working	   groups	   is	   a	   big	   part	   of	  investors’	   work,	   and	   since	   even	   before	   2002	   that	   has	  involved	   filing	   shareholder	   resolutions	   to	   companies	   on	  energy	   and	   climate	   change	   and	   related	   issues.	   That’s	  where	  most	  of	   the	   investors	  put	  most	  of	   their	   time	  and	   […]	   I	   think	  that’s	   where	   investors	   learn	   the	   most	   –	   by	   engaging	   with	  companies,	   and	   then	   continuing	   to	   work	   with	   Ceres	   on	  different	  projects”	  (Interviewee:	  Eag1515).	  The	   INCR	   and	   its	   investor	   summits	   developed	   a	   structured	  engagement	  between	  Ceres	  and	  investors,	  with	  summits	  providing	  a	  forum	  to	  familiarise	  investors	  with	  emerging	  ideas	  and	  with	  working	  groups	  entailing	  a	  longer	   engagement	   to	   develop	   understandings	   of	   specific	   aspects	   of	   climate	  risk.	  A	  senior	  manager	  with	  experience	  within	  investor	  networks	  such	  as	  INCR	  remarked	  that	   investors	  who	  “have	  been	  engaged	  on	  climate	  risk	  since	  2001	  […]	  are	  kind	  of	  what	   I	  would	  call	   ‘true	  believers’	   in	   terms	  of	   climate	  change.	  They	   really	   believe	   and	   acknowledge	   that	   climate	   creates	   lots	   of	   risks	   –	  economic,	  financial	  and	  physical	  –	  and	  they’ve	  been	  pushing	  companies	  to	  do	  something	   about	   that	   for	   a	   while”	   (Interview:	   Eag1522).	   Yet,	   outside	   this	  group	  of	  investors	  that	  became	  closely	  connected	  through	  Ceres’	  INCR,	  climate	  risk	  only	  appeared	  to	  begin	  permeating	  discussions	  in	  the	  early-­‐2010s.	  At	  this	  time,	  Ceres	  had	  begun	  collaborating	  with	  Carbon	  Tracker	  on	  their	  framing	  of	  climate	   risk	   in	   the	   financial	   sector.	   Carbon	   Tracker’s	   Unburnable	   Carbon	  arguments	   had	   captured	   the	   imagination	   of	   senior	   figures	   at	   Ceres	   with,	  according	   to	  a	  senior	  manager	  at	  a	  US	  sustainability	  coalition,	   “Ryan	  Salmon	  and	  Andrew	   Logan	   [from	  Ceres]	   reaching	   out	   to	   James	   Leaton	   and	  Anthony	  Hobley,	   who	   were	   two	   of	   the	   main	   folks	   at	   [Carbon	   Tracker],	   and	   began	  talking	  with	  them	  about	  what	  could	  be	  done	  to	  galvanise	  some	  action	  around	  this	   issue”	   (Interview:	   Eag1522).	   It	   was	   through	   this	   collaboration	   that	   the	  carbon	   budget	   was	   initially	   mobilised	   in	   the	   financial	   sector	   discourse	   on	  climate	  change,	  to	  which	  this	  chapter	  now	  turns.	  
5.3.	  MOBILISING	  THE	  CARBON	  BUDGET	  	  “Within	   a	   year	   after	   the	   Carbon	   Tracker	   Initiative	   was	  founded,	  I	  spoke	  to	  James	  Leaton	  [Carbon	  Tracker’s	  Research	  Director]	   in	   New	   York,	   […]	   and	   I	   think	   my	   thought	   at	   that	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time	  was,	  ‘Well	  this	  is	  a	  great	  argument	  but	  are	  you	  going	  to	  make	   it	   real?	  How	  are	  you	  going	   to	  get	  people	   to	  act	  on	   the	  information?’	  Because	  at	   the	  beginning	   the	   information	  was	  just	   that	   the	  science	  doesn’t	  agree	  with	  company	  actions.	   In	  other	   words,	   ‘a	   scientist	   says	   2°C	   is	   the	   most	   that	   we	   can	  allow	   the	   climate	   to	   change	   and	   corporations,	   specifically	  fossil	  fuel	  corporations,	  have	  too	  much	  reserves	  and	  they	  are	  going	  to	  go	  over	  the	  carbon	  budgets’.	  And	  I	  thought	  ‘That’s	  a	  really	   intriguing	   argument,	   but	   how	   is	   that	   going	   to	   lead	   to	  action?’”	  (Interview:	  Eag1515)	  Sections	  5.1	  and	  5.2	   focussed	  on	  how	  the	   two	  degrees	   target	  became	  connected	   to	   pre-­‐existing	   ideas	   of	   climate	   risk,	   with	   Section	   5.2	   also	   noting	  some	  interaction	  between	  civil	  society	  actors	  and	  investors	  on	  climate	  change.	  This	   section	   focuses	   specifically	   on	  how	   the	   carbon	  budget	   and	   its	  narrative	  were	  mobilised	   and	   came	   to	   reconfigure	   the	   idea	   of	   climate	   risk,	  while	   also	  becoming	   connected	   to	   concerns	  of	   its	   threat	   to	   financial	   stability	   as	  well	   as	  serving	   as	   a	   foundation	   for	   an	   emerging	   grassroots	   divestment	   movement	  targeted	   at	   fossil	   fuel	   companies.	   As	   the	   senior	   manager	   of	   a	   non-­‐profit	  organisation	  quoted	  above	  commented,	  the	  Unburnable	  Carbon	  report	  by	  itself	  presented	  a	  new	  argument	   about	   the	   intersection	  of	   climate	   change	  and	   the	  financial	  sector.	  Yet	  it	  was	  through	  the	  work	  of	  civil	  society	  actors	  to	  mobilise	  the	  carbon	  budget	   that	   it	  came	  to	  mediate	  between	  the	  concerns	  of	   financial	  organisations	  and	  regulators	  as	  well	  as	  climate	  activists.	  	  
5.3.1.	  CERES	  AND	  CARBON	  TRACKER	  COLLABORATE	  ON	  CLIMATE	  RISK	  The	  discussions	  between	  leading	  figures	  at	  Ceres	  and	  Carbon	  Tracker	  gave	  birth	  to	  a	  collaboration	  aiming	  to	  stimulate	  action	  on	  climate	  risk.	  As	  one	  interviewee	   remarked	   “Carbon	   Tracker	   was	   essentially	   providing	   data”	  (Interview:	  Eag1522)	  while	  Ceres	  used	  its	  INCR	  and	  investor	  summits	  to	  raise	  awareness	  of	  Carbon	  Tracker’s	  analysis:	  “I	   think	   in	   terms	   of	   investors	   getting	   really	   engaged	   in	   the	  Carbon	   Tracker	  work,	   Ceres	   did	   a	   lot	   of	  webinars	   designed	  for	   investors	  to	   join,	  and	  listen	  to,	  on	  the	  initial	  [Unburnable	  
Carbon]	  report.	  And	  you	  are	  talking	  about	  over	  100	  investors	  that	  are	  part	  of	  the	  Investor	  Network	  on	  Climate	  Risk.	  And	  so	  getting	  access	  to	  [investors]	  through	  the	  webinars	  –	  but	  also	  through	  direct	  meetings	   at	   the	  Ceres	   conferences	   and	  other	  events	  that	  were	  being	  convened	  primarily	  in	  New	  York	  City	  but	  also	   in	  other	   financial	  hubs	  around	  the	  US	  –	  was	  part	  of	  it.”	  (Interview:	  Eag1522)	  The	   Carbon	   Tracker	   argument	   was	   not	   confined	   to	   the	   pages	   of	   the	  
Unburnable	   Carbon	   report.	   Webinars	   served	   as	   a	   forum	   to	   familiarise	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investors	   with	   the	   analysis	   and	   senior	   figures	   at	   Carbon	   Tracker	   became	  regular	   and	   prominent	   speakers	   at	   climate	   conferences	   beyond	   those	  organised	   by	   Ceres.	   As	   noted	   in	   Section	   5.2,	   presentations	   provided	   Carbon	  Tracker	  with	  the	  opportunity	  to	  be	  challenged	  by	  investors	  and	  to	  defend	  the	  logic	   that	   underpinned	   their	   idea	   of	   climate	   risk.	  However	   the	   collaboration	  went	  beyond	  providing	  a	  platform	  to	  espouse	  the	  reconfigured	  idea	  of	  climate	  risk,	  “[Ceres,	  Carbon	  Tracker]	  and	  a	  couple	  of	  the	  more	  active	  investors	  [in	  the	  INCR]	  discussed	  the	   idea	  of	  creating	  a	   letter	  and	  sending	  that	  out	  to	  some	  of	  the	   companies	   that	  were	  most	   likely	   to	   be	   impacted”	   (Interview:	   Eag1522).	  Named	  the	  Carbon	  Asset	  Risk	  Initiative,	  75	  Carbon	  Tracker	  and	  Ceres	  leveraged	  the	   backing	   of	   75	   institutional	   investors	   –	  managing	   a	   total	   of	   $3	   trillion	   of	  collective	  assets	  (Ceres	  2013)	  –	  to	  confront	  the	  boards	  of	  45	  leading	  coal,	  oil	  and	   gas	   corporations	   on	   their	   investment	   strategies	   and	   plans	   for	   a	   two	  degrees	   scenario	   (See	   Figure	   5.3	   for	   a	   diagrammatic	   representation	   of	   the	  relationships	   and	   interactions).	   Carbon	  Tracker’s	   idea	   of	   climate	   risk	  was	   at	  the	  core	  of	  the	  letter	  sent	  to	  these	  companies:	  
Figure	  5.3:	  The	  Carbon	  Asset	  Risk	  Initiative,	  its	  engagement	  with	  institutional	  investors	  and	  its	  dialogue	  with	  fossil	  fuel	  corporations	  that	  was	  backed	  by	  institutional	  investor	  support.	  “As	   investors	   with	   diversified	   portfolios,	   we	   recognize	   the	  critical	   importance	   of	   having	   affordable	   energy	   to	   support	  economic	  growth.	  We	  also	  recognize	  that	  more	  than	  80%	  of	  the	  world’s	  growing	  energy	  demand	  is	  currently	  met	  by	  fossil	  fuels,	  but	  that	  to	  achieve	  the	  2˚C	  goal,	  fossil	  fuel-­‐related	  GHG	  emissions	  will	  have	  to	  be	  reduced	  by	  about	  80%	  by	  2050.	  It	  is	   therefore	   important	   to	   understand	   how	   current	   and	  probable	  future	  policies	  to	  make	  these	  emissions	  reductions	  will	  impact	  capital	  expenditures	  and	  current	  assets	  in	  the	  oil	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  75	  Carbon	  asset	   risk	   is	  explained	  by	   the	  WRI	  as	  a	   “type	  of	   financial	   risk	   is	  driven	  by	  non-­‐physical	   factors	   during	   the	   transition	   to	   the	   low-­‐carbon	   economy:	   changing	  public	   policy	   and	   private	   sector	   regulation,	   rapidly	   evolving	   technologies,	  unpredictable	   economic	   markets,	   and	   shifting	   public	   opinion”	   (WRI	   2015).	   From	  observations,	  the	  term	  appeared	  to	  be	  used	  interchangeably	  with	  ‘carbon	  risk’.	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and	  gas	  sector	  and	  how	  the	  physical	   impacts	  of	  unmitigated	  climate	   change	  will	   impact	   the	   sector’s	   operations”	   (Carbon	  Tracker	  Initiative	  and	  Ceres	  2013).	  Through	   these	   letters	   the	   carbon	   budget	   narrative	   was	   framed	   as	   a	  challenge	   to	   the	   investments	   and	   assets	   of	   fossil	   fuel	   companies.	   With	   the	  support	   of	   institutional	   investors,	   Carbon	   Tracker	   and	   Ceres	   called	   for	  transparency	   regarding	   exposure	   to	   “risks	   associated	   with	   current	   and	  probable	   future	   policies	   for	   reducing	   GHG	   emissions	   by	   80%	   by	   2050	   to	  achieve	   the	   2°C	   goal”	   as	   well	   as	   those	   of	   “increasing	   extreme	   weather	  associated	   with	   the	   world’s	   current	   path	   to	   a	   warming	   of	   3.6°C	   or	   more”	  (Carbon	   Tracker	   Initiative	   and	   Ceres	   2013).	  Moreover,	   the	   letters	   called	   for	  concrete	   responses	   that	   detailed	   the	   “options	   there	   are	   for	   (insert	   company	  name)	  to	  manage	  these	  risks	  by,	  for	  example,	  reducing	  the	  carbon	  intensity	  of	  its	  assets,	  divesting	  its	  most	  carbon-­‐intensive	  assets,	  diversifying	  its	  business	  by	   investing	   in	   lower-­‐carbon	   energy	   sources,	   or	   returning	   capital	   to	  shareholders”	  (Carbon	  Tracker	  Initiative	  and	  Ceres	  2013).	  	  In	   this	   regard,	   the	   Carbon	   Asset	   Risk	   Initiative	   prompted	   efforts	   to	  understand	  the	  implications	  of	  a	  carbon-­‐constrained	  future	  by	  challenging	  the	  investment	  practices	  of	  fossil	  fuel	  companies.	  Furthermore,	  it	  pressured	  those	  companies	   to	  develop	  means	  of	  analysing	   their	  operations	   in	   terms	  of	  a	   two	  degrees	  scenario	  as	  well	  as	  the	  current	  path	  of	  at	  least	  3.6°C	  of	  warming.	  That	  is,	   it	   pushed	   for	   fossil	   fuel	   companies	   to	   being	   experimenting	   and	   tinkering	  (Gooding	  1992)	  with	  ideas	  and	  instruments	  to	  link	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	  to	  the	   specifics	   of	   their	   operations.	   Indeed,	   the	   initiative	   did	   not	   attempt	   to	  construct	  a	   technical	  bridge	  between	   the	  carbon	  budget	   (or	   the	   two	  degrees	  target)	  and	  the	  investment	  decisions	  of	  fossil	  fuel	  companies.	  Rather,	  whereas	  the	   carbon	   budget	   refined	   the	   two	   degrees	   target	   into	   a	   more	   concrete	  representation,	  the	  Carbon	  Asset	  Risk	  Initiative	  called	  on	  fossil	  fuel	  companies	  to	  develop	   their	  own	  practices	   for	  analysing	  concrete	  operations	   in	   terms	  of	  the	   two	   degrees	   target.	   This	   exposed	   a	   particular	   application	   of	   fossil	   fuel	  companies’	   knowledge	   to	   the	   two	   degrees	   target	   (albeit	   one	   for	   public	  consumption)	  and,	  in	  doing	  so,	  it	  engaged	  them	  in	  a	  dialogue	  focussed	  on	  the	  potential	   implications	   of	   a	   carbon-­‐constrained	   future.	   To	   illustrate	   this	   it	   is	  worth	   considering	  Royal	  Dutch	   Shell	   plc.	   and	  ExxonMobil’s	   responses	   to	   the	  letters.	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Shell’s	  statement	  to	  the	  Carbon	  Asset	  Risk	  Initiative	  was	  premised	  on	  “the	  view	   in	   the	  recent	   Intergovernmental	  Panel	  on	  Climate	  Change	   (“IPCC”)	  Report	   that	   there	   is	   a	   high	   degree	   of	   confidence	   that	   global	   warming	   will	  exceed	  2°C	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  21st	  century”	  (Royal	  Dutch	  Shell	  plc.	  2014,	  p.1).	  It	  argued	  that	  scenarios	  based	  on	  the	  current	  proposed	  GHG	  mitigation	  policies	  (one	   produced	   by	   Shell	   and	   the	   other	   by	   the	   IEA)	   “do	   not	   limit	   emissions	  enough	   to	  be	   consistent	  with	   the	  back-­‐calculated	  450	  ppm	  2°C	   scenario.	  We	  also	  do	  not	  see	  governments	  taking	  the	  steps	  now	  that	  are	  consistent	  with	  the	  2°C	  scenario”	   	   (Royal	  Dutch	  Shell	  plc.	  2014,	  p.6).	  Yet	  Carbon	  Tracker,	  whose	  idea	   of	   climate	   risk	   is	   malleable	   regarding	   the	   warming	   scenario	   applied,	  retorted	   that	   “Shell	  has	  missed	  an	  opportunity	   to	  explain	   to	   its	  shareholders	  how	   its	   capital	   expenditure	   plans	   are	   resilient	   to	   the	   impending	   energy	  transition”	  (Carbon	  Tracker	  Initiative	  and	  Energy	  Transition	  Advisors	  2014).	  Carbon	   Tracker	   presented	   action	   on	   climate	   change	   as	   being	   inevitable,	  scorning	  Shell’s	   response	   “as	   classic	   a	   case	  of	  Orwellian	  double	   think	  as	  you	  are	   likely	   to	   find”	   as	   it	   “[acknowledges]	   the	   seriousness	   of	   the	   climate	  challenge	  whilst	   at	   the	   same	   time	  asserting	  no	   effective	   action	  will	   be	   taken	  until	   the	   end	   of	   the	   century”	   (Ibid.).	   Specifically,	   the	   “no	   effective	   action”	  element	   of	   this	   criticism	   condemns	   Shell’s	   choice	   of	   scenarios.	   These	   were	  based	   on	   the	   current	   policy	   landscape	   and	   did	   not	   include	   assumptions	  regarding	  the	  strengthening	  of	  policy	  responses	  to	  climate	  change	  over	  time.	  In	   contrast,	   Carbon	   Tracker’s	  Unburnable	   Carbon	   report	   is	   premised	   on	   the	  assumption	   that	   enhanced	   policy	   intervention	   is	   inevitable,	   and	   that	  shareholders	   should	   be	   concerned	   that	   Shell	   dismissed	   the	   potential	   of	  economic	  transition.	  Ceres,	  however,	  focussed	  less	  on	  maintaining	  Carbon	  Tracker’s	  idea	  of	  climate	  risk	  and	  more	  on	  enhancing	  the	  traction	  of	  their	  institutional	  investor	  support	  in	  prompting	  changes	  to	  fossil	  fuel	  companies’	  investment	  strategies.	  Andrew	   Logan,	   Director	   of	   Ceres’	   Oil	   and	   Gas	   Program,	   was	   quoted	   in	   a	  statement	  on	  the	  ExxonMobil	  response	  saying,	   “[m]oving	   forward,	  Ceres	  and	  Investor	  Network	  on	  Climate	  Risk	  will	  be	   looking	   for	  concrete	  commitments	  by	   companies	   to	   avoid	   making	   riskier	   investments	   in	   the	   most	   carbon-­‐intensive	  assets,	  which	  would	  demonstrate	  the	  companies’	  ability	  to	  adapt	  as	  the	  world	   transitions	   to	   a	   low-­‐carbon	   economy”	   (Arjuna	  Capital	   and	  As	  You	  Sow	  2014).	   This	  maintains	   focus	   on	   carbon-­‐intensive	   assets	   as	   those	   at	   risk	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and	   the	   need	   to	   plan	   for	   a	   carbon-­‐constrained	   future,	   taking	   the	   initial	  dialogue	  as	  a	  foundation	  for	  further	  engagement.	  In	  terms	  of	  action	  stimulated	  by	  the	  carbon	  budget,	  the	  letters	  were	  more	  than	  a	  one-­‐off	  challenge	  to	  fossil	  fuel	   companies;	   they	   initiated	   a	   dialogue	   through	   which	   Ceres,	   leveraging	  institutional	   investor	   support,	   sought	   to	   pressure	   those	   companies	   to	  implement	   more	   concrete	   responses	   to	   the	   risks	   of	   climate	   change.	   While	  Ceres	  worked	  to	  further	  their	  own	  agenda	  of	  deeper	  engagement,	  the	  dialogue	  generated	  through	  the	  Carbon	  Asset	  Risk	  Initiative	  was	  focussed	  on	  responses	  to	  the	  carbon-­‐constrained	  future	  envisaged	  by	  the	  Unburnable	  Carbon	  report.	  Shortly	  after	  ExxonMobil	  and	  Shell	  released	  their	  letters	  of	  response	  to	  the	   Carbon	  Asset	  Risk	   Initiative,	   fieldwork	  was	   conducted	   as	   an	   observer	   of	  the	  Advisory	  Committee	  meeting	  of	   the	  Financed	  Emissions	  Initiative	   in	  May	  2014.	   Indeed,	   climate	   risk	   became	   a	   focal	   point	   of	   discussions	   among	  representatives	  of	  banks,	  investors,	  insurers,	  UNEP	  FI,	  NGOs	  and	  think	  tanks.	  Remarking	  on	   the	   impact	  of	  Carbon	  Tracker’s	   idea	  of	   climate	   risk,	  one	   think	  tank	   representative	  argued	   that	   “[methods	   for	   calculating	   carbon	   footprints]	  and	  carbon	  metrics	  have	  existed	  for	  8	  or	  9	  years	  now	  and	  gained	  no	  traction	  in	  the	   investment	  community	  until	  Carbon	  Tracker	  published	   their	   stuff	  on	   the	  carbon	   bubble”.	   He	  was	   arguing	   that	   to	   create	   carbon	   accounting	   tools	   that	  reframe	   investment	   and	   lending	   decisions	   within	   organisations,	   “the	   buy-­‐in	  from	  the	   investment	  community”	   is	  based	  on	  the	  relevance	  of	  such	  practices	  to	  measuring	  and	  managing	  climate	  risk.	  	  It	   is,	   however,	   important	   to	   recognise	   that	   while	   the	   carbon	   budget	  narrative	   had	   become	   prominent	   during	   meetings	   of	   Financed	   Emissions	  Initiative	  (as	  well	  as	  climate	  events	  and	  conferences)	  it	  was	  not	  the	  only	  form	  of	  risk	  that	  climate	  change	  posed	  to	  financial	  organisations.	  In	  particular,	  the	  next	   section	   responds	   to	   O’Sullivan	   and	   O’Dwyer’s	   (2015)	   call	   for	   research	  into	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	   NGO	   movement	   driving	   the	   Equator	  Principles	  and	  the	  integration	  of,	  in	  particular,	  the	  issue	  of	  climate	  change	  into	  investment	   and	   lending	   activities	   beyond	   project	   finance	   (O’Sullivan	   and	  O’Dwyer	  2015,	  p.51).	   Indeed	   it	   supports	   their	   argument	  by	  highlighting	   that	  BankTrack	   –	   the	   global	   network	   of	   campaigning-­‐NGOs	   studied	   by	  O’Sullivan	  and	   O’Dwyer	   –	   maintained	   pressure	   on	   commercial	   banks	   to	   develop	   and	  adopt	   reporting	   practices	   for	   GHG	   emissions.	   However	   it	   also	   highlights	   the	  contrast	   between	   their	   strategy	   aimed	   at	   posing	   reputational	   risks	   to	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commercial	   banks	   and	   the	   work	   of	   Carbon	   Tracker	   and	   Ceres	   to	   render	  climate	   change	   into	   a	   systemic	   threat	   to	   be	   addressed	   by	   aligning	   capital	  markets	  with	  a	  transition	  to	  a	  low-­‐carbon	  economy.	  
5.3.2.	  NGO	  CAMPAIGNS	  AND	  DISCLOSURE	  GROUPS	  O’Sullivan	   and	  O’Dwyer	   (2015)	   document	   an	   early-­‐2000s	  movement	  by	   BankTrack,	   a	   global	   network	   of	   NGOs,	   to	   campaign	   for	   adherence	   to	   the	  Equator	   Principles	   –	   a	   set	   of	   environmental	   and	   social	   risk	   management	  guidelines	  for	  project	  finance	  –	  that,	  over	  time,	  enhanced	  social	  responsibility	  and	   reporting	   among	   commercial	   banks.	   As	   a	   Vice	   President	   at	   a	   large	  commercial	   bank	   noted,	   “We	   were	   also	   one	   of	   the	   founders	   of	   the	   Equator	  Principles,	   and	   RAN,	   Rainforest	   Action	   Network[76],	   was	   involved	   in	   that	  because	   they	   were	   kind	   of	   pushing	   us	   through	   the	   conversations	   we	   were	  having”	   (Interview:	   Eag1519).	   RAN	   continued	   to	   target	   campaigns	   at	   this	  commercial	  bank:	  “One	  of	  their	  demands…	  Or	  ‘requests’…	  was	  that	  we	  report	  on	  the	  greenhouse	  gas	  emissions	  tied	  to	  our	  portfolio.	  And	  so	  we	  did	  commit	  to	  do	   that,	  we	  did	  do	   that,	  we	  are	   to	   this	  date	  one	  of	   the	  only	  banks	   that	  do	  that.”	  Commenting	  on	  the	  reasons	  that	  commercial	  banks	  engage	  in	  measuring	  and	  disclosing	  their	  climate	  impacts,	  an	  interviewee	  from	  a	  large	  US	  think	  tank	  commented	   it	   is	   “plain	   and	   simple	   –	   campaigning	   NGOs	   were	   naming-­‐and-­‐shaming”	  (Interview:	  Eag1514).	  Furthermore,	  and	  as	  shown	  by	  O’Sullivan	  and	  O’Dwyer	  (2015),	  pressures	  from	  NGOs	  within	  BankTrack	  persisted	  over	  time.	  The	  Vice	  President	  quoted	  above	  already	  highlighted	  RAN’s	  influence	  on	  their	  involvement	  with	  the	  Equator	  Principles	   in	  the	  early-­‐2000s.	  Yet	   in	  the	  early-­‐2010s	   the	   commercial	   bank	   came	   under	   pressure	   to	   participate	   in	   the	  Financed	  Emissions	  Initiative:	  	  “We	   got	   involved	   [with	   the	   project]	   because	   RAN	   –	   who	  historically	  had	  big	  campaigns	  against	  us	  for	  client	  structure	  and	   financing	   coal,	   but	   pressure	   had	   been	   off	   us	   for	   a	   few	  years	   –	   reached	   out	   to	   us	   […]	   and	  were	   like,	   ‘We	   are	   really	  disappointed	   that	   we	   don’t	   see	   enough	   decrease	   in	   your	  financing	   of	   mountaintop	   removal	   [mining],	   we	   don’t	   see	  enough	   decrease	   in	   your	   financing	   of	   coal-­‐fired	   power’	   […]	  and	  ‘we	  are	  going	  to	  start	  a	  campaign	  against	  you’.	  And	  one	  of	  their	   demands	   was,	   ‘We	   need	   you	   to	   be	   reporting	   on	   your	  portfolio’	  […]”	  (Interview:	  Eag1519).	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  Rainforest	  Action	  Network	  (RAN)	  is	  a	  US-­‐based	  campaigning-­‐NGO	  and	  a	  member	  of	  the	  global	  NGO	  network,	  BankTrack.	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However	   a	   representative	   from	   one	   of	   the	   members	   of	   BankTrack	  attempted	   to	   convey	   a	   more	   nuanced	   explanation	   of	   their	   engagement	  strategy,	   focussing	   especially	   on	   the	   importance	   of	   campaigns	   in	   prompting	  behaviour	  change:	  	  “We	  approach	  banks	  […]	  from	  behind	  the	  scenes,	  via	  email	  or	  a	  phone	  call	  with	  an	  environmental	  risk	  manager	  at	  a	  bank.	  It	  can	   also	   be	   anything	   up	   to	   or	   including	   a	   sustainability	  yearlong	   campaign,	   involving	   pressure	   from	   constituents,	  email	   writing,	   in	   person	   protests	   or	   even	   non-­‐violence	  disobedience	   in	   certain	   circumstances.	   So	   it	   will	   vary	   by	  group,	  vary	  by	  circumstance.	  ”	  (Interview:	  Eag1414).	  Whereas	   the	  Vice	  President	  emphasised	  the	  pressure	  stemming	   from	  RAN’s	   “big	   campaigns	   against”	   them	   and	   the	   threat	   of	   initiating	   a	   new	  campaign,	   the	   experienced	   campaigner	   and	   policy	   analyst	   added	   that	   such	  campaigns	  are	  one	  aspect	  of	  a	  long-­‐term	  engagement	  with	  commercial	  banks.	  Yet,	  the	  interviewee	  continued,	  commercial	  banks	  were	  reluctant	  to	  shift	  their	  lending	  activities	  “even	  if	  you	  have	  a	  good	  case	  and	  a	  good	  reason	  why	  a	  bank	  shouldn’t	   be	   involved	   with	   the	   project”	   (Interview:	   Eag1414).	   As	   such,	  campaigns	   were	   presented	   as	   a	   complement	   to	   these	   ‘behind	   the	   scenes’	  efforts,	  with	   the	   interviewee	   arguing	   “to	   actually	   change	   a	   bank’s	   behaviour	  often	  requires	  more	  than	  just	  making	  the	  case	  to	  them”	  (Interview:	  Eag1414).	  Considering	   that	   the	   interviewee	  was	  a	  policy	  analyst	  within	  a	  campaigning-­‐NGO,	  such	  comments	  are	  perhaps	  unsurprising.	  However	  it	  is	  a	  sentiment	  that	  was	   echoed,	   and	   that	   contrasted	  with	   the	  more	   indirect	   approach	  of	  Carbon	  Tracker,	  by	  some	  commercial	  banks	  during	  a	  May	  2014	  Advisory	  Committee	  meeting	  of	  the	  Financed	  Emissions	  Initiative:	  “When	   I	   talk	   to	   portfolio	   managers	   they	   are	   pretty	   much	  aware	  of	  this	  carbon	  budget	  concept.	  Their	  difficulty	  is	  to	  buy	  it,	   because	   they	   are	   investors	   with	   time	   horizons	   that	   are	  usually	  much	   shorter	   and	   people	   are	   pretty	   convinced	   that	  they	  can	  just	  go	  out	  of	  the	  door	  if	  it	  becomes	  serious.	  […]	  But,	  of	   course,	   [the	   Board	   of	   the	   bank]	   are	   pretty	   aware	   of	  criticism	   that	  we	   are	   getting	   at	   the	  moment	  particularly	   for	  financing	   the	   fossil	   fuel	   industry.	   That’s	   the	   topic	   senior	  people	   are	   pretty	   open	   to	   and	   know	   about”	   (Commercial	  bank	  representative).	  While	  the	  idea	  of	  climate	  risk	  promoted	  by	  Carbon	  Tracker	  and	  Ceres	  may	  have	   started	   to	   gain	   traction	   in	   financial	   discourse,	   the	  maintained	   and	  immanent	   pressure	   from	   campaigning-­‐NGOs	   appeared	   to	   permeate	   further	  into	   the	  decision-­‐making	  authorities	  of	  commercial	  banks.	  This	   is	  not	   to	  say,	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however,	   that	   the	   idea	   of	   climate	   risk	   was	   dismissed	   by	   commercial	   banks.	  Rather,	   civil	   society	   actors	   generated	   a	   range	   of	   pressures	   on	   financial	  organisations	  to	  integrate	  a	  climate	  change	  framing	  into	  their	  investment	  and	  lending	  decisions	  and	  their	  public	  disclosures.	  For	  example,	  during	   the	  same	  May	   2014	   Advisory	   Committee	   meeting	   a	   member	   of	   the	   Secretariat	  remarked,	   “already	   today	   CDP	   [(formerly	   the	   Carbon	   Disclosure	   Project)]	   is	  demanding	   [in	   their	   annual	   questionnaire]	   for	   financial	   institutions’	   Scope	  3	  [supply	  chain	  emissions].”	  As	  the	  leading	  disclosure	  group	  on	  GHG	  emissions,	  the	   reporting	   requirements	   of	   CDP’s	   annual	   questionnaire	   appeared	   to	   have	  considerable	   influence	   over	   financial	   organisations’	   climate	   change	  disclosures.	   As	   one	   commercial	   bank	   remarked	   during	   the	   June	   2014	  Technical	   Working	   Group	   in-­‐person	   meeting	   of	   the	   Financed	   Emissions	  Initiative,	  “as	  soon	  as	  the	  Scope	  3	  guidance	  came	  out	  [from	  the	  GHG	  Protocol],	  the	   finance	   sector	   said	   ‘by	   the	  way	  no-­‐one	  knows	  how	   to	  do	   this’.	  And	  CDP,	  without	  question,	  suddenly	  shoved	  this	   into	  their	  survey.	  So	  […]	  what	  comes	  out	  of	  this	  [standard-­‐setting	  project]	  will	  still	  be	  fairly	  influential.”	  While	  NGO	  campaigns	  pressured	  commercial	  banks,	  in	  particular,	  to	  engage	  in	  developing	  new	   carbon	   accounting	   tools,	   the	   integration	   of	   such	   tools	   into	   CDP’s	  disclosure	  requirements	  similarly	  drove	  enhanced	  reporting.	  The	  point	  is	  that	  while	   financial	   organisations	   faced	   a	   range	   of	   pressures	   from	   civil	   society	  actors,	   the	   carbon	  budget’s	   rendering	   of	   the	   two	  degrees	   target	   into	   a	  more	  concrete	   form	   provided	   a	   foundation	   for	   a	   new,	   more	   indirect,	   strategy	   of	  integrating	   the	   apparent	   systemic	   threat	   of	   climate	   change	   into	   investment	  and	  lending	  activities.	  It	  should	  also	  be	  recognised	  that	  this	  is	  by	  no	  means	  an	  exhaustive	  list	  of	  the	  pressures	  on	  financial	  organisations	  to	  adopt	  practices	  that	  integrate	  a	  sustainability	  or	  climate	  change	  framing	  into	  their	  decisions.	  It	  does,	  however,	  offer	   valuable	   context	   for	   Chapter	   6,	   by	   demonstrating	   why	   financial	  organisations	   engaged	   with	   the	   Financed	   Emissions	   Initiative.	   This	   enables	  Chapter	  6	   to	   focus	  on	  how	   the	   standard-­‐setting	  project	  was	   reconfigured	  by	  the	   two	   degrees	   target.	   Yet	   this	   is	   not	   intended	   to	   suggest	   that	   Carbon	  Tracker’s	  work	  was	  separate	  from	  NGO	  campaigns	  and	  the	  work	  of	  disclosure	  groups.	  Indeed,	  the	  chapter	  now	  turns	  to	  the	  connecting	  of	  the	  carbon	  budget	  narrative	  with	  the	  movement	  to	  divest	  from	  fossil	  fuels.	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5.3.3.	  THE	  CARBON	  BUDGET	  AND	  THE	  DIVESTMENT	  MOVEMENT	  At	   the	   start	   of	   Section	  5.3,	   a	   senior	  manager	  of	   a	   large	  US	  non-­‐profit	  organisation	  was	  quoted	  commenting	  that	  the	  carbon	  budget	  narrative	  was	  “‘a	  really	   intriguing	   argument,	   but	   how	   is	   that	   going	   to	   lead	   to	   action?’”	  (Interview:	  Eag1515).	  Reflecting	  on	  activity	   since	   that	   initial	   impression,	   the	  interviewee	   answered	   his	   own	   question:	   “I	   think	   it	   can	   lead	   to	   action	   over	  time	  because	   others	   are	  working	   on	   this	   issue	   and	   the	   arguments	   are	   being	  influential”	   (Interview:	   Eag1515).	   Maintaining	   that	   an	   economic	   and	   risk	  framing	  of	  climate	  change	  provided	  traction	  to	  the	  issue	  in	  financial	  circles,	  he	  was	  keen	  to	  emphasise	  that	  “those	  [Carbon	  Tracker]	  arguments	  actually	  had	  a	  great	  deal	  to	  do	  with	  leading	  to	  the	  divestment	  movement	  in	  the	  US,	  so	  that’s	  been	   a	   huge	   influence”	   (Interview:	   Eag1515).	   The	   350.org 77 	  divestment	  movement,	  Go	  Fossil	  Free:	  Divest	   from	  Fossil	  Fuels!,	  was	   launched	   in	   2012	   to	  coincide	  with	  the	  20-­‐city	  month-­‐long	  Do	  The	  Math	   tour	  led	  by	  Bill	  McKibben,	  the	   founder	   of	   350.org.	   The	   tour,	   taking	   place	   in	   November	   and	   December	  2012,	  proclaimed:	  “We’re	  jumpstarting	  a	  new	  movement,	  and	  we	  need	  your	  
help.	  It’s	  simple	  math:	  we	  can	  emit	  565	  more	  gigatons	  of	  carbon	  
dioxide	   and	   stay	   below	  2°C	   of	   warming	  —	   anything	  more	  than	   that	   risks	   catastrophe	   for	   life	   on	   earth.	   The	   only	  problem?	  Burning	  the	  fossil	  fuel	  that	  corporations	  now	  have	  in	  their	  reserves	  would	  result	  in	  emitting	  2,795	  gigatons	  of	  
carbon	  dioxide	  —	  five	  times	  the	  safe	  amount.	  
Fossil	  fuel	  companies	  are	  planning	  to	  burn	  it	  all	  —	  unless	  
we	  rise	  up	  to	  stop	  them.	  In	  November	  2012,	  Bill	  McKibben	  and	  350.org	  hit	  the	  road	  to	  build	  a	  movement	  strong	  enough	  to	  change	  the	  terrifying	  math	  of	   the	  climate	  crisis.”	  (350.org	  2012,	  emphasis	  in	  original)	  The	   argument	   mirrored	   McKibben’s	   July	   2012	   Rolling	   Stone	   article,	  
Global	   Warming’s	   Terrifying	   New	   Math,	   that	   centred	   on	   “[t]hree	   simple	  numbers	  that	  add	  up	  to	  global	  catastrophe	  –	  and	  that	  make	  clear	  who	  the	  real	  enemy	  is”.	  An	  analysis	  of	  the	  first	  two	  numbers,	  2°C	  and	  565	  GtCO2,	  was	  drawn	  together	   with	   Carbon	   Tracker’s	   2,795	   GtCO2	   estimate	   of	   the	   total	   carbon	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  77 	  350.org	   is	   an	   international	   environmental	   organisation	   that	   works	   to	   foster	  grassroots	   movements	   on	   climate	   change,	   deriving	   it’s	   name	   from	   the	   view	   that	  limiting	   atmospheric	   concentration	   of	   CO2	   to	   350ppm	   is	   necessary	   to	   “preserve	   a	  planet	  similar	  to	  that	  on	  which	  civilization	  developed”	  (Hansen	  et	  al.	  2008,	  quoted	  on	  'The	  Science'	  page	  on	  350.org).	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potential	   of	   fossil	   fuel	   reserves.	   The	   article,	   frequently	   referenced	   by	  interviewees	   and	   at	   climate	   conferences,	   recognises	   Carbon	   Tracker’s	  “relatively	  modest	  goal	  –	  they	  simply	  wanted	  to	  remind	  investors	  that	  climate	  change	   poses	   a	   very	   real	   risk	   to	   the	   stock	   prices	   of	   energy	   companies”	  (McKibben	  2012).	  However,	  the	  article	  claims,	  “it	  hasn’t	  been	  easy	  to	  convince	  investors”,	  and	  quotes	  James	  Leaton	  from	  Carbon	  Tracker	  as	  saying	  the	  reason	  bubbles	  emerge	  “’is	  that	  everyone	  thinks	  they're	  the	  best	  analyst	  –	  that	  they'll	  go	  to	  the	  edge	  of	  the	  cliff	  and	  then	  jump	  back	  when	  everyone	  else	  goes	  over’”	  (Ibid.).	   As	   with	   the	   NGO	   campaigner	   that	   saw	   a	   good	   ‘investment	   case’	   as	  insufficient	   to	   prompt	   behavioural	   change	  without	  more	   coercive	   pressures	  (Section	  5.3.2),	  McKibben	  highlights	  investors’	  resistance	  to	  the	  carbon	  budget	  narrative	   in	   arguing	   that	   “pure	   self-­‐interest	   probably	   won't	   spark	   a	  transformative	   challenge	   to	   fossil	   fuel.	   But	   moral	   outrage	   just	   might	   –	   and	  that's	  the	  real	  meaning	  of	  this	  new	  math”	  (Ibid.).	  Where	  Carbon	  Tracker	  used	  the	   carbon	   budget	   as	   the	   foundation	   for	   a	   narrative	   of	   the	   vulnerability	   of	  capital	  markets	  to	  action	  on	  climate	  change,	  McKibben	  enrolled	  it	  in	  calling	  for	  a	   divestment	   campaign	   that	   applied	   the	   lessons	   from	   apartheid	   to	   the	   fossil	  fuel	   industry	   (Ibid.).	   The	   350.org	   Go	   Fossil	   Free	   campaign	   was	   launched,	   as	  part	  of	  the	  Do	  The	  Math	  tour,	  to	  target	  the	  fossil	  fuel	  industry	  as,	  in	  McKibben’s	  terms,	   “Public	   Enemy	   Number	   One	   to	   the	   survival	   of	   our	   planetary	  civilization”	  (Ibid.).	  By	   2013	   the	   Go	   Fossil	   Free	   movement	   was	   the	   fastest	   growing	  divestment	   campaign	   in	   history	   (Ansar,	   Caldecott,	   and	   Tilbury	   2013),	   with	  grassroots	   activists	   calling	   on	   individuals	   to	   pressure	   their	   universities,	  pension	   funds,	   and	   religious	   organisations	   to	   divest	   from	   fossil	   fuels.	  Combined	  with	  its	  enrolment	  in	  the	  divestment	  movement,	  the	  carbon	  budget	  began	  to	  generate	  more	  widespread	  attention	  among	  investors.	  One	  portfolio	  analyst	   at	   an	   investment	   advisory	   firm	   attributed	   the	   “growing	   interest	   in	  climate	   risk	   over	   the	   past	   year,	   maybe	   two	   years[78]	   […]	   to	   the	   divestment	  campaign	   and	   the	   whole	   carbon	   budget	   and	   stranded	   assets	   debate”	  (Interview:	  Eag1520).	  This	  portfolio	  analyst	  went	  on	  to	  highlight	  Rockefeller	  Brothers	   Fund’s	   2014	   commitment	   to	   divest	   as	   an	   event	   that,	   in	   his	  words,	  “sent	  a	  serious	  signal”	  to	  investors.	  Divestment	  of	  their	  $900million	  portfolio,	  would	  first	  focus	  on	  coal	  and	  tar	  sands,	  with	  a	  more	  gradual	  divestment	  from	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  78	  For	  reference,	  this	  interview	  was	  conducted	  in	  August	  2015.	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other	  fossil	  fuel	  stocks	  (Rockefeller	  Brothers	  Fund	  2014).	  Commenting	  on	  the	  decision	  at	  a	  European	  Green	  Party	  Conference,	  Stephen	  Heintz,	  President	  of	  the	  Rockefeller	  Brothers	  Fund,	  remarked	  that	  it	  was	  the	  argument	  developed	  by	  Carbon	  Tracker	  “that	  helped	  us	  persuade	  our	  investment	  advisors	  and	  our	  investment	   committee	   […	   that]	   investments	   in	   the	   fossil	   fuel	   industry	   are	  going	  to	  be	  risky	  investments	  that	  are	  not	  going	  to	  pay	  returns”	  (Heintz	  2015).	  However	   this	   is	   not	   to	   argue	   that	   the	   broader	   investor	   community	  immediately	   began	   divesting	   from	   fossil	   fuel	   holdings.	   Indeed	   divestment	  decisions	  had	  largely	  been	  taken	  by	  funds	  with	  an	  ethical	  mandate,	  university	  endowments,	  and	  the	  investment	  and	  pension	  funds	  managed	  by	  city	  councils.	  As	  the	  portfolio	  analyst	  quoted	  above	  remarked,	  “divestment	  itself,	  I	  mean,	  it’s	  mostly	   a	  moral	   argument.	   Okay,	  maybe	   they	   talk	   about	   risk	  when	   they	   talk	  about	   divesting,	   but	   really	   the	   idea	   is	   based	   on	   more	   of	   a	   moral	   choice”	  (Interview:	   Eag1520).	   Rather,	   according	   to	   a	   senior	   manager	   at	   a	   global	  investor	   coalition,	   the	   divestment	   movement	   “put	   branding	   pressures	   on	  investors”	   and	   prompted	   them	   to	   understand	   the	   underlying	   issue	   and	  possible	   responses,	   with	   the	   senior	   manager	   stating:	   “I	   talked	   to	   people	   at	  Ceres	   and	   they	  were	   getting	   calls	   from	   the	   investors	   they	  work	  with	   saying,	  ‘How	   do	   you	   think	   we	   should	   handle	   this?’”	   (Interview:	   Eag1515).	   The	  combination	  of	  the	  divestment	  movement	  and	  an	  increasing	  range	  of	  research	  into	   the	   impact	   of	   climate	   change	   on	   the	   financial	   sector	   had	   refined	   the	  debate	   “from	   a	   relatively	   simple	   issue	   to	   one	  where	   you	   are	   thinking	   about	  asset	   classes,	   and	  different	   strategies,	   and	  which	  people	   to	  work	  with	  at	   the	  pension	   funds	   –	   be	   it	   governance	   people	   or	   investment	   staff	   or	   outside	  consultants”	  (Interview:	  Eag1515).	  For	  an	  executive	  director	  of	  a	  large	  global	  index	  provider,	  “the	  first	  questions	  we	  got	  were	  around	  divestment	  were,	  you	  know,	  ‘I’m	  an	  investor	  being	  asked	  to	  divest	  and	  I	  don’t	  want	  to	  divest.	  What	  do	   I	   do?’	   That’s	   kind	   of	   like	   the	   tone	   of	   it.”	   (Interview:	   Eag1516).	   Her	  organisation	  began	  “researching	  what’s	  the	  impact	  of	  divestment”	  and	  created	  more	   refined	   investment	   products	   “by	   […]	   putting	   together	   a	   fossil	   fuel	   free	  index	   family	   –	   ex	   coal,	   ex	   fossil	   fuels.	   I	  mean,	   if	   you	   are	   going	   to	   divest	   you	  should	   have	   the	   appropriate	   index”	   (Interview:	   Eag1516).	   As	  with	   the	   fossil	  fuel	   companies’	   responses	   to	   the	   Carbon	   Asset	   Risk	   Initiative,	   investors	  responded	  to	  the	  divestment	  movement	  by	  looking	  to	  connect	  their	  concrete	  processes	   to	   the	  more	   abstract	   ideas	   of	   the	  movement.	   Constructing	   a	   fossil	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fuel	   free	   index	   family,	   for	   example,	   provided	   an	   instrument	   that	   could	  potentially	  appeal	  to	  pressures	  to	  divest,	  while	  designed	  to	  be	  compatible	  with	  existing	  investment	  and	  lending	  practices	  (see	  Figure	  5.4	  regarding	  relations).	  
	  
Figure	  5.4:	  Initiating	  a	  divestment	  movement	  and	  its	  impact	  on	  investors	  and	  index	  providers	  In	   summary,	   Section	   5.3	   has,	   thus	   far,	   focussed	   on	   the	   work	   of	   civil	  society	   actors	   that	   connected	   the	   carbon	   budget	   to	   the	   way	   financial	  organisations	   understand	   and	   act	   on	   climate	   change.	   In	   particular,	   it	  highlighted	   that	   the	   2010	   UNFCCC	   commitment	   to	   the	   two	   degrees	   target	  provided	   the	   foundation	   for	   civil	   society	   actors	   to	   construct	   the	   idea	   of	   a	  carbon-­‐constrained	   future,	   and	   that	   the	   carbon	   budget	   provided	   the	   bridge	  between	   the	   two	   degrees	   target	   and	   these	   efforts.	   For	   Carbon	   Tracker	   and	  Ceres,	   the	  carbon	  budget	  narrative	  shaped	  their	  coordination	  of	   institutional	  investor	  pressure	  on	   fossil	   fuel	   companies,	  while	  350.org	  enrolled	   it	   in	   their	  development	   of	   the	   Go	   Fossil	   Free	   divestment	   movement.	   In	   this	   light	   the	  section	  demonstrated	  that	  the	  carbon	  budget	  became	  more	  than	  a	  bridge	  that	  renders	   the	   two	   degrees	   target	   into	   a	   more	   concrete	   form.	   It	   also	   gained	  traction	  with	  the	  concerns	  of	  diverse	  groups	  through	  the	  way	  it	  was	  mobilised	  by	   civil	   society	   actors.	   A	   financial	   reasoning	   of	   climate	   risk	   connected	   the	  carbon	  budget	  to	  concerns	  of	  investors	  and	  lenders,	  while	  it	  became	  a	  rallying	  message	  for	  the	  divestment	  movement	  against	  the	  fossil	   fuel	   industry.	  It	  was	  through	   this	   work	   that	   the	   carbon	   budget	   came	   to	   mediate	   between	   civil	  society	   actors’	   concerns	   of	   gaining	   traction	   with	   investors	   and	   lenders,	  financial	   organisations’	   ideas	   of	   risk	   management,	   and	   the	   ‘urgency’	   of	   a	  divestment	   movement.	   However	   the	   carbon	   budget	   narrative	   also	   claimed	  that	   the	   economic	   transition	   to	   a	   two	   degrees	   scenario	   posed	   a	   threat	   to	  financial	   stability,	   an	   argument	   based	   on	   the	   incorrect	   pricing	   of	   carbon-­‐intensive	   stocks	  by	   capital	  markets.	   Section	  5.3.4	   focuses	  on	   the	   response	  of	  financial	  regulatory	  authorities	  to	  this	  apparent	  threat.	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5.3.4.	  STATE	  RESPONSES	  TO	  CLIMATE	  RISK	   	  In	   parallel	   to	   the	   civil	   society	   actor	   movements	   and	   initiatives	   that	  built	   momentum	   behind	   the	   idea	   of	   climate	   risk,	   policy	   formulation	   and	  implementations	  from	  financial	  stability	  authorities	  added	  to	  the	  perceptions	  policy	  risk.	  The	  French	  government	  was	  among	  the	  first	  to	  begin	  discussions	  on	  the	  potential	  implications	  of	  climate	  change	  for	  the	  financial	  sector.	  In	  2012	  it	   began	   working	   on	   the	   Energy	   Transition	   Law,	   dedicating	   one	   article	   to	  climate-­‐related	   disclosures	   from	   institutional	   investors.	   Adopted	   by	   the	  French	   Parliament	   in	   July	   2015,	   Section	   VI	   of	   Article	   173	   of	   the	   Law	   for	   the	  
Energy	  Transition	  and	  Green	  Growth	   requires	   that	   institutional	   investors	   (i.e.	  public	  pension	  funds,	  insurance	  companies	  operating	  under	  French	  insurance	  law,	  and	  public	   institutions)	  “[disclose]	   information	  on	  how	  their	   investment	  decision-­‐making	  process	  takes	  social,	  environmental	  and	  governance	  criteria	  into	   consideration,	   and	   the	  means	   implemented	   to	   contribute	   to	   the	   energy	  and	  ecological	   transition”	  (Assemblée	  Nationale	  2015).	  With	   its	  emphasis	  on	  how	   institutional	   investors	   “contribute	   to	   the	   energy	   and	   ecological	  transition”,	   Article	   173	   was	   designed	   to	   bring	   investment	   and	   lending	  activities	  into	  alignment	  with	  the	  French	  and	  EU	  strategies	  for	  tackling	  climate	  change.	   Furthermore,	   the	   mandatory	   disclosures	   centred	   on	   climate	   risks,	  carbon	  footprints,	  and	  a	  framing	  of	  investment	  and	  lending	  activities	  in	  terms	  of	  an	  international	  long-­‐term	  climate	  objective:	  “The	   information	   relative	   to	   the	   consideration	   of	  environmental	   objectives	   includes:	   the	   exposure	   to	   climate-­‐related	   risks,	   including	   the	   GHG	   emissions	   associated	   with	  assets	  owned,	  and	   the	  contribution	   to	   the	   international	  goal	  of	   limiting	   global	   warming	   and	   to	   the	   achievement	   of	   the	  objectives	   of	   the	   energy	   and	   ecological	   transition”	  (Assemblée	  Nationale	  2015).	  From	   conversations	   at	   conferences	   and	   workshops,	   the	   wording	  “contribution	   to	   the	   international	   goal	   of	   limiting	   global	   warming”	   did	   not	  specify	   a	   temperature	   or	   emissions	   target	   because	   the	   law	  was	   passed	   five	  months	   before	   COP21	   where	   said	   international	   goal	   was	   on	   the	   agenda.	  Rather	   this	   wording	   links	   the	   French	   law	   to	   the	   international	   goal	   agreed	  under	   the	   UNFCCC.	   Furthermore,	   “exposure	   to	   climate-­‐related	   risks”	   (Ibid.)	  pertained	   to	   both	   the	   physical	   risks	   of	   climate	   change	   and	   the	   so-­‐called	  “transition	   risks”	  of	   an	  economic	   transition	   to	  a	   low-­‐carbon	  economy.	  Those	  conversations,	  as	  well	  as	  remarks	  from	  several	  interviewees,	  also	  highlighted	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that	   the	   adoption	   of	   the	   French	   Energy	   Transition	   law	   strengthened	  institutional	  investors’	  perceptions	  of	  policy	  risk,	  seeing	  the	  law	  as	  an	  example	  for	  other	  states	  and	  financial	  regulatory	  authorities.	  	  However	  civil	  society	  actors	  also	  worked	  to	  provoke	  and	  shape	  policy	  responses	   from	   other	   financial	   regulatory	   authorities.	   Indeed	   in	   September	  2015	  Mark	  Carney,	  as	  Governor	  of	  the	  Bank	  of	  England,	  delivered	  his	  “Tragedy	  of	   the	  Horizon”	   speech	  at	  Lloyds	  of	  London.	  He	  highlighted	  climate	   risk	  as	  a	  threat	   to	   financial	   stability,	   arguing	   that	   the	   horizon	   for	   financial	   stability	  policy	  is	  about	  a	  decade	  and	  so	  “once	  climate	  change	  becomes	  a	  defining	  issue	  for	  financial	  stability,	  it	  may	  already	  be	  too	  late”	  (Carney	  2015).	  Central	  to	  his	  speech	  was	  Carbon	  Tracker’s	  carbon	  budget	  narrative:	  “Take,	  for	  example,	  the	  [Intergovernmental	  Panel	  on	  Climate	  Change’s]	   estimate	   of	   a	   carbon	   budget79	  that	   would	   likely	  limit	   global	   temperature	   rises	   to	   two	   degrees	   above	   pre-­‐industrial	  levels.	  That	  budget	  amounts	  to	  between	  a	  fifth	  and	  a	   third	  of	   the	  world’s	  proven	  reserves	  of	  oil,	  gas	  and	  coal.	   If	  that	  estimate	   is	  even	  approximately	  correct	   it	  would	  render	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  reserves	  ‘stranded’	  –	  oil,	  gas	  and	  coal	  that	  will	  be	  literally	  unburnable”	  (Carney	  2015).	  Carbon	  Tracker	  had	  engaged	  with	  the	  Bank	  of	  England	  for	  a	  few	  years	  preceding	  Carney’s	  speech,80	  with	  the	  Bank	  beginning	  an	  investigation	  into	  the	  ‘carbon	  bubble’	  in	  late-­‐2014	  (Carrington	  2014).	  Governor	  Carney	  emphasised	  that	  the	  Bank	  of	  England’s	  role	  was	  “in	  developing	  the	  frameworks	  that	  help	  the	  market	  to	  adjust	  itself	  efficiently”	  and	  that	  “[a]ny	  efficient	  market	  reaction	  to	   climate	   change	   risks	   as	   well	   as	   the	   technologies	   and	   policies	   to	   address	  them	  must	  be	  founded	  on	  transparency	  of	  information”	  (Carney	  2015).	  If	  the	  lack	  of	  information	  could	  be	  remedied,	  Governor	  Carney	  argued,	  “[a]	  ‘market’	  in	  the	  transition	  to	  a	  two-­‐degree	  world	  can	  be	  built	  [and]	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  pull	  forward	  adjustment”	  (Ibid.).	  	  At	   COP21,	   Governor	   Carney’s	   comments	   were	   reinforced	   by	   the	  Governor	  of	  the	  Bank	  of	  France,	  François	  Villeroy	  de	  Galhau,	  through	  his	  calls	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  79	  In	  its	  Fifth	  Assessment	  Report	  the	  IPCC	  provided	  its	  own	  carbon	  budget	  for	  the	  first	  time.	   To	   the	   IPCC,	   the	   carbon	   budget	   offered	   an	   additional	   way	   of	   articulating	   the	  implications	  of	  limiting	  warming	  to	  two	  degrees	  Celsius	  (IPCC	  2013).	  80	  Discussions	  regarding	  Carbon	  Tracker’s	  engagement	  with	  the	  Bank	  of	  England	  took	  place	  during	  the	  participant	  observation	  of	  the	  UNEP	  FI	  and	  GHG	  Protocol’s	  standard-­‐setting	  at	  two	  events,	  the	  evening	  dinner	  following	  the	  May	  2014	  Advisory	  Committee	  meeting	   and	   the	   drinks	   reception	   following	   the	   June	   2014	   in-­‐person	   Technical	  Working	  Group	  meeting.	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for	  greater	  regulatory	  action	  to	  bring	  the	  financial	  sector	  into	  line	  with	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	  (Bank	  of	  France	  2015).	  This	  speech	  also	  saw	  Governor	  Villeroy	  de	   Galhau	   endorse	   the	   Governor	   Carney’s	   formation	   of	   the	   Task	   Force	   on	  Climate-­‐related	   Financial	   Disclosures	   (TCFD).	   At	   COP21	   Governor	   Carney	  announced	  the	   task	   force,	  which	  was	   to	  be	  chaired	  by	  Michael	  Bloomberg.	   It	  was	   tasked	   with	   making	   “recommendations	   for	   consistent	   company	  disclosures	   that	   will	   help	   financial	   market	   participants	   understand	   their	  climate-­‐related	  risks	  […]	  which	  are	  likely	  to	  grow	  with	  time”	  (FSB	  2015).	  Carbon	  Tracker’s	  engagement	  with	  the	  Bank	  of	  England	  highlights	  that	  the	   mobilisation	   of	   the	   carbon	   budget	   was	   not	   only	   directed	   at	   integrating	  climate	   change	   into	   financial	   organisations’	   risk	   management	   processes.	   It	  was	   also	   enrolled	   in	   arguments	   that	   challenged	   the	   extent	   to	  which	   existing	  financial	  stability	  policy	  could	  address	  ‘the	  carbon	  bubble’.	  By	  constructing	  the	  vision	  of	  a	  carbon-­‐constrained	  future,	  civil	  society	  actors	  mobilised	  the	  carbon	  budget	   to	   challenge	   the	   time	   horizon	   for	   financial	   stability	   policy	   on	   the	  grounds	   that	   existing	   horizons	   were	   incompatible	   with	   addressing	   the	  systemic	  threat	  of	  climate	  change.	  The	  response	  from	  the	  Financial	  Regulatory	  Authority	   was	   to	   begin	   developing	   disclosure	   tools	   that	   render	   visible	   the	  apparently	  overlooked	  risks	  of	   climate	  change,	  providing	   the	   information	  on	  which	   “[a]	   ‘market’	   in	   the	   transition	   to	   a	   two-­‐degree	   world	   can	   be	   built”	  (Carney	  2015).	  	  
5.5.	  DISCUSSION	  This	  Chapter	  has	  investigated	  how	  mobilisations	  of	  the	  carbon	  budget	  influenced	   the	   financial	   sector	   discourse	   on	   climate	   change.	   Prior	   to	   its	  mobilisation,	   major	   financial	   organisations	   were	   confronted	   with	   NGO	  campaigns	  targeting	  specific	  carbon-­‐intensive	  projects,	  with	  an	  understanding	  that	   climate	   risk	   stemmed	   from	   potential	   reputational	   harm	   and	   the	  possibility	   of	   regulation	   surrounding	   cap-­‐and-­‐trade	   or	   carbon	   taxation	  schemes.	   The	   carbon	   budget,	   however,	   was	   mobilised	   to	   portray	   the	  implications	   of	   the	   carbon-­‐constrained	   future	   of	   a	   two	   degrees	   scenario	   in	  terms	  of	   investment	   risk	   and	   the	   threat	   to	   financial	   stability.	  This	   started	   to	  reorient	   the	   financial	   sector	   discourse	   on	   climate	   change	   towards	   one	   of	  managing	  the	  transition	  to	  a	  two	  degrees	  scenario.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  idea	  of	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climate	   risk	  was	   reframed	  as	  one	   stemming	   from	   the	  economic	   transition	   in	  pursuit	  of	  the	  two	  degrees	  target.	  The	  point,	  which	  is	  discussed	  in	  this	  section,	  is	  that	  the	  carbon	  budget	  envisaged	  the	  vulnerability	  of	  the	  financial	  sector	  to	  the	  transition	  to	  a	  low-­‐carbon	  economy.	  In	  doing	  so	  it	  began	  to	  orient	  actions	  towards	  rendering	  that	  vulnerability	  visible	  and	  manageable.	  	  
5.5.1.	  THE	  CARBON	  BUDGET	  AS	  A	  MEDIATING	  INSTRUMENT	  As	   an	   apparently	   simple	   representation	   of	   climate	   change,	   the	   two	  degrees	  target	  remains	  abstract	  with	  regards	  to	  actual	  investment	  and	  lending	  decisions.	   It	   was	   through	   its	   rendering	   into	   the	   more	   concrete	   form	   of	   the	  carbon	   budget	   that	   civil	   society	   actors	   were	   provided	   a	   foundation	   for	  building	  arguments	  of	   investment	   risks,	   threats	   to	   financial	   stability	   and	   the	  ‘urgency’	  for	  campaigns	  against	  fossil	  fuels.	  This	  section	  discusses	  the	  carbon	  budget	  as	  a	  bridge	  between	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	  and	  the	  carbon	  potential	  of	  resources	   and	  emission	   levels	  of	  different	   entities.	  The	  next	   section	   (Section	  5.5.2)	   discusses	   the	   enrolment	   of	   the	   carbon	   budget	   in	   civil	   society	   actors’	  arguments	   on	   the	   implications	   of	   the	   two	   degrees	   target	   for	   financial	  organisations	  and	  regulators	  as	  well	  as	  for	  grassroots	  climate	  activists.	  Chapter	  4	  charted	  how	  the	   two	  degrees	   target	  became	  an	  apparently	  simple	   objective	   to	   guide	   efforts	   to	   mitigate	   emissions	   and	   adapt	   to	   the	  impacts	  of	  climate	  change,	  while	  allowing	  flexibility	  in	  how	  it	  is	  implemented.	  However	   Section	   5.1	   demonstrated	   the	   difficulties	   in	   translating	   the	   target	  into	  emission	  budgets	  (Meinshausen	  et	  al.	  2009),	   illustrating	  one	  attempt	  by	  the	   scientific	   community	   to	   address	   considerations	   such	   as	   the	   likelihood	  of	  exceeding	  2°C	  of	  warming	  and	  the	  range	  of	  gases	  included	  in	  the	  budgets.	  The	  emission	   budgets	   produced	   enabled	   a	   comparison	  between	   the	   two	  degrees	  target	   and	   the	   carbon	   potential	   of	   fossil	   fuel	   reserves,	   through	   which	   the	  authors	  showed	  that	  “less	   than	  half	   the	  proven	  economically	  recoverable	  oil,	  gas	  and	  coal	  reserves	  can	  still	  be	  emitted	  up	  to	  2050	  to	  achieve	  such	  a	  goal”	  (Ibid.,	   p.1158).	   Indeed	   Carbon	   Tracker's	   Unburnable	   Carbon	   report	   (Carbon	  Tracker	  2011)	   is	  underpinned	  by	  this	  analysis	  and	   logic,	  as	  well	  as	   the	  2010	  UNFCC	   commitment	   to	   the	   two	   degrees	   target.	   However	   in	   addressing	   only	  one	  of	  the	  budgets	  calculated	  by	  Meinshausen	  et	  al.	  (2009)	  the	  report	  centres	  on	  an	  apparently	  simple	  correspondence	  between	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	  and	  a	  carbon	  budget	  of	  565	  GtCO2.	  That	  is,	  the	  report	  argues	  that	  achieving	  the	  two	  degrees	   target	   implies	   keeping	   cumulative	   emissions	   from	   2010	   to	   2050	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below	   585	   GtCO2.	   This	   is	   not	   to	   say	   that	   the	   Unburnable	   Carbon	   report	  misrepresents	  Meinshausen	  et	  al.	   (2009).	  Rather,	   that	   it	   anchors	   its	   analysis	  on	   a	   single	   figure	   corresponding	   to	   the	   two	   degrees	   target.	   Moreover,	   the	  apparently	   straightforward	   logic	   presented	   in	   the	  Unburnable	  Carbon	  report	  was	  central	  to	  Carbon	  Tracker’s	  efforts	  to	  gain	  traction	  in	  the	  financial	  sector	  discourse,	  with	  the	  climate	  risk	  narrative	  and	  the	  single	  carbon	  budget	  figure	  becoming	  mutually	   reinforcing.	   Furthermore,	   the	   numbers	   used	   to	   illustrate	  that	  logic,	  as	  was	  demonstrated	  during	  several	  Carbon	  Tracker	  presentations,	  were	  malleable	  when	  faced	  with	  diverse	  concerns	  while	  still	  maintaining	  their	  conclusion	  that	  investments	  in	  fossil	  fuels	  were	  overvalued	  in	  the	  transition	  to	  a	  low-­‐carbon	  economy.	  However,	   while	   the	   carbon	   budget	   is	   more	   concrete	   than	   the	   two	  degrees	   target,	   it	   remains	   abstract	   with	   regards	   to	   actual	   investment	   and	  lending	  decisions.	  This	  differs	   from	  Morgan	  and	  Morrison’s	   (1999)	  notion	  of	  mediating	   instruments,	  which	  the	  authors	  use	  to	  analyse	  how	  models	  bridge	  between	   theory	   and	   data	   by	   simultaneously	   embodying	   the	   higher-­‐level	  structure	  of	   a	   theory	  and	  producing	   concrete-­‐level	  data	   through	   simulations	  (Morgan	  and	  Morrison	  1999,	  p.31).	   Similarly	   the	   industry	   roadmaps	   studied	  in	  Miller	  and	  O’Leary	  (2007)	  appear	  as	  bridges	   that	  codify	  Moore’s	  Law	   into	  “key,	   generic	   aspects	   of	   product	   development”	   such	   as	   “to	   at	   least	   double	  product	   functionality	   every	   three	   years”	   and	   “seek	   manufacturing	   cost	  reductions	   per	   three	   year	   period	   of	   roughly	   65%	   (Miller	   and	   O’Leary	   2007,	  p.719).	   The	   carbon	   budget,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   translates	   the	   two	   degrees	  target	   into	   ideas	   of	   climate	   risk	   and	   threats	   to	   financial	   stability	   for	   the	  financial	   sector.	   It	   bridges	   between	   a	   global	   objective	   and	   the	   industry-­‐level	  through	   its	   vision	   of	   a	   carbon	   constrained-­‐future	   with	   implications	   for	   the	  financial	  sector.	  	  Where	   the	   two	   degrees	   target	   envisages	   a	   direction	   for	   efforts	   to	  tackle	   climate	   change,	   the	   carbon	   budget	   envisages	   an	   apparently	   simple	  constraint	  on	  carbon-­‐intensive	  sectors	  and	  investments	  in	  them.	  However	  the	  carbon	  budget	   does	  not	   detail	   the	   levels	   or	   timings	   of	   emissions	   reductions,	  apart	  from	  its	  specificity	  to	  the	  period	  2000-­‐2050.	  Rather,	  it	  provides	  a	  more	  concrete	  frame	  that	  problematizes	  existing	  investment	  strategies	  and	  financial	  stability	  regulations.	  In	  this	  regard,	  it	  provides	  an	  instrument	  based	  on	  which,	  as	  one	  interviewee	  remarked,	  an	  "intriguing	  argument"	  (Interview:	  Eag1515)	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can	  be	  made.	  However,	   and	   as	   this	   discussion	  now	   turns	   to	   consider,	   it	  was	  through	   a	   range	   of	   work	   from	   civil	   society	   actors	   that	   the	   carbon	   budget	  narrative	   connected	   to	   the	   concerns	   of	   diverse	   actors	   and	   began	   orienting	  efforts	  towards	  making	  visible	  a	  systemic	  threat	  of	  climate	  change.	  
5.5.2.	  CIVIL	  SOCIETY	  AS	  A	  QUASI-­‐REGULATOR	  Based	   on	   the	   work	   of	   Chandhoke	   (2002),	   this	   chapter	   frames	   its	  observations	   in	   terms	   of	   the	  work	   of	   civil	   society	   actors	   that	   shapes	   and	   is	  shaped	   by	   the	   regulatory	   agenda	   of	   the	   state	   as	   well	   as	   the	   strategies	   of	  market	  actors.	  Specifically,	  the	  2010	  UNFCCC	  commitment	  to	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	  provided	  a	  foundation	  for	  the	  work	  of	  civil	  society	  actors	  who	  enrolled	  the	  carbon	  budget	   in	   their	  arguments	  of	  climate	  risk	  and	   threats	   to	   financial	  stability.	  Compared	  to	  NGO	  campaigns	  in	  the	  2000s	  that	  specifically	  targeted	  the	   financing	   of	   carbon-­‐intensive	   projects,	   civil	   society	   actors	  mobilised	   the	  carbon	  budget	   to	   reshape	   the	   financial	  discourse	  on	  climate	  change	   towards	  one	  of	  a	  systemic	  threat.	  In	  particular,	  this	  section	  of	  the	  discussion	  focuses	  on	  how	   civil	   society	   actors	   created	   several	   lenses	   through	   which	   the	   carbon	  budget	  came	  to	  mediate	  between	  the	  concerns	  of	  diverse	  actor	  groups.	  It	   is	  through	  their	  work	  to	  stimulate	  action	  based	  on	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	  that	  civil	  society	  actors	  came	  to	  take	  on	  a	  quasi-­‐regulatory	  role.	   In	  the	  most	  basic	  sense,	  this	  focuses	  on	  civil	  society	  actors’	  role	  in	  shaping	  regulatory	  conditions	   –	   whether	   this	   is	   in	   enforcing	   existing	   pledges	   or	   regulations,	  producing	   policy	   recommendations,	   or	   shaping	   expectations	   as	   to	   the	  inevitability	  of	   regulatory	   interventions	  –	  while	  doing	  so	   in	  a	  manner	   that	   is	  not	   legally	  binding.	   In	   terms	  of	  Hood	  et	  al.’s	   three	   components	  of	   regulation	  (Hood	  et	  al.	  1999),	   the	  carbon	  budget	  was	  enrolled	   in	  efforts	   to,	   first,	  gather	  information	  both	   from	   fossil	   fuel	   companies	   (through	   the	  Carbon	  Asset	  Risk	  Initiative)	   and	   through	   new	   disclosure	   requirements	   (through	   financial	  regulatory	   authorities).	   Second,	   to	   alter	   behaviours	   by	   shifting	   finance	   away	  from	   carbon-­‐intensive	   sectors	   (through	   ideas	   of	   climate	   risk	   as	   well	   as	   the	  divestment	   movement).	   Third,	   to	   create	   standardised	   reporting	   of	   climate	  risks	   (explored	   further	   in	  Chapter	  6).	  However	   in	  another	  sense,	   seeing	  civil	  society	  actors	  as	  quasi-­‐regulators	  draws	  attention	  to	  the	  emerging	  strategies	  that	  break	  with	  the	  tradition	  of	  NGO	  campaigns.	  They	  instead	  work	  to	  render	  an	   abstract	   and	   complex	   issue	   such	   as	   climate	   change	   into	   a	   form	   to	   be	  integrated	   into	   the	   existing	   strategies	   of	   financial	   organisations	   and	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regulators.	   This	   emerging	   strategy	   was	   both	   enabled	   by	   a	   more	   concrete	  rendering	  of	  climate	  change	  and	  taken	  up	  by	  other	  civil	  society	  actors	  as	  the	  climate	   risk	   framing	   began	   to	   resonate	   with	   financial	   organisations	   and	  provide	  traction	  to	  their	  arguments.	  	  Regarding	   the	  ongoing	  debate	   on	   the	   ability	   of	   civil	   society	   actors	   to	  enhance	   corporate	   accountability	   (Cooper	   and	   Owen	   2007;	   Archel,	   Husillos,	  and	   Spence	   2011;	   O’Sullivan	   and	   O’Dwyer	   2015),	   the	   above	   discussion	  partially	  supports	  Archel	  et	  al.’s	  (2011)	  argument	  that	  the	  work	  of	  civil	  society	  actors	   becomes	   reoriented	   through	   a	   ‘dominant	   discourse’.	   Climate	   change,	  through	  its	  representations	  as	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	  and	  the	  carbon	  budget,	  was	  refined	  in	  terms	  of	  risk	  management	  and	  financial	  stability	  rationales.	  	  On	  the	   other	   hand,	   where	   Archel	   et	   al.	   (2011)	   focus	   on	   enhancing	   corporate	  accountability	   through	   institutional	   change,	   this	   chapter	   sees	   civil	   society	  actors	  as	  quasi-­‐regulators	  that	  render	  an	  abstract	  issue	  into	  a	  form	  compatible	  with	  existing	  investment	  and	  lending	  frameworks.	  As	  suggested	  elsewhere	  (cf.	  Owen,	  Gray,	  and	  Bebbington	  1997;	  Cooper	  and	  Owen	  2007),	  this	  construction	  of	   a	   ‘business	   case’	   for	   reconfiguring	   decision-­‐making	   processes	   may	   not	  prompt	   institutional	   reform	   that	   empowers	   a	   wider	   range	   of	   stakeholders.	  However	   the	   chapter	   focuses	   attention	  on	   the	  way	   the	   cases	   that	  were	  built	  upon	  the	  carbon	  budget	  centred	  on	  and	  oriented	  expectations	  towards,	  as	  one	  interviewee	  remarked,	  the	  inevitability	  of	  state-­‐backed	  policy	  intervention:	  “[O]ne	   of	   the	   best	  weapons	   that	   the	   fossil	   fuel	   industry	   has	  used	  against	  climate	  activists	  and	  others	  is	  creating	  a	  sense	  of	  inertia	  that	  things	  are	  just	  not	  going	  to	  change.	  […]	  What	  I	  see	  now	   is	   that	   climate	   activists	   and	   investors	   have	   started	   to	  embrace	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  ‘inevitability	  of	  inaction’	  is	  shifting	  towards	   an	   ‘inevitability	   of	   action’”	   (Interviewee:	   Eag1522,	  Emphasis	  added).	  	  At	  their	  time	  of	  writing,	  Cooper	  and	  Owen	  observed	  “[i]n	  the	  absence	  of	  government	  regulation,	  which	  is	  clearly	  not	  on	  the	  agenda	  in	  the	  prevailing	  voluntaristic	   climate	   dominating	   matters	   of	   CSR	   policy	   […]	   [a]n	   alternative	  means	   of	   introducing	   a	   greater	   measure	   of	   social	   control	   over	   business	  behaviour,	   it	   has	   been	   suggested,	   lies	   in	   civil	   regulation”	   (Cooper	   and	  Owen	  2007,	   658).	   This	   chapter	   does	   not	   disagree	  with	   this	   observation.	   Rather,	   it	  highlights	   the	   role	   of	   civil	   society	   actors	   in	   changing	   expectations	   of	   policy	  intervention	   as	   a	   means	   of	   shaping	   action	   through	   existing	   ‘institutional	  arrangements’.	  Policies	  may	  be	  absent;	  however	  an	  expectation	  of	  policy	  and	  a	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carbon-­‐constrained	   future	   is	   nurtured	   by	   civil	   society	   actors	   and	   tailored	   to	  the	  concerns	  of	  shareholders.	  Yet	  it	  should	  also	  be	  noted	  “the	  extent	  to	  which	  different	   entities	   will	   be	   exposed	   to	   carbon	   constraints	   varies	   significantly”	  (Busch	  and	  Hoffmann	  2007,	  p.525).	   It	  has	  been	  argued	   that	   competitive	  and	  regulatory	  risks	  would	  prompt	  the	  development	  of	  accounting	  practices	  “from	  which	  they	  can	  assess	  the	  carbon	  intensity	  of	  corporate	  products	  and	  services	  and	  estimate	  the	  regulatory	  and	  competitive	  risks	  that	  a	  corporation	  is	  likely	  to	   face”	   (Bebbington	   and	   Larrinaga-­‐González	   2008,	   p.707).	   However	   where	  Bebbington	   and	  Larrinaga-­‐González	   point	   to	   introduction	   of	   regulations	   and	  shifting	  competitive	  environments,	  the	  work	  of	  civil	  society	  actors	  centres	  on	  creating	   expectations	   of	   a	   carbon-­‐constrained	   future.	   That	   is,	   this	   chapter	  extends	   Bebbington	   and	   Larrinaga-­‐González’s	   argument	   by	   demonstrating	  that	   the	   perception	   of	   constraints	   focuses	   efforts	   on	   understanding	   and	  managing	   regulatory	   and	   competitive	   risks.	   In	   this	   regard,	   shifting	   the	  expectations	   of	   financial	   sector	   actors	   towards	   a	   carbon-­‐constrained	   future	  stimulated	   work	   to	   experiment	   with	   assembling	   and	   adjusting	   ideas	   and	  instruments	  as	  part	  of	  a	  process	  for	  understanding	  and	  managing	  that	  future	  (Gooding	  1992).	  It	   is,	   however,	   important	   not	   to	   overstate	   this	   emerging	   strategy	   as	  one	   that	   has	   been	   adopted	   by	   all	   civil	   society	   actors.	   Indeed,	   O’Sullivan	   and	  O’Dwyer’s	   (2015)	   argument	   that	   BankTrack	   improved	   corporate	  accountability	   over	   time	   (through,	   in	   their	   case,	   enhancing	   compliance	  with	  Equator	   Principles)	   is	   supported	   by	   this	   chapter’s	   findings.	   	   In	   particular	   it	  was	   widely	   acknowledged	   that	   the	   naming-­‐and-­‐shaming	   efforts	   of	  campaigning-­‐NGOs,	   and	   specifically	   RAN	   in	   the	   US,	   pressured	   financial	  organisations	   to	   develop	   and	   adopt	   GHG	   reporting	   methods	   for	   their	  investment	   portfolios.	   However	   where	   O’Sullivan	   and	   O’Dwyer	   argue	   that	  “powerful	   field	   incumbents”	   shape	   the	   emergence	   of	   an	   issue	   to	   “suit	   their	  preferred	   rationale	   and	   logics”	   (O’Sullivan	   and	   O’Dwyer	   2015,	   p.35),	   this	  chapter	  shows	  that	  climate	  change	  became	  framed	  by	  a	  financial	  rationale	  and	  logic	  through	  Carbon	  Tracker’s	  analysis	  of	  the	  carbon	  budget.	  To	  reiterate,	  the	  prevailing	   dissidence	   of	   earlier	   campaigning	   efforts	   was	   transformed	   into	   a	  mode	  of	  pragmatism	  (Chandhoke	  2002),	  where	  civil	  society	  actors	  reimagined	  the	  financial	  sector’s	  role	  in	  tackling	  climate	  change	  as	  one	  of	  adapting	  to	  and	  supporting	  an	  economic	  transition.	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As	  the	  expectations	  of	  investors,	  civil	  society	  actors	  and	  state	  agencies	  became	   oriented	   towards	   the	   pursuit	   of	   the	   two	   degrees	   target	   through	   the	  transition	   to	   a	   low-­‐carbon	   economy,	   they	   began	   searching	   for	   ways	   to	  measure	   and	   report	   climate	   risk	   exposure	   across	   investment	   portfolios.	   To	  reiterate,	  actions	  became	  oriented	  towards	  rendering	   the	   transition	  to	  a	   two	  degrees	  scenario	  visible	  on	  a	  more	  refined	  level	  –	  for	  both	  the	  financial	  sector	  and	  individual	  investment	  portfolios	  –	  and	  compatible	  with	  strategic	  planning	  and	   risk	  management.	   As	   Chapter	   6	   will	   demonstrate,	   efforts	   to	   create	   this	  visibility	   reoriented	   an	   emerging	   carbon	   accounting	   standard	   away	   from	  carbon	   footprints	   of	   portfolios	   and	   towards	   indicators	   of	   alignment	   with	  investment	  roadmaps	  for	  the	  transition	  to	  a	  low-­‐carbon	  economy.	  
5.6.	  CONCLUSION	  This	  chapter	  has	  studied	  how	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	  came	  to	  reshape	  the	   financial	   sector	  discourse	  on	  climate	  change.	   It	   specifically	  examined	   the	  more	  concrete	  rendering	  of	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	  as	  the	  carbon	  budget	  and	  the	   enrolment	   of	   this	   new	   instrument	   in	   arguments	   of	   investment	   risks	   and	  threats	   to	   financial	   stability,	   as	  well	   as	   in	   calls	   for	   grassroots	   activism.	   As	   a	  bridge	  (Morgan	  and	  Morrison	  1999)	  between	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	  and	  the	  more	   concrete	   carbon	   dioxide	   potentials	   of	   fossil	   fuel	   reserves,	   the	   carbon	  budget	   is	  analysed	  as	  a	  mediating	  instrument	  (Miller	  and	  O’Leary	  2007)	  that	  enables	   the	   local	  analysis	  of	  a	  global	  objective.	   In	  particular,	  by	   focussing	  on	  the	   development	   and	   mobilisation	   of	   that	   carbon	   budget,	   the	   chapter	  examined	   the	   construction	  of	   its	  mediating	   role.	   In	   doing	   so,	   it	   showed	  how	  the	  concretion	  of	  climate	  change	  enabled	  civil	  society	  actors	  to	  deploy	  a	  new	  strategy	   for	   arguing	   that	   climate	   change	   poses	   a	   systemic	   threat	   to	   the	  financial	   sector,	  warranting	   attention	  by	   framing	   the	   problem	  as	   one	   of	   risk	  and	  financial	  stability.	  On	   the	   ability	   of	   civil	   society	   actors	   to	   enhance	   corporate	  accountability,	   the	   analysis	   supports	   O’Sullivan	   an	   O’Dwyer’s	   (2015)	  argument	   that,	   through	   maintained	   campaigning	   against	   financial	  organisations,	   an	   NGO	   movement	   enhanced	   reporting	   on	   the	   sustainability	  agenda.	  However	  it	  primarily	  demonstrates	  an	  emerging	  strategy	  deployed	  by	  civil	   society	   actors,	  working	   to	   develop	   and	  mobilise	   concrete	   renderings	   of	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climate	  change	  as	  a	  systemic	  threat	  to	  the	  existing	  institutional	  arrangements	  of	   the	   financial	   sector.	   As	   such,	   while	   it	   supports	   Archel	   et	   al.’s	   (2011)	  observation	  that	  civil	  society	  actors	  come	  to	  adopt	  the	  ‘dominant	  discourse’	  of	  those	  they	  seek	  to	  influence,	   it	  argues	  that	  this	  enabled	  the	  carbon	  budget	  to	  mediate	   between	   multiple	   concerns	   and	   catalyse	   efforts	   to	   align	   capital	  markets	   with	   the	   transition	   to	   a	   low-­‐carbon	   economy.	   The	   chapter	   also	  responds	   to	   the	   call	   for	   further	   theoretical	   development	   in	   accounting	  scholarship	   on	   sustainable	   development	   (Unerman	   and	   Chapman	   2014;	  O’Dwyer	   and	   Unerman	   2016),	   arguing	   that	   the	   concept	   of	   mediating	  instruments	   focuses	   the	   researcher	   on	   the	   instruments	   through	   which	   the	  abstract	  and	  complex	  issues	  on	  the	  sustainability	  agenda	  are	  rendered	  into	  a	  more	  concrete	  form	  that	  provides	  a	  foundation	  for	  civil	  society	  movements.	  Relatedly,	   the	   chapter	   expands	   on	   the	   bridging	   role	   of	   mediating	  instruments.	   In	  particular,	   it	  demonstrates	   that	   the	  carbon	  budget	  enabled	  a	  form	   of	   scenario	   testing	   through	   which	   existing	   investment	   and	   regulatory	  strategies	   were	   problematized.	   Specifically	   the	   two	   degrees	   target	   became	  seen	  as	  posing	  constraints	  on	  carbon-­‐intensive	  industries	  that	  could	  result	  in	  asset	  impairments,	  thereby	  raising	  concerns	  of	  investment	  risk	  and	  threats	  to	  financial	  stability.	  Furthermore,	  the	  perceived	  simplicity	  of	  the	  carbon	  budget	  was	   central	   to	   the	   traction	   of	   a	   narrative	   on	   climate	   risk,	   while	   it	   also	  remained	   flexible	   in	   responding	   to	   challenges	   so	   as	   to	   maintain	   the	   logic	  underpinning	  the	  idea.	  Indeed,	  the	  idea	  of	  climate	  risk	  created	  by	  the	  carbon	  budget	   is	  still	  somewhat	  abstract,	  albeit	  more	  concrete	  than	  the	  two	  degrees	  target.	   This	   differs	   from	   Morrison	   and	   Morgan	   (1999)	   who	   discuss	   the	  bridging	   principle	   of	   mediating	   instruments	   as	   connecting	   theory	   and	   data.	  Rather,	  the	  carbon	  budget	  refines	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	  from	  a	  global	  vision	  for	   tackling	   climate	   change	   into	   a	   vision	   of	   the	   vulnerability	   of	   the	   financial	  sector	  to	  the	  transition	  to	  a	  low-­‐carbon	  economy.	  Seen	  in	  this	  light,	  the	  carbon	  budget	   stimulated	   experimentation	   (Gooding	   1992)	   with	   ideas	   and	  instruments	  to	  link	  the	  global	  objective	  of	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	  to	  the	  local	  specifics	  of	  the	  financial	  sector.	  The	   thesis	   now	   brings	   the	   reader	   inside	   the	   meeting	   rooms	   and	  webinars	   of	   a	   UNEP	   FI	   and	   GHG	   Protocol	   standard-­‐setting	   project,	   with	  Chapter	  6	  examining	   the	   influence	  of	   a	   shifting	   financial	   sector	  discourse	  on	  an	   emerging	   carbon	   accounting	   standard.	   In	   particular,	   it	   focuses	   on	   the	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reorienting	   of	   the	   emerging	   carbon	   accounting	   standard	   towards	   rendering	  visible	   the	  alignment	  of	   investment	  portfolios	  with	   investment	  roadmaps	   for	  economic	   transitions	   to	   tackle	   climate	   change.	  Furthermore,	   it	  demonstrates	  that	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	  came	  to	  permeate	  the	  project	  as	  the	  expectations	  of	  actors	  were	  reoriented	  towards	  that	  target	  and	  as	  they	  began	  applying	  their	  expertise	  and	  resources	  to	  rendering	  it	  visible.	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CHAPTER	  6	  –	  MAINTAINING	  STANDARDS:	  	  
CARBON	  ACCOUNTING	  AND	  LINKING	  
WITH	  THE	  TWO	  DEGREES	  TARGET	  
6.0	  INTRODUCTION	  Chapter	   5	   highlighted	   that	   the	   carbon	   budget	   provided	   a	   more	  concrete	  rendering	  of	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	  and	  was	  mobilised	  and	  reshaped	  the	   financial	   sector	   discourse	   on	   climate	   change.	   This	   chapter	   demonstrates	  how	   the	   shifting	   discourse	   came	   to	   reconfigure	   an	   emerging	   carbon	  accounting	   standard	   away	   from	   a	   focus	   on	   transparency	   for	   campaigning-­‐NGOs	   and	   towards	   managing	   carbon	   risk	   and	   monitoring	   the	   alignment	   of	  portfolios	  with	  a	  two	  degrees	  scenario.	  The	  empirical	  core	  of	  the	  chapter	  is	  a	  participant	   observation	   of	   the	   UNEP	   FI	   and	   GHG	   Protocol’s	   Financed	  Emissions	   Initiative,	   which	   set	   out	   to	   standardise	   the	   disclosure	   of	   GHG	  emissions	   enabled	   by	   investment	   and	   lending	   activities	   (so-­‐called	   ‘financed	  emissions’).	   It	   frames	   this	   standardisation	   work	   as	   the	   configuration	   of	   a	  mediating	   instrument	   (Miller	   and	   O’Leary	   2007),	   viewing	   the	   emergent	  standard	  as	  an	  instrument	  that	  is	  adjusted	  to	  embed	  ideas	  stemming	  from	  the	  two	   degrees	   target.	   Furthermore,	   through	   this	   remoulding	   the	   standard	   is	  interconnected	  with	  two	  other	  mediating	  instruments,	  the	  carbon	  budget	  and	  investment	   roadmaps	   for	   the	   transition	   to	   a	   low-­‐carbon	   economy.	   Based	   on	  this	   framing,	   the	   chapter	   nuances	   Botzem	   and	   Dobusch’s	   claim	   that	   a	  standard’s	   output	   legitimacy 81 	  is	   “predominantly	   related	   to	   its	   diffusion”	  (Botzem	  and	  Dobusch	  2012,	  p.741).	   It	   argues	   that	   the	  development	  of	   input	  and	   output	   legitimacy	   is	   interrelated	   during	   standard	   formation,	   with	   the	  concerns	   and	   expertise	   of	   stakeholders	   being	   drawn	   on	   to	   develop	   the	  “effectiveness	  and	  coordinative	  capacity”	  of	  a	  standard	  (Ibid.).	  The	  participant	  observation	  of	  the	  Financed	  Emissions	  Initiative	  forms	  the	   empirical	   core	   of	   this	   chapter,	   providing	   the	   basis	   for	   studying	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  81 	  Botzem	   and	   Dobusch	   explain	   output	   legitimacy	   as	   “the	   effectiveness	   and	  coordinative	   capacity	   of	   a	   standard”	   and	   input	   legitimacy	   as	   originating	   “from	  stakeholder	  involvement	  in	  the	  process	  of	  standard	  formation”	  (Botzem	  and	  Dobusch	  2012,	  p.741).	  
Chapter	  6:	  Maintaining	  Standards	  
	   176	  
corporate-­‐	   and	   portfolio-­‐level	   refinement	   of	   the	   two	   degrees	   target	   through	  the	   creation	  of	   new	  carbon	  accounting	   tools.	   The	   initial	   aim	  of	   the	  Financed	  Emissions	   Initiative	   was	   to	   standardise	   the	   measurement	   and	   reporting	   of	  ‘financed	  emissions’	  –	  the	  GHG	  emissions	  enabled	  by	  investment	  and	  lending	  activities	   –	   by	   financial	   organisations.	   It	   set	   out	   to	   both	   tailor	   the	   GHG	  Protocol’s	  core	  standards	  to	  the	  specificities	  of	  the	  financial	  sector,	  as	  well	  as	  respond	   to	   campaigning-­‐NGOs’	   calls	   for	   enhanced	   transparency	   of	   financial	  organisations’	   climate	   impacts.	   Observations	   were	   conducted	   through	   120	  hours	  of	  participation	   in	  a	   range	  of	   sites,	   from	  online	  webinars,	   to	   in-­‐person	  workshops	   in	   London,	  Milan	   and	  New	  York,	   as	  well	   as	   conferences	   in	   Paris.	  Guided	   by	   Spradley’s	   (1980)	   insights,	   involvement	   was	   as	   an	   “active	  participant”	  (Spradley	  1980,	  58)	  in	  discussing	  and	  drafting	  the	  standard,	  and	  engaging	   with	   the	   community	   during	   informal	   events	   surrounding	   the	   in-­‐person	  meetings	  (see	  Chapter	  3	  for	  further	  discussion).	   In	  addition,	  18	  semi-­‐structured	  interviews	  enable	  this	  chapter	  to	  probe	  into	  specific	  aspects	  of	  the	  standard-­‐setting	   project,	   and	   these	   were	   conducted	   across	   2014	   and	   2015	  with	  individuals	  from	  major	  financial	  organisations,	  campaigning-­‐NGOs,	  think	  tanks,	  and	  government	  treasuries.	  The	   growing	   academic	   interest	   in	   standardisation	   processes	  (Brunsson,	  Rasche,	  and	  Seidl	  2012)	  has	  brought	  attention	  to	  the	  development	  and	   diffusion	   of	   accounting	   standards,	   ranging	   from	   studies	   of	   the	  harmonization	   of	   international	   accounting	   standards	   (Botzem	   and	   Quack	  2006)	  to	  the	  fragility	  of	  international	  standardisation	  projects	  in	  settings	  such	  as	   post-­‐Soviet	   Russia	   (Mennicken	   2008).	   Others	   have	   focussed	   on	  standardisation	   of	   social	   and	   environmental	   performance	   (Gilbert,	   Rasche,	  and	  Waddock	  2011)	   through	  projects	  such	  as	   the	  Global	  Reporting	   Initiative	  (Etzion	  and	  Ferraro	  2006;	  Brown,	  de	  Jong,	  and	  Lessidrenska	  2009b;	  D.	  L.	  Levy,	  Brown,	  and	  Jong	  2010)	  and	  organisations	  such	  as	  the	  GHG	  Protocol	  (J.	  F.	  Green	  2010),	   Fairtrade	   International	   (Casula	   Vifell	   and	   Thedvall	   2012)	   and	   the	  Forestry	   Stewardship	   Council	   (Boström	   2006).	   Similarly,	   Slager,	   Gond	   and	  Moon	   (2012)	   draw	   on	   interview	   and	   archival	  material	   in	   their	   study	   of	   the	  creation	  and	  maintenance	  of	  a	  responsible	   investment	   index,	  the	  FTSE4Good	  index	   (Slager,	  Gond,	   and	  Moon	  2012).	   In	  doing	   so,	   the	   authors	   attend	   to	   the	  lack	   of	   attention	   to	   the	   production	   of	   standards,	   which	   has	   been	   called	   the	  “‘black	   box’	   of	   standardization”	   (Gilbert,	   Rasche,	   and	  Waddock	   2011,	   p.38).	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Similarly,	   it	   is	   by	   studying	   the	   formation	   of	   a	   standard	   that	   this	   chapter	  nuances	  Botzem	  and	  Dobusch’s	   interpretation	  of	   input	  and	  output	  legitimacy	  (Botzem	  and	  Dobusch	  2012).	  Botzem	  and	  Dobusch	  distinguish	  between	  input	  and	  output	  legitimacy,	  seeing	   input	   legitimacy	   as	   being	   generated	   during	   standard	   formation	   –	  through	  the	  inclusion	  of	  those	  considered	  to	  be	  stakeholders	  of	  the	  standard	  –	  and	  output	   legitimacy	  being	   “predominantly	   related	   to	   standard	  diffusion”	   –	  resulting	   from	   its	   “effectiveness	   and	   coordinative	   capacity”	   in	   responding	   to	  collective	   problems	   (Botzem	   and	   Dobusch	   2012,	   p.741).	   Yet	   this	   chapter	  highlights	   that	  moments	  during	  standard	   formation	   that	  appear	  as	  efforts	   to	  maintain	   input	   legitimacy	   are	   simultaneously	  negotiations	  over	   the	   expected	  
output	  legitimacy	   of	   the	   standard.	  That	   is,	   both	   the	   concerns	  of	   stakeholders	  and	   the	   codification	   of	   those	   concerns	   into	   measurement	   and	   reporting	  practices	   are	   negotiated	   during	   standard	   formation.	   This	   is	   not	   to	   disagree	  with	   Botzem	   and	   Dobusch’s	   argument	   that	   during	   diffusion	   “high	   adoption	  contributes	  to	  output	  legitimacy	  […]	  due	  to	  network	  or	  crowd	  effects”	   	  (Ibid.,	  p.743).	  Rather,	  the	  chapter	  argues	  that	  a	  standards’	  “effectiveness	  in	  achieving	  the	   goals”	   (Scharpf	   1997,	   p.19)	   is	   negotiated	   during	   standard	   formation.	  Furthermore,	  standard	  formation	  draws	  on	  diverse	  and	  distributed	  expertise	  to	   address	   “the	   high	   level	   of	   technical	   complexity”	   (Scharpf	   1999,	   p.16)	   of	  translating	  identified	  goals	  into	  measurement	  and	  reporting	  practices.	  In	  this	  light,	  the	  output	  legitimacy	  that	  fosters	  initial	  adoption	  of	  the	  standard	  is	  both	  configured	   and	   generated	   during	   standard	   formation,	   and	   is	   interdependent	  with	   the	   pursuit	   of	   input	   legitimacy.	   To	   develop	   this	   argument	   the	   chapter	  draws	  on	  the	  work	  of	  Miller	  and	  O’Leary	  (2007)	  to	  frame	  the	  negotiations	  as	  the	  configuration	  of	  a	  mediating	  instrument.	  By	  framing	  the	  Financed	  Emissions	  Initiative	  as	  the	  configuration	  of	  a	  mediating	   instrument,	   the	   analysis	   focuses	   on	   the	   codification	   of	   shifting	  concerns	   into	   measurement	   and	   reporting	   requirements.	   Furthermore,	   it	  highlights	   the	   linkages	   that	   were	   formed	   between	   the	   standard	   and	   other	  mediating	  instruments,	  connecting	  the	  standard	  to	  emerging	  instruments	  and	  practices	   for	   refining	   the	   two	  degrees	   target	   to	   the	  corporate-­‐	  and	  portfolio-­‐level.	  Specifically,	   it	  demonstrates	  how	  the	  permeation	  of	  new	   ideas	   into	   the	  Financed	   Emissions	   Initiative	   –	   ideas	   that	   stemmed	   from	   the	   two	   degrees	  target	  –	  came	  into	  conflict	  with	  the	   initial	  vision	  guiding	  the	  configuration	  of	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the	  standard.	  Through	  this	  conflict	   the	  Financed	  Emissions	   Initiative	  became	  unstable,	  and	  was	  subsequently	  relaunched	  with	  a	  focus	  on	  linking	  the	  carbon	  budget	   and	   sectoral	   roadmaps	   for	   the	   transition	   to	   a	   low-­‐carbon	   economy	  with	   corporate-­‐	   and	   portfolio-­‐level	   metrics.	   This	   draws	   from	   Miller	   and	  O’Leary’s	   (2007)	   study	   of	   the	   refinement	   of	   Moore’s	   Law	   into	   technology	  roadmaps	   to	   frame	   cost-­‐of-­‐ownership	   calculations	   for	   developing	   optical	  forms	   of	   lithography.	   This	   chapter	   shows	   that	   the	   Financed	   Emissions	  Initiative	  developed	  risk	  management	  tools	  to	  connect	  to	  growing	  concerns	  of	  carbon	   risk,	   while	   also	   aligning	   its	   standardisation	   work	   with	   refining	  roadmaps	   into	   corporate-­‐	   and	   portfolio-­‐level	   metrics.	   However	   the	   chapter	  specifically	   examines	   how	   the	   reorientation	   of	   actors’	   expectations	   towards	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	  stimulated	  work	  to	  link	  these	  instruments.	  Seen	  in	  this	  light,	  the	  Financed	  Emissions	  Initiative	  simultaneously	  identifies	  participants’	  concerns	  (input	   legitimacy)	  while	   linking	   the	  standard	  with	   instruments	  and	  practices	   for	   connecting	   the	   two	   degrees	   target	   to	   portfolio-­‐	   and	   corporate-­‐level	  investment	  and	  lending	  decisions	  (output	  legitimacy).	  The	  chapter	  is	  structured	  as	  follows.	  Section	  6.1	  provides	  background	  on	   the	   UNEP	   FI	   and	   GHG	   Protocol’s	   Financed	   Emissions	   Initiative,	   the	  researcher’s	   role	   as	   a	   participant	   observer,	   and	   the	   pressure	   on	   financial	  organisations	   to	   participate	   in	   the	   project.	   Section	   6.2	   traces	   discussions	   on	  two	  aspects	  of	  the	  Financed	  Emissions	  Initiative,	  the	  ‘Business	  Goals’	  and	  the	  ‘Boundary	   Setting’	   sections,	   to	   follow	   the	   emergence	   of	   ideas	   that	   came	   to	  destabilise	   the	   project.	   Section	   6.3	   examines	   the	   project’s	   relaunch	   as	   the	  Portfolio	   Carbon	   Initiative,	   highlighting	   its	   new	   focus	   on	   enabling	   the	  transition	   to	  a	   two	  degrees	  scenario.	  Section	  6.4	  discusses	   the	  project	  as	   the	  production	  of	  a	  mediating	   instrument,	  and	  the	  contribution	  of	  the	  chapter	  to	  the	  standard-­‐setting	  literature,	  before	  Section	  6.5	  concludes	  the	  chapter.	  
6.1.	   BACKGROUND	   TO	   THE	   FINANCED	   EMISSIONS	  
INITIATIVE	  The	   Financed	   Emissions	   Initiative	   is	   a	   standard-­‐setting	   project	  coordinated	   by	   UNEP	   FI	   and	   GHG	   Protocol	   to	   develop	   a	   carbon	   accounting	  standard	   specifically	   for	   the	   emissions	   that	   are	   enabled	   through	   the	  investment	   and	   lending	   activities	   of	   a	   financial	   organisation.	   This	   section	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begins	  by	  providing	  the	  reader	  with	  background	  to	  the	  GHG	  Protocol	  and	  their	  previous	   efforts	   to	   create	   carbon	  accounting	  methods	   for	   so-­‐called	   ‘financed	  emissions’	   (6.1.1).	   It	   then	   considers	   the	   initial	   aims	   of	   Financed	   Emissions	  Initiative	   (6.1.2),	   before	   presenting	   the	   structure	   of	   the	   standard-­‐setting	  project	  (6.1.3).	  Building	  on	  insights	  from	  Chapter	  5,	  this	  section	  explores	  why	  representatives	   of	   different	   groups	   volunteered	   their	   time	   and	   expense	   to	  participate	   in	   developing	   the	   standard	   (6.1.4).	   Finally,	   the	   emergence	   and	  remit	  of	  the	  Financed	  Emissions	  Initiative	  work	  stream	  on	  ‘Carbon	  Asset	  Risk’	  is	   detailed	   (6.1.5),	   before	   turning	   Section	   6.2	   regarding	   discussions	   on	  ‘Business	  Goals’	  and	  ‘Boundary	  Setting’	  during	  the	  project.	  
6.1.1.THE	  GREENHOUSE	  GAS	  PROTOCOL	  AND	  FINANCED	  EMISSIONS	  The	  GHG	  Protocol	  has	  become	  the	  dominant	  global	  standard-­‐setter	  for	  carbon	  accounting	  (J.	  F.	  Green	  2010;	  Lovell	  and	  MacKenzie	  2011)	  since	  it	  was	  launched	   in	   1998	   in	   a	   collaborative	   initiative	   between	   the	  World	   Resources	  Institute	  (WRI)	  and	  the	  World	  Business	  Council	  for	  Sustainable	  Development	  (WBCSD).82	  Publishing	   its	   Corporate	   Standard	   in	   2004,	   the	   GHG	   Protocol	  began	   its	   efforts	   to	   standardise	   the	   measurement	   and	   reporting	   of	   GHG	  emissions	   specifically	   for	   the	   corporate	   entity	   and	   now	   serves	   as	   the	  foundation	  for	  almost	  all	  corporate-­‐level	  GHG	  disclosure	  requirements	  around	  the	   world.	   This	   includes,	   among	   others,	   the	   International	   Standards	  Organisation’s	   ISO-­‐14064,	   the	   UK’s	   Department	   for	   the	   Environment,	   Food	  and	  Rural	  Affairs’	   (DEFRA)	   requirements	   for	  mandatory	  GHG	   reporting,	   and	  voluntary	   disclosures	   both	   under	   the	   Global	   Reporting	   Initiative’s	   (GRI)	  sustainability	  reporting	  and	  to	  CDP	  (formerly	  the	  Carbon	  Disclosure	  Project).	  In	   terms	   of	   Botzem	   and	   Dobusch’s	   characterisation	   of	   the	   standardisation	  process	   (Botzem	   and	   Dobusch	   2012),	   the	   formation	   of	   carbon	   accounting	  standards	  for	  the	  corporate	  entity	  has	  been	  driven	  by	  the	  GHG	  Protocol,	  while	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  82	  WRI	   is	   a	   global	   think	   tank,	   headquartered	   in	  Washington	  D.C.,	   that	   seeks	   to	   shift	  societal	  behaviour	  towards	  protecting	  the	  Earth’s	  environment	  so	  that	  is	  can	  provide	  for	  future	  generations	  (WRI	  2016b).	  Since	  its	  founding	  in	  1982	  it	  has	  avoided	  what	  it	  terms	  the	  ‘prevailing	  activist	  model’	  (WRI	  2016a)	  in	  favour	  of	  work	  that	  advances	  an	  evidence-­‐based	  understanding	  of	  sustainable	  development	  issues	  and	  works	  to	  bring	  this	  to	  the	  attention	  of	  decision-­‐makers	  across	  the	  public	  and	  private	  sectors.	  	  WBCSD	   was	   founded	   shortly	   before	   the	   Rio	   Earth	   Summit	   in	   1992	   in	   an	   effort	   to	  ensure	   the	   business	   voice	   was	   present	   (WBCSD	   2016),	   and	   based	   its	   work	   on	   the	  belief	   that	   business	   had	   an	   inescapable	   role	   to	   play	   in	   sustainable	   development	  (Schmidheiny	  1992).	  It	  is	  a	  CEO-­‐led	  organization	  that	  works	  to	  influence	  the	  business	  community	   towards	   creating	   a	   “sustainable	   future	   for	   business,	   society	   and	   the	  environment”	  (WBCSD	  2016).	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the	  diffusion	  of	  those	  standards	  is	  enabled	  through	  their	  incorporation	  in	  both	  state	   regulation	   as	   well	   as	   voluntary	   reporting	   requirements.	   As	   such,	   by	  studying	   the	  GHG	  Protocol’s	   standard-­‐setting	  process	   this	   chapter	   is	   able	   to,	  first,	   study	   the	   emerging	   linkages	   between	   the	   two	   degrees	   target	   and	   the	  corporate	   entity	   and,	   second,	   focus	   on	   how	   the	   ideas	   for	   monitoring	   the	  climate	   impact	  of	   financial	  organisations	  both	  shape	  and	  are	  shaped	  through	  the	  standard-­‐setting	  process.	  	  The	  GHG	  Protocol’s	  standards	  address	  three	  ‘Scopes’	  of	  emissions	  that	  determine	  different	  boundaries	   for	  measuring	  and	  reporting	  an	  entity’s	  GHG	  emissions.	   Scope	   1	   emissions	   are	   those	   directly	   caused	   by	   assets	   owned	   or	  controlled	  by	  a	  company,	  while	  Scope	  2	  emissions	  are	  those	  caused	  indirectly	  through	  energy	  usage.	  Measurement	  and	  reporting	  practices	  for	  each	  of	  these	  are	  detailed	  in	  the	  GHG	  Protocol’s	  core	  Corporate	  Standard.	  Scope	  3	  emissions	  are	   detailed	   in	   the	   2011	   Corporate	   Value	   Chain	   Accounting	   and	   Reporting	  
Standard,	   and	   refer	   to	   indirect	   emissions	   within	   the	   supply	   chain	   such	   as	  outsourced	  activities,	   extraction	  and	  production	  of	  purchased	  materials,	   and	  investments	  that	  fall	  outside	  the	  Scope	  1	  and	  2	  boundary	  (GHG	  Protocol	  2004,	  pp.26–29).	   This	   chapter	   centres	   on	   the	   Scope	   3	   emissions	   of	   financial	  organisations,	   focussing	   on	   the	   climate	   framing	   of	   investment	   and	   lending	  activities	   that	   have	   the	   potential	   to	   influence	   decision	   making	   across	  economies	   towards	   developing	   and	   implementing	   low-­‐carbon	   modes	   of	  production	  (Coulson	  and	  Dixon	  1995;	  Richardson	  2009).	  	  The	  GHG	  Protocol’s	   	   ‘core’	   standards,	  however,	  often	   lack	   refinement	  to	  the	  specifics	  of	  particular	   industries.	  Rather,	   they	  detail	  measurement	  and	  reporting	  practices	  that	  apply	  across	  sectors	  on	  a	  more	  general	  level.	  For	  the	  financial	   sector,	   the	   Scope	   3	   standard	   provided	   four	   pages	   of	   guidance	   on	  measuring	   and	   reporting	   for	   investments	   (GHG	   Protocol	   2011,	   pp.51–4),	  which	   had	   been	   developed	   through	   a	   workgroup	   of	   financial	   organisations	  comprised	  mostly	  of	  commercial	  banks.	  However	  a	  member	  of	  the	  Secretariat	  commented	   that	   this	   workgroup	   “never	   got	   to	   the	   level	   of	   detail	   that	   we	  needed	  to	  be	  very	  helpful	  to	  the	  banks.	  So,	  […]	  we	  always	  had	  the	  idea	  in	  mind	  that	  afterwards	  we	  would	  develop	  sector	  guidance	  with	   the	   financial	   sector”	  (Interview:	   Eag1412).	   Indeed,	   the	   GHG	   Protocol	   often	   developed	   sector-­‐specific	  guidance	  to	  both	  tailor	  the	  core	  standard	  to	  and	  encourage	  adoption	  of	  the	  standards	  in	  certain	  industries	  (J.	  F.	  Green	  2010).	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The	  Financed	  Emissions	  Initiative	  was	  launched	  to	  create	  sector-­‐specific	  guidance	   for	   the	   financial	   sector	  on	  measuring	  and	  reporting	  GHG	  emissions	  from	  its	  supply	  chain.	   In	  other	  words,	   the	   initiative	  aimed	  to	  create	   tools	   for	  measuring	   and	   reporting	   the	   carbon	   footprint	   of	   investment	   and	   lending	  activities,	   the	  aforementioned	   ‘financed	  emissions’.	  To	  coordinate	  the	  project	  the	  GHG	  Protocol	  partnered	  with	  UNEP	  FI	   in	  mid-­‐2012,	  partly	  due	  to	  similar	  agendas	   and	  partly	   to	   foster	   the	   uptake	   of	   the	   standard.	   By	   partnering	  with	  UNEP	  FI	  the	  GHG	  Protocol	  also	  extended	  the	  reach	  of	  its	  calls	  for	  participation	  in	   the	   Financed	   Emissions	   Initiative,	   contributing	   to	   “larger	   participation	   in	  the	  technical	  working	  groups	  than	  [GHG	  Protocol]	  have	  ever	  had	  before”	  with	  “representatives	   from	   nearly	   60	   different	   countries	   […	   and]	   a	   pretty	   good	  balance	  between	  industry,	  consultants,	  governments	  and	  NGOs.”83	  
6.1.2.	  INTRODUCING	  THE	  FINANCED	  EMISSIONS	  INITIATIVE	  The	  ‘kickoff	  call’	  for	  the	  Financed	  Emissions	  Initiative,	  held	  in	  January	  2014,	   was	   conducted	   via	   webinar	   using	   the	   online	   platform	   GoToWebinar.	  Invitations	   to	   join	   the	   webinar	   were	   emailed	   to	   all	   of	   the	   280	   participants	  (representing	   a	   variety	   of	   groups:	   institutional	   investors,	   commercial	   banks,	  asset	   managers,	   consultancies,	   accounting	   firms,	   financial	   market	   data	  providers,	   government	   treasuries,	   multi-­‐lateral	   development	   banks,	  academics,	   think	   tanks,	   campaigning-­‐NGOs,	   and	   voluntary	   disclosure	  organisations)	  whose	  requests	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  project	  had	  been	  accepted	  by	   the	   Secretariat.84	  Upon	   signing-­‐in,	   a	   holding	   screen	   greeted	   participants,	  displaying	   the	   webinar	   title	   and	   host’s	   name.85	  Participants	   could	   interact	  through	  a	   small	   control	  panel	   and	  dialogue	  box	  on	   screen	   (see	  Appendix	  6A	  for	  an	  example),	   and	  were	  periodically	   reassured	  by	  an	  automated	  message,	  ‘The	  webinar	  will	   begin	   shortly,	   please	   remain	   on	   the	   line’,	  which	  would	   be	  heard	  hundreds	  of	  times	  across	  the	  two	  years	  of	  the	  standard-­‐setting	  project.	  When	   the	   host	   logged	   in	   the	   presentation	   window	   would	   switch	   to	   mirror	  their	   screen,	   usually	   displaying	   PowerPoint	   slides	   or	   draft	   documents	   to	   all	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  83	  Comments	  made	  by	  one	  member	  of	  the	  secretariat	  during	  the	  launch	  webinar	  of	  the	  Financed	  Emissions	  Initiative	  TWG	  process	  on	  30th	  January	  2014.	  84	  During	  a	  phone	  call	  with	  one	  member	  of	  the	  Secretariat	  it	  was	  explained	  that	  they	  only	  declined	  requests	  if	  they	  felt	  there	  was	  no	  clear	  contribution	  that	  the	  individual	  could	  make	   and	   that	   the	   individual’s	   interest	   in	   the	   project	   was	   solely	   journalistic.	  Also	   note	   that	   Chapter	   3	   provides	   further	   details	   of	   access	   for	   the	   participant	  observation.	  85	  Participants	  could	  also	  join	  the	  webinar	  via	  telephone	  by	  calling	  a	  number	  specific	  to	  their	  country.	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participants	  (see	  Appendix	  6B).	  The	  purpose	  of	  the	  initial	  ‘kickoff	  call’	  was	  to	  explain	  why	  the	  Financed	  Emissions	  Initiative	  had	  been	  launched	  and	  what	  it	  was	  trying	  to	  achieve.	  	  The	   Secretariat	   (comprised	   of	   representatives	   from	   both	   the	   GHG	  Protocol	   and	   UNEP	   FI	   that	   oversaw	   and	   coordinated	   the	   standard-­‐setting	  project)	  hosted	   this	   initial	  webinar,	  which	   focussed	  on	   the	   findings	  of	  a	  one-­‐year	   scoping	   phase	   conducted	   in	   2013.	   They	   explained	   that	   this	   had	  highlighted	   the	   need	   for	   a	   standardized	   approach	   to	   measuring	   ‘financed	  emissions’.	   Based	   on	   130	   survey	   responses,	   two	   workshops,	   and	   a	  consultation	  with	  UNEP	  FI	  members,	  one	  member	  of	  the	  Secretariat	  explained	  that	   there	   was	   strong	   support	   for	   standardising	   and	   harmonising	   the	  approach	  for	  measuring	  and	  reporting	  financed	  emissions:	  “What	   we	   mainly	   wanted	   to	   establish	   [during	   the	   scoping	  phase]	  is	  that	  there	  was	  a	  need	  for	  this,	  for	  the	  standard	  and	  a	   harmonized	   approach	   to	   accounting	   and	   reporting	   for	  financed	   emissions.	   And	   […]	   the	   majority	   of	   the	   survey	  respondents	  supported	  that	  there	  was	  a	  need	  for	  guidance.”	  	  The	   Secretariat	   remarked	   on	   “a	   need	   for	   guidance”	   throughout	   the	  first	  webinar,	  emphasising	  that	  the	  ‘demand’	  for	  the	  standard	  indicated	  there	  would	  be	  ‘strong	  take-­‐up’	  (adoption	  of	  the	  standard)	  following	  its	  publication.	  	  However	  as	  well	  as	  allowing	   the	  Secretariat	   to	  assess	   the	  potential	  adoption	  levels,	   the	   scoping	   phase	   suggested	   “accounting	   and	   reporting	   of	   the	  environmental	   impacts	   of	   financial	   operations	   is	   important	   for	   the	   finance	  sector	  to	  be	  able	  to	  see	  whether	  or	  not	  it	  is,	  over	  time,	  evolving	  in	  line	  with	  the	  transition	  to	  the	  low-­‐carbon	  economy”	  (Secretariat).	  More	  specifically,	   it	  was	  not	  about	  industry-­‐level	  metrics	  for	  monitoring	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  financial	  sector	   as	   a	   whole;	   rather	   it	   was	   about	   monitoring	   at	   the	   organisation-­‐	   and	  portfolio-­‐level.	   “Developing	  guidance	  on	   that	   is	  precisely	   the	  objective	  of	   the	  first	   track	   of	   our	   process,	   which	   is	   focused	   on	   accounting	   guidance”	  (Secretariat).	  By	  creating	  accounting	  tools	  for	  measuring	  and	  reporting	  carbon	  footprints	   of	   investment	   portfolios	   (financed	   emissions),	   the	   Financed	  Emissions	  Initiative	  sought	  to	  render	  visible	  the	  development	  of	  the	  financial	  sector	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  transition	  to	  a	  low-­‐carbon	  economy.	  However	  it	  should	  also	  be	  noted	  that	  aligning	  the	  financial	  sector	  with	  the	  transition	  to	  the	  low-­‐carbon	   economy	   is	   one	   of	   the	   core	   objectives	   of	   UNEP	   FI.	   It	   is	   perhaps	  unsurprising	  that	  a	  consultation	  with	  members	  of	  UNEP	  FI	  –	  as	  well	  as	  UNEP	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FI’s	   involvement	   in	   conceiving	   and	   coordinating	   the	   project	   –	   revealed	   the	  transition	  to	  a	  low-­‐carbon	  economy	  was	  as	  one	  of	  the	  main	  goals.	  The	  same	  Secretariat	  member	  went	  on	  to	  detail	  numerous	  problems	  in	  the	  current	   landscape	  of	  GHG	  emissions	  accounting	  and	  reporting,	   identified	  through	   the	   scoping	  phase,	  which	   the	  project	  would	   address.	   Central	   to	   this	  was	  the	  “proliferation,	  or	  great	  number	  of,	  different	  methods	  and	  approaches	  out	  there,	  some	  developed	  by	  the	  finance	  sector	  itself,	  others	  developed	  by	  the	  NGO	   community,	   and	   others	   developed	   by	   consultancies.”	   These	   standards	  emphasised	  different	  aspects	  of	  the	  sustainability	  agenda	  and,	  where	  overlaps	  existed,	  a	  degree	  of	  cross-­‐compatibility	  had	  emerged	  and	  was	  enabled	  through	  tools	   that	   would	   compare	   the	   requirements	   of	   multiple	   standards.86	  This	  “coexistence”	  (Botzem	  and	  Dobusch	  2012,	  p.744)	  of	  standards	  was	  presented	  as	  a	  problem	   to	   the	  adoption	  of	  methods	  on	   the	  grounds	   that	   “as	  a	   financial	  institution	  you	  might	  simply	  be	  a	  bit	  overwhelmed	  and	  confused	  about	  what	  to	  do	  with	   this	   ecosystem	  of	   existing	  approaches”	   (Secretariat).	  However,	   as	  Botzem	   and	   Dobusch	   (2012)	   note,	   the	   coexistence	   of	   standards	   “can	   be	   the	  first	   stage	   of	   negotiating	   comprehensive	   collective	   standards”	   (Botzem	   and	  Dobusch	   2012,	   p.744).	   Indeed,	   the	   Financed	   Emissions	   Initiative	   was	  presented	  as	  an	  attempt	  to	  connect	  with	  and	  build	  upon	  existing	  methods	  of	  carbon	   accounting,	   “trying	   to	   harmonize	   and	   standardize	   […]	   focussing	   on	  what	   is	   out	   there,	   and	   […]	   trying	   to	   tailor	   the	   frameworks	   used	   by	   many	  companies	   in	   the	   real	   economy	   to	   the	   needs	   of	   the	   actors	   in	   the	   financial	  economy”	   (Secretariat).	   To	   the	   Secretariat,	   the	   Scope	   3	   standard	   was	  “probably	   not	   detailed	   enough,	   it's	   probably	   not	   nuanced	   enough,	   and	   it's	  probably	  not	  being	   truly	   tailored	   to	   the	  needs	  of	   the	  many	  subsectors	   in	   the	  financial	   economy.”87	  The	   Secretariat	   argued	   that	   this	   lack	   of	   refinement,	  combined	  with	   range	   of	   available	  methods	   for	   assessing	   financed	   emissions	  (e.g.	  those	  developed	  by	  Trucost,	  Inrate,	  Profundo,	  and	  Ecofys),	  explained	  why	  “we're	   not	   seeing	   a	   mainstream,	   upscale	   use	   of	   these	   methods	   by	   financial	  practitioners”.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  86	  See,	   for	   a	   recent	   example,	   the	   Climate	   Disclosure	   Standards	   Board’s	  Making	   the	  
Connections	  report	  (CDSB	  2015).	  87	  The	  Scope	  3	  Standard	   categorised	   investments	  across	   financial	  organisations	   into	  equity	   investments,	  debt	   investments,	  project	   finance	  and	  managed	  investments	  and	  client	   services.	   Informal	   conversations	   during	   the	   in-­‐person	   Financed	   Emissions	  Initiative	   meetings	   suggested	   that	   further	   refinements	   should	   allow	   for	   differences	  between	  types	  of	  financial	  organisations	  and	  asset	  classes.	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6.1.3.	  STRUCTURE	  OF	  THE	  FINANCED	  EMISSIONS	  INITIATIVE	  Access	   was	   granted	   for	   a	   participant	   observation	   as	   a	   member	   of	  Technical	  Working	  Group	  4	  (TWG	  4),	  the	  group	  tasked	  with	  discussing	  ‘cross-­‐cutting	   issues’	   that	  are	   relevant	   to	   the	  work	  of	  more	   than	  one,	   and	  often	  all,	  TWGs.	   TWG	   4	   considered	   and	   drafted	   sections	   on	   accounting	   principles,	  boundary	   setting	   rules,	   target	   setting,	   performance	   metrics,	   assurance	   and	  relevant	  information	  regarding	  on	  fossil	   fuel	  reserves.	  In	  contrast,	  TWGs	  1,	  2	  and	  3	  worked	  on	  guidance	  for	  specific	  types	  of	  finance;	  company	  and	  project	  finance	  guidance	  is	  considered	  by	  TWG	  1,	  government	  finance	  by	  TWG	  2,	  and	  consumer	   finance	   by	   TWG	   3.	   These	   first	   four	   TWGs	   worked	   separately	   on	  their	  respective	  aspects	  of	  the	  standard	  and	  were	  overseen	  by	  the	  Secretariat,	  who	  coordinated	  across	  the	  groups	  to	  avoid	  overlap	  and	  to	  relay	  concerns	  that	  arose	   elsewhere	   to	   the	   relevant	   TWG.	   TWG	   5,	   which	   will	   be	   discussed	   in	  further	   detail	   in	   the	   Section	  6.1.5,	  worked	   on	   a	   ‘sister’	   guidance	  document88	  dealing	  with	  measuring	   and	  managing	   carbon	   asset	   risk,	  which	  pertained	   to	  the	   risk	   investors	   face	   as	   a	   result	   of	   new	   regulations,	   changing	   customer	  preferences,	  threats	  to	  reputation	  and	  impairments	  to	  underlying	  assets.	  Each	   of	   the	   TWGs	   divided	   its	   workload	   between	   subgroups,	   which	  worked	  on	  the	  draft	  of	  their	  particular	  topic	  and	  presented	  back	  to	  the	  TWG.	  TWG	  4	  members	  were	  allocated	  to	  the	  subgroups	  more	  or	  less	  based	  on	  their	  individual	   preferences,	   and	   the	   meetings	   were	   conducted	   via	   webinars.	  However	   there	   was	   no	   prescribed	   process	   for	   the	   discussions	   and	   work	   of	  these	   subgroups.	   Rather,	   the	   subgroup	   leader,	   appointed	   by	   the	   project	  secretariat,	  decided	  on	   the	   course	  of	   action.	  The	  boundary	   setting	   subgroup,	  for	  example,	  held	   two	  meetings	   to	   identify	   the	  core	   issues	  and	  objectives	   for	  the	   section.	   However	   when	   consensus	   could	   not	   be	   reached	   within	   the	  subgroup,	   it	   reported	   its	   progress	   back	   to	   the	   whole	   of	   TWG	   4	   for	   further	  guidance.	  Once	  a	  subgroup	  produced	  a	  draft	  or	  decided	  that	  further	  guidance	  was	   required,	   it	   reported	   back	   during	   a	   TWG	   4	   webinar	   and	   subsequently	  worked	  on	  finalising	  a	  draft	  in	  line	  with	  the	  feedback	  received.	  There	  were	  two	  key	  milestones	  for	  the	  TWG	  process	  in	  the	  first	  half	  of	  2014.	   First,	   in	  May	   there	  was	   a	   two-­‐day	   in-­‐person	  meeting	   of	   the	   Advisory	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  88	  See	   Appendix	   6C	   for	   the	   diagram	   presented	   by	   the	   Secretariat	   to	   explain	   the	  planned	  structure	  for	  the	  document	  and	  the	  responsibility	  allocated	  to	  each	  TWG.	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Committee	  in	  Milan.	  The	  Advisory	  Committee	  consists	  of	  between	  20	  and	  2589	  representatives	   of	   the	   major	   stakeholder	   groups	   –	   investment	   banks,	  insurance	   companies,	   investor	   alliances,	   think	   tanks	   and	  NGOs.	   The	   head	   of	  each	  TWG	  also	  attended	  the	  meeting	  and	  provided	  an	  update	  on	  the	  progress	  made,	  highlighting	  areas	  where	  the	  TWG	  was	  in	  need	  of	  advice	  and	  direction.	  For	   example	   even	   after	   the	   boundary	   setting	   subgroup	   raised	   its	   concerns	  with	  the	  whole	  of	  TWG	  4	  the	  matter	  remained	  unresolved.	  Following	  a	  lengthy	  discussion,	  the	  Head	  of	  TWG	  4	  concluded	  that	  boundary	  setting	  should	  be	  on	  the	   Advisory	   Committee	   meeting	   agenda.	   Following	   prolonged	   deliberation,	  the	   Advisory	   Committee	   agreed	   on	   three	   possible	   options	   for	   boundary	  setting,	   which	   the	   head	   of	   TWG	   4	   relayed	   to	   the	   members	   in	   a	   webinar	   a	  fortnight	  later.	  As	  such,	  the	  role	  of	  the	  May	  2014	  Advisory	  Committee	  meeting	  was	   to	   provide	   feedback	   to	   TWGs	   on	   matters	   where	   disagreements	   arose.	  However	   the	  specific	  content	  of	   the	  draft	   standard	  was	   to	  be	  decided	  within	  the	  TWGs.	  As	  such,	  the	  Advisory	  Committee	  steered	  the	  work	  of	  the	  TWGs	  and	  would	  also	  review	  and	  comment	  on	  the	  TWGs’	  completed	  drafts.	  The	  second	  milestone	  was	  a	  two-­‐day	  in-­‐person	  meeting	  in	  June	  2014	  in	  Washington	  D.C..	  All	  TWGs	  were	  invited	  to	  attend	  and	  the	  head	  of	  each	  TWG	  presented	   a	   progress	   update	   and	   raised	   aspects	   of	   their	   work	   requiring	  further	  guidance.	  The	  intention	  was	  for	  TWGs	  to	  have	  received	  feedback	  from	  the	  May	   Advisory	   Committee	  meeting	   and	   to	   present	   the	   updated	   drafts	   or	  work	  plans	  during	  the	  June	  TWG	  meeting.	  It	  also	  provided	  an	  opportunity	  for	  participants	  to	  meet	  the	  members	  of	  their	  TWG	  for	  the	  first	  time.	  While	  most	  of	   the	   Advisory	   Committee	  members	  were	   acquainted	   before	   the	  May	   2014	  meeting	  (either	  through	  earlier	  involvement	  with	  the	  GHG	  Protocol	  or	  through	  international	   climate	   finance	   conferences),	   the	   relationships	   between	   most	  TWG	   members	   were	   restricted	   to	   their	   interactions	   during	   webinars	   and	  related	  email	  correspondence.	  However	  with	  the	  global	  participation	  base	  of	  the	   project	   many	   TWG	   members	   were	   unable	   to	   attend	   in	   person,	   instead	  listening	   to	   the	  meeting	   through	   a	   live	   stream	   and	   sending	   their	   comments	  and	  questions	  by	  email	  to	  the	  Secretariat.	  During	  the	  presentations	  any	  aspect	  of	   the	   TWG’s	   work	   could	   be	   questioned	   and	   debated	   by	   members	   of	   other	  TWGs.	  As	  well	  as	  offering	  a	  milestone	  to	  work	  towards,	  this	  meeting	  allowed	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  89	  The	  number	  of	  Advisory	  Committee	  members	  varied	  slightly	  across	  the	  participant	  observation.	  This	  was	  because	   individuals	   changed	   roles	  or	  organizations	  and	  could	  no	  longer	  take	  responsibility	  for	  their	  position	  in	  the	  project.	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for	  discussion	  between	  the	  TWGs	  to	  raise	  concerns,	  confusions	  and	  to	  reshape	  the	   overall	   direction	   and	   objectives	   of	   the	   standard-­‐setting	   project.90	  As	  will	  be	   shown	   in	   Section	   6.3.2	   of	   this	   chapter,	   however,	   it	  was	   at	   the	   June	   TWG	  meeting	  that	  conflict	  between	  participants’	  objectives	  produced	  tensions	  that	  brought	  the	  Financed	  Emissions	  Initiative	  to	  the	  brink	  of	  collapse.	  
6.1.4.	  PRESSURES	  ON	  FINANCIAL	  ORGANISATIONS	  TO	  PARTICIPATE	  When	   the	   TWG	   process	   began	   it	   had	   attracted	   the	   highest	   level	   of	  participation,	   280	   individuals,	   of	   any	  GHG	  Protocol	   standard	   setting	   project.	  These	   participants	   included	   representatives	   from	   major	   financial	  organisations,	  with	  Bank	  of	  America,	  Barclays,	  RBS,	  State	  Street,	  Unicredit	  and	  Wells	  Fargo	  all	   sitting	  on	   the	  Advisory	  Committee.	  Numerous	  other	   financial	  organisations	   were	   represented	   through	   investor	   networks	   such	   as	   the	  Investor	  Group	  on	  Climate	  Change,	  whose	  members	  are	  institutional	  investors	  from	  Australia	  and	  New	  Zealand	  (see	  Appendix	  6E	  for	  a	  full	  list	  of	  all	  advisory	  committee	   members).	   Many	   of	   these	   representatives	   were	   the	   Heads	   of	  Sustainability	   of	   their	   respective	   organisations	   and,	   from	   informal	  conversations	   during	   the	   participant	   observation,	   would	   sometimes	   be	  required	   to	   report	   to	   their	   Board	   of	   Directors	   on	  matters	   such	   as	   a	   specific	  type	  of	  environmental	  risk	  or	  media	  scrutiny	  resulting	  from	  NGO	  campaigns.	  However,	  as	  shown	  in	  Chapter	  5,	  financial	  organisations	  were	  under	  pressure	  to	   integrate	   a	   climate	   change	   framing	   in	   their	   investment	   and	   lending	  decisions	  from	  a	  range	  of	  civil	  society	  actors.	  This	  section	  provides	  the	  reader	  with	  background	  to	  the	  connections	  between	  such	  pressures	  and	  the	  Financed	  Emissions	  Initiative,	  shedding	  light	  on	  why	  these	  individuals	  would	  volunteer	  their	   time	   to	   attend	   webinars,	   travel	   internationally	   to	   several	   in-­‐person	  meetings,	  and	  to	  discuss	  and	  draft	  what	  would	  become	  a	  publically	  available	  document.	  
DISCLOSURE	  GROUPS	  AS	  AN	  “IMPLEMENTATION	  PARTNER”	  First,	  upon	  publication	  of	  the	  Scope	  3	  Standard	  in	  2011	  CDP91	  included	  a	   new	   segment	   in	   their	   annual	   survey	   on	   reporting	   GHG	   emissions	   from	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  90	  See	   Appendix	   6D	   for	   an	   overview	   of	   the	   governance	   structure	   for	   the	   Financed	  Emissions	  Initiative.	  91	  CDP	   is	   a	   GHG	   disclosure	   organisation	   that	   gathers	   information	   through	   annual	  questionnaires,	  and	  was	  formerly	  known	  as	  the	  Carbon	  Disclosure	  Project.	  It	  changed	  its	  name	  to	   the	  abbreviation	  CDP	  to	  reflect	   their	  expansion	   into,	   in	  particular,	  water	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investments,	   requiring	   compliance	   with	   the	   new	   standard.	   The	   financial	  sector,	   however,	  was	   unfamiliar	  with	   the	   standard	   that	   they	  were	   suddenly	  required	  to	  comply	  with.	  By	  participating	  in	  the	  Financed	  Emissions	  Initiative,	  financial	   organisations	   sought	   to	   both	   shape	   the	   refinement	   of	   carbon	  accounting	  methods	   for	   investment	  and	   lending	  activities	  as	  well	   as	  develop	  an	  understanding	  of	  a	  method	  that	  they	  expected	  would	  be	  required	  by	  future	  CDP	  annual	  surveys.	  During	  following	  exchange	  from	  the	  May	  2014	  Advisory	  Committee,	   representatives	   from	   financial	   organisations	   pressed	   the	  Secretariat	   to	   confirm	   the	   degree	   of	   alignment	   between	   the	   Financed	  Emissions	  Initiative	  and	  the	  future	  requirements	  of	  CDP:	  “This	   would	   be	   akin	   to	   hard	   coding	   some	   of	   the	   CDP	  questions	  for	  example?	  Potentially.	  In	  accounting	  regulation.	  (Investor	  community)	  Exactly.	  (Think	  tank)	  Well	  yes,	  […]	  aren’t	  they	  evolving	  their	  questionnaire	  to	  make	  it	  more	  industry	  specific?	  So	  theoretically	  I	  mean	  some	  of	  the	  issues	  could	  be	  addressed	  in	  the	  next	  CDP	  [survey].	  (Banking	  community)	  Is	  there	  a	  plan	  for	  a	  financial	  sector	  supplement?	  CDP	  is	  going	  to	   develop	   a	   financial	   sector	   supplement	   once	   this	   project	  completed.	  (Secretariat)	  […]	   they’ve	  been	  waiting	   for	   this	   [standard].	   They	  don’t	   see	  any	   point	   in	   coming	   out	   with	   a	   bunch	   of	   questions	   only	   to	  find	   out	   it’s	   not	   what	   anybody	   wanted.	   (Non-­‐profit	  community)	  Yeah.	  I	  mean	  I	  would	  say	  rather	  than	  try	  to	  address	  this	  here,	  just	  make	  sure	  that	  the	  input	  from	  this	  script	  is	  aligned	  with	  what	  CDP	  is	  doing	  and	  what	  you	  guys	  want	  with	  that	  process.	  (Banking	  community)	  Yes,	  well	  that’s	  kind	  of	  why	  they	  are	  here.	  (Secretariat)	  [Laughter	  from	  around	  the	  room]	  Yes,	  well	   CDP	  will	   base	   its	   questions	   on	  what	   comes	   out	   of	  this	  guidance.”	  (Secretariat)	  The	   above	   exchange	   also	   highlights	   the	   Secretariat’s	   awareness	   of	  CDP’s	  influence.	  A	  member	  of	  the	  Secretariat	  explained	  that	  they	  had	  reached	  an	   agreement	   that	   CDP	   would	   “develop	   a	   financial	   sector	   supplement	   once	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  reporting	  (For	  more	  detail	  on	  CDP	  see:	  Kolk,	  Levy,	  and	  Pinkse	  2008;	  Matisoff,	  Noonan,	  and	  O’Brien	  2013).	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we’re	   done	   with	   the	   project”,	   describing	   them	   as	   “sort	   of	   like	   an	  implementation	  partner”	  (Interview:	  Eag1413).	   Indeed	  this	  supports	  Botzem	  and	  Dobusch’s	  observation	  that	  “third	  parties	  can	  play	  a	   fundamental	  role	   in	  pushing	   adopters	   to	   follow	   a	   standard,	   making	   them	   virtually	   obligatory”	  (Botzem	   and	   Dobusch	   2012,	   p.740),	   with	   financial	   organisations’	   desire	   to	  disclose	   to	   CDP	   driving	   adoption	   of	   and	   compliance	   with	   the	   GHG	   Protocol	  standards.	  
CAMPAIGNING-­‐NGOS	  DEMANDS	  ON	  COMMERCIAL	  BANKS	  TO	  PARTICIPATE	  The	  influence	  of	  NGO	  campaigns	  on	  financial	  organisations	  (Chapter	  5)	  had	  provided	  organisations	  such	  as	  Rainforest	  Action	  Network	  (RAN)	  92	  with,	  as	  Gough	   and	   Shackley	  write,	   	   “a	   place	   at	   the	   negotiating	   table”	   (Gough	   and	  Shackley	   2001,	   329).	   It	   should	   be	   noted,	   however,	   that	   even	   though	  participants	   recognized	   RAN’s	   influence,	   the	   organisation	   did	   not	   hold	   a	  position	  on	  the	  Advisory	  Committee.	  RAN	  was,	  as	  members	  of	  the	  Secretariat	  explained	  during	   informal	   conversation,	   consulted	   on	  whether	   the	   decisions	  being	   made	   within	   the	   Financed	   Emissions	   Initiative	   would	   satisfy	   the	  campaigning-­‐NGOs	   demands	   for	   transparency	   from	   commercial	   banks.	   Yet	  they	   were	   not	   invited	   to	   join	   the	   Advisory	   Committee	   or	   its	   meetings.	   This	  was,	   the	   Secretariat	   explained	   during	   informal	   conversations,	   in	   order	   to	  promote	  a	  ‘more	  open	  and	  collaborative	  atmosphere’.	  However	  as	  well	  as	  working	  to	  align	  the	  Financed	  Emissions	  Initiative	  with	  RAN’s	   transparency	  demands,	  RAN	   also	   placed	   substantial	   pressure	   on	  US-­‐based	  commercial	  banks	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  project.	  While	  their	  influence	  in	   the	   financial	   sector	   as	   a	  whole	  was	   studied	   in	   Chapter	   5,	   RAN	   also	  made	  demands	   to	   specific	   commercial	   banks	   that	   they	   disclose	   their	   financed	  emissions,	  with	  RAN	  acknowledging	  participation	   in	   the	  Financed	  Emissions	  Initiative	  as	  part	  of	  a	  commercial	  bank’s	  response.	  As	  an	  interviewee	  of	  a	  large	  US	  commercial	  bank	  explained,	   “we	  are	  not	  going	   to	  go	  out	  and	  develop	  our	  own	   policy.	   First	  we	   need	   to	   develop	   an	   industry	   standard	   […]	   If	  we	   take	   a	  leadership	  role	  in	  [the	  Financed	  Emissions	  Initiative],	  then	  that’s	  our	  response	  to	  the	  activists,	  saying	  ‘Look	  we	  are	  trying	  to	  work	  with	  the	  industry	  to	  find	  a	  way	   to	   make	   this	   happen’”	   (Interview:	   Eag1519).	   RAN	   had	   threatened	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  92	  RAN	  is	  a	  member	  of	  BankTrack,	  a	  network	  of	  campaigning-­‐NGOs	  whose	  activism	  in	  the	   financial	   sector	   have	   been	   well	   documented	   through	   O’Sullivan	   and	   O’Dwyer’s	  work	  (O’Sullivan	  and	  O’Dwyer	  2009;	  O’Sullivan	  and	  O’Dwyer	  2015).	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initiate	  a	  campaign	  against	  the	  interviewee’s	  commercial	  bank,	  similar	  to	  RAN	  campaigns	   faced	   by	   the	   same	   bank	   during	   the	   early-­‐2000s.	   By	   maintaining	  pressure,	   especially	   on	   US	   commercial	   banks,	   RAN	   sought	   to	   build	   a	   “quiet	  consensus	   among	   banks	   that	   NGO	   pressure	   on	   this	   issue	   is	   not	   going	   to	   go	  away	  so	  they	  might	  as	  well	  be	  transparent	  and	  disclose”	  (Interview:	  Eag1414).	  Indeed	   the	   memory	   and	   experience	   of	   being	   targeted	   by	   earlier	   RAN	  campaigns	  underpinned	  comments	  from	  the	  commercial	  bank	  representative.	  Moreover,	   the	   initial	   aims	   for	   the	  Financed	  Emissions	   Initiative	   aligned	  with	  the	  combined	  pressures	  from	  CDP	  and	  RAN	  to	  make	  visible	  the	  GHG	  emissions	  that	  are	  enabled	  by	  investment	  and	  lending	  activities.	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  this	  section	  only	  set	  out	   to	  provide	  background	  to	  the	  pressures	  on	   financial	  organisations	   to	   engage	  with	   the	   standard-­‐setting	   project.	   The	   chapter	   now	  turns	  its	  attention	  to	  the	  gradual	  reconfiguration	  of	  the	  standard	  away	  from	  a	  focus	   on	   financed	   emissions	   and	   towards	   metrics	   for	   monitoring	   the	  alignment	  of	  investment	  and	  lending	  activities	  with	  a	  two	  degrees	  scenario.	  To	  study	  this,	  the	  next	  section	  brings	  the	  reader	  inside	  the	  TWG	  webinars	  and	  the	  in-­‐person	  meetings	   of	   both	   the	   Advisory	   Committee	   (in	  May	   2014)	   and	   the	  project	  as	  a	  whole	  (in	  June	  2014).	  
6.1.5.	  TECHNICAL	  WORKING	  GROUP	  5	  AND	  CARBON	  ASSET	  RISK	  In	   October	   2013	   the	   Advisory	   Committee	   met	   at	   Bank	   of	   America’s	  New	   York	   office	   to	   build	   a	   common	   vision	   for	   the	   standard	   and	   to	   set	   its	  objectives	   and	   scope,	   as	   well	   as	   agreeing	   the	   project	   development	   timeline.	  Prior	   to	   this	  meeting	   the	   Financed	   Emissions	   Initiative	  maintained	   a	   strong	  focus	  on	  developing	  accounting	  guidance	  for	   financed	  emissions.	  However	  at	  that	  meeting	  the	  representatives	  of	  a	  major	  US	  bank	  pushed	  for	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  guidance	  document	  on	  managing	  carbon	  asset	  risk.	  Discussing	  this	  proposal	  during	   an	   interview,	   a	   representative	   from	   a	   large	   US	   commercial	   bank	  commented:	  “[That	   bank]	   proposed	   carbon	   asset	   risk	   because	   of	   the	  
Unburnable	   Carbon	   thesis.	   Carbon	   asset	   risk	   was	   kind	   of	  newer	   on	   the	   horizon	   and	   it’s	   something	   everyone	   was	  talking	  about	  and	  [that	  bank]	  was	  really	  kind	  of	  saying,	  ‘Hey,	  this	   is	   something	   that	   actually	   could	  have	   an	   impact	   on	  our	  balance	   sheets,	   could	   potentially	   change	   our	   risk	  management	  analysis’”	  (Interview:	  Eag1519)	  As	   Carbon	   Tracker’s	   work	   on	   the	   carbon	   budget	   came	   to	   shape	   the	  financial	   sector	   discourse	   on	   climate	   risk,	   this	   major	   US	   bank	   turned	   to	   its	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involvement	  in	  the	  Financed	  Emissions	  Initiative	  as	  a	  means	  of	  developing	  the	  tools	   to	   understand	   and	   manage	   such	   risks.	   However	   while	   the	   Secretariat	  suggested	   that	   financed	   emissions	   information	   had	   relevance	   to	   risk	  management,	   this	   generated	   little	   support	   among	   Advisory	   Committee	  members	   during	   the	   October	   2013	   meeting.	   This	   was	   primarily	   because	  carbon	  asset	  risks	  stemmed	  from	  impairment	  of	  underlying	  assets	  stemming	  from	   new	   carbon	   constraints.	   However	   financed	   emissions	   were	   argued	   to	  have	  little	  relevance	  to	  risk	  management	  because	  they	  only	  provide	  an	  annual	  emissions	   figure,	  whereas	   ‘locked-­‐in’	   or	   ‘cumulative’	   emissions93	  of	   an	   asset,	  for	   example,	   could	   be	   compared	   more	   easily	   with	   scenarios	   for	   carbon	  constraints.	   Through	   these	   discussions	   the	   idea	   for	   a	   fifth	   TWG	   emerged,	  which	  would	   create	   a	   ‘sister	   guidance’	   document	   developed	   in	   parallel	  with	  the	  core	  Accounting	  work	  stream.	  Specifically,	   this	  group	  would	  use	  existing	  risk	  management	   practices	   as	   its	   foundation,	   working	   to	   render	   the	   idea	   of	  carbon	  risk	  into	  a	  compatible	  form.	  As	  such	  it	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  group	  was	   not	   working	   on	   refining	   the	   carbon	   budget	   into	   portfolio-­‐level	   risk	  management	  metrics.	  Rather,	  it	  worked	  to	  render	  the	  idea	  of	  carbon	  risk	  into	  a	   form	   compatible	   with	   existing	   risk	   management	   practices,	   such	   as	  Environment,	  Social	  and	  Governance	  (ESG)	  analysis	  and	  stress	  testing	  through	  scenario	  analysis.	  Beyond	  the	  interest	  in	  measuring	  and	  managing	  carbon	  asset	  risk	  from	  the	  US	  bank,	  the	  sister	  guidance	  document	  was	  presented	  to	  the	  Secretariat	  as	  providing	   “a	   new	   way	   to	   get	   climate	   mainstream	   within	   [their	   bank]”	  (Interview:	   Eag1514).	   It	   was	   claimed	   that	   it	   would	   enable	   the	   bank’s	  sustainability	   team	   to	   “have	   a	   convincing	   conversation	   with	   risk	   managers,	  [who]	  are	  the	  influencers	  on	  what	  you’re	  going	  to	  invest	  in	  and	  where	  you	  are	  going	   to	   focus	   your	   business”	   (Interview:	   Eag1514).	   To	   the	   Secretariat,	   the	  formation	   of	   TWG	   5	   promised	   to	   extend	   the	   reach	   and	   influence	   of	   the	  Financed	   Emissions	   Initiative’s	   output	   within	   adopting	   organisations.	  However,	   the	   member	   of	   the	   Secretariat	   remarked	   that	   the	   guidance	  developed	  by	  TWG	  5	   “was	  different	   than	  other	   types	  of	  documents	   from	  the	  GHG	   Protocol	   in	   that	   it	   wasn’t	   only	   focussed	   on	   reporting,	   it	   was	   only	   for	  internal	   decision-­‐making”	   (Interview:	   Eag1514).	   Prior	   to	   the	   formation	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  93	  Locked-­‐in	  emissions	  refer	  to	  the	  pre-­‐determined	  lifetime	  emissions	  of	  an	  asset	  and	  cumulative	  emissions	  is	  the	  total	  emissions	  associated	  with	  a	  particular	  investment.	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TWG	   5,	   the	   GHG	   Protocol	   had	   developed	   standards	   to	   guide	   the	   corporate-­‐level	   reporting	   of	   GHG	   emissions	   in	   order	   to	   enhance	   the	   accuracy	   and	  comparability	   of	   the	   information	   being	   produced.	   In	   contrast,	   TWG	   5	   was	  formed	  to	  develop	  tools	  that	  could	  factor	  the	  idea	  of	  climate	  risk	  into	  existing	  risk	  management	  practices.	  	  During	  the	  January	  2014	  ‘kickoff	  call’	  for	  the	  TWG	  process,	  the	  Carbon	  Asset	  Risk	  work	  stream	  was	  presented	  by	  the	  Secretariat	  as	  creating	  tools	  to	  “highlight	   how	   greenhouse	   gas	   risks	   materialize	   for	   different	   financial	  institutions	  and	  in	  different	  points	  along	  the	  provision	  of	  capital	  to	  companies	  and	  to	  assets.	  Particularly	  those	  companies	  and	  those	  assets	  that	  have	  a	  high	  exposure	   to	   greenhouse	   gas	   emissions.”	  While	   there	  had	  been	  disagreement	  among	  the	  Advisory	  Committee	  as	  to	  the	  relevance	  of	   financed	  emissions	  for	  the	   risk	  guidance	  document,	   the	  Secretariat	  explained	  during	   the	  kickoff	   call	  that	   the	  work	   of	   TWGs	   1	   to	   4	  would	   inform	   the	   risk	   guidance	   produced	   by	  TWG	  5.	  This	  was	  premised	  on	  the	  idea	  that	  financed	  emissions	  had	  relevance	  to	   risk	  management.	  However,	   as	   the	  next	   section	   explores,	   this	   assumption	  was	  central	  to	  growing	  tensions	  within	  the	  project,	  tensions	  that	  would	  bring	  the	  Financed	  Emissions	  Initiative	  to	  the	  brink	  of	  collapse	  in	  June	  2014.	  
6.2.	   TENSIONS	   EMERGE	   IN	   DISCUSSIONS	   ON	   ‘BUSINESS	  
GOALS’	  This	   chapter	   now	   turns	   its	   focus	   to	   discussions	   on	   the	   ‘Business	  Goals’94	  section	   of	   the	   standard	   for	   two	   reasons.	   First,	   tensions	   began	   to	  emerge	  between	  the	  Secretariat	  and	  Advisory	  Committee	  members	  regarding	  the	   relevance	   of	   financed	   emissions	   to	   the	   proposed	   business	   goal	   of	  managing	   risk.	   It	   should	   be	   noted	   that,	   whereas	   the	   idea	   of	   ‘climate	   risk’	  (Chapter	  5)	  relates	  to	  the	  physical,	  regulatory,	  competitive	  and	  litigation	  risks	  that	  climate	  change	  poses,	   the	  Financed	  Emissions	   Initiative	   focussed	  on	   the	  financial	   risks	   to	   intermediaries	  and	   investors	   that	   stem	   from	   their	   financial	  stake	   in	   companies,	   referred	   to	   as	   ‘carbon	   asset	   risk’.	   Second,	   an	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  94	  ‘Business	  goals’	  refers	  to	  –	  as	  will	  be	  explained	  further	  in	  Section	  6.2.1	  –	  the	  section	  of	  the	  standard	  that	  outlines	  the	  purposes	  for	  which	  an	  organization	  would	  adopt	  the	  standard.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Financed	  Emissions	  Initiative,	  the	  business	  goals	  relate	  to	  the	   reasons	   a	   financial	   organization	   would	   measure	   and	   report	   their	   financed	  emissions.	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understanding	  of	  the	  ‘Business	  Goals’	  component	  of	  the	  standard	  is	  necessary	  for	   understanding	   later	   discussions	   on	   boundary-­‐setting	   rules,	   addressed	   in	  Section	  6.3.	  
6.2.1.	  BACKGROUND	  TO	  BUSINESS	  GOALS	  	  Since	  the	  GHG	  Protocol’s	  Corporate	  Standard	  in	  2001,	  the	  first	  stage	  in	  measuring	   and	   reporting	  GHG	  emissions	   is	   for	   an	   organisation	   to	  define	   the	  business	  goals	  it	  pursues	  by	  measuring	  and	  reporting	  on	  GHG	  emissions.	  The	  GHG	  Protocol’s	  updated	  2004	  Corporate	  Standard	  details	  such	  goals:	  “A	   well-­‐designed	   and	   maintained	   corporate	   GHG	   inventory	  can	  serve	  several	  business	  goals,	  including:	  
• Managing	   GHG	   risks	   and	   identifying	   reduction	  opportunities	  
• Public	   reporting	   and	   participation	   in	   voluntary	   GHG	  programs	  	  
• Participating	  in	  mandatory	  reporting	  programs	  
• Participating	  in	  GHG	  markets	  
• Recognition	  for	  early	  voluntary	  action.”	  (GHG	  Protocol	  2004,	  p.3)	  
	   Business	   goals	   play	   a	   significant	   role	   in	   the	   GHG	   Protocol	   standards	  because	  their	  guidance	  on	  boundary	  setting	  allows	  a	  reporting	  organisation	  to	  tailor	   their	   measurement	   and	   reporting	   to	   the	   specific	   business	   goals	   they	  select.	   Put	   differently,	   business	   goals	   do	  more	   than	   offer	   a	   reason	   to	   report,	  they	   allow	   reporting	   organisations	   the	   flexibility	   of	   stating	   their	   reasons	   for	  producing	   GHG	   accounts	   and	   to	   tailor	   their	   efforts	   specifically	   to	   those	  reasons.	   What	   is	   important	   to	   note	   is	   that	   the	   GHG	   Protocol	   standards	   are	  designed	   to	   provide	   toolkits	   that	   cater	   to	   the	   numerous	   motivations	   for	  measuring	  and	  reporting	  on	  GHG	  emissions.	  This	  reasoning	  was	  expressed	  in	  the	  2004	  Corporate	  Standard	  as	  follows:	  	  “Companies	   generally	   want	   their	   GHG	   inventory[95]	   to	   be	  capable	  of	  serving	  multiple	  goals.	  It	  therefore	  makes	  sense	  to	  design	  the	  process	  from	  the	  outset	  to	  provide	  information	  for	  a	   variety	   of	   different	   users	   and	   uses—both	   current	   and	  future.	   The	   GHG	   Protocol	   Corporate	   Standard	   has	   been	  designed	  as	  a	  comprehensive	  GHG	  accounting	  and	  reporting	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  95	  A	  GHG	   inventory	  can	  be	   thought	  of	  as	  a	   reporting	  entity’s	  annual	  carbon	  account.	  The	  GHG	   inventory	  accounts	   for	   the	  GHG	  pollutants	  emitted	   into	   the	  atmosphere	  by	  an	  organization’s	  activities	  that	  are	  within	  the	  reporting	  entity	  boundaries	  set	  out	   in	  the	   standard.	   However	   GHG	   inventory	   (and	   emissions	   inventory)	   is	   a	   general	   term	  referring	  to,	  for	  example,	  the	  annual	  submissions	  of	  Parties	  to	  the	  UNFCCC	  regarding	  their	  net	  emissions,	  which	  consist	  of	  annual	  emissions	  less	  the	  ‘sinks’	  (or	  removals)	  of	  GHGs	  from	  the	  atmosphere.	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framework	   to	   provide	   the	   information	   building	   blocks	  capable	  of	  serving	  most	  business	  goals.”	  (GHG	  Protocol	  2004,	  p.11)	  In	   this	   regard,	   companies	  may	  adopt	   the	  GHG	  Protocol	   standards	   for	  reasons	   other	   than	   requirements	   to	   do	   so	   for	   a	   particular	   reporting	   regime.	  Indeed,	  this	  also	  allows	  the	  GHG	  Protocol	  standards	  to	  remain	  flexible	  in	  how	  they	   are	   implemented,	   while	   appearing	   as	   the	   standardised	   approach	   that	  underpins	  numerous	  disclosure	   requirements.	   For	   example	   compliance	  with	  the	   GHG	   Protocol	   standards	   is	   required	   by	   the	   DEFRA	   mandatory	   GHG	  reporting	  rules	  for	  companies	  listed	  on	  the	  FTSE	  Main	  Market	  (DEFRA	  2012),	  as	  well	  as	  the	  voluntary	  disclosures	  to	  CDP	  outlined	  in	  Section	  6.1.4.	  In	  other	  words,	   the	   GHG	   Protocol	   standards	   are	   designed	   to	   offer	   a	   comprehensive	  toolkit	   that	   is	   compatible	   with	   different	   motivations	   and	   initiatives	   for	  measuring	  and	   reporting	  GHG	  emissions.	   It	   is	  when	   they	  are	   combined	  with	  regulatory	   requirements	   that	   the	   standards	   become	   more	   prescriptive.	  However	   this	   chapter	   focuses	   on	   the	   emergence	   of	   a	   standard	   and,	   as	   such,	  incorporation	   into	   other	   regulatory	   regimes,	   while	   perceived	   by	   many	  participants	  as	  likely,	  is	  a	  matter	  for	  further	  study.	  Instead,	  this	  section	  focuses	  on	   ‘Business	  Goals’	  discussions	   to	  highlight	   tensions	   that	  emerged	  regarding	  the	   relevance	   of	   financed	   emissions	   to	   the	   shifting	   objectives	   of	   project	  participants.	  	  
6.2.2.	  TWG	  4	  DEVELOPS	  DRAFT	  BUSINESS	  GOALS	  During	  a	  March	  2014	  webinar	  one	  of	  the	  TWG	  4	  leaders	  explained	  that	  the	  Business	  Goals	  subgroup	  had	  developed	   four	  separate	  goals,	  which	  were	  almost	  identical	  to	  those	  in	  the	  Scope	  3	  Standard.	  Again,	  one	  of	  the	  key	  aspects	  of	   establishing	   a	   business	   goal	   was	   to	   provide	   flexibility	   to	   the	   adopting	  organisation,	  allowing	  it	  to	  tailor	  the	  measurement	  and	  reporting	  practices	  to	  their	   specific	   concerns.	  As	   such,	   the	  business	   goals	  were	  being	  developed	   to	  represent	  the	  concerns	  of	  project	  participants,	  as	  well	  as	  establishing	  financed	  emissions	  as	  an	  appropriate	  basis	  for	  addressing	  those	  concerns	  at	  corporate-­‐	  and	  portfolio-­‐level.	  This	  section	  will	  explore	  the	  tensions	  that	  emerged	  around	  four	   business	   goals,	   which	   were	   outlined	   in	   the	   April	   2014	   Business	   Goals	  draft	  text	  as:	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“Goal	  1:	  Identify	  carbon	  risks	  and	  opportunities	  […]	  Goal	  2:	  Develop	  a	  carbon	  management	  plan/strategy	  […]	  Goal	  3:	  Engage	  value	  chain	  partners	  […]	  Goal	  4:	  Stakeholder	  engagement.”	  (April	  2014	  Business	  Goals	  draft	  text)	  	  The	  first	  business	  goal,	  “Identify	  carbon	  risks	  and	  opportunities”,	  was	  motivated	   by	   the	   view	   that	   “[c]orporate	   carbon	   footprints	   and	  management	  strategies	   are	   increasingly	   subject	   to	   public	   scrutiny,	   legislation	   and	  regulation.	   This	   translates	   into	   two	   principal	   sources	   of	   carbon	   risk	   and	  opportunity	  for	  financial	  institutions:96	  [regulatory	  and	  reputational	  risks	  and	  opportunities]”.	  	  “In	  the	  second	  goal”,	  one	  of	  the	  TWG	  4	  coordinators	  explained	  during	  a	  webinar,	   “[the	   subgroup	   on	   Business	   Goals	   is]	   looking	   to	   take	   that	  information,	   once	   you’ve	   actually	   gone	   through	   the	   process	   of	   using	   the	  standard	  to	  map	  out	  what	  your	  key	  risks	  and	  opportunities	  are,	  to	  develop	  a	  strategy	  and	  a	  response”.	  Titled	  “Develop	  a	  carbon	  management	  strategy”,	  this	  goal	   argues	   that	   financed	   emissions	   information	   helps	   to	   identify	   ‘hotspots’	  where	   emissions	   are	   particularly	   high.	   This,	   it	   continues,	   puts	   the	   financial	  organisation	   “in	   a	   better	   position	   to	   determine	   potential	   risk	   mitigation	  approaches,	   or	   new	  market	   opportunities,	   that	   should	   be	   considered	  within	  the	  broader	  corporate	  strategy.”	  “The	  third	  goal	  [‘Value	  Chain	  Engagement’]”	  the	  coordinator	  explained,	  “is	  looking	  to	  very	  much	  address	  the	  question	  of	  how	  you	  would	  then	  leverage	  the	   whole	   value	   chain	   in	   order	   to	   more	   effectively	   deliver	   that	   response”.	  Central	   arguments	   in	   the	   draft	   document	   are	   that	   the	   standard	   offers	   “a	  unified	  approach	  to	  GHG	  management”	  as	  well	  as	  helping	  to	  “achieve	  common	  and	   differentiated	   business	   objectives	   –	   driving	   collaboration,	   knowledge	  sharing,	   efficiencies	   and	   cost	   reduction.”	   As	   such,	   the	   first	   three	   goals	   were	  interconnected	   parts	   of	   creating	   and	   implementing	   a	   risk	   management	  strategy:	  identification,	  planning,	  and	  implementing.	  The	   fourth	   and	   final	   goal,	   however,	   appeared	   more	   as	   a	   standalone	  objective	   and	   one	   that	   had	   been	   central	   to	   the	   project	   since	   the	   start	   of	   its	  2012	  scoping	  phase.	  The	  coordinator	  noted	  that	   it	  addresses	  “the	  benefits	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  96	  UNEP	  FI	  Investor	  Briefing:	  Portfolio	  Carbon.	  http://www.unepfi.org/fileadmin/documents/UNEP_FI_Investor_Briefing_Portfolio_Carbon.pdf	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disclosure	  and	  what	  some	  of	  the	  stakeholder	  benefits	  are”.	  The	  argument	  was	  based	  on	   the	  opinion	   that	  environmental	   campaigns	   “are	   shifting	   their	   focus	  from	   the	   environmental	   performance	   of	   corporations	   to	   that	   of	   financial	  institutions”	   (April	   2014	  Business	  Goals	   draft	   text).	   Particular	   attention	  was	  drawn	   to	   the	   recent	   RAN	   campaigning	   effort	   “for	   enhanced	   disclosure	   of	  “financed	   emissions”	   by	   commercial	   banks	   in	   the	   US”	   as	   well	   as	   the	   Asset	  Owners	  Disclosure	  Project’s	   (AODP)97	  campaign	   to	  mobilise	   the	  beneficiaries	  of	   institutional	   investors	   to	   “increase	   transparency	   on	   [institutional	  investors’]	   GHG	   emissions	   and	   broader	   climate	   change	   related	   risks”	   (Ibid.).	  “Responding	   to	   stakeholder	   interest	   by	   disclosing	   GHG	   emissions”	   was	  highlighted	  in	  the	  draft	  text	  as	  “a	  core	  business	  objective	  of	  developing	  a	  scope	  3	  invested	  assets	  inventory.”	  This	  very	  brief	  presentation	  of	  the	  four	  business	  goals	  during	  a	  March	  2014	  webinar	  was	  followed	  with	  a	  range	  of	  questions,	  focussing	  in	  particular	  on	  the	  three	  goals	  pertaining	  to	  risk	  management.	  Indeed,	  these	  remained	  the	  focus	  of	  discussions	  in	  the	  in-­‐person	  Advisory	  Committee	  and	  TWG	  meetings	  over	  the	  coming	  months,	  as	  examined	  later	  in	  this	  section.	  However	  in	  one	  of	  the	   more	   animated	   exchanges	   during	   the	   webinar	   participants	   challenged	  whether	  financed	  emissions	  could	  be	  made	  compatible	  with	  risk	  assessments	  without	   a	   carbon	   price	   through	   which	   the	   emissions	   information	   could	   be	  monetized:	  “I	   would	   just	   have	   one	   comment	   on	   it,	   just	   from	   what	   I’ve	  heard	  other	  financial	  institutions	  have	  to	  say	  about	  this.	  They	  would	   say	   greenhouse	   gas	   emissions	   on	   their	   loans	   are	   not	  useful	   for	  their	  risk	  management	  models,	  because	  right	  now	  emissions	   don’t	   equate	   to	   risk	   because	   there	   is	   not,	   in	   any	  countries,	  a	  price	  on	  carbon.”	  (TWG	  participant)	  Central	  to	  this	  criticism	  is	  that	  financed	  emissions	  are	  not	  compatible	  with	   risk	   assessment	  methods	  without	   a	   price	   on	   carbon.	   However	  without	  the	   ability	   to	   monetize	   emissions	   data,	   participants	   argued	   that	   financed	  emissions	   had	   little	   relevance	   to	   risk.	   That	   is,	   making	   climate	   change	  compatible	  with	  risk	  was	  not	  only	  a	  matter	  of	  quantifying	  GHG	  emissions,	  but	  also	   of	   costing	   those	   emissions.	   Indeed,	   participants	   argued	   that	   it	   was	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  97	  AODP	  is	  a	  London-­‐based	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  organization	  “whose	  objective	  is	  to	  protect	  asset	   owners	   from	   the	   risks	   posed	   by	   climate	   change	   […]	   by	  working	  with	   pension	  funds,	   insurance	  companies,	  sovereign	  wealth	   funds,	   foundations	  and	  universities	   to	  improve	  the	  level	  of	  disclosure	  and	  industry	  best	  practice”	  (AODP	  2012,	  p.4).	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because	   a	   carbon	   price	   could	   not	   be	   applied	   across	   financed	   emissions	   that	  TWG	   5,	   in	   working	   on	   the	   Carbon	   Asset	   Risk	   guidance,	   had	   focussed	   on	  developing	  a	  general	   framework	   to	  guide	   investors	  and	   lenders	   in	  assessing,	  evaluating	  and	  managing	  risk.	  The	  exchange	  continued:	  “Yes.	  Yes,	  ok.	  That	  is	  a	  valid	  point.	  (TWG	  lead)	  I	   definitely	   think	   it’s	  worth	   highlighting	   or	   at	   least	   pointing	  out	  this	  issue	  in	  the	  guidance.	  I	  mean	  eventually	  there	  will	  be	  a	  price	  on	  carbon	  and	  then	  hopefully	  then	  you	  will	  be	  able	  to	  more	  easily	  translate	  emissions	  directly	  to	  risk.	  That	  was	  like	  one	  of	   the	  main	  drivers	   for	  developing	   the	   second	  guidance	  document.”	  (TWG	  participant)	  However	   the	   participant	   leading	   the	   discussion	   on	   Business	   Goals	  appeared	   keen	   to	   support	   the	   link	   between	   financed	   emissions	   and	   risk	  management,	  connecting	  the	  core	  accounting	  standard	  to	  the	  growing	  carbon	  asset	   risk	   concerns	   among	   participants.	  Without	   a	   carbon	   price,	   the	   project	  was	   limited	  to	  developing	  a	  standard	  that	  created	   information	  with	  a	  degree	  of	   relevance	   to	   risk	   management,	   and	   it	   was	   the	   relevance	   of	   financed	  emissions	   that	   continued	   to	   be	   challenged	   in	   later	   meetings.	   While	  acknowledging	   the	   participant’s	   point,	   the	  TWG	   lead	   sought	   to	  maintain	   the	  connection	  and	  to	  adopt	  the	  criticism	  as	  a	  caveat	  to	  that	  link:	  	  “That’s	   true.	   I	  mean	   it	   also	   sometimes	   translates	   to	  market	  risk	   in	   that	   regard	   as	   well,	   or	   investment	   risk;	   where	   you	  have	   concentrated	   emissions	   activity	   in	   your	   portfolio,	   if	  there	   is	   regulatory	   change	   or	   a	   technological	   shift	   or	  behavioural	   shift.	   So	   I	   think	   that’s	   a	   good	  point,	   and	   I	   don’t	  think	  we	  have	  to	  be	  too	  explicit	  about	  it,	  but	  definitely	  saying	  that	   [financed	  emissions]	   can	  aid	   in	   that	   [risk	  management]	  process	  perhaps.”	  (TWG	  lead)	  The	   fourth	   business	   goal,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   was	   only	   questioned	  during	   the	   following	   webinar,	   held	   in	   April	   2014.	   A	   participant	   from	   a	  campaigning-­‐NGO	   commented	   “Rainforest	   Action	   Network	   is	   only	   one	   of	  several	  NGOs	  that	   is	  campaigning	  on	  this	   issue	  so	  I	  recommend	  reframing	   in	  paragraph	   two:	   ‘several	   global	   NGOs	   are	   campaigning	   for	   banks	   to	   disclose	  their	   financed	   emissions’”	   instead	   of	   only	   remarking	   on	   the	   campaigning	  efforts	   of	  RAN	   in	   the	  US.	   In	   particular,	   the	  participant	   drew	  attention	   to	   the	  “partners	  in	  the	  BankTrack	  network	  that	  focus	  on	  the	  European	  banks	  […]	  so	  that	  will	   sort	  of	   globalise	   the	   scope	  of	   that.”	  The	  participant	  also	  went	  on	   to	  outline	  that	  campaigning-­‐NGOs	  will	  come	  to	  expect	  more	  than	  transparency	  in	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the	  near	  future,	  building	  on	  earlier	  campaigns	  to	  push	  financial	  organisations	  to	  demonstrate	  their	  performance	  plans	  and	  targets	  for	  reducing	  the	  financed	  emissions	  figures:	  “Rainforest	   Action	   Network	   is	   actually	   interested	   in	  performance	   improvements	   and	   emissions	   reduction.	   So	   in	  terms	  of	   the	   long-­‐term	  stakeholder	  expectations,	  we	  foresee	  that,	   over	   the	   next	   five	   to	   ten	   years,	   at	   least	   major	   high-­‐profile	   investment	   banks	  will	   face	   an	   expectation	   from	   civil	  society	   that	   they	   should	   not	   only	   disclose	   their	   financed	  emissions	   […]	   but	   also	   develop	   performance	   plans	   and	  performance	   targets	   for	   reducing	   them,	   so	   I	   think	   that	   is	  worth	  capturing.	  (TWG	  Participant	  from	  an	  NGO)	  And	  would	  that	  be	  in	  the	  stakeholder	  engagement	  [Business	  Goal	  4]	  bit?	  (TWG	  Presenter)	  Yes,	   I	   think	   that	   is	   worth	   putting	   in	   the	   stakeholder	  engagement	  part.	  (TWG	  Participant	  from	  an	  NGO)	  Ok	   then,	   I’ll	   do	   my	   best	   to	   address	   those	   comments	   and	  perhaps	   circulate	   those	   back	   to	   you	   individually	   just	   to	  confirm	   that	   captures	   what	   you	   put	   forward.	   (Subgroup	  Lead)	  That	  sounds	  great.	  […]	  (TWG	  Participant	  from	  an	  NGO)	  To	  be	  honest	  I	  actually	  had	  the	  comment	  around	  ‘what	  about	  the	  other	  groups?	  They	  might	  get	  a	  bit	  miffed.’	  [Laughter]	  […]	  (TWG	  Presenter)	  Yeah,	   we	   have	   to	   be	   very	   careful	   not	   to	   look	   US-­‐centric.”	  (Secretariat)	  However	   apart	   from	   the	   standard	   emphasising	   that	   transparency	  demands	   will	   be	   strengthened	   to	   include	   plans	   and	   targets	   for	   reducing	  financed	  emissions,	   the	  stakeholder	  engagement	  business	  goal	  received	   little	  attention.	   Discussions	   instead	   focussed	   on	   the	   connection	   between	   financed	  emissions	  and	   the	  emerging	   concerns	  of	   carbon	  asset	   risk.	  Having	  discussed	  the	  Business	  Goals	  draft	  twice	  with	  the	  entire	  TWG,	  the	  subgroup	  made	  minor	  alterations	  to	  the	  Business	  Goals	  draft	  before	  it	  was	  presented	  to	  the	  Advisory	  Committee	  at	  their	  in-­‐person	  meeting	  held	  in	  May	  2014	  in	  Milan.	  This	  chapter	  now	   turns	   to	   consider	   the	   emerging	   tensions	   surrounding	   the	   relevance	   of	  financed	  emissions	  to	  risk	  management	  systems,	  and	  how	  this	  cast	  doubt	  on	  the	  connection	  between	  the	  core	  accounting	  standard	  and	  the	  ‘sister’	  guidance	  on	  risk	  management.	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6.2.3.	   RELEVANCE	   OF	   FINANCED	   EMISSIONS	   QUESTIONED	   BY	   ADVISORY	  
COMMITTEE	  At	   UniCredit’s	   headquarter,	   the	   May	   2014	   Advisory	   Committee	  meeting	  commenced	  promptly	  at	  8.30am	  in	  a	  12th	  floor	  conference	  room	  with	  views	   stretching	   across	  Milan.98Observations	  were	  made	   from	   the	   corner	   of	  the	  room,	  with	  the	  centre	  of	  the	  room	  being	  occupied	  by	  tables	  arranged	  in	  a	  ‘horseshoe’	  and	  focussed	  on	  a	  projector	  screen	  at	  the	  front	  of	  the	  room	  where	  presentations	   were	   made. 99 	  Advisory	   Committee	   members	   in	   attendance	  included	   representatives	   of	   commercial	   banks,	   institutional	   investors,	  investor	  networks,	  disclosure	  groups,	  think	  tanks	  and	  NGOs.	  During	   this	  meeting	   it	   was	   the	   NGO	   and	   think	   tank	   community	   that	  challenged	  the	  relevance	  of	  financed	  emissions	  to	  risk.	  Members	  representing	  financial	   organisations	   also	   voiced	   concerns,	   however	   they	   primarily	  challenged	   what	   they	   saw	   as	   overly	   cumbersome	   requirements	   within	   the	  guidance.	   The	   challenges	   were	   presented	   on	   two	   grounds:	   first,	   whether	   it	  would	   help	   inform	   financial	   organisations’	   risk	   management	   practices;	   and	  second,	   the	  extent	   to	  which	  the	  numbers	  would	  help	  reveal	   the	  alignment	  of	  investment	   and	   lending	   activities	   with	   the	   transition	   to	   a	   two	   degrees	  scenario.	  This	  section	  considers	  each	  in	  turn.	  
RELEVANCE	  OF	  FINANCED	  EMISSIONS	  TO	  RISK	  MANAGEMENT	  	   Whereas	   in	   the	   October	   2013	   Advisory	   Committee	   meeting	   the	  commercial	  banks	  had	  pushed	  for	  a	  fifth	  TWG	  on	  carbon	  asset	  risk,	  it	  was	  the	  think	  tank	  and	  NGO	  community	  that	  pushed	  for	  the	  accounting	  guidance	  to	  be	  relevant	   to	   risk	   management	   at	   the	   May	   2014	   meeting.	   As	   the	   discussions	  commenced	   the	   think	   tank	   and	   NGO	   community	   argued	   that	   the	   core	  accounting	   standard	   should	   be	   tailored	   to	   gain	   traction	   by	   demonstrating	  relevance	   to	   risk	   management	   practices.	   After	   the	   four	   business	   goals	   (see	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  98	  For	  images	  of	  the	  UniCredit	  tower	  and	  the	  rooms	  in	  which	  the	  Advisory	  Committee	  met	  and	  took	  breaks	  see	  Appendix	  6F.	  99	  After	   being	   introduced	   as	   an	   observer	   of	   the	   Advisory	   Committee	   meeting	   and	  briefly	   explaining	   the	   research	   project,	   participants	   agreed	   that	   material	   from	   the	  meeting	   could	   be	   used	   in	   the	   research,	   but	   that	   it	   should	   not	   be	   attributed	   to	  individuals	   or	   their	   organisations.	   As	   such,	   excerpts	   from	   this	   meeting	   are	  contextualised	   by	   indicating	   whether	   comments	   were	  made	   by	   the	   ‘NGO	   and	   think	  tank	   community’,	   the	   ‘finance	   community’	   or	   the	   ‘Secretariat’.	   For	   a	   list	   of	   Advisory	  Committee	   members	   see	   Appendix	   6E,	   and	   note	   that	   this	   is	   publically	   available	  information	  and	  that	  some	  Advisory	  Committee	  members	  were	  unable	   to	  attend	  the	  May	  2014	  meeting	  in	  Milan.	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Figure	   6.1)	   had	   been	   presented,	   the	   first	   three	   became	   the	   centre	   of	   their	  concerns.	  	  
	   	  The	  centre	  of	  their	  concern	  was	  that	  “the	  value	  of	  publishing	  Scope	  3	  emissions	   for	   financial	   institutions	   today	   is	  mostly	   related	   to	   reputation	  and	  totally	   disconnected	   from	   risk	   management”	   (Think	   tank	   and	   NGO	  community)	  because	  it	  is	  focussed	  on	  responding	  to	  the	  demands	  and	  threats	  of	   certain	   campaigning-­‐NGOs.	   They	   argued	   that	   as	   a	   result	   the	   “buy-­‐in	   from	  top	  management	  and	  risk	  management	  teams	  is	  very	  weak,”	  whereas	  the	  idea	  of	   climate	  risk	  had	  started	  gaining	   traction.	  To	   these	   think	   tanks,	   connecting	  the	  new	  carbon	  accounting	  tools	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  climate	  risk	  was	  central	  to	  their	  strategy	   of	   engaging	  with	   decision	  makers	  within	   financial	   organisations.	   In	  this	   regard,	   stakeholders	   (both	   the	   finance	   and	   the	   NGO	   and	   think	   tank	  communities)	  expressed	  their	  desire	  for	  the	  standard	  to	  address	  carbon	  asset	  risk	   concerns.	   Yet	   they	   simultaneously	   challenged	   whether	   the	   choice	   of	  metric,	   financed	   emissions,	   would	   provide	   an	   “effective”	   basis	   for	   risk	  management	  (cf.	  Botzem	  and	  Dobusch	  2012).	  That	  is,	  their	  participation	  in	  the	  project	  was	   not	   only	   about	   identifying	   the	   preferences	   of	   the	   “constituents”	  
Figure	  6.1:	  Business	  Goals	  slide	  presented	  at	  Advisory	  Committee	  meeting	  in	  May	  2014.	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(Scharpf	  1997,	  p.19)	  of	  a	  standard	  (i.e.	  developing	  the	  input	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  standard),	   it	   also	   applied	   their	   expertise	   to	  developing	  practices	   that	   embed	  those	  preferences	  into	  an	  instrument	  that	  is	  compatible	  with	  risk	  assessment	  in	  financial	  organisations	  (Scharpf	  1999,	  p.16).	  	  Yet,	   to	   the	   Secretariat,	   creating	   accounting	   guidance	   on	   financed	  emissions	   was	   an	   opportunity	   for	   the	   GHG	   Protocol	   to	   extend	   its	   Scope	   3	  Standard	   specifically	   to	   the	   financial	   sector.	   To	   develop	   different	  metrics	   or	  indicators	   would	   break	   from	   the	   GHG	   Protocol’s	   focus	   on	   producing	   GHG	  emissions	   data.	   However	   for	   the	   NGO	   and	   think	   tank	   community	   the	  connection	   between	   financed	   emissions	   and,	   in	   particular,	   risk	   was	  unfounded:	  “We	  may	  try	  to	  categorize	  some	  industries	  that	  are	  perceived	  as	  highly	  exposed	  to	  regulatory	  risks.	  But	  we	  don't	  need	  the	  actual	  [financed	  emissions]	  calculations	  to	  do	  that.	  (NGO	  and	  think	  tank	  community)	  Right.	   But	   it	   could	   be	   one	   indication	   though.	   If	   you	   saw	   the	  emissions	  of	  fossil	  fuel	  investments	  in	  certain	  sectors	  and	  the	  weighting	   of	   those	   versus	   others,	   that	   could	   give	   you	   some	  indication	  of	  the	  risks	  from	  this	  one	  company	  versus	  another.	  […]	  What	   I'm	   just	   hearing	   though	   is	   that	   we	   have	   to	   think	  carefully	  about	  how	  you	  would	  report	  for	  the	  inventory	  to	  be	  useful	   for	   providing	   information	   on	   regulatory	   risks.	  (Secretariat)	  I	  think	  for	  at	  least	  for	  the	  first	  four	  [TWGs]	  it	  is	  just	  not	  in	  the	  scope	  of	   the	  work	  we	   are	  doing.	   It's	   just	   disconnected	   from	  regulatory	  risks.”	  (NGO	  and	  think	  tank	  community)	  	  To	   the	   Secretariat,	   the	   Financed	   Emissions	   Initiative	   presented	   an	  opportunity	   to	   foster	   further	   adoption	   of	   the	  GHG	  Protocol	   standards	   in	   the	  financial	   sector.	   It	   was	   similarly	   a	   chance	   for	   them	   to	   demonstrate	   the	  relevance	   of	   their	   standards	   to	   the	   growing	   concerns	   regarding	   carbon	   risk,	  which	   appeared	   to	   be	   a	   key	   element	   of	   their	   adoption	   strategy.	  However	   to	  those	   representatives	   of	   the	   NGO	   and	   think	   tank	   community	   engaging	   with	  financial	  organisations,	  a	  standard	  specifically	  on	  financed	  emissions	  would	  be	  of	   little	   use	   to	   integrating	   carbon	   risk	   considerations	   in	   risk	   management	  practices.	  	  Indeed	   in	   the	   limited	   time	   remaining	   after	   the	   extensive	   discussions	  on	   the	   accounting	   guidance,	   TWG	   5	   outlined	   their	   approach	   to	   assessing,	  evaluating	   and	   managing	   carbon	   asset	   risk	   and	   made	   little	   mention	   of	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financed	   emissions.	   Rather,	   it	   centred	   on	   comparing	   portfolio-­‐level	   risk	  exposure	   to	   risk	   scenarios	   by,	   first,	   develop	   a	   portfolio-­‐level	   ‘carbon	   risk	  exposure’.	   This	   was	   to	   be	   based	   on	   assessments	   of	   policy,	   economic	   and	  reputational	  risks,	  and	  focus	  only	  on	  those	  sectors	  most	  exposed	  to	  such	  risks	  (typically	   the	  most	   carbon-­‐intensive).	   Second,	   this	   carbon	  risk	  exposure	  was	  to	   be	   compared	   against	   ‘risk	   scenarios’	   either	   through	   stress	   testing	   or	  applying	  a	   ‘shadow’	  carbon	  price	   (assigning	  a	  price	  as	  a	  proxy	   for	  estimated	  controls	  on	  GHG	  emissions).	  The	  scenarios,	   it	  was	  suggested,	   could	  be	  based	  on	   different	   levels	   of	   policy	   intervention	   or	   those	   derived	   from	   particular	  levels	  of	  warming.	  However,	  as	  noted,	  time	  constraints	  meant	  that	  TWG	  5	  only	  outlined	   the	  proposed	   structure	  of	   their	   document	   and	   approach	  during	   the	  Advisory	   Committee	  meeting.	   Yet	   the	   approach	   it	   highlighted	  was	   based	   on	  rendering	   an	   investment	   or	   lending	   portfolio	   into	   a	   form	   that	   could	   be	  analysed	   in	   terms	   of	   scenarios	   for	   future	   efforts	   to	   address	   climate	   change.	  Financed	   emissions,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   only	   appeared	   relevant	   as	   one	  component	  of	   identifying	   industries	  with	  potentially	  high	  exposure	  to	  policy,	  economic	  and	  reputational	  risks.	  	  Following	   the	   Advisory	   Committee	  meeting,	   the	   feedback	   for	   TWG	  4	  was	  outlined	  and	  discussed	  via	  webinar.	  Regarding	  the	  redraft	  of	  the	  Business	  Goals	   section,	   the	   Secretariat	   noted	   the	   limited	   relevance	   of	   financed	  emissions	   to	   risk	   assessments	   and	   suggested	   the	   TWG	   focus	   instead	   on	   the	  relevance	   of	   accounting	   specifically	   to	   reputational	   risk	   management.	  Concerns	  over	  risk	  relevance	  would	  surface	  again	  at	  the	  June	  2014	  in-­‐person	  TWG	  meeting	   in	  Washington	   D.C.,	   however	   this	   section	   remains	   within	   the	  May	  2014	  Advisory	  Committee	  meeting	  and	  focuses	  on	  discussions	  regarding	  whether	   the	   Financed	   Emissions	   Initiative	   would	   assist	   in	   rendering	   visible	  the	   alignment	   of	   investment	   and	   lending	   activities	   with	   a	   two	   degrees	  scenario.	  
CALLS	  FOR	  RELEVANCE	  TO	  FINANCING	  THE	  TWO	  DEGREES	  SCENARIO	  Beyond	   calling	   for	   an	   enhanced	   focus	   on	   the	   ‘risk	   relevance’	   of	   the	  accounting	  guidance,	  the	  NGO	  and	  think	  tank	  community	  questioned	  whether	  financed	   emissions	   information	   was	   useful	   for	   monitoring	   the	   alignment	   of	  financial	  organisations’	   investment	  and	   lending	  activities	  with	  a	   two	  degrees	  scenario.	   In	   particular,	   the	   International	   Energy	  Agency	   (IEA)	   had	   produced	  investment	  roadmaps	  of	  industrial	  transition	  for	  different	  policy	  scenarios	  for	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climate	  change,	  including	  a	  scenario	  aimed	  at	  limiting	  the	  average	  increase	  in	  global	   temperatures	   to	   two	  degrees	  Celsius.	  These	   roadmaps	  were	  based	  on	  emission	   budgets	   for	   different	   warming	   scenarios	   as	   well	   as	   emissions	  trajectories	   to	   remain	   within	   those	   budgets.	   One	   member	   of	   the	   NGO	   and	  think	   tank	  community	  pressed	   for	   the	  section	  of	   the	  accounting	  standard	  on	  ‘performance	   metrics’	   to	   use	   the	   IEA	   roadmaps	   to	   benchmark	   investment	  portfolios	  against	  this	  two	  degrees	  scenario:	  “When	   you	   assess	   the	   climate	   performance	   of	   a	   portfolio,	  carbon	   emissions	   are	   just	   a	   part	   of	   the	   story	   and	   you	  benchmark	  this	  against	  something.	  Usually	  it’s	  benchmarked	  against	  the	  carbon	  emissions	  of	  the	  benchmark,	  which	  is	  not	  relevant	   because	   the	   benchmark	   is	   very	   carbon	   intensive.	  [laughter]	   ‘So	   it	   would	   be	   better	   than	   the	   worst	   thing	  possible’	   [laughter].	   So	   the	   idea	   here	   is	   to	   compare	   it	   with	  what	   you	  want	   to	   achieve,	  which	   is	   basically	   to	   finance	   the	  two	  degrees	  scenario.”	  (NGO	  and	  think	  tank	  community)	  Compared	   to	   the	   calls	   for	   transparency	   over	   financed	   emissions,	  benchmarking	   portfolios	   against	   a	   two	   degrees	   scenario	   would	   expose	   the	  deviations	  of	  a	  financial	  organisations’	  investment	  and	  lending	  activities	  from	  the	   common	   vision	   for	   tackling	   climate	   change,	   the	   two	   degrees	   target.	  Moreover,	   the	   investment	   roadmaps	   produced	   by	   the	   IEA	   mapped	   the	  emissions	   trajectories	   and	   the	   related	   investment	   requirements,	   refining	   the	  two	   degrees	   target	   into	   a	   form	   that	   could	   be	   compared	   to	   the	   existing	  investment	   landscape	   on	   an	   annual	   basis.	   That	   is,	   it	   appeared	   as	   a	   potential	  instrument	   through	   which	   carbon	   accounting	   could	   be	   linked	   to	   the	   two	  degrees	   target.	   However	   the	   roadmap	   was	   for	   the	   investment	   needs	   of	   the	  energy	   sector	   as	   a	   whole.	   As	   such,	   the	   participant’s	   suggestion	   was	   for	   the	  Financed	   Emissions	   Initiative	   to	   work	   on	   translating	   that	   roadmap	   to	   the	  corporate-­‐	  and	  portfolio-­‐level.	  To	  reiterate,	  campaigning-­‐NGOs	  had	  previously	  called	  on	  the	  Financed	  Emissions	  Initiative	  to	  create	  methods	  to	  for	  enhancing	  transparency	  over	  the	  financed	  emissions	  of	  commercial	  banks.	  The	  increased	  availability	  and	  comparability	  of	   financed	  emissions	   figures	  could	  then	  serve	  as	   a	   foundation	   for	   the	   campaigning	   and	   engagement	   efforts	   regarding	   the	  financial	  sector.	  However	  the	  NGO	  and	  think	  tank	  community	  at	  the	  May	  2014	  Advisory	   Committee	  meeting	   presented	   demands	   that	   stepped	   away	   from	   a	  case-­‐by-­‐case	   approach	   to	   pressuring	   financial	   organisations,	   instead	  proposing	   that	   the	   Financed	   Emissions	   Initiative	   should	   be	   underpinned	   by	  investment	  roadmaps	  for	  a	  two	  degrees	  scenario.	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It	   should	   be	   highlighted,	   however,	   that	   this	   idea	   of	   monitoring	  alignment	  with	   a	   two	   degrees	   scenario	   came	   to	   the	   fore	   during	   discussions	  centring	   on	   the	   ‘relevance’	   of	   financed	   emissions	   data.	   That	   is,	   the	   Financed	  Emissions	  Initiative	  provided	  a	  forum	  in	  which	  the	  metrics	  and	  the	  ideas	  to	  be	  embedded	   developed	   simultaneously.	   Each	   developed	   through	   efforts	   to	  grapple	   with	   the	   vision	   of	   the	   two	   degrees	   that	   had	   come	   to	   permeate	   the	  project.	   Claims	   that	   financed	   emissions	   were	   relevant	   to	   ‘transparency’	  prompted	   challenges	   regarding	   whether	   that	   notion	   of	   transparency	  corresponded	   to	   ‘financing	   the	   two	   degrees	   scenario’.	   As	   this	   idea	   entered	  discussions,	  financed	  emissions	  were	  challenged	  regarding	  their	  relevance	  as	  a	   basis	   for	   monitoring	   alignment.	   This	   is	   not	   to	   say	   that	   the	   metrics	   being	  developed	   were	   immediately	   overhauled	   through	   one	   discussion	   during	   an	  Advisory	  Committee	  meeting.	  Rather,	  it	  is	  to	  highlight	  an	  early	  instance	  in	  the	  simultaneous	   adjustment	   of	   ideas	   and	   instrument	   into	   a	   form	   cohering	  with	  the	   two	   degrees	   target	   (as	  well	   as	   its	  more	   concrete	   representations	   as	   the	  carbon	   budget	   and	   investment	   roadmaps).	   However	   this	   raised	   concerns	  among	   members	   of	   the	   financial	   community,	   becoming	   seen	   as	   overly	  prescriptive	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  way	  a	  financial	  organisation	  reported:	  “I	   don’t	   know…	   I	  would	   advocate	   for	   having	   good	   rigour	   in	  terms	  of	  metrics	  but	  to	  give	  the	  flexibility	  for	  institutions	  to,	  if	  they	  so	  want	  to,	  talk	  about	  their	  business	  and	  how	  that	  may	  overlay	   with	   that	   two-­‐degrees	   future	   scenario	   of	   staying	  within	   the	   two	   degrees	   Celsius	   threshold.”	   (Financial	  community)	  To	   this	   Advisory	   Committee	   member,	   the	   Financed	   Emissions	  Initiative	   was	   to	   create	   accounting	   guidance	   that	   enhances	   the	   “rigour”	   of	  climate	  metrics	  and	  to	  focus	  specifically	  on	  establishing	  a	  common	  method	  for	  their	   calculation.	   Yet	   financial	   organisations,	   it	   was	   argued,	   should	   be	   given	  flexibility	   in	   how	   they	   represent	   those	   metrics.	   The	   argument	   was	   that	   the	  Financed	   Emissions	   Initiative	   should	   establish	   the	   metrics	   that	   frame	  investment	  and	  lending	  decisions	   in	  terms	  of	  warming	  trajectories,	  yet	  allow	  flexibility	   with	   regards	   to	   the	   reasons	   financial	   organisations	   adopt	   the	  metrics	   and	   how	   they	   present	   the	   information	   produced.	   Put	   differently,	  ensuring	   flexibility	   in	   how	   the	   instrument	   was	   to	   be	   connected	   to	   the	   local	  specifics	  within	  a	  particular	   financial	  organisation	  would	  allow	   it	   to	  mediate	  multiple	  concerns.	  The	  comment	  continued,	  “I	  don’t	  want	  the	  requirements	  or	  the	   elements	   in	   the	   report	   to	   kind	   of	   force	   an	   institution	   into	   reporting	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because	   that	  might	   sound	  daunting,	  and	  because	   I	   think	  many	  people	  would	  argue	   that	   we’re	   not	   going	   to	   make	   a	   two	   degrees	   target”	   (Financial	  community).	  The	  Financed	  Emissions	   Initiative	  was	   to	   focus	  on	   the	  methods	  for	   producing	   information,	   while	   ensuring	   flexibility	   in	   its	   implementation	  that	  enabled	  it	  to	  simultaneously	  connect	  to	  the	  concerns	  of	  multiple	  actors.	  So	  far,	  this	  section	  has	  focussed	  on	  emerging	  concerns	  regarding	  both	  the	  risk	  relevance	  of	  financed	  emissions	  information,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  ability	  to	  use	  the	  tools	  created	  through	  the	  Financed	  Emissions	  Initiative	  to	  monitor	  the	  alignment	   of	   investment	   and	   lending	   activities	  with	   a	   two	   degrees	   scenario.	  Indeed,	   each	   of	   these	   two	   concerns	   had	   emerged	   through	   the	   orientation	   of	  participants’	   objectives	   towards	   the	   two	   degrees	   target:	   TWG	   5’s	   work	   on	  ‘Carbon	   Asset	   Risk’	   was	   initiated	   as	   Carbon	   Tracker’s	   Unburnable	   Carbon	  report	  gained	  traction	  within	   financial	  organisations;	  and	  the	  NGO	  and	  think	  tank	   community	   attempted	   to	   connect	   the	   measurement	   and	   reporting	  requirements	   to	   investment	   roadmaps	   for	   the	   two	   degrees	   scenario.	  Moreover,	   the	   two	   degrees	   target	   continued	   to	   permeate	   into	   the	   Financed	  Emissions	   Initiative	  and,	  with	   the	   resulting	  pressures	   to	   reorient	   the	  project	  becoming	  amplified	  at	   the	   June	  2014	  TWG	   in-­‐person	  meeting,	   cast	  doubt	  on	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  project	  and	  the	  timeline	  for	  its	  completion.	  By	  10am	  on	  the	  first	  day	  of	  the	  June	  2014	  TWG	  in-­‐person	  meeting	  in	  Washington	  D.C.	  scepticism	  over	  the	  risk-­‐relevance	  of	  financed	  emissions	  had	  become	  central	  to	  discussions.	  It	  appeared	  that	  TWG	  members	  –	  as	  well	  as	  the	  Advisory	   Committee	   members	   in	   attendance	   –	   had	   arrived	   at	   the	   meeting	  prepared	   for	  a	  heated	  exchange.	  Challenges	  were	   first	   raised	  by	  members	  of	  TWG	  5,	  asking	  “will	  the	  output	  from	  a	  Scope	  3	  measurement	  be	  at	  all	  useful	  to	  how	  [financial	  organisations]	  think	  about	  risk?”	  They	  appeared	  startled	  by	  the	  way	   participants	   in	   discussions	  would	   “keep	   saying	   financed	   emissions	   and	  risk	   in	  the	  same	  sentence.”	  To	  TWG	  5	  members	  the	  Accounting	  work	  stream	  and	  their	  risk	  work	  stream	  “were	  two	  distinctly	  separate	  paths”.	  As	  one	  TWG	  5	  member	  commented:	  “The	   [financed]	   emissions	   number	   is	   not	   really	   where	   we	  focus.	   Carbon	   asset	   risk	   is	   evident	   to	   us	   […]	   in	   carbon-­‐intensive	   sectors.	   […]	   We	   focus	   on	   the	   carbon-­‐intensive	  sectors	   and	   then,	   once	   we	   have	   established	   that,	   we’re	   not	  really	   overly	   interested	   in	   the	   exact	   number	   of	   emissions”	  (Consulting	  community).	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Participants	   developing	   the	   accounting	   guidance,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	  had	  been	  guided	   to	   focus	  exclusively	  on	  measurement	  of	   financed	  emissions	  and	  not	  on	  their	  relevance	  to	  risk	  management.	  Rather,	  the	  suggestion	  of	  risk	  relevance	  was	  proposed	  as	  a	  business	  goal	  and,	  moreover,	  was	  implicit	  in	  the	  Secretariat’s	  assertion	  that	  the	  accounting	  guidance	  would	  inform	  the	  Carbon	  Asset	  Risk	  work	  stream.	  Once	  again,	   the	  Secretariat’s	  efforts	  to	  connect	  their	  carbon	  accounting	  standards	  to	  managing	  carbon	  asset	  risk	  were	  undermined,	  with	   financed	   emissions	   challenged	   as	   being	   irrelevant	   to	   the	   first	   three	  proposed	  Business	  Goals.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  participants	  disagreed	  that	  the	  first	   three	   Business	   Goals	   addressed	   certain	   participants’	   concerns.	   Rather,	  that	   financed	   emissions	   were	   unsuited	   to	   addressing	   those	   concerns.	   In	   an	  impassioned	   appeal	   to	   the	   room	   an	   individual	   from	   of	   the	   consulting	  community	  argued:	  	  “We	  actually	  don’t	  need	  Scope	  3	   [financed	  emissions]	   to	  do	  the	  first	  three	  [business	  goals]	  (Consulting	  community)	  [Affirmation	   from	   several	   individuals	   in	   the	   finance	  community]	  But	   the	   fourth	   [on	   transparency	   to	   stakeholders],	   I	   don’t	  know	  if	  that’s	  the	  business	  goal	  of	  a	  financial	  institution,	  but	  it’s	   certainly	   what	   has	   been	   asked	   of	   them.	   Let’s	   get	   that!	  They	   [financial	   organisations]	   don’t	   really	   want	   to	   do	   that,	  but	   okay	   they	   get	   asked	   to	   do	   it	   and	   it	   costs	   them	   a	   lot	   of	  money	   to	   do	   it	   and	   that’s	   why	   they	   don’t	   want	   to	   do	   it.”	  (Consulting	  community)	  In	   what	   appeared	   to	   be	   an	   attempt	   to	   calm	   the	   discussion	   the	  Secretariat	  shifted	  focus	  to	  a	  discussion	  of	  on	  the	  seemingly	  less	  controversial	  fourth	  Business	  Goal	  on	  transparency.	  The	  Secretariat	  invited	  a	  question	  from	  a	  member	  of	   the	  NGO	  and	  think	  tank	  community,	  who	  wanted	  to	  respond	  to	  earlier	   comments	   regarding	  Business	  Goal	  4,	   framing	   this	   as	  one	  of	   the	   core	  pursuits	  of	  the	  accounting	  guidance:	  “In	   response	   to	   [two	   participants’]	   point	   about	   providing	  transparency	  to	  stakeholders,	  one	  way	  to	  think	  about	  it…	  sort	  of	   zooming	   out…	   is	   streamlining	   and	   standardising	  transparency	   to	   stakeholders.	   A	   lot	   of	   banks	   are	   already	  publishing	  information	  about	  carbon,	  Scope	  3	  emissions,	  and	  stakeholders	   are	   asking	   for	   more.	   Stakeholders	   have	   their	  own	  methodologies	  that	  they	  are	  using,	  and	  I	   think	  that	  one	  benefit	   to	   really	   digging	   in	   and	   providing	   a	   standardised	  methodology	   is	   having	   clarity	   and	   rigour	   in	   how	   these	   are	  measured.”	  (NGO	  and	  think	  tank	  community)	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It	   is	  worth	   recalling	   that	   the	   initial	   thrust	   of	   the	   Financed	  Emissions	  Initiative	   was	   to	   standardise	   the	   financed	   emissions	   figures	   already	   being	  reported	  some	  of	  the	  major	  financial	  organisations.	  Indeed,	  transparency	  was	  at	   the	   core	   of	   campaigning-­‐NGOs’	   pressure	   on	   financial	   organisations	   to	  participate	   in	   developing	   and	   adopting	   more	   refined	   Scope	   3	   carbon	  accounting	  methods.	  Rather,	  it	  was	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  risk-­‐	  and	  alignment-­‐based	  objectives	  stemming	  from	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	  that	  raised	  challenges	  regarding	   the	   project’s	   purpose.	   While	   there	   was	   still	   disagreement	   on	   the	  specifics	  of	  Business	  Goal	  4,	  the	  focus	  on	  transparency	  brought	  a	  calm	  to	  the	  discussion	   as	   the	   NGO	   and	   think	   tank	   community	   as	   well	   as	   the	   finance	  community	  understood	   the	   role	  of	   financed	  emissions	   in	  achieving	   this	  goal.	  As	  one	  member	  of	  TWG	  5	  phrased	  it,	  	  “[My	   banking	   friends]	   all	   understand	   transparency	   to	  stakeholders.	  They	  don’t	  know	  why	  they	  want	  it,	  by	  the	  way.	  [laughter]	  But	  let	  me	  tell	  you	  on	  their	  behalf,	  publically,	  they	  don’t	  know	  what	  the	  hell	  you’re	  going	  to	  do	  with	  it.	  But	  they	  know	   you	   [campaigning-­‐NGOs]	   want	   it.	   So	   they	   think	   it’s	   a	  name-­‐and-­‐shame	  process.”	  (Consulting	  community)	  Yet	  the	  desire	  for	  transparency	  did	  not	  go	  unchallenged.	  In	  particular,	  the	  idea	  of	  monitoring	  alignment	  with	  the	  transition	  to	  a	  low-­‐carbon	  economy	  was	   highlighted	   as	   a	   significant	   omission	   from	   the	   Business	   Goals,	   and	  something	   to	   be	   addressed	   in	   Business	   Goal	   4	   on	   transparency	   to	  stakeholders.	   While	   the	   concerns	   regarding	   risk	   may	   have	   challenged	   the	  connection	  between	   the	   two	  work	   streams,	   the	   idea	  of	  monitoring	  efforts	   to	  ‘finance	  the	  transition	  to	  a	  low-­‐carbon	  economy’	  brought	  a	  challenge	  to	  work	  on	  the	  core	  accounting	  guidance.	   Indeed	  it	  was	  premised	  on	  the	  problems	  of	  comparing	  reported	  financed	  emissions	  across	  different	  countries:	  	  “If	   I’m	   a	   bank	   in	   Australia,	   at	   the	   moment	   the	   economy	   is	  underpinned	   by	   brown	   coal.	   I’m	   going	   to	   look	   shocking	   to	  New	   Zealand,	   which	   if	   you	   compare	   is	   75%	   renewables	   –	  hydro,	  geothermal,	  etcetera.	  So	  if	  you’re	  a	  ratings	  agency	  how	  do	   you	   compare	   these	   things	   in	   a	   meaningful	   way	   by	   just	  looking	  at	  financed	  emissions?”	  (Finance	  community).	  	  The	  participant	  was	   arguing	   that	   name-­‐and-­‐shame	   campaigns	  based	  on	   financed	  emissions	  specifically	  related	  to	   the	  energy	  sector	  (as	  per	  RAN’s	  campaigning	   focus)	   would	   target	   banks	   in	   nations	   with	   a	   carbon-­‐intensive	  energy	   infrastructure.	   The	   member	   of	   the	   financial	   community	   went	   on	   to	  argue,	  “none	  of	  this	  discussion	  lets	  me	  account	  for	  what	  my	  investment	  in	  the	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transition	  to	  a	  cleaner	  economy	  is.	  If	  I’ve	  got	  money	  being	  funnelled	  [through	  green	  investments],	   ‘oh	  no,	  you	  can’t	  count	  that,	  […]	  subtract	  it	  out’.	  So	  there	  are	   some	   material	   issues	   here	   in	   that	   fourth	   box	   around	   transparency”	  (Finance	  community).	  	  While	   the	   link	   between	   financed	   emissions	   and	   the	   demands	   from	  campaigning-­‐NGOs	   had	   been	   present	   from	   the	   start	   of	   the	   project,	   financed	  emissions	  began	  to	  be	  questioned	  regarding	  their	  connection	  to	  the	  emerging	  idea	   of	   the	   financial	   sector’s	   role	   in	   financing	   the	   transition	   to	   a	   low-­‐carbon	  economy.	  However	  the	  Secretariat	  remarked	  that	  the	  heated	  exchanges	  in	  this	  first	  half-­‐day	  had	  put	   the	   two-­‐day	  meeting	  behind	   schedule	   and	   that	  TWG	  4	  had	  feedback	  on	  developing	  the	  Business	  Goals	  draft.	  They	  were	  eager	  for	  the	  discussion	   to	   move	   on	   to	   TWG	   4’s	   work	   on	   Performance	   Metrics	   and	  Boundary	  Setting.	   Indeed,	   this	   chapter	  now	   turns	   to	   study	  TWG	  4’s	  work	  on	  boundary	   setting	   and	   how	   disagreements	   surrounding	   this	   section	   of	   the	  standard	  brought	  the	  Financed	  Emissions	  Initiative	  to	  the	  brink	  of	  collapse.	  	  
6.3.	  BOUNDARY	  SETTING:	  TO	  THE	  BRINK	  OF	  COLLAPSE	  This	  section	  begins	  by	  returning	  to	  the	  May	  2014	  Advisory	  Committee	  meeting	   in	   Milan	   in	   order	   to	   introduce	   and	   explain	   different	   proposed	  approaches	  for	  the	  Boundary	  Setting	  aspect	  of	  the	  standard.	  It	  then	  returns	  to	  the	   TWG	   in-­‐person	   meeting	   in	   Washington	   D.C.	   to	   examine	   how	   the	  combination	   of	   concerns	   over	   both	   Business	   Goals	   and	   Boundary	   Setting	  destabilised	   the	   initial	   direction	   of	   the	   project	   and	   brought	   the	   Financed	  Emissions	  Initiative	  to	  the	  brink	  of	  collapse.	  
6.3.1.	   BOUNDARY	  DISCUSSIONS	   AT	   THE	  MAY	   2014	  ADVISORY	   COMMITTEE	  
MEETING	  Following	   a	   90-­‐minute	   discussion	   during	   the	   May	   2014	   Advisory	  Committee	   meeting	   in	   Milan,	   the	   Secretariat	   called	   a	   vote	   to	   “check	   the	  temperature	   of	   the	   room”	   on	   the	   different	   approaches	   to	   Boundary	   Setting.	  TWG	   4,	   having	   been	   unable	   to	   reach	   an	   agreement	   on	   a	   single	   approach,	  produced	   four	   options	   (see	   Figure	   6.2)	   for	   consideration	   by	   the	   Advisory	  Committee.	  The	  Boundary	  Setting	  approach	  would	  underpin	  the	  core	  carbon	  accounting	   standard,	   establishing	   the	   range	   of	   investment	   and	   lending	  activities	  for	  which	  financed	  emissions	  figures	  were	  to	  be	  produced.	  As	  such,	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the	   material	   in	   this	   section	   is	   more	   focussed	   on	   the	   work	   of	   TWGs	   1-­‐4	   to	  develop	   the	   core	   accounting	   standard	   for	   financed	   emissions,	   whereas	   the	  previous	  section	  focussed	  on	  the	  connections	  between	  that	  standard	  and	  the	  Carbon	  Asset	  Risk	  work	  stream.	  
	  
Figure	  6.2:	  Boundary	  options	  presented	  during	  the	  May	  2014	  Advisory	  Committee	  meeting.	  In	   the	  GHG	  Protocol’s	   Scope	  3	   Standard,	   published	   in	  2011,	   financial	  organisations	   were	   required	   to	   report	   on	   all	   Scope	   3	   emissions	   from	  investment	   and	   lending	   activities	   and	   to	   explain	   any	   omissions.	   However,	  while	   this	  boundary	  prioritised	   the	  comprehensiveness	  of	  measurement	  and	  reporting,	  discussions	  on	  the	  four	  options	  sought	  to	  simultaneously	  tailor	  the	  boundary	  to	  participants’	  concerns	  while	  balancing	   it	  with	  the	  practicality	  of	  implementing	  the	  requirements.	  The	   draft	   of	   Approach	   1	   (see	   Figure	   6.2)	   placed	   its	   emphasis	   on	   the	  quality	   of	   the	   emissions	   data	   reported,	   requiring100 	  the	   measurement	   of	  emissions	  where	   there	  was	  a	   “known	  use	  of	  proceeds”	   from	   investment	  and	  lending	   activities.	   This	   first	   part	   of	   the	   approach,	   the	   Secretariat	   explained,	  created	   a	   narrow	   boundary	   mostly	   regarding	   project	   finance.	   Indeed,	  individuals	   from	   the	   finance	   community	   commented	   that	   the	   ‘known-­‐use	   of	  proceeds’	  aspect	  of	  this	  approach	  was	  only	  relevant	  to	  project	  finance,	  which	  was	  a	  small	  part	  of	   investment	  and	  lending	  activities.	  However	  the	  approach	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  100	  The	  ‘shall’	  at	  the	  start	  of	  Approach	  1	  indicates	  a	  requirement,	  whereas	  the	  use	  of	  ‘should’	  indicates	  a	  recommendation.	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was	   also	   supplemented	   by	   an	   additional	   boundary	   for	   which	   three	   options	  were	  presented.	  These	  three	  options	  overlap	  with	  Approaches	  2-­‐4,	  which	  are	  explained	  below.	  Approach	   2	   ties	   the	   Boundary	   Setting	   decision	   to	   the	   Business	   Goal	  that	  an	  organisation	  chooses	  as	  their	  motivation	  for	  measuring	  and	  reporting	  financed	   emissions.	   It	   is	   worth	   noting	   that	   the	   “recommended	   boundary	  approach”	   for	   each	   Business	   Goal	   had	   not	   been	   drafted	   at	   this	   stage	   in	   the	  project.	   This	   focus	   of	   this	   approach,	   the	   Secretariat	   explained,	   was	   “just	   to	  provide	  recommendations	  that	  are	  helpful	  for	  companies	  to	  think	  about	  how	  to	   draw	   boundaries	   that	   will	   help	   them	   achieve	   a	   specific	   business	   goal.”	  Flexibility	   was	   presented	   as	   its	   main	   advantage,	   as	   well	   as	   allowing	   an	  organisation	   to	   tailor	   the	   boundary	   to	   their	   internal	   decision-­‐making	  processes.	   However	   “the	   con	   would	   be	   [that]	   it	   will	   not	   create	   consistency,	  which	  was	  one	  of	  the	  main	  intentions	  of	  this	  guidance	  […]	  and	  it's	  not	  going	  to	  satisfy	   some	   of	   the	   NGOs’	   desires	   for	   greater	   transparency	   from	   [financial	  organisations].”	  Approach	   3	   was	   based	   on	   the	   idea	   that	   a	   certain	   percentage	   of	  activities	  could	  be	  excluded	  from	  the	  boundary.	  This	  was	   intended	  to	  reduce	  the	   burden	   on	   reporting	   organisations	   while	   ensuring	   the	   most	   ‘material’	  activities	   remained	   within	   the	   boundary.	   However	   the	   use	   of	   an	   “x%”	  placeholder	   and	   the	   lack	   of	   guidance	   on	   how	   this	   approach	   would	   be	  implemented	  caused	  confusion	  during	  the	  Advisory	  Committee	  meeting:	  “So,	   sorry.	   To	   understand	   that	   better.	  What	   is	   the	   basis	   for	  this	  1	  or	  5%?	  (Insurance	  community)	  How	  do	  we	  come	  up	  with	  the	  number?	  (Secretariat)	  No,	  no,	  no	  not	  just	  the	  number.	  (Insurance	  community)	  How	  we	  apply	  it?	  (Secretariat)	  Yes.	  1%	  of	  what?	  (Insurance	  community)	  Exactly.	  (Secretariat)	  Yeah.	  (Insurance	  community)	  Exactly,	  we	  did	  not	  really	  clarify	  that	  well	  (Secretariat)	  [Laughter	  around	  the	  room]
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So,	   it	   could	   be,	   it	   could	   be	   looking	   at	   your	   whole	   loan	  portfolio.	  Look	  at	  how	  much	  money	  do	  you	  lend,	  and	  then	  try	  to	  figure	  out	  some	  place	  to	  cut	  it	  off	  where	  [there	  is]	  5%	  you	  can	  exclude.	  Maybe	  there	  is	  a	  bunch	  of	  little	  loans	  you	  would	  cut	   out	   that	   only	   total	   5%	   of	   the	   total	   dollars.	   You	   do	   the	  same	   for	   the	   investment	   portfolio.	   Something	   like	   that.	   We	  never	  got	  into	  detail	  of	  how	  to	  apply	  this.	  […]	  It's,	  I	  guess,	  it's	  a	   simple	   approach	   to	   enable	   [financial	   organisations]	   to	  exclude	  what's	  not	  significant	  to	  them.”	  (Secretariat)	  Approach	  4,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   set	   a	  much	  narrower	   boundary	   than	  the	   other	   options,	   focussing	   on	   the	   most	   carbon	   intensive	   sectors	   and	  emphasising	   the	   relevance	   of	   the	   measurement	   and	   reporting	   exercise.	   As	  with	  Approach	  3,	  one	  aim	  was	  to	  reduce	  the	  workload	  for	  organisations	  that	  adopt	   the	   standard.	   However	   in	   discussions	   during	   both	   the	   TWG	   4	   and	  Advisory	   Committee	   meetings	   there	   was	   disagreement	   on	   the	   appropriate	  shortlist	  of	  sectors,	  and	  how	  this	  could	  be	  defined	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  preventing	  ‘gaming’	  of	  the	  standard.	  The	   Secretariat	   called	   for	   a	   vote	   on	   the	   4	   options,	   which	   caused	  concern	   among	   representatives	   from	   several	   individuals	   in	   the	   finance	  community	   who	   did	   not	   want	   their	   votes	   documented.	   Assuaging	   these	  concerns,	   the	  Secretariat	  said	  that	  the	  results	  would	  only	  be	  used	  to	   indicate	  preferences	  across	  the	  options.	  As	  such,	  the	  precise	  number	  of	  votes	  for	  each	  approach	   cannot	   be	   reproduced	   in	   this	   chapter.	   The	   vote	  was	   conducted	   in	  two	  rounds	  by	  a	  show	  of	  hands	  regarding	  the	  Boundary	  Option	  that	  should	  be	  applied	   to,	   in	   the	   first	   round	   of	   voting,	   banks	   and,	   in	   the	   second	   round,	   to	  investors.	   For	   banks,	   it	   was	   argued	   that	   where	   there	   are	   ‘known	   use	   of	  proceeds’	   this	   was	   the	   most	   straightforward	   and	   reliable	   data	   for	   financed	  emissions	   and	   “roughly	   half	   of	   the	   AC	   [Advisory	   Committee]	   members	  favoured	   a	   more	   limited	   reporting	   boundary	   focused	   on	   known	   use	   of	  proceeds	  and	  GHG-­‐intensive	  sectors	  only	  (a	  variation	  on	  boundary	  option	  1)”	  (Summary	   document	   of	   Advisory	   Committee	   meeting).	   The	   inclusion	   of	  reporting	   for	  GHG	   intensive	   sectors	  was	   to	  extend	   the	  boundary	  beyond	   the	  relatively	  narrow	  scope	  of	  activities	  where	  ‘known	  use	  of	  proceeds’	  exists.	  For	  investors,	   on	   the	  other	  hand,	  most	  Advisory	  Committee	  members	   supported	  Approach	   3,	   creating	   a	   “broad	   and	   inclusive	   boundary	   […]	   based	   on	   a	  prescribed	   significance	   threshold”	  with	   the	   availability	   of	   average	   emissions	  data	   for	   industries	   and	   subsectors	   making	   a	   broader	   approach	   less	  cumbersome.	   However	   based	   on	   the	   Advisory	   Committee	   vote	   “there	   was	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little	   support	   for	   boundary	   option	   2”	   with	   members	   preferring	   “a	   more	  prescriptive	   approach	   that	   creates	   further	   consistency	   across	   [financial	  organisations].”	  Based	  on	  the	  Advisory	  Committee	  feedback	  TWG	  4	  decided	  to	  remove	  Approach	  2,	  leaving	  three	  remaining	  options	  to	  be	  presented	  at	  the	  in-­‐person	  TWG	   meeting	   in	   Washington	   D.C.	   in	   June	   2014.	   With	   the	   Washington	   D.C.	  meeting	  taking	  place	  just	  over	  a	  month	  after	  the	  Advisory	  Committee	  meeting	  there	  was	   little	   time	   for	  TWG	  4	   to	  discuss	   further	   revisions	   to	   the	  boundary	  options.	  As	  can	  be	  seen	  by	  comparing	  Figure	  6.3	  with	  Figure	  6.2,	  several	  minor	  amendments	   were	   made:	   the	   second	   stage	   of	   Boundary	   Approach	   1	   was	  narrowed	  down	  from	  three	  possible	  requirements	  to	  the	  one	  regarding	  GHG-­‐intensive	  sectors;	  and	  the	  threshold	  for	  Approach	  3	  (now	  Approach	  2)	  was	  set	  at	  5%	  of	  total	  dollars	  invested	  or	  lent.	  
	  
6.3.2.	  REVISED	  BOUNDARIES	  CREATE	  CONCERN	  IN	  WASHINGTON	  D.C.	  Returning	   to	   the	   June	   2014	   TWG	   in-­‐person	   meeting	   in	   Washington	  D.C.,	  the	  final	  session	  of	  the	  first	  day	  focussed	  on	  the	  three	  revised	  Boundary	  Setting	   approaches.	   Discussions	   centred	   on	   the	   practicality	   of	   measuring	  financed	   emissions	   under	   different	   Boundary	   Approaches,	   while	   also	  producing	   information	   tailored	   to	   the	   day-­‐to-­‐day	   concerns	   of	   financial	  organisations	  as	  well	  as	  the	  campaigning	  efforts	  of	  NGOs.	  	  However	  the	  tense	  
Figure	  6.3:	  Boundary	  Options	  presented	  at	  the	  June	  2014	  TWG	  in-­‐person	  meeting.	  
Chapter	  6:	  Maintaining	  Standards	  
	   212	  
atmosphere	   from	  earlier	  disagreements	  over	  Business	  Goals	  carried	   through	  to	   this	   session,	   having	   remained	   the	   focus	   of	   discussions	   over	   coffee	   breaks	  and	   lunch.	  This	   section	  of	   the	  chapter	  attends	   to	   the	  discussion,	  highlighting	  that	   the	  definition	  of	  an	  accounting	  entity	  was	  simultaneously	  a	  challenge	  of	  connecting	   to	   the	   diverse	   concerns	   of	   participants	   while	   ensuring	   the	  workload	   placed	   on	   financial	   organisations	   would	   not	   discourage	   initial	  adoption	  of	  the	  standard.	  As	  with	  the	  May	  2014	  Advisory	  Committee	  meeting,	  the	  availability	  of	  average	   emission	   factors101	  –	   from	   data	   providers	   such	   as	   Bloomberg	   and	  MSCI	   –	   was	   enrolled	   in	   arguments	   for	   the	   “broad	   and	   inclusive”	   boundary	  defined	  by	  Approach	  2.	  A	  member	  of	   the	   consulting	   community,	   rather	   than	  the	   NGO	   and	   think	   tank	   community,	   raised	   the	   argument:	   “[i]n	   order	   to	  exclude	  sectors	  […]	  you	  need	  to	  evaluate	  them	  […]	  based	  on	  these	  metrics	  that	  we	   use	   in	   order	   to	   calculate	   emissions.	   So	   I	   really	   don’t	   see	   the	   point	   of	  excluding	  them	  if	  […]	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  do	  Approach	  2	  without	  much	  more	  effort	  than	  Approach	  1	  or	  Approach	  3.”	  As	  had	  been	  argued	  by	  other	  participants,	  if	  to	  exclude	  a	  sector	  you	  had	  to	  know	  its	  emissions	  then	  it	  would	  be	  more	  work	  to	   exclude	   it	   than	   include	   it.	  While	   the	   presenter	   argued	   that	   the	   exclusion	  would	   be	   a	   “one-­‐off	   assessment”	   that	   would	   save	   time	   when	   measuring	  financed	   emissions	   “on	   a	   quarterly	   or	   six	   monthly	   basis,”	   the	   consultant	  maintained	  that	  the	  potential	  need	  to	  revise	  the	  system	  meant	  it	  was	  “easier	  to	  do	   it	   all	   rather	   than	   to	   have	   to	   evaluate	   and	   reiterate.”	   Reinforcing	   the	  comments,	   a	   member	   of	   the	   NGO	   and	   think	   tank	   community	   remarked,	   “to	  [exclude	  sectors]	  properly,	  you	  really	  need	  to	  figure	  out	  the	  exposure	  of	  every	  company	   on	   your	   balance	   sheet	   to	   these	   activities,	  which,	   in	   terms	   of	   being	  time-­‐consuming,	   it’s	   a	  nightmare!”	  Rather,	   these	  arguments	   claimed	   that	   the	  most	  practical	  approach	  was	  to	  report	  all	  of	   the	   financed	  emissions	  by	  using	  average	  emissions	  factors.	  	  However	   while	   this	   was	   aimed	   at	   countering	   concerns	   from	   the	  finance	  sector	  on	  the	  practicality	  of	  the	  carbon	  accounting	  exercise,	  the	  use	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  101	  An	  emission	  factor	  may	  be	  applied	  to	  a	  statistic	  for	  a	  particular	  activity	  to	  produce	  an	   emission	   estimate	   for	   that	   activity	   (Emission	   =	   Factor	   x	   Activity).	   There	   are	  numerous	  data	  providers	  for	  these	  emission	  factors,	  from	  private	  organizations	  such	  as	  Bloomberg	   and	  MSCI	   to	   government-­‐funded	  databases	   such	   as	   the	  UK’s	  National	  Atmospheric	  Emissions	  Inventory.	  For	  the	  Financed	  Emissions	  Initiative,	  the	  average	  emission	  factors	  referred	  to	  could	  potentially	  be	  applied	  to	  the	  USD	  lent	  to	  or	  invested	  in	  a	  particular	  sector	  or	  subsector.	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average	  emission	  factors	  tied	  disclosures	  to	  the	  carbon-­‐intensity	  of	  the	  sector	  rather	   than	   the	   specific	   investment	   or	   client.	   For	   commercial	   banks,	   this	  raised	  the	  concern	  that	  “you’re	  going	  to	  get	  criticised	  because	  people	  out	  there	  will	   not	   understand	   that’s	   an	   average	   and	   it	   doesn’t	   reflect	   your	   client.”	   In	  other	   words,	   banks	   that	   specifically	   lent	   to	   clients	   who	   were	   less	   carbon-­‐intensive	   than	   their	   sectors	   would	   have	   to	   measure	   and	   report	   financed	  emissions	   figures	   that	   represented	   the	   industry	   average.	   Yet	   discussions	  became	  heated	  when	  a	  member	  of	  the	  consulting	  community	  challenged	  these	  concerns:	  “If	   there	  are	  portfolios	   that	  are	   focussed	  on	  certain	  portions	  of	  that	  [sector]	  obviously	  they	  would	  want	  to	  highlight	  their	  benefits.	   So	   they	   would	   reduce	   that	   [emission]	   factor	   and	  justify	   it	  […]	  [saying]	   ‘we	  are	  not	  using	  0.7,	  we	  are	  using	  0.3	  and	  here	  is	  the	  justification	  for	  it.	  Because	  we	  want	  to	  market	  ourselves	  as	  a	  greener	  bank’	  (Consulting	  community)	  Oh!	  So	   then	  the	  good	  guys	  have	   to	  do	   the	  work	  and	  the	  bad	  guys	   can	   just	   report	   the	   average?	   It’s	   complete	   bullshit!	  (Commercial	  bank)	  No,	  no,	  no,	  no…	  I’m	  saying	  that…	  (Consulting	  community)	  No,	  no,	  no.	  This	  is	  exactly	  what	  you’re	  saying.	  You’re	  saying	  if	  I	  want	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  I’m	  actually	  a	  good	  person	  and	  I’m	  selecting	   the	   right	   companies	   then	   I	   can	   do	   the	   extra	  work	  but	  everybody	  else	  gets	  the	  average.	  (Commercial	  bank)	  What	   I’m	   saying	   is	   […]	   you	   are	   not	   going	   to	   develop	  everything	  from	  scratch.	  So	  you	  might	  have	  cases	  where	  you	  say,	   ‘No	   I	   don’t	   want	   to	   use	   that	   average	   factor	   because	   I	  think	   I’m	   better	   than	   that.’	   You	   are	   free	   to	   do	   that.”	  (Consulting	  community)	  On	   the	   one	   hand,	   the	   consultant	   was	   proposing	   how	   to	   incorporate	  flexibility	  into	  Boundary	  Approach	  2	  so	  that	  it	  could	  be	  tailored	  to	  the	  specific	  reporting	  objectives	  of	  a	  commercial	  bank.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	   the	   individual	  from	   the	   finance	   community	   saw	   the	   purpose	   of	   creating	   the	   standard	   as	  driving	   a	   change	   in	   investment	   and	   lending	   practices,	   for	  which	   the	   second	  approach	   increased	   the	  measurement	   and	   reporting	   burden.	   Reiterating	   the	  point	   later	   in	   the	   discussion,	   the	   individual	   from	   the	   finance	   community	  argued	  “the	  objective	  is	  […]	  to	  use	  that	  information	  to	  work	  with	  the	  client	  or	  work	   with	   people	   you	   are	   actually	   investing	   in	   so	   that	   they	   change	   their	  emission	  profile	  and	  that	  you	  have	  changes	  in	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  economy.”	  While	   this	   only	   represented,	   as	   another	   individual	   from	   the	   finance	  
Chapter	  6:	  Maintaining	  Standards	  
	   214	  
community	  put	  it,	  “one	  example	  of	  a	  Business	  Goal”,	  it	  was	  further	  argued	  that	  average	  emissions	  factors	  were	  incompatible	  with	  bankers’	  incentive	  systems	  for	   influencing	   client	   relationships.	  By	   applying	  an	  average	  emissions	   factor,	  any	   reduction	   in	   a	   client’s	   carbon-­‐intensity	   of	   production	   would	   be	   hidden	  from	   the	   financed	   emissions	   measurements	   that	   would	   remain	   based	   on	   a	  sectoral	  average.	  The	  point	  is	  that	  while	  Boundary	  Approach	  2	  was	  supported	  as	   the	   least	   onerous	   method	   for	   measuring	   financed	   emissions	   –	   seen	   as	  crucial	   to	   fostering	   adoption	   of	   the	   standard	   –	   it	   was	   seen	   as	   disconnected	  from	  commercial	  banks’	  low-­‐carbon	  investment	  strategies	  and	  their	  influence	  through	   client	   relationships.	  Moreover,	   the	   disagreement	   stemmed	   from	   the	  conflicting	  objectives	  of	  project	  participants,	  with	  Boundary	  Approach	  2	  being	  unable	   to	   appeal	   simultaneously	   to	   aspirations	   to	   foster	   adoption,	   highlight	  ‘green’	   lending	  strategies,	  and	  to	   influence	  the	  production	  methods	  of	  banks’	  clients.	  The	   banking	   community	   did	   offer	   some	   support	   to	   Boundary	  Approach	   3.	   However	   they	   supported	   an	   initial	   step	   of	   measuring	   financed	  emissions	   for	   one	   specific	   carbon-­‐intensive	   sector,	   and	   then	   adjusting	   the	  requirements	   based	   on	   that	   experience	   before	   extending	   them	   to	   other	  industries.	   It	  was	  proposed	  by	  the	  banking	  community	  as	  “one	  thing	  that	  we	  can	   all	   probably	   come	   to	   agreement	   on”	   because	   it	   reduces	   the	   burden	   of	  adoption	  while	  focussing	  on	  a	  “sector	  that	  is	  known	  to	  be	  emissions	  intensive,	  like	  the	  power	  and	  utility	  sector,	  and	  taking	  an	  iterative	  approach.”	  While	  this	  was	   an	   effort	   to	   appeal	   to	   both	   concerns	   of	   adoption	   and	   refinement	   of	   the	  measures,	  it	  also	  prompted	  concerns	  regarding	  a	  list	  of	  GHG-­‐intensive	  sectors.	  To	   the	   NGO	   and	   think	   tank	   community,	   campaigns	   already	   targeted	  investments	   in	   and	   lending	   to	   the	   most	   carbon-­‐intensive	   sectors.	   The	  standard,	  they	  argued,	  had	  the	  potential	  to	  expose	  the	  “other	  industries	  [that]	  might	  be	  more	  strategic,	  […]	  like	  the	  transport	  sector	  is	  carbon	  intensive,	  […]	  and	   to	   say	   to	  NGOs,	   ‘Maybe	   you	   should	   focus	   on	   investment	   in	   airports	   and	  highways,	  and	  so	  on,	  rather	  than	  just	  focusing	  on	  the	  power	  sector.’”	  However	  asset	  managers	  raised	  concerns	  that	  users	  would	  misunderstand	  the	  reported	  information.	  One	  participant	  remarked,	  “What	  is	  something	  my	  CEO	  can	  be	  on	  CNN	  and	  say?	  […]	  We	  don’t	  want	  to	  be	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  political	  conversation	  of,	  you	  know,	  oil	  and	  gas	  has	  to	  be	  reported	  but	  agriculture	  doesn’t.	  […]	  I	  need	  to	  have	  something	   that’s	  very	   simple	  and	  my	  CEO	  can	  sit	   there	   […]	  and	  be	   like	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‘this	   is	  simple,	   this	   is	  what	  we	  do,	   this	   is	  what	   is	  required.’”	   It	  appeared	  that	  none	  of	  the	  Boundary	  Approaches	  could	  establish	  a	  carbon	  accounting	  entity	  for	   investment	   and	   lending	   activities	   that	   could	   simultaneously	   be	   practical	  enough	  to	  foster	  adoption	  while	  providing	  a	  flexibility	  of	  application	  enabling	  it	  to	  connect	  to	  concerns	  across	  NGOs,	  think	  tanks,	  and	  financial	  organisations.	  The	   TWG	   4	   presenter,	   recognising	   that	   the	   first	   day	   had	   already	  overrun	   by	   more	   than	   an	   hour,	   and	   keen	   to	   identify	   the	   direction	   for	   the	  redrafting	   work,	   proposed	   “there	   are	   a	   lot	   of	   feasibility	   questions	   that	   I’m	  hoping	   could	   be	   resolved	   through	   the	   roadtesting	   process.”	   The	   Financed	  Emissions	   Initiative	   had	   scheduled	   to	   roadtest	   the	   draft	   standard	   in	   several	  financial	  organisations	   in	  order	   to	   inform	  the	  drafting	  and	  publication	  of	   the	  final	  standard.	  In	  appealing	  to	  the	  roadtesting	  phase,	  as	  a	  participant	  from	  the	  NGO	  and	  think	  tank	  community	  commented,	  the	  discussion	  could	  focus	  on	  the	  questions	   “what	   approach	   is	  most	   desirable	   to	   external	   stakeholders?	   [And]	  what	   approach	   is	   most	   feasible	   for	   the	   financial	   institution?”	   The	   technical	  configuration,	   this	   participant	   argued,	   was	   something	   to	   be	   refined	   through	  roadtesting	   and	   not	   something	   to	   be	   agreed	   at	   such	   an	   early	   stage.	   To	   this	  participant:	   “for	   what’s	   most	   desirable,	   obviously	   Approach	   2	   is	   simple	   […]	  and	   in	   terms	  of	   feasibility	   I	   think	   there’s	  a	   lot	  of	  questions	   […]	  and	  my	  hope	  would	   be	   that	   through	   the	   roadtesting	   process,	   a	   lot	   of	   things	   will	   come	   to	  light.”	   The	   sentiment	  was	   echoed	  by	   the	   attempt	   of	   the	  TWG	  4	  presenter	   to	  conclude	   the	   discussion	   by	   suggesting	   “for	   commercial	   banks,	   a	   narrow	  version	  of	  Boundary	  Option	  3	  makes	  sense	  to	  move	  forward	  with	  through	  the	  first	   draft.	   But	   for	   asset	   owners	   and	   asset	  managers	   I	   thought	  what	   I	   heard	  was	  Boundary	  Option	  2	  was	  preferred.”	  	  While	  some	  of	  the	  Secretariat	  supported	  this	  conclusion,	  one	  member	  remained	   concerned	   that	   “we	   have	   been	   leading	   our	   discussion	   around	  boundaries	  and	  scopes	  assuming	  certain	  things	  are	  in	  Business	  Goals,”	  where	  “Business	  Goals	  1	  and	  3	  are	  off-­‐the-­‐table	  […	  and	  Business	  Goals	  2	  and	  4]	  are	  still,	   more	   or	   less,	   on-­‐the-­‐table.”	   To	   this	   member	   of	   the	   Secretariat,	   “the	  discussion	  we	  had	  so	  far	  on	  scope	  and	  boundaries	  is	  under	  the	  assumption	  of	  those	  Business	  Goals	  [2	  and	  4]	  are	  still	  there.”	  As	  discussions	  on	  both	  Business	  Goals	  and	  Boundary	  Setting	  began	  to	  resurface,	   the	  Secretariat	  called	  an	  end	  to	  the	  discussion	  on	  the	  agreement	  that	  all	  decisions	  would	  be	  revisited	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  second	  day.	  However	  it	  was	  during	  the	  second	  day	  of	  the	  meeting,	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to	  which	   this	   chapter	   now	   turns,	   that	   the	   Financed	  Emissions	   Initiative	  was	  brought	  to	  the	  brink	  of	  collapse.	  
TO	  THE	  BRINK	  OF	  COLLAPSE	  During	  the	  second	  day	  of	  the	  meeting	  tensions	  over	  the	  Business	  Goals	  and	   the	   workload	   required	   by	   different	   boundary	   options	   persisted.	   By	   the	  end	  of	   the	   first	  day	   it	  was	  suggested	  that	  some	  agreement	  had	  been	  reached	  on	   Business	   Goal	   4	   regarding	   transparency,	   yet	   by	   the	   second	   day	  impassioned	  challenges	  targeted	  this	  sole	  point	  of	  apparent	  consensus:	  “It’s	   a	   fundamental	   comment	   I	   believe.	   If	   [the	   standard]	   is	  about	  assigning	  guilt	  […]	  then	  this	  becomes	  an	  issue	  entirely	  of	  reputational	  risk	  management	  	  (Finance	  community	  1)	  Yeah	  (Finance	  community	  2)	  And	  then	  we	  can	  forget	  the	  whole	  thing	  all	  together.	  Because	  then	   this	   an	   exercise	   in	   futility;	   going	   through	   a	   massive	  construction	  of	  evaluation	  of	  stuff	  and	  accounting	  for	  things,	  when	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	   day	  we	   can	   just	   do	  what	   is	   already	  happening.	   You	   know,	   league	   tables	   are	   created	   of	   who	  finances	   the	  most	   coal	   and	  who	   finances	   the	  most	   this-­‐and-­‐that.	   And	   some	  people	   care	   about	   it	   and	   some	  people	   don’t	  much	  care	  about	  it.	  So	  some	  manage	  their	  reputation	  around	  it	  and	  others	  say	  well	  we	  are	  willing	  to	  take	  that	  reputational	  risk	   because,	   you	   know,	  whatever.	   So	   if	   that	   is	  what	   this	   is	  about	   I	   think	   we	   should	   shut	   this	   all	   down!	   (Finance	  community	  1)	  [Pause]	  Thank	  you	  for	  that	  perspective”	  (Secretariat)	  The	   tone	   was	   sombre.	   News	   had	   spread	   that	   one	   of	   the	   prominent	  organisations	   in	   the	   NGO	   and	   think	   tank	   community	   was	   considering	  withdrawing	   from	  the	  project	  as	   it	  was	   losing	  relevance	   to	   their	  demand	   for	  transparency.	  Similarly,	  during	  the	  evening	  function	  following	  the	  first	  day	  of	  the	  meeting,	  financial	  organisations	  been	  arguing	  that	  the	  standard	  appeared	  to	   present	   a	   significant	   workload	   that	   would	   produce	   largely	   irrelevant	  information.	   Following	   a	   heated	   exchange	   regarding	   double	   counting	   of	  emissions,	   where	   further	   confusion	   over	   Scope	   3	   emissions	   had	   become	  apparent,	  an	  individual	  from	  the	  consulting	  community	  became	  exasperated:	  “Does	   anyone	  here	   from	   the	   ten	  major	   investment	   banks	   in	  the	   world	   think	   they’re	   going	   to	   do	   this?	   (Consulting	  community)	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No	  (audible	  from	  3	  individuals	  from	  the	  finance	  community)	  And	   because	   it’s	   voluntary,	   you	   know.	   Without	   being...	   I	  sound	  very	  negative	  but	  I’m	  actually	  trying	  to	  be	  helpful.	  I’m	  not	  sure	  that	   if	  you	  spend	  this	  vast	  amount	  of	  work	  […]	  and	  are	  giving	  this	  out	  to	  people	  with	  no	  finance	  experience…	  […]	  this	   is	   so	   far	   beyond	   them	   it’s	   ridiculous	   -­‐	   it’s	   like	   Ph.D.	  Rocket	  Science	  –	  if	  you’re	  spending	  all	  this	  time	  and	  then	  no-­‐one’s	   going	   to	   do	   it…	   Is	   that	   a	   valid	   question?”	   (Consulting	  community)	  The	  Boundary	  Setting	  and	  accompanying	  measurement	  methods	  had	  become	   seen	   as	   overly	   complicated;	   a	   result	   of	   trying	   to	   adjust	   them	   to	  connect	   with	   the	   diverse	   demands	   from	   project	   participants.	   While	   the	  Secretariat	   appealed	   to	   the	   roadtesting	   phase	   as	   refining	   these	   technical	  aspects	  of	   the	   standard,	  participants	   from	   the	   finance	   community,	   especially	  commercial	   banks,	   maintained	   their	   arguments	   that	   the	   resulting	   standard	  would	  not	  be	  adopted.	  As	  the	  third	  session	  of	  the	  second	  day	  drew	  to	  a	  close,	  TWG	   5	   was	   scheduled	   to	   break	   off	   for	   a	   separate	   discussion	   on	   their	   risk	  guidance	  document.	  TWGs	  1	   to	  4,	   however,	  would	   remain	   in	   the	   conference	  room	  to	  reflect	  on	  the	  comments	  received	  and	  to	  continue	  the	  discussion.	  This	  concerned	   several	   members	   of	   TWG	   5,	   with	   one	   remarking	   “I	   suppose	   the	  question	  from	  our	  chapter	  [leads]	  is	  ‘so	  what	  are	  we	  missing	  out	  on	  in	  here?’”	  The	   Secretariat	   suggested	   that	   the	   individual	   TWG	   workshops	   could	   be	  postponed	   to	   allow	   the	   project-­‐wide	   discussion	   to	   continue,	   with	   their	  proposition	  being	  welcomed	  enthusiastically.	  	  This	   discussion	   was	   due	   to	   continue	   after	   a	   short	   coffee	   break.	  However	   during	   that	   break	   three	   separate	   clusters	   of	   participants	   emerged,	  with:	  TWG	  5	  members	  forming	  a	  circle	  in	  one	  corner;	  the	  Secretariat	  speaking	  together	  at	  the	  front	  of	  the	  room;	  and	  several	  members	  of	  the	  NGO	  and	  think	  tank	   community	   sitting	   at	   the	   back	   of	   the	   room.	   After	   approximately	   five	  minutes	  the	  Secretariat	  appeared	  to	  reach	  an	  agreement	  among	  their	  cluster	  and	  approached	  the	  circle	  of	  TWG	  5	  members.	  After	  a	  ten-­‐minute	  discussion,	  the	  Secretariat	  commenced	  the	  final	  session	  by	  announcing:	  “It	  was	  proposed	  to	  us	  during	  the	  break,	   the	   idea	  of	  doing	  a	  landscape	   analysis	   of	   all	   the	   metrics	   out	   there	   that	   all	   the	  banks	  are	  using,	  both	  public	  and	  private,	  and	  looking	  at	  what	  the	   data	   providers	   are	   also	   producing,	   which	   we	   can	  definitely	  do	  as	  a	  next	  step.”	  (Secretariat)	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  The	   core	   accounting	   guidance,	   it	   appeared,	  would	   be	   put	   on	   hold	   to	  consider	   alternative	  metrics	   to	   financed	   emissions.	   Their	   concern,	   however,	  was	  that	  financed	  emissions	  were	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  GHG	  Protocol	  standards,	  while	   this	   was	   less	   clear	   for	   alternative	  metrics.	   The	   Secretariat	   asked,	   “Do	  GHG	   Protocol	   and	   UNEP	   FI	   have	   a	   role	   in	   coming	   up	   with	   a	   standardised	  template	  that	  will	  enable	  stakeholders	  to	  understand	  the	  climate	  impacts	  and	  the	  climate	  friendliness	  of	  banks	  through	  the	  set	  of	  metrics	  that	  we’ve	  tried	  to	  standardise?”	   Earlier	   discussions	   had	   already	   considered	   other	  metrics	   that	  could	   supplement	   the	   financed	   emissions	   information,	   however	   it	   appeared	  that	  at	  some	  point	  during	  the	  coffee	  break	  the	  idea	  of	  adjusting	  the	  direction	  of	   the	  project	  gained	  momentum.	  Among	  the	  confusion	  this	  caused	  for	  many	  participants,	  one	  individual	  from	  the	  finance	  community	  sought	  to	  clarify	  the	  information	   that	   would	   be	   fed	   back	   to	   the	   TWG	   members	   that	   were	   not	  present	  at	  the	  in-­‐person	  meeting:	  “So	   just	   to	   be	   clear,	   and	   so	   we’re	   not	   appearing	   kind	   of	  schizophrenic,	   are	  we	   basically	   going	   back	   to	   our	   Technical	  Working	  Groups	   –	   those	   [members]	   that	   aren’t	   in	   the	   room	  that	  have	  been	  a	  part	  of	  the	  process	  –	  to	  say	  we’re	  making	  a	  course	   correction	  here?	  At	   least	   in	   terms	  of	   trying	   to	   figure	  out	   if	  we	   need	   to	   turn	   the	   ship	   a	   little	   bit	   and	   find	   a	   better	  methodology?	  (Finance	  community	  1)	  So	  we	  are	  considering	  that,	  yeah.	  And	  we’ll	  go	  back	  after	  this	  and	  rethink	  the	  scope.	  […]	  We	  have	  to	  go	  back,	  come	  up	  with	  a	  new	  strategy,	  our	  proposed	  strategy,	  and	  bring	  it	  out	  to	  the	  advisory	   group	   and	   the	   Technical	   Working	   Groups.	  (Secretariat	  member)	  […]	  And	  the	  ‘why’?	  As	  to	  why	  we	  are	  doing	  this,	  we	  will	  need	  that.	  (Finance	  community)	  Absolutely.	  (Finance	  community	  2)	  	  Because	  it	  seems	  like	  we	  did	  make	  some	  progress	  on	  that	  the	  last	  couple	  of	  days,	  but	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  are	  so	  many	  people	  that	   are	   just	   still	   concerned	   about	   how	   you	  would	   even	   do	  financed	  emissions…”	  (Finance	  community	  1)	  Taking	  on	  a	  more	  energetic	  tone,	  the	  discussion	  focussed	  on	  questions	  about	   the	   process	   for	   changing	   the	   direction	   of	   the	   project.	   However	   the	  Secretariat	   also	  wanted	   to	   clarify	   that	   they	   should	  be	  engaging	  directly	  with	  campaigning-­‐NGOs	  that	  weren’t	  present	  at	   the	   in-­‐person	  meeting	   in	  order	  to	  gauge	  their	  support	  of	  this	  new	  direction	  for	  the	  Financed	  Emissions	  Initiative.	  This	   new	  direction,	   the	   Secretariat	   argued,	  would	   still	   need	   to	   connect	  with	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the	   transparency	   demands	   from	   campaigning-­‐NGOs.	   Playing	   out	   their	  expectation	  of	  the	  NGO	  response:	  “What	   they	   are	   going	   to	   say	   in	   a	   first	   step	   is	   they	   have	   no	  alternative	  to	  financed	  emissions	  at	  the	  moment.	  But	  we	  can	  say…	  Our	  approach	  would	  be	  –	  and	  this	  is	  for	  everyone	  in	  the	  room,	   this	   is	   not	   only	   for	   X,	   Y,	   Z	   organisations	   –	   to	   say	  financed	   emissions	   is	   one	   [option]	   and	   here’s	   a	   set	   of	  alternatives,	  what	  do	  you	  think?	  […]	  (Secretariat	  member	  2)	  And	  I	  think	  you	  know	  [an	  individual	  from	  the	  NGO	  and	  think	  tank	   community]	   said	   yesterday	   that	   [they	   are]	   open	   to	  discussion	  of	  other	  metrics.	  If,	  you	  know,	  you	  invent	  a	  better	  mousetrap	  then	  let’s	  build	  it.”	  (Finance	  community)	  The	   two-­‐day	   meeting	   came	   to	   a	   close,	   concluding	   that	   a	   ‘landscape	  review’	   was	   required.	   Many	   participants	   appeared	   encouraged	   by	   the	  outcome,	   and	  during	   the	  drinks	   reception	   that	   followed	  one	   individual	   from	  the	   finance	  community	   joked,	   ‘this	   is	  great;	  we	  now	  have	   the	   ‘why’.	  Why	  we	  are	   doing	   this’.	   Others	   felt	   that	   people	   had	   already	   been	   thinking	   that	   the	  project	   should	   refocus	   away	   from	   financed	   emissions,	   however	   no	   one	   had	  wanted	  to	  say	  it	  at	  the	  start	  of	  the	  meeting.	  On	  the	  other	  hand	  one	  individual	  from	   the	   finance	   community	   took	   issue	   with	   the	   term	   ‘climate	   friendliness’	  that	  had	  emerged	  within	  the	  last	  two	  hours,	  saying	  that	   ‘the	  NGOs	  will	  rip	  us	  apart	  for	  claiming	  our	  activities	  are	  friendly’.	  The	  Secretariat,	  surprised	  at	  the	  range	  of	  misunderstanding	  across	  the	  two	  days,	  appeared	  unsure	  of	  what	  the	  next	  steps	  would	  look	  like.	  However	  they	  felt	  that	  by	  conducting	  their	  review	  and	  refocusing	  the	  project	  they	  would	  push	  the	  debate	  forward.	  
6.4.	  THE	  PORTFOLIO	  CARBON	  INITIATIVE	  IS	  LAUNCHED	  Three	   months	   after	   the	   TWG	   in-­‐person	   meeting	   in	   Washington	   D.C.	  preliminary	   findings	   from	   the	   landscape	   review	   were	   presented	   by	   the	  Secretariat	   during	   a	   webinar	   with	   all	   participants.	   Trends	   identified	   in	   the	  reporting	   landscape	   varied	   from	   broader	   observations,	   such	   as	   “[Financial	  Organisations’]	  CSR	  [Corporate	  Social	  Responsibility]	  reports	  disclose	  almost	  exclusively	  positive	  metrics;	  stakeholders	  demand	  both	  positive	  and	  negative	  metrics”,	   to	   more	   specific	   characteristics	   of	   the	   reported	   information.	   Four	  categories	   of	   metrics	   –	   Financed	   emissions	   (units	   CO2e);	   Other	   emissions	  metrics	   (units	   CO2e);	   Energy-­‐related	   metrics	   (units	   MW,	   MWh,	   etc.);	  Exposure-­‐based	  metrics	  (units	  $,	  €,	  etc.)	  –	  were	  noted.	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After	   presenting	   these	   early	   findings	   to	   TWG	   participants,	   the	  Secretariat	   sought	   feedback	   on	   the	   new	   direction	   for	   the	   project.	   Some	  participants	   suggested	   continuing	   with	   ‘business	   as	   usual’	   for	   the	   project,	  continuing	   to	  develop	  Scope	  3	  accounting	  and	  reporting	  guidance,	  and	  some	  suggested	  a	   ‘wait	  and	  see’	  approach	  that	  focussed	  on	  analysing	  the	  results	  of	  the	  landscape	  review	  once	  this	  phase	  of	  the	  project	  was	  completed.	  However	  the	  majority	  of	  participants	  favoured	  an	  approach	  that	  maintained	  momentum	  in	   the	   project,	   while	   allowing	   for	   a	   so	   called	   ‘course	   correction’.	   As	   such,	   a	  ‘phased’	  and	  ‘hybrid’	  approach	  emerged	  with	  significant	  support.	  This	  was	  to	  press	  ahead	  with	  developing	  guidance	  for	  asset	  owners	  –	  for	  which	  there	  was	  stronger	   agreement	   and	   appetite	   –	   and	   would	   refocus	   the	   guidance	   being	  developed	  for	  banks.	  	  In	  February	  2015,	  when	  the	  project	  was	  relaunched,	  the	  restructuring	  of	   work	   streams	   into	   separate	   guidance	   documents	   for	   ‘Asset	   Owners’	   and	  ‘Banks’	   reflected	   this	   ‘phased’	   and	   ‘hybrid’	   approach	   (see	   Figure	   6.4).	   The	  email	   announcing	   the	   relaunch	   explained	   that	   “Given	   the	   broader	   scope	   of	  work”,	   which	   resulted	   from	   the	   new	   ‘phased’	   and	   ‘hybrid’	   approach,	   “the	  project	  has	  been	  renamed	  The	  Portfolio	  Carbon	  Initiative.”	  This	  was	  to	  tie	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  project	  more	  closely	  to	  “several	  exciting	  and	  related	  initiatives	  [that	   had]	   launched	   [since	   the	   June	   2014	   meeting],	   including	   PRI's	   [the	  Principles	   for	   Responsible	   Investment’s]	   Montreal	   Pledge	   and	   the	   Portfolio	  Decarbonization	   Coalition”.	   These	   two	   initiatives	   had	   emerged	   as	   an	  alternative	  to	  divestment,	  with	  financial	  organisations	  (especially	  those	  other	  than	  university	  and	  charitable	  funds)	  proving	  resistant	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  divesting	  from	  fossil	  fuels.	  	  Their	  arguments	  hinged	  on	  the	  idea	  that	  by	  “selling	  stock	  in	  a	  company	  […]	  they	  lose	  the	  influence	  they	  build	  with	  [investees]”	  (Interview:	  Eag1515).	  Rather,	  they	  preferred	  to	  ‘engage’	  with	  the	  companies	  they	  invest	  in	  and	   lend	   to	   as	   a	   way	   of,	   for	   example,	   pushing	   for	   reductions	   in	   the	   carbon	  intensity	  of	  production.	  	  Through	   the	   claimed	   nuances	   of	   engagement	   over	   divestment	   this	  emerging	  movement	  worked	  towards	  ‘portfolio	  decarbonisation’,	  described	  as	  “the	   process	   through	   which	   investors	   reduce	   portfolio	   exposure	   to	   GHG-­‐emissions	  and	  align	   their	  portfolios	  with	   the	  climate	  economy	  of	   the	   future.”	  (PDC	   2015,	   p.2).	   The	   two	   initiatives	   at	   the	   centre	   of	   this	   decarbonisation	  movement	   were	   the	   Portfolio	   Decarbonization	   Coalition	   (PDC)	   and	   the	  
Chapter	  6:	  Maintaining	  Standards	  
	   221	  
Montréal	   Carbon	   Pledge	   (MCP).	   The	   Financed	   Emissions	   Initiative	   was	  relaunched	   by	   the	   Secretariat	   as	   the	   Portfolio	   Carbon	   Initiative.	   This	  was	   to	  align	   the	   project	   with	   an	   idea	   of	   portfolio	   decarbonisation,	   focussing	   on	  metrics	   that	   bring	   the	   financial	   sector	   into	   a	   ‘supporting	   role’	   in	   efforts	   to	  tackle	  climate	  change.	  
	  
Figure	  6.4:	  Portfolio	  Carbon	  Initiative	  Work	  Stream	  Structure	  and	  4	  Deliverables.	  However	   it	   is	   crucial	   to	   note	   that	   both	   the	  MCP	   and	  PDC	   centred	   on	  disclosure	   of	   financed	   emissions	   and	   using	   the	   metric	   as	   a	   basis	   for	   target	  setting.	   By	   pledging	   to	   the	   MCP,	   financial	   organisations	   committed	   “to	  measure	   and	   publicly	   disclose	   the	   carbon	   footprint	   of	   their	   investment	  portfolios	   on	   an	   annual	   basis”	   (PRI	   2014).	   Through	   the	   PDC,	   financial	  organisations	   would	   also	   “commit	   to	   concrete	   and	   quantifiable	   carbon-­‐footprinting	  as	  well	  as	  portfolio	  decarbonization	  targets”	  (PDC	  2016,	  emphasis	  added).	   Yet	   the	   relaunched	   Portfolio	   Carbon	   Initiative	   only	   aligned	  with	   the	  idea	  of	  portfolio	  decarbonisation.	  Its	  new	  concept	  note	  stated:	  “as	  providers	  of	  debt	   and	   equity,	   capital	   financial	   institutions	   can	   be	   considered	   potential	  financiers,	   and	   hence	   key	   enablers,	   of	   the	   transition	   to	   the	   low-­‐carbon	  economy”	   (Portfolio	   Carbon	   Initiative	   Concept	   Note).	   Yet	   the	   concept	   note,	  while	   acknowledging	   the	   MCP	   and	   PDC,	   also	   highlighted	   the	   view	   that	  “[d]espite	   this	   growing	   appetite	   to	  develop	   carbon	   footprinting	   guidance	   for	  institutional	  investors,	  […]	  stakeholders	  in	  the	  [Portfolio	  Carbon	  Initiative]	  are	  divided	   over	   the	   practicality	   and	   meaningfulness	   of	   using	   the	   Scope	   3	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emissions	   concept	   to	   deliver	   transparency	   and	   disclosure	   to	   external	  stakeholders	  and	  shareholders.”	  Rather,	  the	  metrics	  now	  being	  developed	  by	  the	   project	   focussed	   instead	   on	   ‘climate	   performance’,	   briefly	   explained	   as	  “the	  contribution	  of	  a	  financial	  institution	  to	  financing	  the	  transition	  to	  a	  low-­‐carbon	  economy”	  (Portfolio	  Carbon	  Initiative	  Concept	  Note,	  p.2).	  It	   is	   also	   important	   to	   note	   that	   the	   Portfolio	   Carbon	   Initiative	   now	  focussed	  on	  assessing	  the	  ‘practicality	  and	  meaningfulness’	  of	  existing	  climate	  metrics,	  viewing	  this	  as	  the	  first	  step	  in	  the	  standardisation	  of	  carbon	  risk	  and	  climate	   performance	   measurement	   and	   reporting.	   Only	   the	   Asset	   Owner	  ‘Guidance	   on	   climate	   performance	   disclosure	   and	   targets’	   would	   inform	   the	  application	  of	  the	  GHG	  Protocol’s	  Scope	  3	  Standard,	  whereas	  the	  assessments	  presented	  through	  the	  other	  three	  deliverables	  were	  seen	  as	  a	  foundation	  for	  future	   standard-­‐setting.	   In	   this	   regard,	   concerns	   of	   carbon	   asset	   risk	   and	  financing	   the	   transition	   to	   a	   low-­‐carbon	   economy	   had	   become	   the	   guiding	  ideas	  for	  the	  Portfolio	  Carbon	  Initiative.	  	  Furthermore,	   transparency	   to	   stakeholders	   was	   now	   to	   be	   achieved	  through	   metrics	   representing	   the	   climate	   performance	   of	   investment	   and	  lending	  activities.	  Emerging	  ideas	  of	  carbon	  risk	  and	  ‘financing	  the	  transition	  to	  a	   two	  degrees	  scenario’	  had	  permeated	   the	  project.	  These	  gradually	  came	  into	   conflict	   with	   its	   initial	   focus	   on	   transparency	   to	   campaigning-­‐NGOs	  through	   carbon	   accounting	   for	   financed	   emissions.	   Put	   differently,	   the	  Financed	   Emissions	   Initiative	   became	   destabilised	   as	   the	   shifting	   financial	  sector	  discourse	  on	  climate	  change	  infiltrated,	  through	  participants’	  changing	  demands,	  the	  standard-­‐setting	  project.	  Where	  such	  suggestions	  and	  concerns	  had	   emerged	   as	   central	   features	   to	   the	   May	   2014	   Advisory	   Committee	  meeting,	   the	   objectives	   of	   the	   project	   and	   the	  metrics	   being	   developed	   had	  been	   adjusted	   into	   a	   form	   cohering	   to	   the	   two	   degrees	   target.	   Yet	   the	  indicators	   for	   rendering	   the	   emerging	   concerns	   visible	   were	   a	   matter	   for	  further	  work.	  Whereas	  a	  carbon	  accounting	  approach	  was	  based	  on	  the	  GHG	  Protocol’s	   core	   standards,	   the	   measurement	   and	   reporting	   options	   for	   a	  performance	  metrics	   approach	  were	   to	   be	   assessed	   before	   standard	   setting	  could	  resume.	  The	  Portfolio	  Carbon	  Initiative	  also	  restructured	  the	  work	  of	  TWGs	  1-­‐4	  into	   two	  work	   streams	   (one	   for	  Banks,	   one	   for	  Asset	  Owners),	   each	   shifting	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focus	   towards	   the	   aforementioned	   climate	  performance	  metrics.	   In	   addition,	  the	   drafting	   process	   was	   restructured,	   with	   the	   Secretariat	   preparing	   the	  drafts	  and	  then	  presenting	  them	  to	  TWGs	  for	  feedback.	  To	  assist	  in	  producing	  these	   drafts	   the	   Secretariat	   initiated	   a	   formal	   relationship	  with	   the	   2°	   (Two	  Degrees)	   Investing	   Initiative,	   a	  Paris-­‐based	   think	   tank,	   as	  a	   research	  partner	  for	   the	  project.	  The	  2°	   Investing	  Initiative	  works	  “to	  promote	  the	   integration	  of	   climate	   goals	   in	   financial	   institutions’	   investment	   strategies	   and	   financial	  regulation”	   (2°	   Investing	   Initiative	   2013,	   p.2),	   and	   its	   employees	   had	   been	  involved	  with	  the	  project	  through	  the	  Advisory	  Committee	  and	  several	  TWGs.	  Moreover,	  the	  Secretariat	  noted	  that	  the	  2°	  Investing	  Initiative’s	  2013	  report,	  
From	   Financed	   Emissions	   To	   Long-­‐Term	   Investing	   Metrics:	   State-­‐of-­‐the-­‐art	  
review	   of	   GHG	   emissions	   accounting	   for	   the	   financial	   sector	   (2°	   Investing	  Initiative	   2013),	   “was	   our	   bible	   for	   starting	   our	   technical	   working	   group	  process	  […]	  that	  was	  a	  really	  useful	  reference	  document	  […]	  we	  share	  with	  all	  the	  technical	  working	  group	  members	  as	  background.	   […]	  We	  didn’t	  want	   to	  start	   from	  scratch,	  we	   just	  wanted	  to	  build	   from	  these	  existing	  methods	  that	  were	  already	  out	  there”	  (Interviewee:	  Eag1513).	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand	  TWG	  5’s	  work	  continued	  in	  a	  third	  work	  stream	  on	  ‘Carbon	  Asset	  Risk’	  and,	  as	  a	  member	  of	  the	  Secretariat	  commented	  during	  an	  interview,	  “nothing	  changed,	  it	  has	  continued	  down	  the	  same	  direction.	  It	  has	  run	   pretty	   smoothly,	   it	   is	   a	   lot	   less	   controversial	   and	   it’s	   really	   just	   a	  discussion	   framework	   so	   it’s	   not	   requiring	   anything”	   (Interview:	   Eag1513).	  Indeed,	   this	   section	   briefly	   outlines	   how	   TWG	   5’s	   work	   progressed,	   before	  moving	  on	   to	   the	  new	  metrics	  being	  developed	  under	   the	  Asset	  Owners	  and	  Banks	  work	  streams.	  
6.4.1.	  TWG	  5,	  PORTFOLIO	  RISK	  EXPOSURE	  AND	  CLIMATE	  SCENARIOS	  In	   February	  2015	  TWG	  5	   circulated	   a	   draft	   of	   the	  Carbon	  Asset	  Risk	  Guidance	   for	   feedback	   from	   all	   TWG	   participants.	   It	   detailed	   a	   similar	  approach	   to	   that	   outlined	   at	   the	   May	   2014	   Advisory	   Committee	   meeting,	  comprised	   of	   assessing	   portfolio	   ‘carbon	   risk	   exposure’	   and	   evaluating	   this	  against	  climate	  scenarios	   to	   identify	   risks	   to	  be	  managed.	  The	  assessment	  of	  portfolio	   ‘carbon	   risk	   exposure’	  was	   divided	   into	   three	   stages,	  with	   the	   first	  “assessing	  the	  potential	  implications	  that	  a	  strong	  climate	  mitigation	  (i.e.,	  2°C)	  scenario	   could	   hold	   for	   various	   categories	   of	   physical	   assets	   and	   economic	  sectors”	   (CAR	   Draft,	   February	   2015,	   p.15).	   This	   two	   degrees	   scenario	   was	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adopted	   for	   the	   analysis,	   with	   the	   document	   stating,	   “the	   implications	   are	  unlikely	   to	  differ	   for	  alternative	  (>2°C)	  scenarios	  (though	  they	  clearly	  would	  for	   [Business	   as	   Usual]	   scenarios)”	   (Ibid.,	   p.16).	   Based	   on	   this	   scenario	   the	  report	   identifies	   four	  asset	   classes	   that	  have	  a	  high	  exposure	   to	   carbon	  risk:	  Fossil-­‐fuel	   assets,	   Fossil-­‐fuel	   dependent	   infrastructure,	   High-­‐carbon	   assets	  facing	  shift	   to	   low-­‐carbon	  technologies,	  and	  High-­‐carbon	  assets	  without	   low-­‐carbon	  competitors	  (see	  Figure	  6.5).	  	  
	  
Figure	  6.5:	  Summary	  of	  typical	  risk	  types	  and	  asset	  classes	  associated	  with	  each	  sector/asset	  category	  (CAR	  Draft,	  February	  2015,	  p.17).	  The	   second	   step	   entails	   an	   assessment	   of	   sectoral	   exposure	   to	   risk,	  with	  the	  document	  stating	  that	  the	  exposure	  of	  the	  four	  asset	  types	  will	  differ	  across	   sectors.	   In	   particular,	   the	   analysis	   highlights	   that	   sectors	   are	   more	  exposed	  where	  there	  is	  relatively	  high	  carbon	  intensity,	  high	  average	  physical	  asset	  lifespan,	  and	  low	  EBIT	  margins.	  As	  with	  the	  sectoral-­‐nuance	  of	  this	  risk	  exposure,	   the	   third	   step	   assesses	   company	   exposure,	   and	   recommends	   that	  the	   financial	   intermediaries	  or	   investors	   that	   are	   conducting	   the	   assessment	  should	  draw	  on	  the	  corporate-­‐level	  environmental	  metrics	  available	  from	  data	  providers	  such	  as	  Trucost,	  MSCI	  and	  South	  Pole	  Carbon.	  The	   document	   frames	   this	   assessment	   as	   enabling	   financial	  intermediaries	   or	   investors	   to	   evaluate	   the	   carbon	   risk	   exposure	   of	   an	  investment	  or	  lending	  portfolio	  against	  climate	  policy	  scenarios.	  In	  particular,	  the	  IEA’s	  World	  Energy	  Outlook	  (IEA	  2013b)	  is	  referred	  to	  as	  “an	  accepted	  and	  trusted	   source	   of	   future	   scenarios”	   (CAR	  Draft,	   February	   2015,	   p.45),	  which	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“include[s]	   scenarios	   for	   carbon,	   demand,	   supply,	   risk	   and	   capex	   for	   key	  carbon	  intense	  industries.”	  Taken	  together,	  by	  conducting	  such	  an	  assessment	  a	   financial	   organisation	   renders	   its	   portfolio	   into	   a	   form	   comparable	   with	  scenarios	   for	   particular	   levels	   of	  warming	   or	   for	   particular	   levels	   of	   climate	  policy	  intervention.	  In	  this	  regard,	  while	  the	  mobilisation	  of	  the	  carbon	  budget	  (Chapter	   5)	   raised	   concerns	   of	   carbon	   asset	   risk,	   the	   Carbon	   Asset	   Risk	  guidance	   emerged	   from	   experimentation	   with	   ways	   to	   render	   portfolios	  compatible	  with	  warming	  and	  policy	  scenarios.	  That	  is,	  the	  mobilisation	  of	  the	  carbon	   budget	   stimulated	   efforts	   to	   develop	   and	   adjust	   risk	   management	  practices	   for	   analysing	   the	   impact	   of	   “a	   global	   GHG-­‐constrained	   economy”	  (Ibid.,	  p.viii)	  on	  investment	  and	  lending	  portfolios.	  
6.4.2.	  CARBON	  RISK	  AND	  CLIMATE	  PERFORMANCE	  By	  March	   2015	   the	   first	   draft	   document	   for	   the	   Asset	   Owners	  work	  stream	   had	   been	   produced,	   titled	   Assessing	   Climate-­‐Related	   Metrics	   and	  
Targets:	  An	  Overview	  for	  Institutional	  Investors.	  The	  document,	  addressing	  the	  decarbonisation	   movement,	   identified	   “two	   key	   and	   distinct	   drivers	   behind	  the	   momentum	   around	   investor	   pledges	   and	   setting	   climate	   performance	  targets,	  […]	  the	  carbon	  risk	  view	  […	  and]	  the	  climate	  performance	  view.”	  (2ii,	  UNEP	  FI,	  GHG	  Protocol,	  2015,	  p.6).	  In	  this	  first	  draft	  the	  carbon	  risk	  view	  was	  based	   on	   the	   idea	   “the	   transition	   to	   a	   low-­‐carbon	   economy	   may	   create	  financial	   risks	   to	   portfolios	   that	   investors	  may	   seek	   to	  manage.”	   (Ibid.)	   The	  climate	  performance	  view,	  on	  the	  other	  hand:	  	  “Relates	   in	   particular	   to	   the	   impact	   of	   portfolio	   allocation	  decisions	   on	   investment	   in	   the	   real	   economy	   or	   capital	  stewardship	   of	   investees	   […]	   Climate	   performance	   is	   the	  umbrella	   term	   for	   the	   impact	   of	   an	   agent	   or	   an	   asset	   on	  climate	   change.	   The	   climate	   impact	   appears	   in	   the	   form	   of	  financing	  or	  investing	  activity	  that	  reduces	  GHG-­‐emissions	  in	  the	  real	  economy.”	  (2ii,	  UNEP	  FI,	  GHG	  Protocol,	  2015,	  p.6).	  While	   the	   Portfolio	   Carbon	   Initiative	   had	   already	   connected	   to	  emerging	  concerns	  of	  carbon	  risk	  through	  TWG	  5,	  in	  restructuring	  the	  project	  around	  these	  two	  views	  it	  also	  came	  to	  focus	  on	  metrics	  to	  monitor	  alignment	  of	   the	   financial	   sector	   with	   the	   transition	   to	   a	   low-­‐carbon	   economy.	   Rather	  than	  using	  carbon	  accounting	  for	  financed	  emissions	  to	  provide	  a	   ‘broad	  and	  inclusive’	  transparency	  primarily	  to	  campaigning-­‐NGOs,	  performance	  metrics	  would	  render	  visible	   the	  alignment	  of	   investment	  and	   lending	  activities	  with	  the	  economic	  transition	  for	  tackling	  climate	  change.	  From	  this	  understanding	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of	   climate	   performance	   the	   guidance	   outlined	   three	   interrelated	   climate	  performance	   strategies	   as	   well	   as	   climate	   performance	   metrics	   for	  implementing	   them.	   Through	   portfolio	   construction,	   the	   first	   strategy,	  “investors	   influence	   the	   cost	   and	   availability	   of	   capital	   through	   portfolio	  allocation	   decisions,	   and	   influence	   investees’	   strategies	   to	   align	   their	  strategies	   with	   portfolio	   allocation	   constraints”	   (Ibid.,	   p.12).	   Capital	  
stewardship,	   the	   second	   strategy,	   aimed	   to	   influence	   capital	   allocation	  decisions	  of	   investee	  companies	  through	  a	  range	  of	  engagement	  tactics,	   from	  relationship	  building	   and	   shareholder	   resolutions	   to,	   ultimately,	   reallocation	  of	   funds	   and	   divestment.	   The	   third	   strategy,	   investor	   positioning,	   sought	   to	  enhance	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  first	  two	  strategies	  by	  providing	  guidance	  on	  how	  to	  tailor	   the	   overall	   strategy	   to	   one	   of	   three	   approaches:	   ‘do-­‐it-­‐yourself’	   as	   an	  individual	   investor;	  mobilise	  a	   ‘critical	  mass’	  of	   investors;	  or	  send	  a	  signal	   to	  influence	  policymakers.	  Three	  different	  categories	  of	  metrics	  were	  proposed	  in	  this	  April	  2015	  draft,	   which	   had	   been	   developed	   by	   the	   GHG	   Protocol,	   UNEP	   FI	   and,	   the	   2°	  Investing	   Initiative,	   as	   their	   new	   research	   partner.	   The	   draft	   outlined	   and	  discussed	   each	   category	   through	   the	   table	   shown	   in	   Figure	   6.6.	   The	   first	  category,	   carbon	   metrics,	   would	   enable	   comparison	   across	   sectors	   at	   a	  portfolio	  level.	  However	  when	  refined	  beyond	  the	  portfolio	  level	  these	  metrics	  introduced	   significant	   error.	   Addressing	   this	   shortcoming,	   as	   well	   as	  emphasising	   that	   “in	   climate	   scenarios,	   the	   shift	   in	   capital	   allocation	   is	  primarily	  an	  increase	  of	  green	  investment”	  (2ii,	  UNEP	  FI,	  GHG	  Protocol,	  2015,	  p.41),	   ‘green/brown	   metrics’	   were	   proposed	   as	   a	   second	   category.	   Green	  metrics	  were	   based	   on	   “a	   categorization	   of	   products	   and	   services	   as	   part	   of	  the	  climate	  solution,”	   such	  as	   renewable	  energy	  generation	  and	  R&D	   in	   low-­‐carbon	   technologies,	   while	   brown	  were	   “part	   of	   the	   climate	   problem”	   (Ibid.	  p.33),	  such	  as	  oil	  and	  gas	  capital	  expenditure.	  	  However	   these	   metrics	   also	   faced	   several	   issues,	   primarily	   that	  green/brown	  metrics	  are	  only	  available	  for	  specific	  carbon-­‐intensive	  sectors	  –	  such	  as	  fossil	  fuels,	  power	  generation	  and	  car	  manufacturing	  –	  and	  cannot	  be	  “easily	   aggregated”	   (Ibid.	   p.34)	   to	   provide	   an	   overview	   for	   a	   portfolio.	   The	  draft	   proposed	   a	   third	   category,	   climate	   scores,	   produced	   by	   data	   providers	  and,	  as	  was	  explained	  during	  the	  April	  2015	  webinar,	  based	  on	  “green/brown	  metrics,	   qualitative	   indicators	   –	   like	   sustainability	   strategy,	   CO2	   reduction	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targets	   and	   reporting	   –	   and	   carbon	   metrics.”	   As	   climate	   scores	   could	   be	  aggregated,	   the	   three	   forms	   of	   metrics	   would	   reveal	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   a	  portfolio	   financing	   requirements	   of	   a	   transition	   to	   a	   low-­‐carbon	   economy	  at	  the	   levels	  of	  specific	   investments	  within	  portfolios,	  whole	  portfolios,	  and	   the	  company’s	   overall	   investment	   and	   lending	   activities.	   However	   it	   was	   in	   the	  revised	   draft	   of	   this	   Asset	   Owner’s	   guidance	   that	   the	   standardisation	   work	  became	   tied	   to	   sectoral	   roadmaps	   for	   the	   two	   degrees	   target.	   It	   is	   to	   this	  refinement	   of	   the	   two	   degrees	   target	   into	   portfolio-­‐level	   metrics	   that	   this	  chapter	  now	  turns.	  	  	  
6.4.3.	   CLIMATE	   PERFORMANCE	   AND	   ROADMAPS	   TO	   THE	   TWO	   DEGREES	  
TARGET	  	   By	  September	  2015	  the	  guidance	   for	   institutional	   investors	  had	  been	  finalised.	  Whereas	   the	  draft	   report	  had	   focussed	  on	   the	   technical	   foundation	  for	   climate	   performance	   strategies,	   the	   final	   report	   emphasised	   an	  overarching	   vision	   of	   aligning	   investment	   portfolios	   to	   “the	   global	   political	  objective	  [of]	  limiting	  global	  warming	  to	  2°C	  above	  pre-­‐industrial	  levels”	  (2ii,	  UNEP	  FI,	  GHG	  Protocol,	  2015b,	  p.17).	  	  In	   particular,	   it	   was	   claimed,	   “[i]nvestors	   must	   connect	   the	   dots	  between	  climate	  change	  and	  their	  portfolios.	  The	   first	  step	   in	  connecting	  the	  dots	  is	  to	  define	  a	  roadmap	  from	  today’s	  economy	  to	  a	  low-­‐carbon	  economy”	  (Ibid.).	   The	   report	   drew	   particular	   attention	   to	   the	   IEA	   World	   Energy	  Investment	  Outlook	  as	  “research	  on	  the	  implications	  of	  reaching	  this	  goal	  [the	  two	   degrees	   target]	   for	   high-­‐emitting	   sectors”	   and	   that	   also	   “highlights	   the	  changes	  in	  investment	  needs	  between	  a	  scenario	  aligned	  with	  the	  2°C	  climate	  goal	  (450[ppm])	  and	  a	  scenario	  associated	  with	  current	  policy	  commitments”	  (Ibid.).	   Indeed,	   during	   the	   participant	   observation,	   the	   IEA’s	   roadmaps	  were	  the	   most	   commonly	   referenced	   among	   project	   participants,	   and	   it	   is	   worth	  briefly	  familiarising	  the	  reader	  with	  their	  analysis.	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Figure	  6.6:	  Overview	  of	  Three	  Categories	  of	  Climate	  Performance	  Metrics	  for	  Institutional	  Investors	  (2ii,	  UNEP	  FI,	  GHG	  Protocol,	  2015,	  p.25).	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The	   IEA’s	   annual	  World	   Energy	   Outlook	   presents	   analysis	   of	   future	  trends	  in	  energy	  demand	  and	  supply	  under	  different	  policy	  scenarios,	  and	  the	  expected	   level	   of	   warming	   under	   each	   scenario.	   The	   2013	   World	   Energy	  Outlook	  finds	  that	  under	  their	  ‘New	  Policies	  Scenario’102	  the	  average	  increase	  in	   global	   temperatures	   is	   likely	   to	   be	   between	  3.6°C	   and	  5.3°C	   (IEA	  2013b).	  Based	  on	  this	  finding	  the	  IEA	  published	  a	  separate	  report	  in	  2013,	  Redrawing	  
the	  Energy-­‐Climate	  Map,	   focussing	  on	  how	   to	  guide	   the	  energy	  sector	   from	  a	  3.6°C	  and	  5.3°C	  path,	  towards	  one	  consistent	  with	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	  (IEA	  2013a).	  The	  carbon	  budget	  of	  884	  GtCO2	  by	  2050	  was	  central	   to	   this	   report,	  which	  further	  refines	  the	  carbon	  budget	  into	  a	  set	  of	  emissions	  trajectories.	  By	  representing	  the	  emissions	  pathways	  for	  remaining	  within	  the	  carbon	  budget,	  the	   roadmaps	   enable	   annual	   emissions	   figures	   to	   be	   compared	   to	   emissions	  trajectories	  for	  remaining	  within	  a	  particular	  carbon	  budget.	  In	  particular,	  the	  report	   notes	   “it	   becomes	   clear	   that	   the	   longer	   action	   to	   reduce	   global	  emissions	  is	  delayed,	  the	  more	  rapid	  reductions	  will	  need	  to	  be	  in	  the	  future	  to	  compensate”	  (IEA	  2013a,	  p.16).	  In	  their	  2014	  Special	  Report,	  the	  World	  Energy	  Investment	  Outlook,	  the	  IEA	   detail	   the	   financing	   needs	   to	   support	   the	   policy	   scenarios	   and	   their	  associated	   emissions	   trajectories.	   The	   report	   addresses	   the	   implications	   of	  changes	  in	  fossil	  fuel	  use	  for	  investment,	  and	  the	  investment	  requirements	  for	  both	   the	   low-­‐carbon	   restructuring	   of	   the	   power	   sector	   and	   for	   advancing	  energy	  efficiency.	  Taking	  the	  450ppm	  policy	  scenario	  as	  an	  example	  –	  which	  is	  the	  scenario	  they	  propose	  “for	  the	  global	  energy	  sector	  that	  gets	  it	  on	  track	  for	  2°C”	   (IEA	   2014,	   p.40)	   –	   the	   report	   highlights	   that,	   between	   2013	   and	   2035,	  investment	   in	   low-­‐carbon	  power	  generation	  needs	  to	   increase	  threefold,	  and	  eightfold	   for	   investment	   in	  efficiency	   improvements.	  This	   chapter	  now	  turns	  to	   show	   how	   the	   Portfolio	   Carbon	   Initiative	   came	   to	   see	   these	   emerging	  roadmaps	   as	   an	   instrument	   that	   could	   underpin	   their	  metrics	   that	   revealed	  the	   alignment	   between	   investment	   and	   lending	   activities	   and	   a	   two	   degrees	  scenario.	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  102	  The	   ‘New	  Policies	   Scenario’	   takes	   into	   consideration	   changes	   in	   policy	   based	   on	  current	  commitments	  and	  recent	  legal	  developments.	  In	  other	  words,	  it	  assumes	  that	  current	  commitments	  are	  maintained,	  but	  does	  not	  assume	  any	  strengthening	  of	  these	  commitments	  in	  the	  future.	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BENCHMARKING	  CLIMATE	  FRIENDLINESS	  AS	  THE	  WAY	  FORWARD	  In	   January	   2016	   the	   first	   draft	   of	   the	  Banks	   guidance	  was	   presented	  for	   feedback.	   The	   draft	   presented	   a	   combination	   of	   financed	   emissions	   and	  green/brown	   ratios.	   The	   application	   of	   financed	   emissions	  was	   restricted	   to	  “project	   finance	   and	   related	   activities”	   as	   a	   result	   of	   “challenges	   associated	  with	   practicality	   and	   meaningfulness	   when	   the	   use	   of	   proceeds	   are	   not	  known”	  (2ii,	  UNEP	  FI,	  GHG	  Protocol,	  2016,	  p.31).	  Green/brown	  ratios,	  on	  the	  other	   hand,	   offered	   “relative	   practicality”	   across	   a	   lending	   portfolio	   because	  they	   only	   required	   two	   sets	   of	   information.	   The	   first	   component	   is	   data	   on	  projects	  and	  the	  loan	  book,	  which	  are	  “tracked	  as	  part	  of	  the	  core	  business	  of	  banking”.	  The	  second	  is	  a	  “taxonomy	  of	  which	  of	  the	  activities,	  sectors,	  etc.	  are	  considered	   ‘green’	   and	   ‘brown’”	   (Ibid.,	   p.27).	   For	   this,	   the	   “most	  comprehensive	  solutions	  […]	  are	  classification	  systems	  and	  standards	  specific	  to	  the	  ESG	  [Environment,	  Social	  and	  Governance]	  space,	  such	  as	  developed	  by	  the	   Climate	   Bonds	   Standard	   and	   commercial	   ‘green’	   taxonomies	   from	  providers	   like	  MSCI,	   FTSE,	   and	   others”	   (Ibid.,	   p.30).	   However	   the	   draft	   also	  recognised	   the	   drawbacks	   of	   specific	   metrics	   and	   the	   variability	   between	  types	   of	   banks	   “make	   it	   very	   difficult	   to	   deliver	   a	   single	   set	   of	  recommendations	   or	   a	   single	   standard	   approach	   to	   tracking	   climate	  friendliness	  at	  bank	  level”	  (Ibid.,	  p.33).	  	  Rather,	   the	   draft	   emphasised	   the	   emergence	   of	   “‘roadmaps’	   showing	  the	   breakdown	   of	   financing	   needs	   by	   region,	   technology,	   and	   asset	   type,”	  through	  which	   it	  would	  become	  possible	   to	   “assess	   and	  benchmark	   [banks’]	  current	  financing	  to	  the	  respective	  needs	  for	  the	  energy	  transition”	  (Ibid.).	  In	  particular,	   the	   draft	   made	   the	   case	   that	   the	   purpose	   of	   measurement	   and	  reporting	   would	   shift	   away	   from	   managing	   reputational	   risk	   from	   NGO	  campaigns	  and	  towards	  planning	  for	  the	  so-­‐called	  ‘energy	  transition’:	  “Although	  currently	  most	  banks	  track	  climate	  friendliness	  for	  reasons	   of	   mandate	   or	   reputational	   management,	   the	  impending	   energy	   transition	   driven	   by	   climate	   policy	   and	  technoeconomic	   change	   is	   changing	   the	   landscape.	  With	   the	  unprecedented	   capital	   needs	   needed	   for	   the	   transition,	  forward	   thinking	   banks	   are	   now	  planning	   for	   the	   transition	  by	  assessing	  the	  financing	  needs	  needed	  for	  different	  critical	  technologies,	   sectors,	   and	   regions	   by	   the	   type	   of	   financing”	  (Ibid.,	  p.35).	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By	  tying	  the	  notion	  of	  climate	  friendliness	  to	  the	  energy	  transition,	  the	  Portfolio	   Carbon	   Initiative	   became	   focussed	   on	   rendering	   visible	   the	  alignment	  of	  the	  financial	  sector	  with	  the	  financing	  needs	  for	  tackling	  climate	  change.	   However	   the	   draft	   noted	   that	   these	   roadmaps	   were	   still	   in	  development	   and,	   in	   the	   Asset	   Owner	   guidance	   document,	   that	   	   “Climate	  scenarios	  do	  not	  enable	  setting	  GHG	  reduction	  or	  investment	  targets	  for	  each	  sector	   or	   company”	   (2ii,	   UNEP	   FI,	   GHG	   Protocol,	   2015a,	   p.63).	   The	   point,	  however,	  is	  that	  benchmarking	  the	  alignment	  of	  portfolios	  against	  investment	  roadmaps	  had	  become	  central	  to	  the	  strategy	  of	  developing	  indicators	  for	  the	  climate	   impact	  of	   investment	  and	   lending	  activities.	   From	   its	   initial	   focus	  on	  pursuing	  transparency	  through	  financed	  emissions	  disclosures,	  the	  standard-­‐setting	   project	   had	   gradually	   been	   reoriented	   and	   now	   focused	   on	   framing	  investment	   and	   lending	   activities	   in	   terms	   of	   their	   alignment	   with	   the	   two	  degrees	   scenario.	   Indeed	   the	   two	   documents	   highlighted	   that	   “two	  international	  research	  efforts,	  both	  based	  on	  the	  IEA	  scenarios	  –	  the	  Sectoral	  Decarbonization	  Approach	   […]	   at	   company	   level	   and	   the	   Sustainable	  Energy	  Investment	  (SEI)	  Metrics	  Research	  Consortium	  (Fig.	  [6.7])	  at	  portfolio	  level	  –	  are	  currently	  addressing	  this	  issue”	  (Ibid.,	  p.63).	  	  
	  
	  Figure	  6.7:	  SEI	  Metrics	  Consortium:	  Comparing	  MSCI	  World	  Exposure	  with	  2°C	  Roadmaps	  (2ii,	  UNEP	  FI,	  GHG	  Protocol,	  2015a,	  p.63).	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This	  new	  focus	  on	  benchmarking	  portfolios	  against	  roadmaps	  featured	  prominently	   in	   the	   final	   feedback	   webinar	   for	   the	   Banks	   work	   stream	   in	  January	  2016,	  with	  the	  secretariat	  emphasising	  that	  they	  wanted	  to	  continue	  the	  Portfolio	  Carbon	  Initiative’s	  work	  beyond	  the	  publication	  of	  the	  guidance	  documents.	  Before	  this	  webinar,	  TWG	  participants	  were	  under	  the	  impression	  that	  the	  publication	  of	  Banks	  and	  Asset	  Owners	  guidance	  documents	  marked	  the	  end	  of	  the	  project.	  However	  the	  Secretariat	  expressed	  a	  desire	  to	  continue	  the	  work,	  specifically	  to	  explore	  how	  it	  could	  be	  more	  closely	  connected	  to	  the	  IEA	  Roadmaps:	  “[W]e	  really	  think	  that	  the	  future	  is	   in	  assessing	  each	  bank’s	  role	   in	   the	   transition	   and	   what	   banks	   are	   doing	   with	   both	  respects	  to	  green	  and	  brown	  in	  the	  energy	  transition.	  And	  we	  are	   hoping	   that	   we’ll	   see	   the	   development	   of	   financing	  roadmaps	   that	   would	   show,	   for	   each	   region	   and	   different	  sectors,	   different	   types	   of	   transactions	   and	   asset	   classes	   on	  what	   different	   institutions,	   given	   their	   midst	   of	   business	  lines,	  should	  be	  doing.”	  (Secretariat)	  Reinforcing	  this	  new	  vision	  of	  monitoring	  the	  alignment	  of	  banks	  with	  an	   energy	   transition,	   a	   different	   Secretariat	  member	   explained,	   “we’ve	   been	  thinking	   through	   various	   options	   for	   how	   we	   could	   be	   working	   together	  through	  [this	  project]	  and	  there’s	  two	  main	  categories	  of	  projects	  that	  we	  will	  be	   working	   on.”	   The	   first	   was	   to	   contribute	   to	   the	   development	   of	   more	  refined	   roadmaps,	  noting	   that	   “[a	  member	  of	   the	  2°	   Investing	   Initiative]	  will	  do	  a	   little	  bit	  on	   the	   financing	   roadmap”.	  The	   second	   “is	   to	   take	   that	  work	  a	  step	  further	  and	  develop	  a	  methodology	  for	  how	  to	  set	  reduction	  targets	  that	  we	   would	   call	   ‘science-­‐based	   targets’,	   targets	   for	   financial	   institutions	   to	  ensure	  their	  alignment	  with	  the	  transition	  to	  a	  two	  degrees	  world.”	  	  Two	  minutes	  later,	  having	  informed	  TWG	  participants	  that	  they	  would	  be	  contacted	  regarding	   further	  projects,	   the	  Secretariat	   thanked	  participants	  and	  drew	  the	  Portfolio	  Carbon	  Initiative	  to	  a	  temporary	  close:	  “Well	   from	  my	  side,	   I	  want	   to	   thank	  everyone	   for	   joining	   in.	  (Secretariat	  member	  1)	  Yes,	  same	  here.	  Thanks	  so	  much	  for	  taking	  part	  everyone	  and	  this	   presentation	   will	   be	   available	   online,	   we’ll	   send	   it	   out	  afterwards	   and	   we	   look	   forward	   to	   hearing	   your	   feedback.	  Thanks	  so	  much.	  (Research	  partner	  1)	  Thanks	  everyone,	  bye.”	  (Secretariat	  member	  2)	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6.5.	  DISCUSSION	  
6.5.1.	  CREATING	  A	  MEDIATING	  INSTRUMENT	  Launched	   in	   2012	   as	   the	   Financed	   Emissions	   Initiative,	   the	  collaborative	   UNEP	   FI	   and	   GHG	   Protocol	   standard-­‐setting	   project	   brought	  together	   financial	   organisations,	   think	   tanks,	   campaigning-­‐NGOs,	   and	  government	  representatives	  to	  develop	  new	  carbon	  accounting	  methods.	  The	  initial	   appeal	   of	   this	   standard	  was	   to	   provide:	   financial	   organisations	  with	   a	  response	   to	   pressure	   from	   campaigning-­‐NGOs;	   campaigning-­‐NGOs	   with	  further	   transparency	   on	   the	   climate	   impacts	   of	   investment	   and	   lending	  activities;	   and	   to	   further	   tailor	   the	   GHG	   Protocol’s	   Scope	   3	   Standard	   to	   the	  specifics	   of	   financial	   organisations.	   For	   the	   Secretariat,	   the	   GHG	   Protocol	  pursued	  its	  usual	  strategy	  of	  developing	  sector-­‐specific	  guidance	  to	  extend	  the	  reach	  of	  the	  core	  Scope	  3	  standard,	  while	  UNEP	  FI	  could	  offer	  its	  membership	  a	  common	  framework	  for	  participating	  in	  disclosure	  initiatives.	  The	  Financed	  Emissions	   Initiative	   had	   emerged	   as	   a	   process	   that	  would	   create	   a	   common	  measurement	  and	  reporting	  framework	  to	  advance	  this	  plethora	  of	  objectives.	  	  However	   by	   tracing	   the	   emergence	   of	   new	   concerns	   stemming	   from	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	  this	  chapter	  demonstrates	  how	  the	  Financed	  Emissions	  Initiative	  became	  unstable.	  Moreover,	  after	  being	  relaunched	  as	  the	  Portfolio	  Carbon	   Initiative,	   the	   emergent	   standard	   became	   interconnected	   with	  instruments	  linking	  a	  global	  objective	  to	  the	  local	  specifics	  of	  investment	  and	  lending	   decisions.	   To	   analyse	   this,	   the	   chapter	   frames	   the	   standard-­‐setting	  project	   as	   the	   configuration	   of	   a	   mediating	   instrument	   (Miller	   and	   O’Leary	  2007).	   In	   particular,	   Miller	   and	   O’Leary	   highlight	   the	   interconnections	  between	  several	  mediating	  instruments,	  with	  Moore’s	  Law	  being	  connected	  to	  the	  development	  of	  optical	  forms	  of	  lithography	  through	  technology	  roadmaps	  and	   cost-­‐of-­‐ownership	   calculations.	   This	   chapter	   that	   documents	   the	  construction	   of	   linkages	   between	   the	   emergent	   standard,	   the	   carbon	   budget	  and	   IEA	   roadmaps	   through	   which	   the	   two	   degrees	   target	   comes	   to	   frame	  investment	  and	  lending	  decisions.	  	  These	   linkages	   between	   mediating	   instruments	   were	   formed	   as	  project	   participants’	   expectations	   shifted	   towards	   the	   implications	   of	   a	   two	  degrees	   target,	   introducing	   new	   demands	   on	   the	   emergent	   standard.	   This	  does	  not	  disagree	  with	  Miller	  and	  O’Leary’s	  argument	  that	  roadmaps	  refined	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highly	   general	   rules	   into	   detailed	   requirements	   and	   timings	   (Ibid.,	   p.729).	  Rather,	   it	   draws	   attention	   to	   the	   way	   actors	   stimulate	   the	   formation	   of	  linkages	   between	   instruments.	   Specifically,	   the	   emergent	   standard	   became	  connected	  to	  IEA	  roadmaps	  as	  participants	  placed	  demands	  on	  the	  project	  to	  render	  their	  new	  concerns	  of	  carbon	  risk	  and	  financing	  the	  transition	  to	  a	  low-­‐carbon	   economy	   visible.	   Indeed	   it	   was	   the	   conflict	   between	   these	   new	  demands	   and	   the	   initial	   direction	   of	   the	   Financed	   Emissions	   Initiative	   that	  destabilised	   the	   standard-­‐setting	   project.	   It	  was	   through	   the	   reconfiguration	  of	  the	  project	  to	  embed	  the	  ideas	  and	  instruments	  of	  carbon	  risk	  and	  financing	  the	   transition	   to	   a	   low-­‐carbon	   economy	   that	   a	   temporary	   stability	   was	  fostered,	   and	   the	   emergent	   standard	   developed	   coherence	   with	   the	   two	  degrees	  target.	  	  This	  discussion	  first	  examines	  how	  emerging	  ideas,	  specifically	  around	  risk	  and	  monitoring	  alignment	  with	   the	   transition	   to	  a	   low-­‐carbon	  economy,	  were	   initially	   addressed	   through	   the	   inclusion	   of	   a	   new	   TWG	   and	   work	  stream,	   yet	   eventually	   led	   to	   the	  project	  becoming	  unstable.	   It	   then	   turns	   to	  consider	  how	  the	  envisaged	  standard	  and	  guidance	  became	  connected	  to	  both	  the	  IEA	  Roadmaps	  and	  the	  carbon	  budget,	  and	  how	  this	  reoriented	  the	  project	  towards	  the	  two	  degrees	  target.	  
THE	  FINANCED	  EMISSIONS	  INITIATIVE	  BECOMES	  UNSTABLE	  As	   Carbon	   Tracker’s	   arguments	   on	   the	   risk	   implications	   of	   the	  remaining	   global	   carbon	   budget	   gained	   traction	   (Chapter	   5),	   several	   of	   the	  major	   financial	   organisations	   on	   the	   Advisory	   Committee	   (one	   large	   US	  investment	  bank	  in	  particular)	  pushed	  for	  the	  Financed	  Emissions	  Initiative	  to	  provide	   guidance	   that	   built	   upon	   existing	   risk	   management	   practices.	  Understanding	   and	   managing	   risk	   had	   emerged	   as	   a	   core	   concern	   of	  commercial	   banks,	   and	   the	   Advisory	   Committee	   and	   Secretariat	   sought	   to	  connect	   the	   standard	   to	   the	   idea	   to	   foster	   future	   adoption	   of	   the	   standard.	  They	   responded	   in	   late-­‐2013	   by	   initiating	   a	   fifth	   TWG	   to	  manage	   a	   ‘Carbon	  Asset	   Risk’	   work	   stream.	   The	   Financed	   Emissions	   Initiative	   would	   not	   only	  produce	   a	   standard	   to	   allow	   financial	   organisations	   to	   respond	   to	  campaigning-­‐NGOs’	   calls	   for	   enhanced	   transparency,	   it	   would	   also	   produce	  guidance	  on	  how	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  concerns	  raised	  by	  the	  risk	  implications	  of	  the	   carbon	   budget.	   However	   TWG	   5	   did	   not	   link	   the	   carbon	   budget	   to	   the	  corporate-­‐	   or	   portfolio-­‐level.	   Rather,	   the	   mobilisation	   of	   the	   carbon	   budget	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stimulated	   work	   to	   develop	   risk	   management	   practices	   through	   which	  portfolios	   could	   be	   rendered	   comparable	   with	   climate	   scenarios.	   This	  maintained	   the	   initial	   vision	   for	   the	   Financed	   Emissions	   Initiative,	   while	  adding	   flexibility	   to	   its	   implementation	   by	   financial	   organisations.	   In	   this	  regard	  the	  configuration	  of	  the	  financed	  emissions	  standard	  was	  maintained,	  with	   the	   Carbon	   Asset	   Risk	   work	   stream	   being	   created	   to	   connect	   the	   core	  standard	  to	  emerging	  risk	  concerns.	  However	   by	   June	   2014	   new	   challenges	   emerged	   regarding	   the	  relevance	  of	  financed	  emissions	  to	  risk	  management	  as	  well	  as	  to	  monitoring	  the	  climate	   impacts	  of	   investment	  and	   lending	  activities.	  Financed	  emissions	  were	  at	  the	  core	  of	  the	  accounting	  standard	  being	  developed	  by	  TWGs	  1-­‐4,	  yet	  across	   both	   days	   of	   the	   in-­‐person	   TWG	   meeting	   in	   Washington	   D.C.	   their	  relevance	  was	  questioned.103	  On	  the	  other	  hand	  financed	  emissions	  remained	  relevant	   for	   the	   asset	   owners	   and	   campaigning-­‐NGOs	   participating	   in	   the	  project.	   The	   point	   is	   that	   tensions	   grew	   between	   the	   initial	   vision	   for	   the	  standard	   and	   participants’	   new	   demands	   for	   risk	   relevance	   and	  monitoring	  the	   financing	   of	   the	   transition	   to	   a	   low-­‐carbon	   economy.	   It	   was	   through	  participants’	  demands	  for	  relevance	  to	  these	  two	  emerging	  concerns	  that	  the	  shifting	   financial	   sector	  discourse	   came	   to	  permeate	   the	  Financed	  Emissions	  Initiative.	   Moreover,	   refinements	   of	   two	   degrees	   target	   stimulated	   and	  underpinned	   these	   concerns	   that	   became	   guiding	   objectives	   for	   configuring	  the	  standard.	  Having	  envisioned	  financed	  emissions	  as	  the	  core	  practice	  that	  would	  allow	   the	   standard	   to	   connect	   with	   numerous	   ideas	   of	   different	   actors,	   the	  Advisory	  Committee	  and	  Secretariat	  initiated	  a	  landscape	  review	  to	  examine	  a	  wider	   range	   of	  metrics	   and	   the	   extent	   to	  which	   a	   change	   in	   direction	   could	  connect	  with	   the	   emerging	   ideas.	   Accounting	   alone	  was	   deemed	   insufficient	  for	   rendering	   visible	   the	   risks	   of	   and	   alignment	  with	   the	   transition	   to	   a	   two	  degrees	   scenario.	   Rather,	   performance	   indicators	   at	   the	   portfolio-­‐	   and	  corporate-­‐level	   were	   to	   be	   assessed	   for	   their	   capacity	   to	   operationalize	   the	  concerns	  stemming	  from	  the	  two	  degrees	  target.	  Furthermore,	  the	  landscape	  review	  emphasised	  a	  new	  focus	  on	  developing	  metrics	   that	  connect	  with	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  103	  These	  concerns,	  as	   the	  Chapter	  highlights,	  began	   to	  surface	  earlier	   in	   the	  project	  and	   had	   been	   at	   the	   core	   of	   conflicts	   during	   the	   May	   2014	   Advisory	   Committee	  meeting.	  However	   it	  was	   at	   the	  Washington	  D.C.	   June	  2014	  TWG	   in-­‐person	  meeting	  that	  the	  conflict	  destabilized	  the	  Financed	  Emissions	  Initiative.	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ideas	   of	   different	   financial	   organisations,	   specifically	   banks	   and	   to	   asset	  owners.	   This	   discussion	   now	   turns	   to	   the	   relaunch	   of	   the	   project	   as	   the	  Portfolio	  Carbon	  Initiative.	  	  
THE	  PORTFOLIO	  CARBON	  INITIATIVE	  AND	  CONNECTING	  TO	  ROADMAPS	  After	  the	   landscape	  review,	  the	  work	  of	  TWG	  5	  remained	  unchanged,	  continuing	   to	   connect	   the	   project	   with	   financial	   organisations’	   growing	  concerns	   of	   carbon	   asset	   risk.	   However	   the	   Portfolio	   Carbon	   Initiative	  reconfigured	   the	   core	   accounting	   standard	   into	   separate	   work	   streams	   for	  banks	  and	  asset	  owners	  as	  well	  as	  refocusing	  that	  work	  on	  developing	  metrics	  for	   corporate-­‐	   and	  portfolio-­‐level	  measurement	   and	   reporting	   of	   carbon	  risk	  and	   climate	   performance.	   In	   addition,	   a	   formal	   relationship	   with	   the	   2°	  Investing	   Initiative	   was	   established	   –	   drawing	   on	   their	   expertise	   in	   climate	  metrics	  beyond	  carbon	  accounting	  –	  with	  the	  think	  tank	  becoming	  a	  research	  partner	  to	  the	  project.	  By	  the	  first	  draft	  of	  the	   ‘comparative	  assessment	  of	  metrics’	   for	  Asset	  Owners	   the	   climate	   performance	   objective	   had	   been	   firmly	   connected	   to	  monitoring	  the	  alignment	  between	   investment	  and	   lending	  activities	  and	  the	  transition	  to	  a	   low-­‐carbon	  economy.	  The	  metrics	  detailed	  in	  this	  document	  –	  green/brown	   ratios,	   climate	   scores,	   as	   well	   as	   financed	   emissions	   –	   were	  claimed	  to	  have	   increased	  relevance	  to	   ‘transition	  risks’	  of	  climate	  change	  as	  well	  as	  providing	  visibility	  to	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  financial	  organisations	  were	  contributing	  to	  the	  transition	  to	  a	  low-­‐carbon	  economy.	  However,	  by	  the	  final	  draft	   of	   the	  Asset	  Owners	   document,	   the	   future	   standardisation	  work	   of	   the	  Portfolio	   Carbon	   Initiative	   was	   to	   be	   guided	   by	   developing	   metrics	   for	  benchmarking	  investment	  and	  lending	  activities	  against	  IEA	  Roadmaps	  for	  the	  transition	   to	   a	   two	   degrees	   scenario.	   This	   benchmarking	   connected	   to	   asset	  owners’	  concerns	  over	  transparency	  as	  well	  as	   think	  tanks’	   ideas	  of	  bringing	  financial	   organisations	   into	   a	   supporting	   role	   in	   tackling	   climate	   change.	  Where	   the	   roadmaps	   refined	   the	   global	   carbon	   budget	   into	   sector-­‐specific	  transitions,	   the	   Portfolio	   Carbon	   Initiative	   metrics	   were	   to	   connect	   those	  roadmaps	   to	   the	   corporate-­‐	   and	   portfolio-­‐level	   investment	   and	   lending	  activities.	  As	  noted,	  however,	   the	   initial	  Portfolio	  Carbon	   Initiative	  publications	  only	   set	   out	   to	   create	   a	   foundation	   for	   further	   standardisation	  work,	   which	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was	  not	  focussed	  on	  rendering	  alignment	  with	  the	  transition	  to	  a	  low-­‐carbon	  economy	  visible	  at	  corporate-­‐	  and	  portfolio-­‐level.	  To	  work	  towards	  this	  vision,	  the	   Portfolio	   Carbon	   Initiative	   aligned	   itself	   with	   efforts	   to	   render	   climate	  scenarios	   compatible	  with	   setting	   climate	  performance	   targets	  –	   such	  as	   the	  Sectoral	   Decarbonization	   Approach	   and	   Sustainable	   Energy	   Investment	  Metrics	  Research	  Consortium.	  Roadmaps	  had	  become	  central	  to	  the	  Portfolio	  Carbon	   Initiative’s	   future	  standardisation	  efforts.	  What	   this	  highlights	   is	   that	  as	   implications	  of	   a	   carbon-­‐constrained	   future	   came	   to	   reshape	   the	   financial	  sector	  discourse	  on	  climate	  change,	  new	  notions	  of	  risk	  gradually	  permeated	  the	   Financed	   Emissions	   Initiative,	   destabilising	   its	   initial	   direction	   and	  reorienting	  it	  towards	  concerns	  stemming	  from	  the	  two	  degrees	  target.	  It	  is	  in	  this	   regard	   that	   standard	   formation,	   in	   the	   case	   of	   the	   Financed	   Emissions	  Initiative,	  was	  not	  simply	  about	   identifying	  the	  concerns	  of	  stakeholders,	  but	  rather	  creating	  an	  instrument	  that	  could	  become	  part	  of	  a	  working	  ensemble	  for	   coordinating	   action	   towards	   the	   two	   degrees	   target.	   It	   is	   based	   on	   this	  analysis	  that	  the	  discussion	  now	  turns	  nuance	  Botzem	  and	  Dobusch’s	  (2012)	  work	  on	  input	  and	  output	  legitimacy.	  
6.5.2.	  OUTPUT	  LEGITIMACY	  IN	  STANDARD	  FORMATION	  By	  analysing	  the	  Financed	  Emissions	  Initiative	  as	  the	  configuration	  of	  a	   mediating	   instrument	   the	   chapter	   demonstrates	   that	   generating	   output	  legitimacy	   –	   “the	   effectiveness	   and	   coordinative	   capacity	   of	   a	   standard”	  (Botzem	   and	   Dobusch	   2012,	   p.741)	   –	   is	   central	   to	   the	   process	   of	   standard	  formation.	   That	   is,	   standard	   formation	   is	   not	   simply	   a	  matter	   of	   identifying	  stakeholder	  concerns,	  but	  a	  process	  of	  negotiation	  through	  which	  diverse	  and	  distributed	   expertise	   is	   brought	   together	   to	   codify	   those	   concerns	   into	  measurement	   and	   reporting	   practices.	   Viewing	   standard	   formation	   as	  primarily	   the	   generation	  of	   input	   legitimacy	   (cf.	  Botzem	  and	  Dobusch	  2012)	  would	   have	   focussed	   this	   study	   on	   how	   stakeholder	   participation	   was	  maintained	  and	  the	  procedures	  for	  identifying	  their	  concerns.	  Yet	  this	  chapter	  demonstrates	   that	   the	   discussions	   during	   the	   Financed	   Emissions	   Initiative	  centred	   on	   the	   ‘effectiveness	   and	   coordinative	   capacity’	   of	   the	   standard	   in	  aligning	   the	   financial	   sector	   with	   the	   two	   degrees	   target.	   Based	   on	   this	  analysis	   the	  chapter	  argues	   that	   the	  process	  of	  standard	   formation	   is	  central	  to	   configuring	   and	   generating	   output	   legitimacy,	   driven	   by	   the	   diverse	   and	  distributed	  expertise	  brought	  together	  in	  the	  Financed	  Emissions	  Initiative.	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It	   is	   in	   this	   regard	   that	   Scharpf’s	   (1997;	   1999)	   distinction	   between	  input-­‐oriented	   and	  output-­‐oriented	   legitimation	   in	   transnational	   governance	  provides	  valuable	  insight.	  To	  Scharpf,	   input-­‐oriented	  legitimation	  is	  plausible	  when	  dealing	  with	  “local	  problems	  where	  all	  persons	  affected	  by	  a	  decision,	  or	  representatives	   closely	   associated	   with	   them,	   can	   be	   brought	   together	   in	  deliberations	   searching	   for	   ‘win-­‐win’	   solutions	   to	   which	   all	   can	   agree”	  (Scharpf	  1999,	  p.7)	  so	   that	   “choices	  should	  be	  derived,	  directly	  or	   indirectly,	  from	   the	   authentic	   preferences	   of	   citizens”	   (Scharpf	   1997,	   p.19,	   emphasis	   in	  original).	  In	  contrast,	  output-­‐oriented	  legitimation	  “presupposes	  the	  existence	  of	   an	   identifiable	   constituency”	   (Scharpf	   1999,	   p.11),	   which	   is	   less	   onerous	  than	   that	   for	   input-­‐oriented	   legitimation	   as	   it	   requires	   “no	   more	   than	   the	  perception	  of	  a	  range	  of	  common	  interests	  that	  is	  sufficiently	  broad	  and	  stable	  to	   justify	   institutional	  arrangements	   for	   collective	  action”	   (Ibid.).	   Indeed,	   the	  Financed	   Emissions	   Initiative	   participants	   represent	   only	   some	   of	   the	  many	  potential	   users	   of	   the	   emergent	   standard.	   Moreover	   these	   participants	  contribute	   to	   the	   project	   through	   their	   technical	   expertise,	   identified	   by	  Scharpf	   as	   one	   of	   the	   output-­‐oriented	   legitimation	   mechanisms	   for	   dealing	  with	   problems	   with	   “a	   high	   level	   of	   technical	   complexity”	   (Ibid.,	   p.16).104	  In	  such	  situations,	  the	  output-­‐oriented	  legitimacy	  that	  stems	  from	  “a	  high	  degree	  of	   effectiveness	   in	   achieving	   the	   goals”	   (Scharpf	   1997,	   p.19)	   is	   generated	   by	  the	   application	   of	   expertise	   to	   embedding	   the	   identified	   and	   potentially	  conflicting	  concerns	  into	  an	  instrument.	  	  Two	   interconnected	   aspects	   of	   output	   legitimacy	   during	   standard	  formation	   come	   into	   focus	   by	   drawing	   from	   Scharpf	   (1999).	   First,	   the	  Financed	  Emissions	  Initiative	  depended	  on	  participants’	  expertise	  to	  draft	  the	  standard;	  not	  only	  for	  identifying	  concerns	  to	  be	  addressed	  but	  also	  to	  shape	  the	   technical	   configuration	   of	   the	   standard	   to	   ensure	   its	   ‘effectiveness	   and	  coordinative	   capacity’.	   As	   Boedeltje	   and	   Cornips	   (2004)	   argue,	   “input	  legitimacy	   is	  needed	   to	  know	  what	   the	  preferences	  of	  people	  are,	  but	   this	   is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  104	  It	   should	   be	   noted	   that	   Scharpf	   develops	   notions	   of	   input-­‐	   and	   output-­‐oriented	  legitimation	   for	   analysing	   policy-­‐making	   in	   transnational	   governance.	   In	   such	   a	  setting,	   the	  application	  of	   expert	   judgment	  becomes	  an	  output-­‐oriented	   legitimation	  mechanism	   where	   “the	   mechanisms	   of	   electoral	   accountability	   are	   thought	   to	   be	  unsuited	   […]	   for	   assuring	   public-­‐interest	   oriented	   policy	   choices”	   and	   where	  “electorally	   accountable	   office	   holders	   would	   still	   be	   able	   to	   override	   the	   expert	  judgement”	  (Ibid.,	  p.17).	  Furthermore,	  Scharpf	  considers	  that	  the	  experts	  making	  such	  decisions	   are	   “most	   effectively	   controlled	   by	   critique	   within	   their	   professional	  communities”	  (Ibid.).	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not	   a	   guarantee	   for	   legitimacy	   on	   the	   output	   side”	   (Boedeltje	   and	   Cornips	  2004,	  p.7).	  In	  this	  regard,	  the	  GHG	  Protocol	  standards	  are	  seen	  as	  generating	  output	   legitimacy	   by	   bringing	   together	   different	   expertise	   as	   a	   way	   of	  simultaneously	   identifying	   concerns	   and	   embedding	   them	   into	   carbon	  accounting	   practices.	   Second,	   the	   emergent	   standard	   is	   configured	   to	   be	  compatible	   with	   other	   instruments	   and	   practices	   for	   working	   towards	   the	  identified	   ‘common	   interests’.	   That	   is,	   participants’	   concerns	   are	   embedded	  into	  the	  standard	  in	  a	  form	  that	  renders	  them	  compatible	  with	  existing	  efforts	  to	  advance	  the	  vision	  that	  underpins	  their	  concerns.	  In	  this	  case,	  by	  2016	  the	  Portfolio	   Carbon	   Initiative	   had	   formed	   linkages	  with	   the	   carbon	   budget	   and	  IEA	   roadmaps.	   These	   were	   to	   guide	   the	   development	   of	   measurement	   and	  reporting	  practices,	  connecting	  the	  underlying	  vision	  of	  a	   two	  degrees	  target	  to	   corporate-­‐	   and	   portfolio-­‐level	   assessments	   of	   investment	   and	   lending	  activities.	  By	   treating	   the	   output	   legitimacy	   of	   a	   standard	   as	   “predominantly	  related	   to	   its	   diffusion”	   (Botzem	   and	   Dobusch	   2012,	   p.741),	   Botzem	   and	  Dobusch	   overlook	   that	   during	   its	   formation	   a	   standard	   is	   configured	   to	  become	   compatible	   with,	   and	   a	   temporarily	   stable	   instrument	   within,	  “institutional	  arrangements	  for	  collective	  action”	  (Scharpf	  1999,	  p.12).	  On	  the	  other	   hand,	   Botzem	   and	   Dobusch	   do	   argue	   for	   the	   interconnectedness	   of	  standardisation	   with	   the	   work	   of	   ‘third	   parties’,	   whose	   requirements	   for	  adopting	   the	   standard	   “make	   them	   virtually	   obligatory	   for	   the	   actors	  depending	   on	   them”	   (Botzem	   and	   Dobusch	   2012,	   p.740).	   Similarly,	   Slager	  Gond	   and	   Moon	   (2012)	   find	   that	   “a	   standard’s	   successful	   diffusion	   can	   be	  related	   to	   the	   emergence	   of	   new	   actors	   who	   aid	   in	   the	   translating	   of	   the	  standard’s	   requirements	   for	   actors	   seeking	   to	   adopt	   it”	   (Slager,	   Gond,	   and	  Moon	  2012,	  p.784).	   	  Yet	  both	  of	   these	   findings,	  which	   focus	  on	   fostering	   the	  compatibility	  of	  a	   standard,	   focus	  on	   its	  diffusion.	  This	   chapter,	  on	   the	  other	  hand,	   highlights	   that	   such	   coordination	   with	   third	   party	   actors	   is	   prevalent	  throughout	  standard	  formation.	  In	  particular,	  organisations	  such	  as	  CDP	  (who	  would	  require	  adherence	  to	  the	  resulting	  standard	  as	  part	  of	  their	  disclosure	  requirements)	   maintained	   an	   informal	   partnership	   with	   GHG	   Protocol	   to	  ensure	   the	   vision	   guiding	   standard	   formation	   is	   compatible	   with	   their	   own	  strategies	  for	  enhanced	  disclosures	  from	  financial	  organisations.	  In	  this	  light,	  output	  legitimacy	  spans	  standard	  formation	  and	  diffusion,	  and	  stems	  from	  the	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embedding	   of	   a	   shared	   vision	   for	   collective	   action	   into	   measurement	   and	  reporting	  practices.	  In	  this	  chapter,	  that	  shared	  vision	  was	  underpinned	  by	  the	  two	  degrees	   target,	  with	   the	   experts	  brought	   together	   through	   the	  Financed	  Emissions	  Initiative	  working	  to	  embed	  that	  vision	  in	  emergent	  measurement	  and	  reporting	  requirements.	  
6.6.	  CONCLUSION	  This	   chapter	   showed	   how	   an	   emerging	   carbon	   accounting	   standard	  was	   destabilised	   and	   subsequently	   reconfigured	   to	   become	   interconnected	  with	  instruments	  and	  ideas	  for	  aligning	  actions	  with	  the	  two	  degrees	  target.	  It	  focussed	   on	   the	   permeation	   of	   a	   shifting	   financial	   sector	   discourse	   into	   the	  UNEP	   FI	   and	   GHG	   Protocol’s	   Financed	   Emissions	   Initiative.	   This	   introduced	  new	   demands	   that	   came	   into	   conflict	   with	   the	   project’s	   initial	   aim	   of	  enhancing	   transparency	   of	   financial	   organisations’	   climate	   impacts	   to	  campaigning-­‐NGOs.	  The	   relaunch	  of	   the	  Financed	  Emissions	   Initiative	   as	   the	  Portfolio	   Carbon	   Initiative	   connected	   the	   emergent	   standard	   to	   growing	  concerns	   over	   carbon	   risk	   and	   financing	   the	   transition	   to	   a	   low-­‐carbon	  economy.	  Furthermore,	   the	  project	   connected	   to	   these	  concerns	   through	   the	  formation	   of	   linkages	  with	   two	   other	  mediating	   instruments	   that	   refine	   the	  two	  degrees	  target,	  namely	  the	  carbon	  budget	  and	  IEA	  roadmaps.	  Indeed,	  the	  chapter	   framed	   the	   Financed	   Emissions	   Initiative	   as	   the	   configuration	   of	   a	  mediating	  instrument	  (Miller	  and	  O’Leary	  2007),	  a	  process	  through	  which	  the	  emergent	   standard	   was	   reoriented	   to	   connect	   to	   the	   shifting	   concerns	   of	  project	   participants.	   In	   doing	   so	   the	   chapter	   demonstrated	   that	   the	   output	  legitimacy	  of	  a	  standard	  is	  configured	  and	  generated	  during	  its	  formation,	  and	  is	   therefore	   not	   “predominately”	   but	   only	   partly	   “related	   to	   its	   diffusion”	  (Botzem	  and	  Dobusch	  2012,	  p.741).	  	  On	   input	  and	  output	   legitimacy,	   the	  analysis	  highlights	   that	   standard	  formation	  is	  not	  simply	  a	  matter	  of	  generating	  input	  legitimacy	  by	  maintaining	  stakeholder	  participation.	  Rather,	   standard	   formation	  draws	  on	  participants’	  expertise	   in	   the	   technical	   configuration	   of	   the	   standard	   to	   ensure	   it	  simultaneously	  embeds	  participants’	  concerns	  and	  is	  compatible	  with	  existing	  institutional	  arrangements.	  This	  compatibility	  advances	  the	  “effectiveness	  and	  coordinative	   capacity	   of	   a	   standard”	   (Botzem	   and	   Dobusch	   2012,	   p.741)	   by	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aligning	  it	  with	  the	  common	  vision	  guiding	  collective	  action	  at	  the	  interface	  of	  climate	   change	   and	   finance,	   which	   was	   underpinned	   by	   the	   two	   degrees	  target.	   This	   argument	   does	   not	   disagree	   with	   Botzem	   and	   Dobusch’s	  observation	   that	   during	   standard	   diffusion	   “high	   adoption	   contributes	   to	  output	  legitimacy	  […]	  due	  to	  network	  or	  crowd	  effects”	  	  (Ibid.,	  p.743).	  Rather	  it	  demonstrates	  that	  negotiations	  during	  standard	  formation	  configure	  output	  legitimacy	  in	  efforts	  to	  foster	  the	  initial	  adoption	  of	  the	  standard.	  The	   chapter	   bases	   its	   nuancing	   of	   Botzem	   and	   Dobusch’s	   (2012)	  argument	  on	  its	  analysis	  of	  the	  Financed	  Emissions	  Initiative,	  which	  it	  frames	  as	   the	   configuration	   of	   a	   mediating	   instrument	   (Miller	   and	   O’Leary	   2007).	  Where	   Chapter	   5	   framed	   the	   carbon	   budget	   as	   a	   bridge	   between	   the	   two	  degrees	  target	  and	  the	  financial	  sector	  discourse,	  this	  chapter	  highlights	  how	  an	  emergent	  instrument	  was	  reconfigured	  as	  shifts	  in	  that	  discourse	  came	  to	  permeate	  the	  Financed	  Emissions	  Initiative.	  Specifically,	  the	  guiding	  vision	  for	  the	   standard	   moved	   away	   from	   developing	   carbon	   accounting	   methods	   to	  enhance	   transparency	   for	   campaigning-­‐NGOs	   and	   towards	   metrics	   for	  managing	   carbon	   risk	   and	   monitoring	   the	   alignment	   of	   investment	   and	  lending	   activities	   with	   the	   transition	   to	   a	   low-­‐carbon	   economy.	   Yet	   it	   also	  highlights	   the	   interconnections	   between	   the	   two	   degrees	   target,	   the	   carbon	  budget,	   IEA	   roadmaps	   and	   the	   emergent	   standard	   through	   which	   a	   global	  objective	   becomes	   linked	   to	   the	   local	   specifics	   of	   investment	   and	   lending	  activities.	   Indeed	   this	   draws	   specifically	   on	   Miller	   and	   O’Leary’s	   (2007)	  attention	   to	   the	   refinement	   of	   Moore’s	   Law	   into	   technology	   roadmaps	   that	  frame	   cost-­‐of-­‐ownership	   calculations	   for	   developing	   optical	   forms	   of	  lithography.	   However	   this	   chapter	   emphasises	   that	   these	   linkages	   were	  stimulated	  as	  Financed	  Emissions	  Initiative	  participants’	  expectations	  shifted	  towards	   the	   two	   degrees	   target.	   Furthermore,	   it	   was	   negotiations	   between	  diverse	   and	   distributed	   expertise	   that	   configured	   the	   linkages	   between	   the	  emergent	  standard	  and	  the	  ensemble	  of	  instruments	  and	  practices	  for	  aligning	  investment	  and	  lending	  decisions	  with	  the	  two	  degrees	  target.	  Having	  traced	  and	  examined	  the	  connections	  between	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	  and	  investment	  and	  lending	  activities	  across	  multiple	  entities,	  the	  thesis	  now	  presents	  a	  discussion	  of	   the	   contributions	   that	   cut	   across	  Chapters	  4,	  5	  and	  6,	   and	  provides	   concluding	   remarks	  as	  well	   as	   addressing	   limitations	  of	  the	  thesis	  and	  areas	  for	  further	  research.	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CHAPTER	  7	  –	  MEDIATING	  
INSTRUMENTS	  AND	  CLIMATE	  CHANGE:	  	  
A	  DISCUSSION	  AND	  CONCLUSION	  
7.0.	  INTRODUCTION	  This	  thesis	  has	  employed	  the	  concept	  of	  mediating	  instruments	  (Miller	  and	  O’Leary	  2007)	  in	  mapping	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	  and	  its	  linkages	   with	   investment	   and	   lending	   activities	   across	   the	   financial	   sector.	  While	   Chapters	   4,	   5	   and	   6	   present	   discussions	   tailored	   to	   their	   specific	  empirics	  and	  analysis,	  this	  chapter	  discusses	  the	  coordination	  of	  action	  across	  multiple	  entities	  on	  climate	  change	  (Bebbington	  and	  Larrinaga	  2014b).	  It	  does	  this	  specifically	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  investigation	  into	  four	  mediating	  instruments	  –	  the	   two	   degrees	   target,	   the	   carbon	   budget,	   industry	   roadmaps,	   and	   the	  emergent	   standard	   –	   and	   the	   work	   surrounding	   their	   development	   and	  mobilisation.	  Section	  7.1	  attends	  to	  the	  characteristics	  of	  and	  interconnections	  between	  the	  four	   instruments,	   focussing	  on	  the	  calculations	  through	  which	  a	  global	   objective	   becomes	   linked	   to	   sectoral-­‐,	   organisational-­‐,	   and	   portfolio-­‐level	   activity.	   It	   then	   turns	   its	   attention	   to	   the	   work	   of	   assembling	   and	  adjusting	   components	   and	   practices	   through	   which	   these	   interconnected	  instruments	  develop	  a	  degree	  of	  coherence	  and	  stability.	  Section	  7.2	  builds	  on	  these	   two	   sections	   to	   discuss	   the	   coordination	   of	   action	   across	   multiple	  entities,	   linking	   this	   to	   the	   sustainable	   finance	   and	   carbon	   accounting	  literatures.	  Finally,	  Section	  7.3	  provides	  concluding	  remarks	  for	  the	  thesis.	  
7.1.	  MEDIATING	  INSTRUMENTS	  AND	  CO-­‐PRODUCTION	  
7.1.1.	  CHARACTERISTICS	  OF	  MEDIATING	  INSTRUMENTS	  This	   thesis	   identified	  and	   studied	   four	  mediating	   instruments	   (Miller	  and	  O’Leary	   2007)	   –	   the	   two	   degrees	   target,	   the	   carbon	   budget,	   investment	  roadmaps	   and	   the	   emergent	   carbon	   accounting	   standard	   –	   to	   trace	   linkages	  between	   global	   objectives	   on	   climate	   change	   and	   the	   carbon	   accounting	  practices	   being	   developed	   to	   frame	   the	   climate	   impact	   of	   investment	   and	  lending	  decisions.	   In	  particular,	   it	  has	   investigated	  how	   the	   interconnections	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between	   these	   instruments	   represent	   the	   problem	   of	   climate	   change	   at	   the	  global-­‐,	   sectoral-­‐,	   organisational-­‐,	   and	   portfolio-­‐level.	   This	   section	   attends	   to	  how	   the	   implications	   of	   climate	   change	   for	   the	   financial	   sector	   have	   been	  “assembled	   at	   various	   collective	   levels	   […]	   and	   how	   the	   ensembles	   that	  emerge	  make	  it	  possible	  to	  link	  local	  issues	  to	  larger	  questions,	  and	  vice	  versa”	  (Miller	  and	  Napier	  1993,	  p.634).	  Central	   to	   each	   of	   the	   four	   instruments	   is	   their	   representation	   of	  multiple	   ideas	   regarding	   efforts	   to	   address	   climate	   change	   in	   a	   simple	   and	  abstract	   form.	   The	   two	   degrees	   target,	   for	   example,	   crystallizes	   the	   climate	  problem	  into	  a	  task	  of	  limiting	  the	  increase	  in	  global	  average	  temperatures	  to	  a	  particular	   level.	   It	  does	  not,	  however,	  prescribe	  how	   this	   is	   to	  be	  achieved.	  Rather	   it	   “convey[s]	   an	   ideal	   picture	   of	   a	   collaboration”	   (Jørgensen,	   Jordan,	  and	  Mitterhofer	   2012,	   p.112)	   towards	  which	   diverse	   and	   distributed	   actors	  may	  adjust	  their	  actions.	  For	  example,	  while	  the	  investment	  roadmaps	  studied	  in	  Chapter	  6	  provide	  a	  refinement	  of	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	  into	  the	  timings	  of	  different	   financing	   requirements,	   they	   remain	   abstract	   representations,	  relative	   to	   investment	   decisions,	   of	   ‘financing	   the	   two	   degrees	   scenario’.	  Indeed,	  the	  roadmaps	  detail	  “key,	  generic	  aspects	  of	  product	  development”	  or,	  in	  this	  case,	  the	  future	  investment	  and	  lending	  landscape	  for	  achieving	  the	  two	  degrees	   target	   (Miller	   and	   O’Leary	   2007,	   p.719).	   Yet,	   as	   was	   demonstrated	  through	   the	   observations	   of	   the	   Portfolio	   Carbon	   Initiative,	  much	  work	  was	  required	  to	  refine	  these	  industry-­‐level	  roadmaps	  into	  a	  form	  compatible	  with	  organisation-­‐	  and	  portfolio-­‐level	  indicators.	  As	  abstract	  representations	  these	  mediating	   instruments	   make	   the	   climate	   problem	   appear	   ‘manageable’	  (Jordan,	   Mitterhofer,	   and	   Jørgensen	   2016),	   yet	   managing	   the	   apparently	  simple	   vision	   entails	   the	   refinement	   of	   the	   instruments	   into	   a	  more	   locally-­‐specific	   form	   –	   from	   a	   global-­‐	   to	   a	   sectoral-­‐level,	   and	   further	   to	   that	   of	   the	  organisation	  or	  portfolio.	  	  It	   is	   also	   necessary	   to	   highlight	   that	   this	   refinement	   is	   not	   only	   a	  matter	  of	  outlining	  “key,	  generic	  aspects	  of	  product	  development”	  (Miller	  and	  O’Leary	  2007,	  p.719).	  Rather,	  Chapter	  5	  frames	  the	  carbon	  budget	  as	  a	  ‘bridge’	  (Morgan	  and	  Morrison	  1999,	  p.30)	  that	  provides	  a	  more	  concrete	  rendering	  of	  the	  global	  objective	  that	   is	  compatible	  with	  analyses	  of	   future	  constraints	  on	  the	   financial	   sector.	   It	   does	  not,	   however,	   specify	   adjustments	   to	   investment	  and	  lending	  activities.	  Instead,	  it	  specifies	  a	  limit	  on	  cumulative	  GHG	  emissions	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that	   can	   be	   enrolled	   in	   arguments	   of	   the	   investment	   risk	   and	   threats	   to	  financial	  stability	   that	  climate	  change	  poses.	  To	  clarify,	   the	  refinement	  of	   the	  two	  degrees	  target	  entails	  more	  than	  a	  series	  of	  calculations	  connecting	   it	   to	  local	  decision-­‐making.	  It	  also	  requires	  that	  ideas	  and	  concerns	  are	  elicited	  and	  generated	   at	   multiple	   levels	   that	   establish	   implications	   of	   the	   two	   degrees	  target	   and	   that	   warrant	   action	   on	   this	   global	   vision	   for	   addressing	   climate	  change.	   The	   carbon	   budget,	   as	   an	   instrument	   bridging	   between	   the	   global	  level	  and	  the	  financial	  sector,	  provided	  a	  single	  figure	  that	  could	  be	  enrolled	  in	  arguments	   to	   stimulate	   and	   orient	   action	   from	   financial	   organisations	   and	  financial	   regulators.	   In	   this	   regard,	   the	   creation	   of	   a	   mediating	   instrument	  entails	  an	  embedding	  of	  particular	  ideas	  and	  concerns	  into	  an	  instrument	  that	  refines	   the	   two	  degrees	   target,	   as	  well	   as	   the	   simultaneous	   and	   interrelated	  work	   to	   elicit,	   generate	   and	   shape	   those	   ideas	   and	   concerns.	   As	   Miller	   and	  O’Leary	   (2007,	   p.708)	   write	   on	   the	   instruments	   that	   link	   Moore’s	   Law	   to	  investment	   decisions	   across	   organisations	   and	   sectors,	   “it	  was	   a	   question	   of	  assembling	   and	   adjusting	   diverse	   components	   and	   practices	   so	   that	   they	  might	  operate	  as	  a	  more	  or	  less	  stable	  and	  coherent	  working	  ensemble”.	  It	  is	  to	   these	   processes	   of	   ‘co-­‐production’	   (Hacking	   1992)	   that	   this	   section	   now	  turns	  its	  attention.	  
7.1.2.	  CO-­‐PRODUCTION	  Pollock	   and	   D’Adderio	   argue	   that	   studies	   employing	   the	   mediating	  instruments	  framework	  “have	  only	  begun	  to	  specify	  the	  process	  by	  which	  we	  might	   study	   and	   theorise	   interactions	   between	   material	   objects	   and	   wider	  calculative	  conceptions”	  (Pollock	  and	  D’Adderio	  2012,	  p.567).	  In	  doing	  so,	  the	  authors	   call	   for	   attention	   to	   the	   processes	   of	   “assembling	   and	   adjusting	  diverse	   components	   and	   practices”	   (Miller	   and	   O’Leary	   2007,	   p.708)	   and	  direct	   their	   attention	   to	   “the	   nuanced	   interplay	   involved	   between	   the	  conceptualisation	   of	   a	   market	   domain	   and	   its	   incorporation	   within	   various	  format	  and	   furniture”	   (Pollock	  and	  D’Adderio	  2012,	  p.581).	  While	   this	   thesis	  does	  not	  share	  Pollock	  and	  D’Adderio’s	  focus	  on	  the	  ‘format	  and	  furniture’	  (or	  graphical	  display)	  of	   instruments,	   it	  draws	  on	  Gooding	  (1992)	  to	  analyse	  the	  work	   involved	   in	   developing	   and	   mobilising	   a	   particular	   instrument	   as	   a	  process	  of	  tinkering	  and	  experimenting	  through	  which	  ideas	  and	  instruments	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are	   ‘mutually	   adjusted’	   (Hacking	   1992,	   p.30). 105 	  To	   Hacking,	   laboratory	  sciences	  become	  stable	  as	  they	  mature	  and	  develop	  “a	  body	  of	  types	  of	  theory	  and	   types	   of	   apparatus	   and	   types	   of	   analysis	   that	   are	   mutually	   adjusted	   to	  each	  other”	  (Ibid.).	  He	  continues,	   "[o]ur	  preserved	  theories	  and	  the	  world	   fit	  so	  snugly	   less	  because	  we	  have	  found	  out	  how	  the	  world	   is	  than	  because	  we	  have	   tailored	   each	   to	   the	  other."	   (Ibid.,	   p.31).	  Where	   Section	  7.1.1	  discussed	  the	   ‘fit’	   between	   the	   four	  mediating	   instruments,	   this	   section	   discusses	   how	  ideas	   of	   how	   the	   financial	   sector	   influences,	   and	   is	   influenced	   by,	   climate	  change	  were	  mutually	  adjusted	  with	  those	  four	  instruments.	  To	  do	  so	  it	  draws	  on	   Gooding’s	   study	   of	   the	   “manipulative	   practices”	   through	   which	  ‘experimenters’	   gradually	   explore	   the	   interactions	   between	   theories	   and	  observations	   (Gooding	  1992,	   pp.65–66).	   Indeed,	  Hacking	   –	  while	  developing	  his	  ‘taxonomy’	  of	  ideas,	  things	  and	  marks	  –	  notes	  Gooding’s	  focus	  on	  the	  work	  of	  scientists	  as	  “the	  way	  in	  which	   ‘representations	  and	  phenomena	  gradually	  
converge’	   (his	   [Gooding’s]	   emphasis)	   to	   a	   point	   where	   the	   resemblance	  between	   what	   is	   observed	   and	   what	   is	   sought	   is	   (as	   Faraday	   put	   it)	   ‘very	  satisfactory””	   (Hacking	   1992,	   p.32,	   quoting	   Gooding	   1992). 106 	  What	   this	  foregrounds	   is	   the	   processes	   of	   tinkering	   and	   experimenting	   with	   an	  instrument	  through	  which	  actors	  explore	  and	  discover	  possible	  configurations	  of	  instruments	  and	  ideas	  and	  which	  informs	  efforts	  to	  develop	  coherence	  and	  stability.	  Chapter	  6,	  for	  example,	  highlighted	  the	  adjustments	  between	  the	  ideas	  and	  instruments	  through	  discussions	  during	  the	  standard-­‐setting	  project	  that	  grappled	   with	   a	   reorientation	   of	   participants’	   expectations	   towards	   a	   two	  degrees	  target.	  The	  co-­‐production	  was	  between	  the	  financial	  sector	  discourse	  on	  climate	  change	  and	  the	  accounting	  tools	  called	  upon	  to	  render	  the	  climate	  impact	   of	   investment	   and	   lending	   activities	   visible.	   That	   is	   not	   to	   say	   the	  discourse	  was	  created	  during	  the	  standard-­‐setting	  project;	  rather,	  there	  was	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  105	  Also	  see	  Wise	  on	  “mutual	  adaptation”	  (Wise	  1988,	  p.79)	  and	  Mennicken	  on	  “how	  audit	  and	  market	  ideals	  mutually	  shape	  and	  condition	  one	  another”	  (Mennicken	  2010,	  p.354).	  106 	  Similarly	   highlighting	   the	   role	   of	   the	   ‘model	   builder’	   in	   the	   process	   of	  experimentation,	   Morgan	   and	   Morrison	   argue	   that	   “there	   are	   no	   rules	   for	   model	  building	  and	  so	  the	  very	  activity	  of	  construction	  creates	  an	  opportunity	  to	  learn:	  what	  will	  fit	  together	  and	  how?	  […]	  It	  does	  seem	  to	  require	  acquired	  skills	  in	  choosing	  the	  parts	   and	   fitting	   them	   together,	   but	   it	   is	  wise	   to	   acknowledge	   that	   some	  people	   are	  good	  model	  builders,	  just	  as	  some	  are	  good	  experimentalists”	  (Morgan	  and	  Morrison	  1999,	  p.31).	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“mutual	  adjustment”	  of	  discourse	  and	  instruments	  (Hacking	  1992,	  p.30)107	  as	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	  came	  to	  permeate	  discussions	  during	  project	  meetings	  and	   webinars.	   Yet	   this	   emerged	   through	   the	   testing	   of	   different	   ideas	   and	  instruments	   through	   webinar	   and	   meeting	   discussions.	   In	   other	   words,	   it	  highlights	   standard-­‐setting	   discussions	   as	   processes	   of	   experimentation,	  framing	   them	   as	   a	   “situated	   form	   of	   learning	   in	   which	   the	   manipulation	   of	  conceptual	   objects	   is	   often	   inseparable	   from	   the	   manipulation	   of	   material	  ones,	   and	   vice	   versa”	   (Gooding	  1992,	   p.66).	  Where	   the	  project	   began	  with	   a	  focus	   on	   measuring	   and	   reporting	   ‘financed	   emissions’	   to	   provide	  transparency	  to	  NGOs,	  it	  shifted	  towards	  indicators	  for	  monitoring	  alignment	  of	   investment	   and	   lending	   activities	   with	   the	   transition	   to	   a	   low-­‐carbon	  economy.	  This	  idea	  of	  ‘monitoring	  alignment’	  gradually	  emerged	  as	  the	  idea	  of	  working	   towards	   the	   two	   degrees	   target	   came	   to	   permeate	   discussions	  regarding	   the	   ‘relevance’	   of	   financed	   emissions	   to	   the	  different	   stakeholders	  participating	   in	   the	   project.	   In	   other	   words,	   participants	   ‘tinkered’	  simultaneously	  with	  ideas	  of	  acting	  on	  climate	  change	  and	  the	  measurements	  to	   render	   climate	   impacts	   visible,	   gradually	   adjusting	   each	   to	   the	   other	   to	  develop	   further	   coherence	   with	   an	   abstract	   and	   simplified	   vision	   for	  addressing	  climate	  change	  While	   the	  discussions	  during	   the	   standard-­‐setting	  project	   highlight	   a	  gradual	  process	  of	  co-­‐production	  through	  work	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  a	  new	  vision	  for	  addressing	  climate	  change,	  Chapter	  4	  demonstrates	  co-­‐production	  through	  the	   ‘elicitation’	   of	   ideas	   and	   concerns	   to	   be	   assembled	   and	   embedded	   in	   a	  particular	   instrument.	  Where	   initial	   work	   on	   a	   long-­‐term	   target	   centred	   on	  analysing	   ‘cost-­‐effective’	   GHG	   control,	   Chapter	   4	   shows	   that	   as	   potential	  targets	   travelled	   into	   different	   domains	   they	   provoked	   responses	   that	  revealed	   the	   concerns	   and	   ideas	   to	   be	   embedded	   in	   an	   instrument	   that	  represents	   the	   complexities	   of	   the	   underlying	   problem.	   For	   example,	   GHG	  concentration	   targets	   elicited	   developing	   nations’	   concerns	   of	   national	  sovereignty	  with	  regards	  to	  target	  setting,	  being	  seen	  as	  a	  prescriptive	  metric	  that	  encroached	  on	  their	  ability	  to	  determine	  their	  own	  path	  to	  development	  (Section	  4.2.4).	  These	  concerns	  are	  what	  Gooding	  refers	  to	  as	  “recalcitrances”	  (Gooding	   1992,	   p.69),	   which	   “indicate	   a	   discrepancy	   between	   theory,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  107	  Also	  see	  Wise	  on	  “mutual	  adaptation”	  (Wise	  1988,	  p.79)	  and	  Mennicken	  on	  “how	  audit	  and	  market	  ideals	  mutually	  shape	  and	  condition	  one	  another”	  (Mennicken	  2010,	  p.354).	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instrumentation,	   practice	   and	   results”	   and	   that	   assist	   in	   identifying	   “the	  assumptions	  that	  matter	  in	  the	  world	  as	  engaged	  in	  that	  particular	  laboratory”	  (Ibid.,	  emphasis	  in	  original).	  In	  this	  regard,	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	   entailed	  both	   the	   assembling	  of	   ideas	   and	   concerns	   that	  were	   elicited	  through	  testing	  particular	  targets	  in	  different	  domains	  as	  well	  as	  adjusting	  the	  base	   metric	   and	   choice	   of	   threshold	   to	   embed	   those	   ideas	   and	   concerns.	  Where	   Chapter	   6	   highlights	   co-­‐production	   through	   adjusting	   ideas	   and	  instruments	   to	  develop	   coherence	  with	  new	  expectations,	   Chapter	  4	   focuses	  on	   experimentation	   with	   an	   instrument	   in	   new	   domains	   as	   a	   process	   of	  simultaneously	  eliciting	  ideas	  to	  be	  assembled	  and	  adjusting	  the	  instrument	  to	  embed	  those	  ideas.	  However	  the	  thesis	  also	  highlights	  that	  instruments	  may	  enable	  efforts	  to	   catalyse	   experimentation	   on	   a	   problem.	   The	   carbon	   budget,	   for	   example,	  was	  mobilised	  by	  civil	  society	  actors	  to	  model	  the	  implications	  of	  regulations	  aligned	  with	  a	  two	  degrees	  scenario	  for	  the	  financial	  sector.	  Their	  arguments	  centred	  on	   the	   investment	   risks	   and	   threats	   to	   financial	   stability,	   prompting	  financial	   organisations	   and	   financial	   regulatory	   authorities	   to	   analyse	   the	  implications	   of	   two	   degrees	   scenario.	   It	   is	   in	   this	   regard	   that	   Chapter	   5	  presented	   the	  carbon	  budget	  as	  a	   ‘bridge’	   (Morgan	  and	  Morrison	  1999)	  and,	  as	  Morgan	  and	  Morrison	  argue,	   it	   is	   in	  the	  mobilisation	  of	  the	  instrument	  “to	  interrogate	  the	  world	  or	  our	  theory	  that	  learning	  takes	  place”	  (Ibid.,	  p.32).	  To	  reiterate,	   the	   mobilisation	   of	   the	   carbon	   budget	   compelled	   financial	  organisations	  and	  regulators	  to	  ‘interrogate’	  their	  ideas	  of	  risk	  and	  threats	  to	  capital	   markets	   in	   terms	   of	   a	   two	   degrees	   scenario.	   Furthermore,	   this	  experimentation	   led	   to	   the	   development	   of	   measurement	   and	   reporting	  techniques	   to	   assist	   in	   understanding	   and	   managing	   the	   problems.	   For	  example	   the	   ongoing	   work	   of	   the	   Taskforce	   on	   Climate-­‐related	   Financial	  Disclosures	   (Section	   5.4.4)	   aims	   to	   develop	   disclosure	   practices	   to	   further	  investigate	  the	  potential	   implications	  of	  climate	  change	  for	  financial	  stability,	  and	   was	   catalysed	   by	   arguments	   based	   on	   the	   carbon	   budget	   as	   a	   more	  concrete	   rendering	   of	   the	   two	   degrees	   target.	   In	   other	   words,	   the	  experimentation	  catalysed	  by	  the	  mobilisation	  of	  the	  carbon	  budget	  entailed	  a	  simultaneous	  assembling	  and	  adjusting	  of	   ideas	  of	  risk	  and	  threats	  to	  capital	  markets	   and	   the	   instruments	   for	   producing	   data	  with	  which	   to	   analyse	   and	  manage	  the	  problem.	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By	   highlighting	   these	   three	   mechanisms	   of	   assembling	   ideas	   and	  instruments	   and	   their	   mutual	   adjustment,	   this	   thesis	   offers	   a	   response	   to	  Pollock	   and	   D’Adderio’s	   (2012)	   call	   for	   attention	   to	   the	   co-­‐production	  “between	   material	   objects	   and	   wider	   calculative	   conceptions”	   (Pollock	   and	  D’Adderio	   2012,	   p.567).	   This	   response	   focuses	   on	   the	   construction	   and	  mobilisation	   of	   instruments,	   whereas	   other	   studies	   have	   applied	   the	  framework	   more	   extensively	   to	   the	   performances	   induced	   by	   particular	  instruments	  (Jørgensen,	  Jordan,	  and	  Mitterhofer	  2012;	  Jeacle	  and	  Carter	  2012;	  Jordan,	   Jørgensen,	   and	  Mitterhofer	   2013;	   Jordan,	  Mitterhofer,	   and	   Jørgensen	  2016).	   In	   this	   regard	   the	   thesis	   highlights	   the	   work	   of	   experimenting	   and	  tinkering	   with	   an	   instrument	   as	   central	   to	   the	   assembling	   and	   adjusting	   of	  “diverse	   components	   and	   practices	   so	   that	   they	  might	   operate	   as	   a	  more	   or	  less	  stable	  and	  coherent	  working	  ensemble”	  (Miller	  and	  O’Leary	  2007,	  p.708),	  and	  draws	  on	  Gooding	  (1992)	  to	  analyse	  the	  processes	  through	  which	  ‘mutual	  adjustment’	  (Hacking	  1992)	  takes	  place.	  
7.3.	  COORDINATING	  ACROSS	  MULTIPLE	  ENTITIES	  So	   far	   this	   discussion	   has	   focussed	   on	   how	   the	   interconnections	  between	   the	   four	   mediating	   instruments	   create	   linkages	   between	   a	   global	  objective	  and	   the	   specifics	  of	  particular	   sectors,	   organisations	  and	  portfolios	  (Section	   7.1),	   as	   well	   as	   identifying	   three	   processes	   of	   mutual	   adjustment	  through	   which	   ideas	   and	   instruments	   develop	   a	   stability	   and	   coherence	   in	  creating	  conditions	  to	  align	  action	  with	  a	  two	  degrees	  scenario	  (Section	  7.2).	  Building	   on	   these,	   this	   section	   provides	   a	  more	   focussed	   discussion	   on	   how	  the	   two	   degrees	   target	   begins	   to	   align	   diverse	   and	   distributed	   action	   on	  climate	   change.	   Specifically,	   it	   returns	   to	   the	   issue	   that	   “no	  one	   single	   entity	  creates	   and	   sustains”	   sustainable	   development	   issues	   (Bebbington	   and	  Larrinaga	   2014b,	   p.401)	   to	   explore	   how	   the	   future	   envisaged	   by	   the	   two	  degrees	   target	   coordinates	   action	   as	   well	   as	   draws	   on	   expertise	   across	  multiple	  entities.	  	  While	   the	   two	   degrees	   target,	   the	   carbon	   budget,	   investment	  roadmaps	   and	   the	   emergent	   standard	   present	   an	   idea	   of	   what	   is	   to	   be	  achieved,	   the	   instruments	   do	   not	   prescribe	   the	   actions	   to	   be	   taken.	   That	   is,	  they	  allow	  flexibility	  in	  how	  their	  visions	  are	  to	  be	  achieved.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	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the	  two	  degrees	  target	  provides	  a	  seemingly	  simple	  and	  manageable	  limit	  for	  the	   increase	   in	   global	   average	   temperatures,	   yet	   does	   not	   per	   se	   set	   out	  whether	   this	   target	   is	   to	   be	   pursued	   by	   emissions	   reductions,	   a	   particular	  emissions	   trajectory,	   other	   metrics	   such	   as	   carbon	   intensity	   or	   even	   the	  application	  of	  negative	  emissions	  technologies	  and	  geo-­‐engineering.	  Indeed,	  it	  was	   this	   flexibility	   in	   working	   towards	   target	   that	   assuaged	   developing	  nations’	   concerns	   that	   the	   UNFCCC	   was	   encroaching	   on	   their	   national	  sovereignty.	   In	  a	   similar	  manner,	   the	  Portfolio	  Carbon	   Initiative	  has	  come	   to	  focus	   on	   benchmarking	   of	   portfolios	   against	   a	   hypothetical	   portfolio	   that	   is	  aligned	   with	   a	   particular	   warming	   scenario.	   This	   would	   reveal	   the	   sectors	  where	   an	   organisation’s	   portfolio	   is	   ‘overexposed’	   or	   ‘underexposed’	   with	  regards	   to	   alignment,	   however	   it	   does	  not	   require	   that	   particular	   actions	  be	  taken.	   In	   this	   regard,	   mediating	   instruments	   provide	   a	   “stable	   frame	   of	  reference”	  while	  being	  “flexible	  enough	  to	  be	  associated	  to	  local	  concerns	  and	  activities”	  (Jørgensen,	  Jordan,	  and	  Mitterhofer	  2012,	  p.112).	  Or,	  as	  Miller	  and	  O’Leary	   (2007,	   p.717)	   write,	   the	   instruments	   “mediate	   between	   […]	  investment	   decisions,	   bringing	   them	   into	   alignment	  without	   permeating	   the	  confidentiality	   of	   individual	   companies’	   capital	   budgeting	   processes	   or	  seeking	   to	   determine	   their	   technology	   choices.”	   They	   present	   a	   common	  vision	  of	  the	  future	  for	  diverse	  and	  distributed	  actors	  to	  work	  towards,	  while,	  crucially,	  allowing	  those	  diverse	  and	  distributed	  actors	  to	  tailor	  that	  work	  to	  their	  local	  specifics.	  In	  this	  regard	  mediating	  instruments	  not	  only	  align	  actions	  towards	  a	  common	  vision,	   they	  do	  so	  by	  stimulating	   the	  creation	  of	   responses	   that	  are	  tailored	   to	   local	   specifics.	   This	   occurs	   as	   actors’	   expectations	   are	   reoriented	  towards	   the	   common	   vision,	   prompting	   them	   to	   apply	   their	   expertise	   and	  resources	   to	   understanding	   the	   implications	   of	   that	   common	   vision	   to	   the	  conditions	  in	  which	  they	  operate	  and	  their	  potential	  responses.	  This	  draws	  on	  the	  knowledge	  and	  resources	  distributed	  across	  multiple	  entities	  (cf.	  O’Malley	  2009),	   prompting	   the	   decentred	   development	   of	   solutions	   to	   a	   sustainable	  development	   problem	   as	   represented	   by	   a	   particular	   instrument.	   Chapter	   4	  demonstrated	   this	   point	   by	   detailing	   instances	   of	   disaggregation,108	  where	  actors	   began	   working	   on	   particular	   components	   of	   the	   two	   degrees	   target,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  108	  As	   noted	   earlier	   in	   the	   thesis,	   Professor	   Morgan	   presented	   her	   work	   on	   both	  
aggregation	  and	  disaggregation	  at	  an	  LSE400	  lecture	  on	  20th	  February	  2015.	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from	  sectoral	  shares	  of	  required	  emissions	  reductions	  to	  target-­‐setting	  at	  the	  level	  of	  an	  individual	  organisation	  (Section	  4.3.2).	  Beyond	  “appear[ing]	  simple,	  imaginable	  and	  ‘manageable’”	  (Jordan,	  Mitterhofer,	  and	  Jørgensen	  2016,	  p.1),	  the	   underlying	   problems	   are	   rendered	   into	   a	   form	   that	   enables	   diverse	   and	  distributed	  actors	  to	  analyse	  the	  local	   implications	  of	  the	  problem	  and	  aligns	  the	  range	  of	  responses	  towards	  a	  common	  objective.	  Returning	  to	  the	  reshaping	  of	  conditions	  in	  the	  financial	  sector,	  climate	  change	  became	  a	  problem	  of	  managing	  the	  risks	  and	  threats	  to	  stability	  of	  the	  carbon-­‐constrained	   future	   of	   limiting	   warming	   to	   two	   degrees	   Celsius.	   The	  literature	   on	   sustainable	   finance	   has	   highlighted	   that	   changes	   in	   legislation	  are	  central	  to	  the	  risk	  concerns	  of	  financial	  organisations	  (Coulson	  and	  Dixon	  1995;	   Coulson	   and	  Monks	   1999;	   Richardson	   2009),	   and	   these	   organisations	  and	   their	   stakeholders	   “could	   be	   expected	   to	   need	   information	   from	   which	  they	  can	  assess	  the	  carbon	   intensity	  of	   	  corporate	  products	  and	  services	  and	  estimate	   the	   regulatory	   and	   competitive	   risks	   that	   a	   corporation	   is	   likely	   to	  face”	   (Bebbington	   and	   Larrinaga-­‐González	   2008,	   p.707).	   Such	   competitive	  risks	   to	   corporations	   emerge,	   Bebbington	   and	   Larrinaga-­‐González	   (2008)	  argue,	   in	   a	   carbon-­‐constrained	   future	   where	   carbon-­‐intensive	   modes	   of	  production	   become	   obsolete	   (Kolk	   and	   Levy	   2001)	   during	   periods	   of	  technological	   shifts	   (Busch	   and	   Hoffmann	   2007).	   Indeed,	   in	   becoming	   a	  common	   vision	   for	   addressing	   climate	   change,	   the	   two	   degrees	   target	  provided	   a	   basis	   for	   developing	   the	   idea	   of	   a	   carbon-­‐constrained	   future	   and	  analysing	   its	   implications	   for	   financial	   regulatory	   authorities	   and	   financial	  organisations.	   In	   other	   words,	   as	   the	   idea	   of	   a	   carbon-­‐constrained	   future	  emerged	  through	  the	  carbon	  budget’s	  concretion	  of	  the	  two	  degrees	  target,	  it	  started	   to	   become	  possible	   for	   individual	   financial	   organisations	   to	  work	  on	  analysing	  potential	   changes	   in	   legislation	  and	   the	   competitive	   risks	   faced	  by	  investee	   companies.	   While	   efforts	   to	   understand	   and	   develop	   ways	   of	  managing	  this	  carbon-­‐constrained	  future	  are	  ongoing	  through	  initiatives	  such	  as	   the	   Taskforce	   on	   Climate-­‐related	   Financial	   Disclosures,	   the	   vision	   has	  prompted	  numerous	  actors	  across	  the	  financial	  sector	  to	  consider	  and	  plan	  for	  the	   impact	   of	   a	   two	   degrees	   scenario	   on	   their	   investment	   and	   lending	  activities.	  On	  the	  one	  hand	  this	  gradual	  realignment	  of	  action	  may	  be	  prompted	  as	   an	   instrument	   comes	   to	   be	   seen	   as	   addressing	   the	   ideas	   and	   concerns	   of	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multiple	  actors,	  such	  as	   the	  risks	  of	  a	   two	  degrees	  scenario	  discussed	  above.	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	   instruments	  may	   be	   enrolled	   in	   efforts	   to	   place	   new	  pressures	   on	   those	   actors.	   Chapters	   5	   and	   6,	   for	   example,	   documented	   how	  the	   carbon	   budget	   was	   mobilised	   as	   a	   ‘call	   to	   action’	   through	   a	   divestment	  campaign,	  being	  enrolled	   in	  arguments	   that	   grassroots	  pressure	  on	   financial	  organisations	  was	  ‘urgent’.	  In	  this	  regard,	  the	  pressure	  these	  actors	  placed	  on	  organisations	  to	  address	  their	  climate	  impact	  stemmed	  from	  the	  two	  degrees	  target.	   Similarly,	   O’Sullivan	   and	   O’Dwyer	   have	   demonstrated	   that	   the	  influence	  of	  a	  global	  network	  of	  campaigning-­‐NGOs,	  over	   time,	  enhanced	  the	  adoption	   of	   and	   compliance	  with	   the	   Equator	   Principles	   among	   commercial	  banks	  (O’Sullivan	  and	  O’Dwyer	  2015).	  Indeed,	  Chapter	  5	  supports	  this	  finding.	  Chapter	   5	   further	   highlights	   an	   evolution	   in	   the	   coordination	   of	   strategies	  between	  civil	  society	  actors	  in	  their	  pursuit	  of	  aligning	  investment	  and	  lending	  activities	   with	   the	   two	   degrees	   target.	   The	   point	   is	   that	   it	   is	   not	   only	   the	  calculative	   infrastructure	  of	   interconnected	  mediating	   instruments	   that	   links	  concrete	  activity	  to	  a	  global	  objective,	  but	  the	  work	  of	  civil	  society	  actors	  that	  is	   integral	   to	   developing	   and	  mobilising	   these	   instruments	   in	   a	  manner	   that	  reorients	  organisation-­‐level	  activity.	  Yet	   the	   refinement	   of	   the	   two	   degrees	   target	   into	   the	   targets	   and	  actions	   for	   entities	   of	   various	   scales	   and	   scopes	   is	   shown	   to	   present	  considerable	   challenges	   for	   the	  development	  of	   carbon	  accounting	  practices.	  Indeed,	  as	  Bebbington	  and	  Larrinaga	  suggest,	  the	  participant	  observation	  of	  a	  carbon	  accounting	  standard-­‐setting	  project	  provided	  the	  opportunity	  to	  study	  a	  “process	  that	  is	  in	  play”	  (Bebbington	  and	  Larrinaga	  2014a,	  p.207).	  While	  this	  fieldwork	   was	   studying	   organisation-­‐	   and	   portfolio-­‐level	   carbon	   accounting	  practices,	  the	  thesis	  does	  not	  overlook	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	  on	  carbon	  accounting	  at	   the	  national-­‐level.	   Indeed,	  Chapter	  4	  demonstrates	  that	  the	   decentred	   approach	   to	   target	   setting	   under	   a	   post-­‐Copenhagen	   climate	  regime	   allows	   flexibility	   in	   how	   Parties	   to	   the	   UNFCCC	   set	   their	   targets	   for	  working	   towards	   the	   two	  degrees	   target.	   In	   addition	   to	  GHG	   reductions	   and	  GHG	   trajectories,	   Parties	   may	   set	   targets	   based	   on	   reductions	   in	   emissions	  intensity	   of	   GDP	   and	   targets	   for	   policy	   implementation	   (centring	   on,	   among	  others,	   renewable	   energy,	   energy	   efficiency,	   and	   forestry).	   Taking	   emissions	  intensity	   of	   GDP	   as	   an	   example,	   the	   UNFCCC’s	  Measurement,	   Reporting	   and	  Verification	   (MRV)	   requirements	   must	   go	   beyond	   an	   accounting	   of	   GHG	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emissions	   from	  a	  particular	  nation,	  and	  develop	  methods	   for	  connecting	   this	  to	   forecasts	   of	   national	   GDP	   to	   work	   towards	   the	   consistent	   reporting	   and	  monitoring	  on	  emissions	  intensity	  targets.	  This	  is	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  literature	  on	  national-­‐level	   carbon	   accounts,	  which	  has	  directed	   attention	   towards	   the	  accuracy	  of	   IPCC	  methods	  (La	  Motta	  et	  al.	  2005;	  Stechemesser	  and	  Guenther	  2012)	   and	   the	   application	   of	   a	   consumption-­‐	   instead	   of	   a	   production-­‐based	  national	  carbon	  entity	  (R.	  Andrew,	  Peters,	  and	  Lennox	  2009;	  Minx	  et	  al.	  2009;	  Wiedmann	  et	   al.	   2010).	  This	   thesis	  highlights	   the	  extension	  of	  national-­‐level	  carbon	   accounting	   practices	   beyond	   GHG	   data	   in	   order	   to	   measure	   and	  monitor	  the	  more	  flexible	  post-­‐Copenhagen	  approach	  regarding	  national-­‐level	  contributions	  to	  an	  international	  effort	  to	  address	  climate	  change.	  With	   regards	   to	   the	   GHG	   Protocol	   and	   UNEP	   FI	   standard-­‐setting	  project,	   the	   challenges	   in	   linking	   a	   global	   objective	   to	   organisation-­‐	   and	  portfolio-­‐level	   investment	   and	   lending	   decisions	   appeared	   to	   stem	   from	  question	  of	  a	  price	  on	  carbon.	  Section	  6.2.2	  highlighted	  that	  participants	  saw	  the	   integration	   of	   emissions	   data	   in	   risk	   analysis	   and	  management	   as	   being	  more	  straightforward	  if	  there	  is	  a	  price	  on	  carbon	  through	  which	  the	  problem	  of	   climate	   change	   can	   be	   monetized.	   In	   this	   light,	   the	   shift	   from	   a	   project	  focussed	   on	   ‘financed	   emissions’	   to	   one	   of	   developing	   alignment	   indicators	  may	   be	   seen	   as	   working	   around	   the	   challenge	   of	   monetizing	   the	   climate	  impacts	   of	   investment	   and	   lending	   activities.	   Indeed,	   the	   compatibility	   of	  emissions	   information	   with	   risk	   analysis	   has	   been	   highlighted	   as	   an	  explanation	   for	   the	   limited	   use	   of	   emissions	   disclosures	   by	   investors	   (Kolk,	  Levy,	   and	   Pinkse	   2008;	   Sullivan	   and	   Gouldson	   2012;	   J.	   Andrew	   and	   Cortese	  2011;	  Dragomir	  2012),	  with	  Sullivan	  and	  Gouldson	   finding	   “where	   there	  are	  clear	  rules	  around	  carbon	  accounting	  and	  reporting,	  and	  where	  there	  is	  a	  clear	  price	  signal,	  investors	  will	  take	  account	  of	  this	  information	  in	  their	  investment	  decisions”	  (Sullivan	  and	  Gouldson	  2012,	  p.65).	  Yet	  this	  thesis,	  and	  Chapter	  6	  in	  particular,	  demonstrates	  efforts	  to	  extend	  carbon	  accounting	  from	  producing	  GHG	   emissions	   information	   to	   indicators	   that	   frame	   investment	   and	   lending	  decisions	   in	   terms	   of	   a	   global	   climate	   objective.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   carbon	  accounting	   provides	   ‘market-­‐enabling’	   practices	   (Ascui	   and	   Lovell	   2011)	   for	  carbon	   pricing	   mechanisms	   (MacKenzie	   2009).	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   and	   as	  highlighted	   in	   this	   thesis,	   an	   indicator-­‐based	   approach	   to	  developing	   carbon	  accounting	   practices	   came	   to	   embed	   a	   global	   objective,	   becoming	   part	   of	   a	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calculative	   infrastructure	   to	   coordinate	   actions	   across	   multiple	   entities	  towards	  a	  common	  vision	  for	  addressing	  climate	  change.	  
7.4.	  CONCLUSIONS	  
7.4.1.	  COORDINATING	  ACTION	  ACROSS	  MULTIPLE	  ENTITIES	  This	   thesis	   has	   mapped	   the	   instruments	   through	   which	   a	   global	  objective	   for	   limiting	   global	   warming	   became	   linked	   with	   the	   accounting	  practices	  that	  frame	  the	  climate	  impacts	  of	  investment	  and	  lending	  decisions.	  A	   participant	   observation	   of	   a	   UNEP	   FI	   and	   GHG	   Protocol	   standard-­‐setting	  project	   conducted	  over	   two	  years	  was	   combined	  with	  documentary	   analysis	  and	   eighteen	   semi-­‐structured	   interviews	   to	   form	   the	   empirical	   base	   for	   this	  analysis.	  The	  thesis	  responds	  to	  Bebbington	  and	  Larrinaga’s	  call	   for	  studying	  sustainable	   development	   issues	   by	   attending	   to	   the	   shifting	   conditions	   in	  which	   organisations	   operate	   and	   how	   this	   influences	   action	   across	  multiple	  entities	   (Bebbington	   and	   Larrinaga	   2014b,	   p.401).	   It	   argues	   that,	   in	  establishing	  a	  common	  vision	  for	  addressing	  climate	  change,	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	   provided	   the	   basis	   for	   refining	   a	   global	   problem	   to	   the	   specifics	   of	  entities	   of	   different	   scales	   and	   scopes	   and,	   in	   doing	   so,	   began	   to	   coordinate	  decentred	  responses	  to	  working	  towards	  that	  vision.	   In	  particular,	   the	  thesis	  employs	   Miller	   and	   O’Leary’s	   (2007)	   concept	   of	   mediating	   instruments	   to	  analyse	   four	   instruments	   –	   the	   two	   degrees	   target,	   the	   carbon	   budget,	  investment	   roadmaps	   and	   an	   emergent	   carbon	   accounting	   standard	   –	   that	  interconnect	   to	   link	  a	  global	  vision	   to	   local	   specifics.	  As	   such,	   the	   thesis	  also	  responds	  to	  Unerman	  and	  Chapman’s	  call	  for	  further	  theoretical	  development	  in	   accounting	   scholarship	   on	   sustainable	   development	   (Unerman	   and	  Chapman	   2014.	   Also	   see	   O’Dwyer	   and	   Unerman	   2016).	   Specifically,	   the	  mediating	   instruments	   framework	   places	   emphasis	   on	   the	   rendering	   of	  sustainable	   development	   issues	   into	   apparently	   simple	   and	   manageable	  visions	   of	   what	   is	   to	   be	   achieved,	   while	   allowing	   flexibility	   in	   how	   actors	  develop	   strategies	   for	   achieving	   that	   vision.	   This,	   the	   thesis	   argues,	   enables	  the	   researcher	   to	   focus	   on	   how	   efforts	   to	   address	   ‘complex’	   sustainable	  development	   issues109	  are	   coordinated	  while	   simultaneously	   stimulating	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  109	  The	  term	  ‘complex’	  refers	  to	  the	  view	  that	  climate	  change	  is	  a	   ‘wicked’	  or	   ‘super-­‐wicked’	  problem	  (Milne	  and	  Grubnic	  2011,	  p.949),	  with	  the	  former	  defying	  “resolution	  because	   of	   the	   enormous	   interdependencies,	   uncertainties,	   circularities,	   and	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application	  of	  diverse	  and	  distributed	  expertise	  and	   resources	   to	  developing	  tailored	  local	  responses	  to	  global	  problems.	  On	  the	  application	  of	  the	  mediating	  instruments	  framework,	  the	  thesis	  focuses	   on	   the	   construction	   of	   the	   four	   mediating	   instruments	   in	   order	   to	  analyse	   the	   assembling	   and	   adjusting	   of	   ideas	   and	   instruments	   to	   develop	   a	  degree	  of	  coherence	  and	  stability	   in	  the	  calculative	   infrastructure	   linking	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	  to	  investment	  and	  lending	  decisions	  (cf.	  Miller	  and	  O’Leary	  2007,	  p.708).	  Elsewhere,	  applications	  of	  the	  framework	  have	  focussed	  on	  the	  performances	   induced	   by	   pre-­‐existing	   instruments	   (Jørgensen,	   Jordan,	   and	  Mitterhofer	  2012;	  Jeacle	  and	  Carter	  2012;	  Jordan,	  Jørgensen,	  and	  Mitterhofer	  2013;	   Jordan,	  Mitterhofer,	   and	   Jørgensen	  2016),	  while	  placing	   less	  emphasis	  on	  how	   those	   instruments	   come	   into	  being	   (see,	   for	   an	  exception,	  Thomson,	  Grubnic,	   and	   Georgakopoulos	   2014).	   This	   thesis	   argues	   that	   a	   focus	   on	   the	  construction	   and	   mobilisation	   of	   mediating	   instruments	   shows	   the	  tumultuous	  work	  of	  experimenting	  and	   tinkering	  with	   instruments	  (Gooding	  1992),	   enabling	   the	   researcher	   to	   study	   the	   gradual	   assembling	   and	   ‘mutual	  adjusting’	   (Hacking	   1992)	   of	   ideas	   and	   instruments	   that	   is	   central	   to	   the	  stability	   and	   coherence	   of	   a	   “working	   ensemble”	   (Miller	   and	   O’Leary	   2007,	  p.708).	   Specifically,	   Section	   7.1.2	   highlights	   processes	   of	   adjusting	   to	   new	  expectations,	   eliciting	   ideas	   to	   be	   embedded	   by	   an	   instrument	   as	   it	   extends	  into	  new	  domains,	  and	  catalysing	  experimentation	  with	  existing	  arrangements	  through	  the	  mobilisation	  of	  mediating	   instruments	  as	  models.	   In	   this	  regard,	  the	   thesis	   offers	   a	   partial	   response	   –	   one	   focussed	   on	   the	   construction	   and	  mobilisation	  of	  mediating	  instruments	  –	  to	  Pollock	  and	  D’Adderio’s	  (2012)	  call	  for	   attention	   to	   the	   co-­‐production	   “between	   material	   objects	   and	   wider	  calculative	  conceptions”	  (Pollock	  and	  D’Adderio	  2012,	  p.567).	  
7.4.2.	  CHAPTER-­‐SPECIFIC	  CONTRIBUTIONS	  	   In	  addition	  to	  these	  contributions	  that	  cut	  across	  the	  thesis,	  the	  three	  substantive	  chapters	  make	  their	  own	  specific	  contributions.	  Chapter	  4	  charted	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	  from	  a	  range	  of	  climate	  metrics	  as	  a	  long-­‐term	  objective	   for	   tackling	   climate	   change.	   The	   chapter	   argues	   that	   the	  ‘boundary	   object’	   framing	   (Star	   and	   Griesemer	   1989)	   adopted	   in	   earlier	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  conflicting	  stakeholders	  implicated	  by	  any	  effort	  to	  develop	  a	  solution”	  (Lazarus	  2008,	  p.1159)	  and	  with	  the	  latter	  adding	  that	  “time	  is	  not	  costless,	  so	  the	  longer	  it	  takes	  to	  address	  the	  problem,	  the	  harder	  it	  will	  be	  to	  do	  so”	  (Ibid.,	  p.1160).	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studies	  of	   the	   two	  degrees	   target	   (Randalls	  2010;	  Cointe,	  Ravon,	   and	  Guérin	  2011)	  is	  an	  inappropriate	  analytical	  lens.	  Where	  boundary	  objects	  are	  “weakly	  structured	   in	  common	  use,	  and	  become	  strongly	  structured	   in	   local	  site	  use”	  (Star	   and	   Griesemer	   1989,	   p.393),	   the	   two	   degrees	   target	   provides	   an	  apparently	   simple	   vision	   of	   what	   is	   to	   be	   achieved	   in	   common	   use	   (i.e.	   is	  strongly	   structured	   in	   common	   use)	   while	   allowing	   flexibility	   in	   how	   to	  achieve	   that	   vision	   (i.e.	   is	   weakly	   structured	   in	   local	   site	   use).	   The	   chapter	  argues	  that	  this	   ‘structure’	  of	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	  corresponds	  to	  that	  of	  a	  mediating	   instrument	  (Miller	  and	  O’Leary	  2007),	  and	  adopts	   this	   framework	  to	   analyse	   how	   the	   target	   renders	   the	   complexities	   of	   climate	   change	   into	   a	  common	   vision	   that	   forms	   the	   basis	   for	   diverse	   and	   distributed	   efforts	   to	  tackle	  climate	  change.	  The	  chapter	  further	  argues	  carbon	  accounting	  practices	  are	   being	   combined	   with	   economic	   and	   other	   physical	   measurements	   to	  provide	  the	  basis	  for	  national-­‐,	  sectoral	  and	  organisational-­‐level	  planning	  and	  target	   setting.	  This	   stems	   from	   the	   flexibility	   in	  how	  diverse	  and	  distributed	  actors	   develop	   strategies	   for	   working	   towards	   the	   two	   degrees	   target,	   and	  highlights	   the	   need	   for	   studies	   of	   carbon	   accounting	   that	   go	   beyond	  scrutinising	  the	  accuracy	  of	  GHG	  data	  (La	  Motta	  et	  al.	  2005;	  Stechemesser	  and	  Guenther	  2012)	  and	  its	  role	  in	  carbon	  pricing	  (MacKenzie	  2009;	  Braun	  2009),	  and	   that	   examine	   its	   hybridisation	   (Kurunmäki	   and	  Miller	   2011)	  with	   other	  forms	  of	  measurement	  expertise.	  Chapter	  5	   transitions	   from	  Chapter	  4’s	   focus	  on	   the	   global	   vision	   for	  addressing	   climate	   change	   to	   examine	   how	   that	   vision	   was	   refined	   to	   the	  sectoral-­‐level.	   In	   particular,	   it	   focuses	   on	   the	   mobilisation	   of	   the	   carbon	  budget	   to	   model	   a	   carbon-­‐constrained	   future	   and	   the	   implications	   for	   the	  financial	   sector	   in	   terms	  of	   investment	   risk	  and	   threats	   to	   financial	   stability.	  This	   demonstrates	   the	   ‘bridging	   role’	   (Morgan	   and	   Morrison	   1999)	   of	  mediating	  instruments	  in	  enabling	  the	  analysis	  of	  an	  abstract	  objective	  in	  the	  context	  of	   the	   local	  specifics	  of	   the,	   in	  this	  case,	   financial	  sector.	  Moreover,	   it	  contributes	  to	  the	  ongoing	  debate	  regarding	  the	  ability	  of	  civil	  society	  actors	  to	  enhance	  corporate	  accountability	  (Cooper	  and	  Owen	  2007;	  Archel,	  Husillos,	  and	   Spence	   2011;	   O’Sullivan	   and	  O’Dwyer	   2015),	   by	   framing	   such	   actors	   as	  ‘quasi-­‐regulators’	  whose	  work	  is	  interwoven	  with	  the	  regulatory	  agenda	  of	  the	  state	   as	   well	   as	   their	   relationships	   with	   market	   participants	   (Chandhoke	  2002).	  This	  specifically	  responds	   to	  O’Sullivan	  and	  O’Dwyer’s	  call	   for	  studies	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of	  movements	  around	  investment	  and	  lending	  activities	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  climate	  change	   (O’Sullivan	   and	   O’Dwyer	   2015,	   p.51).	   Indeed,	   the	   chapter	   supports	  their	  finding	  that	  campaigning-­‐NGOs,	  over	  time,	  achieved	  deeper	  concessions	  on	  social	   responsibility	   from	  commercial	  banks.	  However	   it	  also	  offers	  some	  support	  to	  Archel	  et	  al.’s	  (2011)	  observation	  that	  civil	  society	  actors	  adopted	  the	  ‘dominant	  discourse’	  of	  those	  they	  work	  to	  influence.	  The	  point	  is	  that	  the	  chapter	   demonstrates	   an	   evolution	   in	   the	   strategies	   adopted	  by	   civil	   society	  actors,	  whose	   quasi-­‐regulatory	  work	  mobilised	   the	   carbon	  budget	   to	   render	  climate	   change	   into	   a	   systemic	   issue	   to	   be	   addressed	   through	   risk	  management	  and	  financial	  stability	  regulations.	  	   Chapter	   6	   brings	   the	   reader	   inside	   the	   webinars	   and	   meetings	   of	   a	  UNEP	  FI	   and	  GHG	  Protocol	   standard-­‐setting	   project,	   demonstrating	   how	   the	  shifting	   financial	   sector	   discourse	   on	   climate	   change	   permeated	   and	  destabilised	   the	   project.	   Following	   its	   relaunch	   as	   the	   Portfolio	   Carbon	  Initiative,	   the	   project	   centred	   on	   producing	   instruments	   that	   frame	  investment	   and	   lending	   activities	   in	   terms	   of	   their	   alignment	   with	   the	  transition	   to	   a	   low-­‐carbon	   economy	   and	   investment	   roadmaps	   for	   the	  financing	  needs	  of	  a	  two	  degrees	  scenario.	  The	  chapter	  challenges	  Botzem	  and	  Dobusch’s	   argument	   that	   output	   legitimacy110	  is	   “predominantly	   related	   to	  standard	   diffusion”	   (Botzem	   and	   Dobusch	   2012,	   p.741).	   It	   argues	   that	   the	  development	   of	   input	   and	   output	   legitimacy	   is	   interrelated	   during	   standard	  formation,	   with	   perceived	   ‘effectiveness’	   being	   central	   to	   maintaining	  participation	   in	   the	   standard	   formation	   process.	   Furthermore,	   stakeholder	  participation	   in	   the	   standard-­‐setting	   project	   was	   not	   only	   a	   means	   of	  “know[ing]	  what	  the	  preferences	  of	  people	  are”	  (Boedeltje	  and	  Cornips	  2004,	  p.7),	   it	   also	   allowed	   the	   Secretariat	   to	   draw	   on	   the	   expertise	   of	   commercial	  bankers,	   investors,	   think	   tank	   researchers,	   campaigners,	   academics	  and	  data	  providers	   in	   developing	   an	   ‘effective’	   standard.	   In	   this	   regard,	   standard	  formation	  is	  framed	  as	  a	  process	  that	  draws	  on	  the	  expertise	  of	  participants	  to	  configure	  a	  standard	  into	  a	  form	  compatible	  with	  “institutional	  arrangements	  for	  collective	  action”	  (Scharpf	  1999,	  p.12),	  entailing	  both	  the	  identification	  of	  preferences	   and	   their	   codification	   into	   a	   standard.	   The	   result	   of	   this	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  110	  Input	  legitimacy	  stems	  from	  the	  inclusion	  of	  potential	  stakeholders	  in	  the	  creation	  of	   a	   standard	   so	   that	   their	   preferences	   and	   ideas	   may	   be	   identified	   and	   included.	  Output	   legitimacy	   results	   from	   the	   standard’s	   “effectiveness	   and	   coordinative	  capacity”	  in	  responding	  to	  collective	  problems	  (Botzem	  and	  Dobusch	  2012,	  p.741).	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negotiation	   between	   input	   and	   output	   legitimacy	  was	   a	   reorientation	   of	   the	  project	   towards	   rendering	   alignment	   with	   the	   transition	   to	   a	   low-­‐carbon	  economy	   and	   the	   two	   degrees	   target	   visible	   at	   the	   organisational-­‐	   and	  portfolio-­‐level.	  In	  particular,	  this	  highlighted	  that	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  price	  on	  carbon,	   carbon	   accounting	   is	   being	   called	   upon	   to	   provide	   indicators	   and	  metrics	  for	  aligning	  investment	  and	  lending	  strategies	  with	  a	  common	  vision	  for	  addressing	  climate	  change.	  
7.4.3.	  LIMITATIONS	  AND	  DIRECTIONS	  FOR	  FURTHER	  RESEARCH	  In	   studying	   an	   emerging	   calculative	   infrastructure	   between	   a	   global	  climate	  objective	  and	  carbon	  accounting	  practices,	  this	  thesis	  has	  focussed	  on	  the	   instruments	   that	   link	   different	   entities	   rather	   than	   providing	   a	   detailed	  study	  of	  the	  decision-­‐making	  processes	  within	  financial	  organisations.	  Indeed,	  the	   intention	   was	   to	   study	   the	   shifting	   conditions	   that	   shape	   action	   across	  multiple	  entities.	  However	  this	  also	  constrained	  the	  thesis	  in	  that	  it	  provided	  little	   insight	   into	   the	   influence	   of	   a	   shifting	   financial	   sector	   discourse	   and	  emergence	   of	   new	   carbon	   accounting	   tools	   on	   the	   practices	   and	   decisions	  within	  organisations.	  As	  such,	  the	  thesis	  supports	  the	  call	  for	  further	  attention	  to	   the	   integration	   of	   social	   and	   environmental	   measurement	   and	   reporting	  practices	   through	   studies	   of	   “institutionalization	   processes	   at	   the	  organizational	   level”	   (O’Sullivan	   and	   O’Dwyer	   2015,	   p.51).	   In	   addition,	   the	  majority	  of	  data	  collection	  was	  conducted	  during	  2014	  and	  2015,	  and	  so	   the	  influence	  of	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	  detailed	  in	  this	  thesis	  largely	  pre-­‐dates	  the	  Paris	  Agreement	  of	  COP21	  in	  December	  2015.	  This	  thesis	  is	  therefore	  unable	  to	  shed	  light	  on	  the	  impact	  of	  a	  landmark	  global	  agreement	  on	  climate	  change	  on	   the	   development	   of	   carbon	   accounting	   tools	   as	   it	   “unfolds”	   (Bebbington	  and	  Larrinaga-­‐González	  2008,	  p.711).	  On	  the	  other	  hand	  this	  emphasises	  that	  the	  work	  stimulated	  and	  shaped	  by	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	  emerged	  before	  it	  had	  been	  formally	  adopted	  by	  the	  UNFCCC.	  It	   should	   also	   be	   recognised	   that	   Chapters	   5	   and	   6	   focus	   on	   the	  ramification	  of	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	  specifically	  in	  the	  financial	  sector.	  While	  it	   was	   necessary	   to	   focus	   the	   scope	   of	   the	   project	   to	   enable	   a	   depth	   to	   the	  study,	  this	  also	  restricted	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  thesis	  could	  provide	  insights	  into	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  two	  degrees	  target	  in	  different	  sectors,	  or	  lack	  thereof.	  Chapter	   4	   provided	   some	   insight	   into	   efforts,	   such	   as	   the	   Science-­‐Based	  Targets	   initiative	   and	   new	   consulting	   services,	   which	   base	   their	   efforts	   on	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addressing	   the	   two	   degrees	   target	   at	   the	   sectoral-­‐	   and	   organisational-­‐level.	  However	   these	   insights	  were	   illustrative	  of	   the	  work	  enabled	  and	  shaped	  by	  the	   target,	   rather	   than	   providing	   detailed	   studies	   against	   which	   the	   core	  financial	   sector	   study	   could	   be	   contrasted.	   In	   this	   regard,	   thesis	   provides	   a	  study	   that	   centres	   on	   the	   coordination	   of	   action	   across	  multiple	   entities	   (cf.	  Bebbington	  and	  Larrinaga	  2014b)	  specifically	  in	  the	  financial	  sector.	  While	  the	  configuration	  of	   investment	  and	   lending	  activities	  has	  potential	   impacts	  on	  a	  variety	  of	  sectors	  and	  regions,	  further	  research	  into	  the	  modes	  of	  governance	  employed	   for	   acting	  on	   climate	   change	   in	  different	   settings	   are	  necessary	   to	  study	  the	  roles	  of	  accounting	  in	  coordinating	  diverse	  and	  distributed	  action.	  A	  related	  limit	  to	  the	  response	  this	  thesis	  provides	  to	  Bebbington	  and	  Larrinaga	  (2014b)	   is	   that	   it	   focuses	   on	   climate	   change,	   which	   is	   only	   one	   of	   many	  sustainable	  development	   issues.	   In	   the	   same	  way	   that	   the	   impact	  of	   the	   two	  degrees	   target	  will	   vary	   across	   sectors	   and	   regions,	   coordination	   of	   diverse	  and	   distributed	   action	   on	   other	   sustainable	   development	   issues	   is	   likely	   to	  take	   different	   forms	   and	   a	   target-­‐based	   approach	   to	   aligning	   action	  may	   be	  incompatible	  with	   the	   specifics	   of	   the	   problem.	  Where	   this	   thesis	   set	   out	   to	  specifically	  investigate	  climate	  change,	  studies	  of	  the	  Millennium	  Development	  Goals	   and	   Sustainable	  Development	  Goals,	   as	   examples,	   provide	   sites	  where	  multiple	   sustainable	   development	   issues	   are	   addressed	   through	   the	  application	  of	   accounting,	   indicators	   and	   targets	   (as	  noted	  by	  Chenhall,	  Hall,	  and	   Smith	   2013)	   and	   would	   enable	   a	   more	   comparative	   study	   than	   that	  provided	  in	  this	  thesis.	  The	   thesis	   has	   also	   highlighted	   three	   areas,	   in	   particular,	   for	   further	  research.	   First,	   the	   Paris	   Agreement	   represents	   a	   more	   flexible	   mode	   of	  climate	   governance	   than	   the	   centrally	   determined	   GHG	   targets	   of	   the	   Kyoto	  Protocol,	  which	   raises	   new	   challenges	   for	   carbon	   accounting	   at	   the	   national	  level.	  Indeed,	  the	  Paris	  Agreement,	  as	  Falkner	  writes,	  “managed	  to	  transform	  the	   international	   [UNFCCC]	   negotiations	   from	   a	   distributional	   conflict	   over	  legally	   binding	   targets	   into	   a	   bottom-­‐up	   process	   of	   voluntary	   mitigation	  pledges”	   (Falkner	   2016,	   p.1124).	   These	   national	   pledges,	   however,	   may	   be	  based	   on	   a	   range	   of	   policies	   and	  measures	   other	   than	   the	   Kyoto-­‐style	   GHG	  reduction	  targets,	  including	  reductions	  in	  GHG	  intensity	  of	  GDP	  as	  well	  as	  the	  formulation	   and	   implementation	   of	   policies	   on,	   as	   examples,	   renewable	  energy,	   energy	   efficiency,	   and	   forestry.	  As	   such	   the	  Measurement,	  Reporting	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and	   Verification	   (MRV)	   UNFCCC	  work	   stream	   is	   faced	  with	   the	   challenge	   of	  combining	   carbon	   accounting	  with	   economic	   forecasts	   (for	   GHG	   intensity	   of	  GDP)	   as	  well	   as	   developing	   data	   collection	   and	   reporting	   requirements	   that	  enhance	   consistency	   and	   comparability	   in	  monitoring	   the	   progress	  made	  by	  Parties	  to	  the	  UNFCCC	  and	  combining	  this	  into	  progress	  towards	  achieving	  the	  two	   degrees	   target.	   The	   development	   of	   such	   MRV	   requirements	   and	   the	  implementation	  of	  these	  by	  individual	  Parties,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  Capacity-­‐building	  Initiative	   for	   Transparency	   established	   under	   the	   Paris	   Agreement,	   provide	  sites	   for	   studying	   carbon	   accounting	   as	   a	   practice	   that	   enables	   the	  commensuration	  of	  diverse	   strategies	   adopted	  by	  different	  Parties	   and	   their	  aggregation	   into	   metrics	   for	   monitoring	   global	   progress	   towards	   climate	  objectives.	   Such	   studies	   could	   provide	   a	   comparison	   of	   the	   ways	   in	   which	  carbon	   accounting	   enacts	   the	  different	  modes	  of	   governance	   adopted	   across	  Parties	  to	  the	  UNFCCC.	  Second,	   and	   related	   to	   the	   call	   for	   organisation	   level	   studies	  (O’Sullivan	   and	   O’Dwyer	   2015,	   p.51),	   the	   implementation	   of	   carbon	  accounting	   practices	   that	   render	   visible	   deviations	   from	   a	   ‘two	   degrees	  benchmark’	   portfolio	   requires	   further	   attention.	   Where	   this	   thesis	   has	  mapped	  the	   linkages	  between	  a	  global	  objective	  and	   investment	  and	   lending	  decisions,	  organisation	  level	  studies	  could	  attend	  to	  the	  pressures	  on	  financial	  organisations	   to	   act	   on	   such	   deviations	   and	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   efforts	   are	  made	   to	  bring	  portfolios	   into	   alignment.	  This	   is	  not	  necessarily	   restricted	   to	  the	   financial	   sector	   (however	   the	   work	   surrounding	   the	   Sectoral	  Decarbonization	   Approach	   and	   the	   Sustainable	   Energy	   Investment	   Metrics	  Research	   Consortium	   provide	   starting	   points	   for	   studying	   a	   benchmarking	  approach	   to	   monitoring	   the	   climate	   impacts	   of	   investment	   and	   lending	  portfolios).	   The	   Science	   Based	   Targets	   initiative,	   for	   example,	   offers	   a	   focal	  point	   for	   studies	   outside	   the	   financial	   sector	   to	   attend	   to	   company-­‐level	  adjustments	  in	  pursuit	  of	  the	  two	  degrees	  target.	  As	  highlighted	  in	  Chapter	  6	  and	  reiterated	   in	   this	  chapter,	   this	  refinement	  of	   the	   two	  degrees	   target	   into	  corporate	  objectives	  and	   ‘two	  degrees	  benchmarks’	  provides	  an	  opportunity	  to	  study	  coordination	  on	  climate	  change	   in	   the	  absence	  of,	  and	  aside	   from,	  a	  carbon	  price.	  On	  this	  point,	  the	  mediating	  instruments	  framework	  (Miller	  and	  O’Leary	   2007)	   appears	   to	   provide	   a	   useful	   analytical	   lens,	   focusing	   the	  researcher	   on	   the	   common	   vision	   presented	   by	   such	   objectives	   and	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benchmarks	   while	   allowing,	   and	   being	   refined	   through,	   diverse	   and	  distributed	   efforts	   to	   develop	   local	   strategies	   for	   achieving	   that	   common	  vision.	   Third,	   the	  ongoing	  debate	   regarding	   the	  extent	   to	  which	   civil	   society	  actors	  can	  enhance	  corporate	  accountability	  (Cooper	  and	  Owen	  2007;	  Archel,	  Husillos,	  and	  Spence	  2011;	  O’Sullivan	  and	  O’Dwyer	  2015)	  has	  centred	  on	  the	  relationship	   between	   these	   actors	   and	   organisations,	   as	   has	   much	   of	   the	  sustainable	   finance	   literature	   (Coulson	   2009;	   O’Sullivan	   and	   O’Dwyer	   2009;	  Wright	   2009).	   This	   thesis	   argues	   that	   the	   role	   of	   civil	   society	   actors	   should	  also	   be	   studied	   as	   part	   of	   a	   regulatory	   dynamic	   between	   state	   and	  market,	  with	   their	  work	  being	   interwoven	  with	   the	  regulatory	  agenda	  of	   the	  state	  as	  well	  as	  the	  strategies	  of	  the	  organisations	  they	  seek	  to	  influence	  (Chandhoke	  2002).	  This	  thesis	  highlights	  the	  work	  of	  civil	  society	  actors	  as	  central	   to	  the	  experimentation	   through	   which	   interconnections	   emerged	   between	   four	  mediating	   instruments	   and	   how	   the	   two	   degrees	   target	   came	   to	   stimulate,	  orient	   and	   frame	   action	   in	   the	   financial	   sector.	   However,	   further	   research	  should	   attend	   to	   the	   influence	   of	   this	   work	   in	   catalysing,	   hampering	   and	  reconfiguring	   the	   regulatory	   dynamic	   between	   the	   state	   and	   the	   market.	  Initiatives	   such	   as	   the	   Montreal	   Pledge	   and	   Portfolio	   Decarbonisation	  Coalition	  sought	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  financial	  sector	  support	  for	  an	  agreement	  to	   be	   reached	   at	   COP21,	   and	   the	   UNFCCC	   commitment	   to	   the	   two	   degrees	  target	  has	  been	  shown	  to	  catalyse	  activity	  in	  the	  financial	  sector.	  Furthermore,	  the	  strengthening	  of	  Parties’	  contributions	  to	  the	  global	  effort	  to	  tackle	  climate	  change	  is	  argued	  to	  depend	  on	  technological	  development	  (Falkner	  2016)	  that	  depends	   on	   a	   shifting	   investment	   landscape,	   referred	   to	   more	   generally	   as	  ‘policy	   feedbacks’	   (Jänicke	   2012).	   The	   point	   is	   that	   the	   interrelation	   and	  mutual	   reinforcement	   of	   state	   and	   market	   action	   is	   central	   to	   the	  strengthening	  of	  efforts	   to	   limit	   the	   increase	   in	  global	  average	   temperatures,	  and	  the	  role	  of	  civil	  society	  actors	  in	  addressing	  deadlocks	  and	  catalysing	  this	  regulatory	  dynamic	  requires	  further	  attention.	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APPENDIX	  3B	  This	   appendix	   contains	   three	   tables	   detailing	   observations	   and	  materials	  from	  the	  participant	  observation.	  The	  first	  relates	  to	  the	  meetings	  of	  the	   Financed	   Emissions	   Initiative	   as	   well	   as	   those	   following	   the	   project’s	  relaunch	  as	  the	  Portfolio	  Carbon	  Initiative.	  The	  second	  provides	  a	  summary	  of	  the	  documents	  gathered	   from	  that	  project.	  The	   third	  details	   ‘climate	   finance’	  workshops,	   conferences	   and	   webinars	   attended	   beyond	   the	   Financed	  Emissions	  Initiative.	  	  
OBSERVATIONS	  OF	  MEETINGS	  OF	  THE	  TWG	  PROCESS	  
DATE	   EVENT	  TYPE	   GROUP(S)	   TOPIC	  (MAIN)	  
20/02/14	   Webinar	   TWGs	  1-­‐4	   Background	  -­‐	  General	  20/03/14	   Webinar	   TWG	  4	   Business	  Goals	  
02/04/14	   Webinar	   TWG	  4	  -­‐	  AP	  Subgroup	   Accounting	  Principles	  17/04/14	   Webinar	   TWG	  4	   Boundary	  Setting	  30/04/14	   Webinar	   TWG	  4	   Advisory	  Committee	  -­‐	  issues	  to	  raise	  12/05/14	   In-­‐person	  -­‐	  ACM	   ACM	   TWG	  1-­‐4	  progress	  13/05/14	   In-­‐person	  -­‐	  ACM	   ACM	   TWG	  5	  progress	  20/05/14	   Webinar	   TWG	  4	  	   Performance	  Metrics	  20/05/14	   Webinar	   TWG	  4	  	   Advisory	  Committee	  -­‐	  Feedback	  29/05/14	   Webinar	   TWG	  4	   Boundary	  Setting	  30/05/14	   Webinar	   TWG	  4	  -­‐	  PM	  Subgroup	   Performance	  Metrics	  05/06/14	   Webinar	   TWG	  4	   TWG	  4	  Progress	  
12/06/14	   Webinar	   TWG	  4	  -­‐	  BS	  Subgroup	   Boundary	  Setting	  16/06/14	   Webinar	   TWG	  4	  -­‐	  PM	  Subgroup	   Performance	  Metrics	  18/06/14	   Webinar	   TWG	  4	   TWG	  4	  Progress	  
24/06/14	   In-­‐person	  -­‐	  All	  TWGs	   All	  TWGs	   TWG	  5	  progress	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24/06/14	   In-­‐person	  -­‐	  All	  TWGs	   All	  TWGs	   TWG	  1-­‐4	  progress	  06/08/14	   Webinar	   All	  TWG	  Members	   Feedback	  on	  in-­‐person	  and	  next	  steps	  
07/08/14	   Webinar	   All	  TWG	  Members	   Feedback	  on	  in-­‐person	  and	  next	  steps	  
27/07/15	   Workshop	   TWG	  members	  welcome,	  Moody’s,	  and	  Mercer.	  Wall	  Street	  attendees.	   Launch	  of	  the	  Carbon	  Asset	  Risk	  guidance	  
26/08/15	   Webinar	   All	  TWG	  Members	  welcome,	  interested	  groups	  from	  financial	  sector	  invited	   Launch	  of	  the	  Carbon	  Asset	  Risk	  guidance	  
02/09/15	   Webinar	   Banking	  TWG	  Kickoff	  Call	   Banking	  Guidance	  
26/01/16	   Webinar	   Banking	  TWG	   Banking	  Guidance	  	  	  





DOCUMENT	  TITLE	   TOPIC	  01/01/13	   Concept	  Note	   2013_01	  Concept	  Note	  -­‐	  GHG	  Protocol	  Financial	  Sector	  Guidance	  (version	  2).pdf	   Financed	  Emissions	  Initiative	  Outline	  
01/01/13	   Survey	  Results	   2013_01	  GHG	  Protocol	  Financial	  Sector	  Guidance	  Survey	  Results	  Report.pdf	   FI	  interest	  in	  Financed	  Emissions	  01/02/13	   Agenda	   2013_02	  London	  Scoping	  Workshop	  Agenda.pdf	   Scoping	  Questions	  01/02/13	   Summary	   2013_02	  London	  Scoping	  Workshop	  Summary	  -­‐	  GHG	  Protocol	  Financial	  Sector	  Guidance	  v_2.pdf	  
Purpose	  of	  Creating	  a	  Standard	  
01/02/13	   Presentation	   2013_02	  London	  Workshop	  Presentations	  (part	  two).pdf	   Case	  Studies	  of	  FE	  Accounting	  before	  project	  began	  01/02/13	   Presentation	   2013_02	  London	  Workshop	  Presentations	  (part	  one).pdf	   Reasons	  for	  project	  +	  Deep	  Background	  01/04/13	   Agenda	   2013_04	  Financial	  Sector	  NY	  Scoping	  Workshop	  Agenda_0.pdf	   Scoping	  Questions	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01/04/13	   Summary	   2013_04	  New	  York	  Scoping	  Workshop	  Summary	  -­‐	  GHG	  Protocol	  Financial	  Sector	  Guidance_0.pdf	  
FI	  interest	  in	  Financed	  Emissions	  
01/04/13	   Presentation	   2013_04	  NY_Workshop_Presentations.pdf	   Reasons	  for	  project	  +	  Deep	  Background	  19/07/13	   Press	  Release	   2013_07_19	  UNEP_FI_Investor_Briefing_Press_Release_-­‐_19_July_2013.pdf	  
Reasons	  for	  measuring	  Financed	  Emissions	  01/08/13	   Project	  Plan	   2013_08	  UNEP	  FI	  -­‐	  GHG	  Protocol	  -­‐	  Project	  Plan	  Document.pdf	   Rationale	  for	  project	  01/10/13	   Summary	   2013_10	  Advisory	  Committee	  Meeting	  Oct	  9-­‐10	  2013	  Summary	  of	  Outcomes.pdf	  
Vision	  
01/10/13	   Press	  Release	   2013_10	  GHGP	  Financial	  sector	  press	  release	  final_0.pdf	   FIs	  and	  low-­‐carbon	  economy	  01/11/13	   Terms	  of	  Reference	   2013_11	  Terms	  of	  reference	  for	  Financial	  Sector	  Guidance	  TWG	  members.pdf	   Financed	  Emissions	  Initiative	  Outline	  01/02/14	   Concept	  Note	   2014_02	  Concept	  Note	  GHG	  Protocol	  Financial	  Sector	  Guidance	  final.pdf	   Financed	  Emissions	  Initiative	  Outline	  05/02/14	   Email	  -­‐	  Reading	  List	   TWGs	  1-­‐4	   Background	  -­‐	  General	  19/02/14	   Webinar	  ppt	   TWG4_CrossCuttingIssues_Call1_020414	  (1)	   Overview	  for	  TWG	  4	  13/03/14	   Draft	   TWG4Businessgoalsdrafttext	  (2).pdf	   Business	  Goals	  -­‐	  TWG	  4	  13/03/14	   Participant	  List	   TWG	  4	  subgroup	  participation	  Sheet_1.xls	   TWG	  4	  
20/03/14	   Webinar	  ppt	   TWG4_CrossCuttingIssues_Call1_0319	  (1).pptx	   Overview	  for	  TWG	  4	  
21/03/14	   Summary	   Summary	  of	  TWG4Call#2.docx	   Overview	  for	  TWG	  4	  21/03/14	   Example	  methodology	   20130407	  -­‐	  Methodology	  GHG	  footprinting	  ASN	  investments.doc	   Scope	  3	  Emissions	  Measurement	  24/03/14	   Template	  for	  Webinar	  ppt	   TWG4_CrossCuttingIssues_Subgroup	  template	  (1).pptx	   TWG	  4	  Procedure	  26/03/14	   Participant	  List	   TWG	  4	  subgroup	  participation	  Sheet_1	  (3).xls	   TWG	  4	  02/04/14	   Webinar	  ppt	   TWG4_CrossCuttingIssues_Subgroup	  accounting	  principles.pptx	   Accounting	  Principles	  -­‐	  TWG	  4	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09/04/14	   Webinar	  ppt	   TWG4_CrossCuttingIssues_Subgroup	  boundary	  agenda20140410	  (1).pptx	   Boundary	  Setting	  -­‐	  TWG	  4	  17/04/14	   Webinar	  ppt	   TWG4_CrossCuttingIssues_boundaries	  discussion	  final	  (1).pptx	   Boundary	  Setting	  -­‐	  TWG	  4	  17/04/14	   Webinar	  ppt	   Accounting	  Principle	  Sub-­‐group	  Final	  Draft.	  (1).ppt	   Accounting	  Principles	  -­‐	  TWG	  4	  17/04/14	   Webinar	  ppt	   Accounting	  Principle	  Sub-­‐group	  Final	  Draft.	  (2).ppt	   Accounting	  Principles	  -­‐	  TWG	  4	  17/04/14	   Webinar	  ppt	   TWG4_CrossCuttingIssues_boundaries	  discussion	  final_Martacomm.pptx	   Accounting	  Principles	  -­‐	  TWG	  4	  29/04/14	   Draft	   Corrected	  version	  of	  Accounting	  Principle	  sent	  to	  Emma	  on	  27-­‐4-­‐14.pdf	   Accounting	  Principles	  -­‐	  TWG	  4	  29/04/14	   Draft	   2014-­‐04-­‐29.Financed	  Emissions	  -­‐	  Business	  goals	  draft	  (2).docx	   Business	  Goals	  -­‐	  TWG	  4	  30/04/14	   Draft	   2014-­‐04-­‐29.Financed	  Emissions	  -­‐	  Business	  goals	  draft.docx	   Business	  Goals	  -­‐	  TWG	  4	  30/04/14	   Draft	   Draft	  finalised	  on	  29th	  April	  2014_.pdf	   Accounting	  Principles	  -­‐	  TWG	  4	  30/04/14	   Agenda	   TWGcall#4	  agenda.docx	   TWG	  4	  
06/05/14	   Summary	   Summary	  of	  TWG4Call#4.docx	   TWG	  4	  
08/05/14	   Agenda	   AC	  meeting	  agenda	  and	  schedule_5514	  (1).docx	   ACM	  
10/05/14	   Agenda	   AC	  meeting	  agenda	  and	  schedule_5914.pdf	   ACM	  
10/05/14	   ACM	  ppt	   Financial	  Sector	  Guidance	  AdCom	  Meeting	  final.pdf	   ACM	  
01/06/14	   Example	  methodology	   CGD_BalanceSheet_2012.pdf	   Boundary	  Setting	  -­‐	  TWG	  4	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03/06/14	   Webinar	  ppt	   Emissions-­‐intensive	  sectors.pptx	   Boundary	  Setting	  -­‐	  TWG	  4	  
06/06/14	   Webinar	  ppt	   boundary	  options	  5-­‐29.pptx	   Boundary	  Setting	  -­‐	  TWG	  4	  
11/07/14	   Summary	   TWG	  Meeting	  Summary	  of	  Outcomes	  71114	  (1).docx	   DC	  Meeting	  
05/08/14	   Webinar	  ppt	   TWG	  Update	  Webinar_Final2	  (2).pdf	   Whole	  Project	  
29/09/14	   Landscape	  Review	   GHGP___UNEP_FI_Financed_Emissions_Initiative___Project_update	   Review	  of	  the	  TWG	  process	  and	  current	  demand	  for	  guidance	  
20/04/15	   Webinar	  ppt	   20150420	  BankingTWG_Webinar1.pdf	   Kickoff	  webinar	  for	  Banking	  TWG	  02/09/15	   Discussion	  points	  and	  outline	  for	  draft	  
20150902	  BankPaperOutline_01092015.pdf	   Banking	  TWG	  
03/04/15	   Draft	  for	  review	   20150403	  PCI_Assessing_Climate_Metrics_Targets_draft-­‐2.pdf	   Institutional	  Investors	  TWG	  19/05/15	   Final	  Draft	  for	  review	   20150519	  Climate	  targets_FINAL_DRAFT_DISCUSSION.pdf	   Institutional	  Investors	  TWG	  01/12/15	   Final	  report	   20150519	  Climate	  targets_FINAL.pdf	   Institutional	  Investors	  TWG	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ATTENDANCE	  OF	  WORKSHOPS	  AND	  CONFERENCES	  ON	  CLIMATE	  FINANCE	  
DATE	   HOST	   TITLE	   DUR.	   LOC.	   TOPIC	  11/11/13	   UNEP	  FI	  and	  Natural	  Capital	  Declaration	  
Natural	  Capital	  Declaration	  Event	  at	  UNEP	  FI's	  2013	  Sustainable	  Finance	  Week	  
4	  hrs	   Beijing,	  China	   Accounting	  for	  natural	  capital	  
12/11/13	   UNEP	  FI	   2013	  Global	  Roundtable:	  Financing	  the	  Future	  We	  Want	  
2	  days	   Beijing,	  China	   Financing	  transition	  to	  low-­‐carbon	  economies	  14/11/13	   2	  Degrees	  Investing	  &	  MSCI	   Measuring	  the	  carbon	  impact	  of	  the	  financial	  sector:	  From	  financed	  emissions	  methodologies	  to	  long-­‐term	  investing	  metrics	  
2	  hrs	   Beijing,	  China	   Connecting	  climate	  goals	  to	  investment	  metrics	  
16/12/14	   ICAEW	   Rethinking	  Capitals	  Conference	   2	  days	   London,	  UK	   Accounting	  for	  different	  forms	  of	  capital	  21/01/15	   Greenhouse	  Gas	  Protocol	   Transforming	  energy:	  Bringing	  electricity	  procurement	  into	  corporate	  carbon	  footprints	  
5	  hrs	   London,	  UK	   Launch	  of	  a	  revised	  carbon	  accounting	  standard	  for	  Scope	  2	  emissions	  
30/04/15	   Principles	  for	  Responsible	  Investment,	  UNEP	  FI	  
Climate	  Related	  Metrics	  and	  Targets	  for	  Investors	  
5	  hrs	   London,	  UK	   Climate	  performance	  targets	  for	  investment	  portfolios	  19/05/15	   2	  Degrees	  Investing	  &	  Caisse	  des	  Depots	  
Finance	  and	  Climate	  Change:	  Metrics	  
1	  day	   Paris,	  France	   Measuring	  portfolio	  performance	  on	  climate	  change	  and	  carbon	  asset	  risk	  exposure	  20/05/15	   United	  Nations	   Climate	  Week:	  Climate	  and	  Business	  Summit	  
2	  days	   Paris,	  France	   Sustainable	  Business	  
22/05/15	   UNEP	  FI	   Climate	  Finance	  Day	   1	  day	   Paris,	  France	   Emerging	  climate	  risks	  and	  related	  management	  methods	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27/07/15	   GHG	  Protocol,	  UNEP	  FI,	  Moody's,	  Mercer	  and	  2	  Degrees	  Investing	  
Rotating	  Roundtable	  on	  Carbon	  Risk	  Assessment	  Strategies	  
1	  day	   New	  York,	  USA	   Metrics	  for	  integrating	  climate	  risk	  and	  warming	  scenarios	  into	  portfolio	  analysis	  and	  risk	  management	  24/09/15	   Oxford	  University	   1st	  Stranded	  Assets	  Conference	   2	  days	   Oxford,	  UK	   Impact	  of	  climate	  regulation	  on	  risk	  due	  to	  asset	  stranding	  01/10/15	   ICAEW	   What	  will	  Successful	  Climate	  Talks	  Mean	  for	  Business?	  
4	  hrs	   London,	  UK	   Implications	  of	  COP21	  for	  business	  strategy	  and	  investments.	  19/11/15	   Cambridge	  Institute	  for	  Sustainability	  Leadership	  
Climate	  Implications	  for	  Finance	   2	  hrs	   Webinar	   Current	  finance	  landscape	  regarding	  low-­‐carbon	  investments	  24/11/15	   Climate	  Policy	  Initiative	   Discover	  How	  Much	  Global	  Climate	  Finance	  is	  Flowing	  
1	  hr	   Webinar	   Sources	  and	  levels	  of	  finance	  supporting	  low-­‐carbon	  growth	  30/11/15	   2	  Degrees	  Investing	   CLIMATE	  CHANGE:	  THE	  FINANCE	  SECTOR	  AND	  PATHWAYS	  TO	  2°C	  -­‐	  Investing	  billions	  and	  shifting	  trillions	  
1	  day	   Paris,	  France	   Aligning	  investment	  portfolios	  with	  warming	  scenarios	  
01/12/15	   United	  Nations	   21st	  Conference	  of	  the	  Parties	  to	  the	  UNFCCC	  (COP21)	  -­‐	  Climate	  Generations	  Zone	  
2	  wks	   Paris,	  France	   Using	  public	  finance	  to	  leverage	  private	  finance	  
17/12/15	   Grantham	  Institute,	  LSE	   Post	  COP21	  panel	  debate	  |	  After	  Paris:	  is	  COP21	  a	  turning	  point	  for	  international	  action	  on	  climate	  change?	  
2	  hrs	   London,	  UK	   Detailed	  discussion	  of	  COP21	  negotiations	  and	  the	  Paris	  Agreement	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APPENDIX	  3C	  Below	  is	  a	  summary	  of	  the	  semi-­‐structured	  interviews	  conducted	  over	  the	  course	  of	  2014	  and	  2015.	  
DATE	   GROUP	  REPRESENTED	  
RECORDING	  
LENGTH	  
CODE	  23/06/14	   Government	   1:07:21	   Eag	  1410	  
25/06/14	   Secretariat	   47:32	   Eag	  1411	  
26/06/14	   Secretariat	   39:08	   Eag	  1412	  
08/07/14	   Campaigning	  NGO	   55:09	   Eag	  1413	  
30/07/15	   Advisory	  Committee	  +	  Development	  Finance	   44:42	   Eag1511	  30/07/15	   Trader	   43:13	   Eag1512	  
31/07/15	   Secretariat	   58:14	   Eag1513	  
31/07/15	   Secretariat	   38:04	   Eag1514	  
03/08/15	   Investor	  Coalition	   55:42	   Eag1515	  
04/08/15	   Ratings	  Agency	   46:23	   Eag1516	  
05/08/15	   Advisory	  Committee	  +	  Insurance	   46:29	   Eag1517	  05/08/15	   Advisory	  Committee	  +	  Business	  Association	   51:47	   Eag1518	  06/08/15	   Advisory	  Committee	  +	  Investment	  Bank	   42:25	   Eag1519	  06/08/15	   Secretariat	   Not	  recorded	   Eag1520	  
11/08/15	   Advisory	  Committee	  +	  Investment	  Bank	   37:32	   Eag1521	  11/08/15	   Investor	  Coalition	   57:40	   Eag1522	  
11/08/15	   Investor	  Coalition	   39:39	   Eag1523	  
13/08/15	   Disclosure	  Body	   46:19	   Eag1524	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APPENDIX	  3D	  This	   appendix	   lists	   the	   reports	   (3D.1)	   and	   literature	   (3D.2)	   gathered	  and	  analysed	  as	  part	  of	  the	  documentary	  analysis	  underpinning	  Chapter	  4.	  
APPENDIX	  3D.1:	  REPORTS	  ADP.	  2014a.	  “Intended	  Nationally	  Determined	  Contributions	  of	  Parties	  in	  the	  Context	  of	  the	  2015	  Agreement.”	  ADP.2014.7.DraftText.	  Ad	  Hoc	  Working	  Group	  on	  the	  Durban	  Platform	  for	  Enhanced	  Action.	  UNFCCC.	  ———.	  2014b.	  “Reflections	  on	  Progress	  Made	  at	  the	  Fifth	  Part	  of	  the	  Second	  Session	  of	  the	  Ad	  Hoc	  Working	  Group	  on	  the	  Durban	  Platform	  for	  Enhanced	  Action.”	  ADP.2014.5.InformalNote.	  Ad	  Hoc	  Working	  Group	  on	  the	  Durban	  Platform	  for	  Enhanced	  Action.	  UNFCCC.	  ———.	  2015.	  “Non-­‐Paper.	  Note	  by	  the	  Co-­‐Chairs.	  Draft	  Agreement.”	  ADP.2015.8.InformalNote.	  Ad	  Hoc	  Working	  Group	  on	  the	  Durban	  Platform	  for	  Enhanced	  Action.	  http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/adp2/eng/8infnot.pdf.	  Bach,	  Wilfrid.	  1980.	  “The	  CO2	  Issue	  —	  What	  Are	  the	  Realistic	  Options?	  An	  Editorial.”	  
Climatic	  Change	  3	  (1):	  3–5.	  doi:10.1007/BF02423165.	  BSR.	  2014.	  “Business	  in	  a	  Climate-­‐	  Constrained	  World:	  Catalyzing	  a	  Climate-­‐Resilient	  Future	  through	  the	  Power	  of	  the	  Private	  Sector.”	  BSR,	  San	  Francisco.	  http://www.bsr.org/reports/BSR_Business_in_a_Climate_Constrained_World_Report.pdf.	  CDP.	  2015.	  “Mind	  The	  Science.”	  Paris:	  We	  Mean	  Business.	  http://sciencebasedtargets.org/mindthescience/MindTheScience.pdf.	  CDP,	  UNFC,	  WRI,	  and	  WWF.	  2015.	  “Science-­‐Based	  Target	  Setting	  Manual:	  Driving	  Ambitious	  Corporate	  Climate	  Action	  (Draft).”	  http://sciencebasedtargets.org/wp-­‐content/uploads/2015/09/SBTManual_PubComDraft_22Sep15.pdf.	  CEU.	  2005.	  “Council	  of	  the	  European	  Union.	  Information	  Note	  724205;	  11th	  March	  2005.pdf.”	  Charney,	  Jule.	  1979.	  “Carbon	  Dioxide	  and	  Climate:	  A	  Scientific	  Assessment.”	  Report	  of	  an	  Ad	  Hoc	  Study	  Group	  on	  Carbon	  Dioxide	  and	  Climate.	  Woods	  Hole,	  Massachusetts:	  National	  Research	  Council.	  http://people.atmos.ucla.edu/brianpm/download/charney_report.pdf.	  Cointe,	  B.,	  P.	  A.	  Ravon,	  and	  E.	  Guérin.	  2011.	  “2°C:	  The	  History	  of	  a	  Policy-­‐Science	  Nexus.”	  IDDRI	  Working	  Paper.	  http://www.iddri.org/Publications/Collections/Idees-­‐pour-­‐le-­‐debat/WP%201911_BC%20PAR%20EG_2%20degrees.pdf.	  COP21.	  2015.	  “Guide.	  Climate	  Generations	  Areas:	  United	  for	  Climate	  Action.”	  http://www.cop21.gouv.fr/wp-­‐content/uploads/2015/11/EGC-­‐guide-­‐visitors.pdf.	  Danish	  Text.	  2009.	  “The	  ‘Danish	  Text’:	  Decision	  1/CP.15.”	  http://www.redd-­‐monitor.org/wp-­‐content/uploads/2009/12/Leaked-­‐Danish-­‐text.pdf.	  Eichhorn,	  Noel	  D.	  1963.	  “Implications	  of	  Rising	  Carbon	  Dioxide	  Content	  of	  the	  Atmosphere:	  A	  Statement	  of	  Trends	  and	  Implications	  of	  Carbon	  Dioxide	  Research	  Reviewed	  at	  a	  Conference	  of	  Scientists.”	  Statement	  of	  the	  Consensus	  of	  the	  Conference.	  The	  Conservation	  Foundation.	  https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015004619030;view=1up;seq=2.	  European	  Council.	  1996.	  “1939th	  Council	  Meeting	  -­‐	  Environment.”	  8518/96.	  Brussels:	  European	  Commission.	  http://europa.eu/rapid/press-­‐release_PRES-­‐96-­‐188_en.htm?locale=en.	  European	  Environment	  Agency.	  1996.	  “Climate	  Change	  in	  the	  European	  Union.”	  Copenhagen:	  EEA.	  
Appendices	  
	   295	  
Fransen,	  Taryn.	  2009.	  “Enhancing	  Today’s	  MRV	  Framework	  to	  Meet	  Tomorrow’s	  Needs:	  The	  Role	  of	  National	  Communications	  and	  Inventories.”	  WRI	  Working	  
Paper.	  http://www.undpcc.org/docs/UNFCCC%20negotiations/Countrie%20positions%20and%20analysis/WRI%20-­‐%20National%20Communications%20-­‐%20TFransen.pdf.	  G8.	  2009.	  “Leaders	  Declaration:	  Responsible	  Leadership	  for	  a	  Sustainable	  Future.”	  L’Aquila,	  Italy:	  G8.	  http://www.g8italia2009.it/static/G8_Allegato/G8_Declaration_08_07_09_final%2c0.pdf.	  “G8_Declaration_08_07_09_final,0.pdf.”	  2009.	  Hare,	  F.	  Kenneth.	  1988.	  “World	  Conference	  on	  the	  Changing	  Atmosphere:	  Implications	  for	  Security,	  Held	  at	  the	  Toronto	  Convention	  Centre,	  Toronto,	  Ontario,	  Canada,	  during	  27–30	  June	  1988.”	  Environmental	  Conservation	  15	  (03):	  282–83.	  doi:10.1017/S0376892900029635.	  Houghton,	  John	  T.,	  and	  Intergovernmental	  Panel	  on	  Climate	  Change.	  1996.	  Climate	  
Change	  1995:	  The	  Science	  of	  Climate	  Change:	  Contribution	  of	  Working	  Group	  I	  to	  
the	  Second	  Assessment	  Report	  of	  the	  Intergovernmental	  Panel	  on	  Climate	  Change.	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  Houghton,	  J.	  T.,	  Y.	  Ding,	  D.	  J.	  Griggs,	  M.	  Noguer,	  P.	  J.	  van	  der	  Linden,	  X.	  Dai,	  K.	  Maskell,	  and	  C.	  A.	  Johnson.	  2001.	  Climate	  Change	  2001:	  The	  Scientific	  Basis.	  Edited	  by	  J.	  T.	  Houghton,	  Y.	  Ding,	  D.	  J.	  Griggs,	  M.	  Noguer,	  P.	  J.	  van	  der	  Linden,	  X.	  Dai,	  K.	  Maskell,	  and	  C.	  A.	  Johnson.	  The	  Press	  Syndicate	  of	  the	  University	  of	  Cambridge.	  http://cedadocs.badc.rl.ac.uk/981/.	  ICCF.	  2005.	  Meeting	  the	  Climate	  Challenge:	  Recommendations	  of	  the	  International	  
Climate	  Change	  Taskforce.	  London,	  Eng.;	  Washington,	  DC;	  Canberra,	  Aust.:	  Institute	  for	  Public	  Policy	  Research ;	  Center	  for	  American	  Progress ;	  Australia	  Institute.	  IIASA.	  1972.	  “Charter	  of	  the	  International	  Institute	  for	  Applied	  Systems	  Analysis.”	  http://www.iiasa.ac.at/web/home/about/leadership/iiasacharter/charter.pdf.	  ———.	  2006.	  “From	  Ice	  Age	  to	  Heat	  Wave	  |	  From	  Natural	  Science	  to	  Interdisciplinary	  Research:	  IIASA	  and	  the	  History	  of	  Climate	  Change	  Research.”	  Options	  Magazine.	  ———.	  2013.	  “Howard	  Raiffa	  Talk	  on	  IIASA’s	  Creation.”	  International	  Institute	  for	  
Applied	  Systems	  Analysis.	  September	  12.	  http://www.iiasa.ac.at/web/home/about/whatisiiasa/history/founding/the_founding_of_the_institute.html.	  IPCC.	  1990.	  “Climate	  Change:	  The	  IPCC	  Scientific	  Assessment.”	  WMO	  /	  UNEP.	  ———.	  1995.	  “IPCC	  Second	  Assessment:	  Climate	  Change.”	  ———.	  2014.	  Climate	  Change	  2014:	  Synthesis	  Report.	  Contribution	  of	  Working	  Groups	  
I,	  II	  and	  III	  to	  the	  Fifth	  Assessment	  Report	  of	  the	  Intergovernmental	  Panel	  on	  
Climate	  Change.	  Edited	  by	  R.	  K.	  Pachauri	  and	  Leo	  Mayer.	  Geneva,	  Switzerland:	  Intergovernmental	  Panel	  on	  Climate	  Change.	  Jäger,	  Jill.	  1988.	  Developing	  Policies	  for	  Responding	  to	  Climatic	  Change:	  A	  Summary	  of	  
the	  Discussions	  and	  Recommendations	  of	  the	  Workshops	  Held	  in	  Villach	  (28	  
September-­‐2nd	  October	  1987)	  and	  Bellagio	  (9-­‐13	  November	  1987)	  under	  the	  
Auspices	  of	  the	  Beijer	  Institute,	  Stockholm.	  WCIP ;	  1.	  Geneva?	  World	  Meteorological	  Organization.	  Meadows,	  Donella	  H,	  Dennis	  L	  Meadows,	  Jorgen	  Randers,	  and	  William	  W	  Behrens.	  1972.	  “The	  Limits	  to	  Growth.”	  New	  York	  102.	  Morel,	  Romain,	  and	  Igor	  Shishlov.	  2014.	  “Ex-­‐Post	  Evaluation	  of	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol:	  Four	  Key	  Lessons	  for	  the	  2015	  Paris	  Agreement.”	  44.	  Paris:	  CDC	  Climat	  Research.	  http://www.cdcclimat.com/IMG/pdf/14-­‐05_climate_report_no44_-­‐_analysis_of_the_kp-­‐2.pdf.	  National	  Research	  Council.	  1983.	  “Changing	  Climate:	  Report	  of	  the	  Carbon	  Dioxide	  Assessment	  Committee.”	  Washington	  DC:	  The	  National	  Academies	  Press.	  http://www.nap.edu/catalog/18714/changing-­‐climate-­‐report-­‐of-­‐the-­‐carbon-­‐dioxide-­‐assessment-­‐committee.	  Nino,	  Florencia	  Soto.	  2014.	  “2014	  Climate	  Change	  Summary	  -­‐	  Chair’s	  Summary.”	  UN	  
Climate	  Summit	  2014.	  September	  23.	  
Appendices	  
	   296	  
http://www.un.org/climatechange/summit/2014/09/2014-­‐climate-­‐change-­‐summary-­‐chairs-­‐summary/.	  Noordwijk	  Declaration.	  1989.	  The	  Noordwijk	  Declaration	  on	  Climate	  Change:	  
Atmospheric	  Pollution	  and	  Climatic	  Change :	  Ministerial	  Conference	  Held	  at	  
Noordwijk,	  the	  Netherlands	  on	  6th	  and	  7th	  November	  1989.	  Edited	  by	  Ministerial	  Conference	  on	  Atmospheric	  Pollution	  &	  Climatic	  Change,	  Netherlands,	  Ruimtelijke	  Ordening	  en	  Milieubeheer	  Ministerie	  van	  Volkshuisvesting,	  United	  Nations	  Environment	  Programme,	  and	  World	  Meteorological	  Organization.	  Leidschendam:	  Climate	  Conference	  Secretariat.	  Retallack,	  Simon.	  2005.	  “Setting	  a	  Long-­‐Term	  Climate	  Objective.”	  Institute	  for	  Public	  
Policy	  Research,	  London.	  http://priceofoil.org/content/uploads/2006/05/Setting_a_long-­‐term_climate_objective-­‐1.pdf.	  Rijsberman,	  Frank	  R.,	  and	  R	  J.	  Swart.	  1990.	  “Targets	  and	  Indicators	  of	  Climate	  Change:	  Report	  of	  Working	  Group	  II	  of	  the	  Advisory	  Group	  on	  Greenhouse	  Gases.”	  Stockholm	  Environment	  Institute.	  Schneider,	  Stephen	  H.,	  and	  Michael	  D.	  Mastrandrea.	  2005.	  “Probabilistic	  Assessment	  of	  ‘dangerous’	  Climate	  Change	  and	  Emissions	  Pathways.”	  Proceedings	  of	  the	  
National	  Academy	  of	  Sciences	  of	  the	  United	  States	  of	  America	  102	  (44):	  15728–35.	  doi:10.1073/pnas.0506356102.	  Science-­‐Based	  Targets.	  2015.	  “Companies	  Commit	  to	  Set	  Ambitious	  Science-­‐Based	  Emissions	  Reduction	  Targets	  |	  Science	  Based	  Targets.”	  December	  8.	  http://sciencebasedtargets.org/2015/12/08/114-­‐companies-­‐commit-­‐to-­‐set-­‐ambitious-­‐science-­‐based-­‐emissions-­‐reduction-­‐targets-­‐surpassing-­‐goal/.	  Smith,	  Joel	  B.,	  Hans-­‐Joachim	  Schellnhuber,	  M.	  Monirul	  Qader	  Mirza,	  S.	  Fankhauser,	  R.	  Leemans,	  Erda	  Lin,	  L.	  Ogallo,	  et	  al.	  2001.	  “Vulnerability	  to	  Climate	  Change	  and	  Reasons	  for	  Concern:	  A	  Synthesis.”	  Climate	  Change,	  913–67.	  Stern,	  Nicholas.	  2006.	  The	  Economics	  of	  Climate	  Change:	  The	  Stern	  Review.	  HM	  Treasury.	  Stop	  Climate	  Chaos.	  2010.	  “Advocacy	  Platform:	  What	  the	  Government	  Must	  Do	  To	  Stop	  Climate	  Chaos.”	  http://www.gci.org.uk/Documents/scc_advocacy_platform_2010-­‐11.pdf.	  The	  Climate	  Group.	  2014.	  “‘We	  Mean	  Business’	  Coalition	  to	  Be	  Launched	  at	  Climate	  Week	  NYC.”	  September	  5.	  http://www.theclimategroup.org/what-­‐we-­‐do/news-­‐and-­‐blogs/we-­‐mean-­‐business-­‐coalition-­‐to-­‐be-­‐launched-­‐at-­‐climate-­‐week-­‐nyc/.	  The	  White	  House.	  2014.	  “U.S.-­‐China	  Joint	  Announcement	  on	  Climate	  Change.”	  
Whitehouse.gov.	  November	  11.	  https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-­‐press-­‐office/2014/11/11/us-­‐china-­‐joint-­‐announcement-­‐climate-­‐change.	  ———.	  2015.	  “FACT	  SHEET:	  The	  United	  States	  and	  China	  Issue	  Joint	  Presidential	  Statement	  on	  Climate	  Change	  with	  New	  Domestic	  Policy	  Commitments	  and	  a	  Common	  Vision	  for	  an	  Ambitious	  Global	  Climate	  Agreement	  in	  Paris.”	  
Whitehouse.gov.	  September	  25.	  https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-­‐press-­‐office/2015/09/25/fact-­‐sheet-­‐united-­‐states-­‐and-­‐china-­‐issue-­‐joint-­‐presidential-­‐statement.	  UNFCCC.	  1992.	  “United	  Nations	  Framework	  Convention	  on	  Climate	  Change.”	  https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf.	  ———.	  1995.	  “UNITED	  NATIONS	  FRAMEWORK	  CONVENTION	  ON	  CLIMATE	  CHANGE	  CONFERENCE	  OF	  THE	  PARTIES:	  DECISIONS	  ADOPTED	  BY	  THE	  FIRST	  SESSION	  (BERLIN).”	  Edited	  by	  Marinn	  Carlson	  and	  Annie	  Petsonk.	  International	  Legal	  
Materials	  34	  (6):	  1671–1710.	  ———.	  1998.	  “The	  Kyoto	  Protocol	  to	  the	  United	  Nations	  Framework	  Convention	  on	  Climate	  Change.”	  Kyoto,	  Japan:	  United	  Nations.	  http://unfccc.	  int/resource/convkp/kpeng.	  html.	  ———.	  2006.	  “Report	  of	  the	  Conference	  of	  the	  Parties	  Serving	  as	  the	  Meeting	  of	  the	  Parties	  to	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol	  on	  Its	  First	  Session,	  Held	  at	  Montreal	  from	  28	  November	  to	  10	  December	  2005.	  Addendum.	  Part	  Two:	  Action	  Taken	  by	  the	  Conference	  of	  the	  Parties	  Serving	  as	  the	  Meeting	  of	  the	  Parties	  to	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol	  at	  Its	  First	  Session.”	  FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.1.	  UNFCCC.	  ———.	  2007.	  “Decision	  1/CP.	  13.”	  COP13,	  Bali,	  Indonesia.	  
Appendices	  
	   297	  
———.	  2009.	  “UNFCCC	  COP15	  Report.pdf.”	  ———.	  2010.	  “Report	  of	  the	  Conference	  of	  the	  Parties	  on	  Its	  Sixteenth	  Session,	  Held	  in	  Cancun	  from	  29	  November	  to	  10	  December	  2010.”	  http://unfcc.int/resource/docs/2010/cop16/eng/07a01.pdf.	  ———.	  2012.	  “Report	  of	  the	  Conference	  of	  the	  Parties	  on	  Its	  Seventeenth	  Session,	  Held	  in	  Durban	  from	  28	  November	  to	  11	  December	  2011.”	  FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1.	  UNFCCC.	  ———.	  2013a.	  “Report	  of	  the	  Conference	  of	  the	  Parties	  on	  Its	  Eighteenth	  Session,	  Held	  in	  Doha	  from	  26	  November	  to	  8	  December	  2012.”	  FCCC/CP/2012/8/Add.1.	  UNFCCC.	  ———.	  2013b.	  “Report	  of	  the	  Conference	  of	  the	  Parties	  Serving	  as	  the	  Meeting	  of	  the	  Parties	  to	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol	  on	  Its	  Eighth	  Session,	  Held	  in	  Doha	  from	  26	  November	  to	  8	  December	  2012.”	  FCCC/KP/CMP/2012/13/Add.1.	  UNFCCC.	  ———.	  2014a.	  “Report	  of	  the	  Conference	  of	  the	  Parties	  on	  Its	  Nineteenth	  Session,	  Held	  in	  Warsaw	  from	  11	  to	  23	  November	  2013.”	  FCCC/CP/2013/10/Add.1.	  UNFCCC.	  ———.	  2014b.	  “Press	  Release:	  Lima	  Call	  for	  Climate	  Action	  Puts	  World	  on	  Track	  to	  Paris	  2015.”	  http://newsroom.unfccc.int/lima/lima-­‐call-­‐for-­‐climate-­‐action-­‐puts-­‐world-­‐on-­‐track-­‐to-­‐paris-­‐2015/.	  ———.	  2015a.	  “Report	  of	  the	  Conference	  of	  the	  Parties	  on	  Its	  Twentieth	  Session,	  Held	  in	  Lima	  from	  1	  to	  14	  December	  2014.”	  FCCC/CP/2014/10/Add.1.	  UNFCCC.	  ———.	  2015b.	  “Report	  of	  the	  Subsidiary	  Body	  for	  Implementation	  on	  Its	  Forty-­‐First	  Session,	  Held	  in	  Lima	  from	  1	  to	  8	  December	  2014.”	  FCCC/SBI/2014/21.	  Lima:	  UNFCCC.	  http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2014/sbi/eng/21.pdf.	  ———.	  2015c.	  “Report	  on	  the	  Structured	  Expert	  Dialogue	  on	  the	  2013–2015	  Review.”	  FCCC/SB/2015/INF.1.	  UNFCCC.	  http://newsroom.unfccc.int/unfccc-­‐newsroom/report-­‐of-­‐experts-­‐dialogue-­‐on-­‐2013-­‐2015-­‐review-­‐released/.	  ———.	  2015d.	  “Synthesis	  Report	  on	  the	  Aggregate	  Effect	  of	  the	  Intended	  Nationally	  Determined	  Contributions.”	  FCCC/CP/2015/7.	  UNFCCC.	  http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/07.pdf.	  WBGU.	  1995.	  “Scenario	  for	  the	  Derivation	  of	  	  Global	  CO2	  Reduction	  Targets	  and	  	  Implementation	  Strategies:	  Statement	  on	  the	  Occasion	  of	  the	  First	  Conference	  of	  the	  Parties	  to	  the	  Framework	  Convention	  on	  Climate	  Change	  in	  Berlin;	  Adopted	  at	  the	  26th	  Session	  of	  the	  Counci.”	  Dortmund.	  ———.	  1996.	  “German	  Advisory	  Council	  on	  Global	  Change	  Appointed	  Again.”	  Bremerhaven,	  FRG:	  Secretariat	  at	  the	  Alfred-­‐Wegener	  Institute	  for	  Polar	  and	  Marine	  Research	  (AWI).	  http://www.wbgu.de/fileadmin/templates/dateien/presse/presseerklaerungen/downloads/wbgu_presse_96_3e.pdf.	  ———.	  2003.	  Climate	  Protection	  Strategies	  for	  the	  21st	  Century:	  Kyoto	  and	  beyond.	  Berlin:	  German	  Advisory	  Council	  on	  Global	  Change.	  http://www.wbgu.de/wbgu_sn2003_engl.html.	  We	  Mean	  Business.	  2014.	  “The	  Climate	  Has	  Changed.”	  The	  Climate	  Group.	  http://www.wemeanbusinesscoalition.org/sites/default/files/The%20Climate%20Has%20Changed_2.pdf.	  WMO,	  ed.	  1979.	  Proceedings	  of	  the	  World	  Climate	  Conference:	  A	  Conference	  of	  Experts	  
on	  Climate	  and	  Mankind,	  Geneva,	  12-­‐23	  February	  1979.	  WMO ;	  No.	  537.	  Geneva:	  Secretariat	  of	  the	  World	  Meteorological	  Organization.	  ———.	  1988.	  “The	  Changing	  Atmosphere:	  Implications	  for	  Global	  Security.”	  Conference	  Proceedings	  710.	  Toronto,	  Canada:	  WMO.	  World	  Climate	  Programme,	  International	  Council	  of	  Scientific	  Unions,	  United	  Nations	  Environment	  Programme,	  and	  World	  Meteorological	  Organization,	  eds.	  1986.	  
Report	  of	  the	  International	  Conference	  on	  the	  Assessment	  of	  the	  Role	  of	  Carbon	  
Dioxide	  and	  of	  Other	  Greenhouse	  Gases	  in	  Climate	  Variations	  and	  Associated	  
Impacts,	  Villach,	  Austria,	  9-­‐15	  October	  1985.	  WMO	  661.	  Paris:	  International	  Council	  of	  Scientific	  Unions.	  
	   	  
Appendices	  
	   298	  
APPENDIX	  3D.2:	  LITERATURE	  Agrawala,	  Shardul.	  1998.	  “Context	  and	  Early	  Origins	  of	  the	  Intergovernmental	  Panel	  on	  Climate	  Change.”	  Climatic	  Change	  39	  (4):	  605–20.	  doi:10.1023/A:1005315532386.	  ———.	  1999.	  “Early	  Science–policy	  Interactions	  in	  Climate	  Change:	  Lessons	  from	  the	  Advisory	  Group	  on	  Greenhouse	  Gases.”	  Global	  Environmental	  Change	  9	  (2):	  157–69.	  doi:10.1016/S0959-­‐3780(99)00003-­‐5.	  Arrhenius,	  Prof	  Svante.	  1896.	  “XXXI.	  On	  the	  Influence	  of	  Carbonic	  Acid	  in	  the	  Air	  upon	  the	  Temperature	  of	  the	  Ground.”	  Philosophical	  Magazine	  Series	  5	  41	  (251):	  237–76.	  doi:10.1080/14786449608620846.	  Azar,	  Christian.	  1998.	  “Are	  Optimal	  CO2	  Emissions	  Really	  Optimal?”	  Environmental	  
and	  Resource	  Economics	  11	  (3-­‐4):	  301–15.	  doi:10.1023/A:1008235326513.	  Bodansky,	  Daniel.	  2001.	  “The	  History	  of	  the	  Global	  Climate	  Change	  Regime.”	  
International	  Relations	  and	  Global	  Climate	  Change,	  23–40.	  ———.	  2010.	  “Copenhagen	  Climate	  Change	  Conference:	  A	  Postmortem,	  The.”	  
American	  Journal	  of	  International	  Law	  104:	  230.	  Bolin,	  Bert.	  2007.	  A	  History	  of	  the	  Science	  and	  Politics	  of	  Climate	  Change:	  The	  Role	  of	  the	  
Intergovernmental	  Panel	  on	  Climate	  Change.	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511721731.	  Boykoff,	  Maxwell	  T.,	  David	  Frame,	  and	  Samuel	  Randalls.	  2010.	  “Discursive	  Stability	  Meets	  Climate	  Instability:	  A	  Critical	  Exploration	  of	  the	  Concept	  of	  ‘climate	  Stabilization’	  in	  Contemporary	  Climate	  Policy.”	  Global	  Environmental	  Change,	  Adaptive	  Capacity	  to	  Global	  Change	  in	  Latin	  America,	  20	  (1):	  53–64.	  doi:10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2009.09.003.	  Brooks,	  Harvey,	  and	  Alan	  McDonald.	  1997.	  “Draft:	  Dibner	  Paper.”	  http://sites.nationalacademies.org/cs/groups/pgasite/documents/webpage/pga_064926.pdf.	  Callendar,	  Guy	  Stewart.	  1938.	  “The	  Artificial	  Production	  of	  Carbon	  Dioxide	  and	  Its	  Influence	  on	  Temperature.”	  Quarterly	  Journal	  of	  the	  Royal	  Meteorological	  Society	  64	  (275):	  223–40.	  Chadwick,	  Richard	  W.	  2000.	  “Global	  Modeling:	  Origins,	  Assessment,	  and	  Alternative	  Futures.”	  Simulation	  &	  Gaming	  31	  (1):	  50–73.	  Chamberlin,	  T.	  C.	  1899.	  “An	  Attempt	  to	  Frame	  a	  Working	  Hypothesis	  of	  the	  Cause	  of	  Glacial	  Periods	  on	  an	  Atmospheric	  Basis.”	  The	  Journal	  of	  Geology	  7	  (6):	  545–84.	  Christoff,	  Peter.	  2010.	  “Cold	  Climate	  in	  Copenhagen:	  China	  and	  the	  United	  States	  at	  COP15.”	  Environmental	  Politics	  19	  (4):	  637–56.	  doi:10.1080/09644016.2010.489718.	  Cohen,	  Stewart,	  David	  Demeritt,	  John	  Robinson,	  and	  Dale	  Rothman.	  1998.	  “Climate	  Change	  and	  Sustainable	  Development:	  Towards	  Dialogue.”	  Global	  Environmental	  
Change	  8	  (4):	  341–71.	  doi:10.1016/S0959-­‐3780(98)00017-­‐X.	  Depledge	  *,	  Joanna.	  2005.	  “Against	  the	  Grain:	  The	  United	  States	  and	  the	  Global	  Climate	  Change	  Regime.”	  Global	  Change,	  Peace	  &	  Security	  17	  (1):	  11–27.	  doi:10.1080/0951274052000319337.	  Geden,	  Oliver.	  2016.	  “An	  Actionable	  Climate	  Target.”	  Nature	  Geoscience	  advance	  online	  publication	  (April).	  doi:10.1038/ngeo2699.	  Green,	  Rhys	  E,	  M	  Harley,	  L	  Miles,	  J	  Scharlemann,	  A	  Watkinson,	  and	  O	  Watts.	  2003.	  “Global	  Climate	  Change	  and	  Biodiversity.”	  In	  .	  Royal	  Society	  for	  the	  Protection	  of	  Birds	  (RSPB).	  Hansen,	  James	  E.	  2005.	  “A	  Slippery	  Slope:	  How	  Much	  Global	  Warming	  Constitutes	  ‘dangerous	  Anthropogenic	  Interference’?”	  Climatic	  Change	  68	  (3):	  269–79.	  doi:10.1007/s10584-­‐005-­‐4135-­‐0.	  Hare,	  William.	  2003.	  “Assessment	  of	  Knowledge	  on	  Impacts	  of	  Climate	  Change-­‐Contribution	  to	  the	  Specification	  of	  Art.	  2	  of	  the	  UNFCCC:	  Impacts	  on	  Ecosystems,	  Food	  Production,	  Water	  and	  Socio-­‐Economic	  Systems.”	  Hare,	  William,	  Carl-­‐Friedrich	  Schleußner,	  and	  Michiel	  Schaeffer.	  2014.	  “Rebuttal	  of	  ‘Ditch	  the	  2°C	  Warming	  Goal!’”	  Climate	  Analytics.	  /publications/2014/rebuttal-­‐of-­‐ditch-­‐the-­‐2c-­‐warming-­‐goal.	  
Appendices	  
	   299	  
Höhne,	  Niklas,	  Christian	  Ellermann,	  and	  Lina	  Li.	  2014.	  “Intended	  Nationally	  Determined	  Contributions	  under	  the	  UNFCCC.”	  Hulme,	  Mike.	  2012.	  “On	  the	  Two	  Degrees	  Climate	  Policy	  Target.”	  Climate	  Change,	  
Justice	  and	  Sustainability:	  Linking	  Climate	  and	  Development	  Policy,	  122–25.	  Jaeger,	  Carlo	  C.,	  and	  Julia	  Jaeger.	  2011.	  “Three	  Views	  of	  Two	  Degrees.”	  Regional	  
Environmental	  Change	  11	  (S1):	  15–26.	  doi:10.1007/s10113-­‐010-­‐0190-­‐9.	  Jamieson,	  Dale.	  2014.	  Reason	  in	  a	  Dark	  Time:	  Why	  the	  Struggle	  against	  Climate	  Change	  
Failed	  -­‐	  and	  What	  It	  Means	  for	  Our	  Future.	  New	  York,	  NY:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  Knutti,	  Reto,	  Joeri	  Rogelj,	  Jan	  Sedláček,	  and	  Erich	  M.	  Fischer.	  2016.	  “A	  Scientific	  Critique	  of	  the	  Two-­‐Degree	  Climate	  Change	  Target.”	  Nature	  Geoscience	  9	  (1):	  13–18.	  doi:10.1038/ngeo2595.	  Levy,	  Marc	  A,	  Jeannine	  Cavender-­‐Bares,	  William	  C	  Clark,	  Gerda	  Dinkelman,	  and	  Elena	  Nikitina.	  2001.	  “Goal	  and	  Strategy	  Formulation	  in	  the	  Management	  of	  Global	  Environmental	  Risks.”	  In	  Learning	  To	  Manage	  Global	  Environmental	  Risks,	  2:87–113.	  Cambridge,	  Mass:	  MIT	  Press.	  Liverman,	  Diana	  M.	  2009.	  “Conventions	  of	  Climate	  Change:	  Constructions	  of	  Danger	  and	  the	  Dispossession	  of	  the	  Atmosphere.”	  Journal	  of	  Historical	  Geography,	  Feature:	  Narratives	  of	  Climate	  Change,	  35	  (2):	  279–96.	  doi:10.1016/j.jhg.2008.08.008.	  Manabe,	  Syukuro,	  and	  Richard	  T.	  Wetherald.	  1967.	  “Thermal	  Equilibrium	  of	  the	  Atmosphere	  with	  a	  Given	  Distribution	  of	  Relative	  Humidity.”	  Journal	  of	  the	  
Atmospheric	  Sciences	  24	  (3):	  241–58.	  ———.	  1975.	  “The	  Effect	  of	  Doubling	  of	  CO2	  Concentration	  in	  the	  Atmosphere.”	  
Journal	  of	  the	  Atmospheric	  Sciences	  32	  (1):	  3–15.	  Meinshausen,	  Malte,	  Nicolai	  Meinshausen,	  William	  Hare,	  Sarah	  C.	  B.	  Raper,	  Katja	  Frieler,	  Reto	  Knutti,	  David	  J.	  Frame,	  and	  Myles	  R.	  Allen.	  2009.	  “Greenhouse-­‐Gas	  Emission	  Targets	  for	  Limiting	  Global	  Warming	  to	  2 °C.”	  Nature	  458	  (7242):	  1158–62.	  doi:10.1038/nature08017.	  Meinshausen,	  Malte,	  and	  others.	  2006.	  “What	  Does	  a	  2	  C	  Target	  Mean	  for	  Greenhouse	  Gas	  Concentrations?	  A	  Brief	  Analysis	  Based	  on	  Multi-­‐Gas	  Emission	  Pathways	  and	  Several	  Climate	  Sensitivity	  Uncertainty	  Estimates.”	  Avoiding	  Dangerous	  Climate	  
Change	  270.	  http://www.researchgate.net/profile/Rik_Leemans/publication/40116514_Rapid_species_responses_to_changes_in_climate_require_stringent_climate_protection_targets/links/0c960536a2a8cc4aaf000000.pdf#page=279.	  Mintzer,	  Irving	  M.	  1987.	  “A	  Matter	  of	  Degrees:	  The	  Potential	  for	  Controlling	  the	  Greenhouse	  Effect.”	  Research	  Report	  (USA).	  http://agris.fao.org/agris-­‐search/search.do?recordID=US9006565.	  Nordhaus,	  William	  D.	  1975a.	  “The	  Political	  Business	  Cycle.”	  Review	  of	  Economic	  
Studies	  42	  (2):	  169.	  ———.	  1975b.	  “Can	  We	  Control	  Carbon	  Dioxide?”	  In	  WP-­‐75-­‐063.	  IIASA.	  http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/365.	  ———.	  1976.	  “Long	  Run	  Impact	  of	  Energy	  Use	  on	  Climate.”	  In	  Natural	  Resource	  and	  
Environmental	  Constraints	  on	  Growth.	  Atlantic	  City,	  NJ,	  USA.	  https://www.aeaweb.org/Annual_Meeting/assa_programs/ASSA_1976.pdf.	  ———.	  1977a.	  “Strategies	  for	  the	  Control	  of	  Carbon	  Dioxide.”	  In	  Discussion	  Paper	  No.	  
443.	  Yale	  University.	  http://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d04/d0443.pdf.	  ———.	  1977b.	  “Economic	  Growth	  and	  Climate:	  The	  Carbon	  Dioxide	  Problem.”	  
American	  Economic	  Review	  67	  (1):	  341–46.	  ———.	  1991.	  “To	  Slow	  or	  Not	  to	  Slow:	  The	  Economics	  of	  The	  Greenhouse	  Effect.”	  The	  
Economic	  Journal	  101	  (407):	  920–37.	  doi:10.2307/2233864.	  ———.	  2014.	  A	  Question	  of	  Balance:	  Weighing	  the	  Options	  on	  Global	  Warming	  Policies.	  Yale	  University	  Press.	  Oberthür,	  Sebastian,	  and	  Hermann	  E.	  Ott.	  1999.	  The	  Kyoto	  Protocol:	  International	  
Climate	  Policy	  for	  the	  21st	  Century.	  Springer	  Science	  &	  Business	  Media.	  Oppenheimer,	  Michael,	  and	  Annie	  Petsonk.	  2005.	  “Article	  2	  of	  the	  UNFCCC:	  Historical	  Origins,	  Recent	  Interpretations.”	  Climatic	  Change	  73	  (3):	  195–226.	  doi:10.1007/s10584-­‐005-­‐0434-­‐8.	  
Appendices	  
	   300	  
Pacala,	  S.,	  and	  R.	  Socolow.	  2004.	  “Stabilization	  Wedges:	  Solving	  the	  Climate	  Problem	  for	  the	  Next	  50	  Years	  with	  Current	  Technologies.”	  Science	  305	  (5686):	  968–72.	  doi:10.1126/science.1100103.	  Pearce,	  David.	  2003.	  “The	  Social	  Cost	  of	  Carbon	  and	  Its	  Policy	  Implications.”	  Oxford	  
Review	  of	  Economic	  Policy	  19	  (3):	  362–84.	  doi:10.1093/oxrep/19.3.362.	  Plass,	  Gilbert	  N.	  1956.	  “The	  Carbon	  Dioxide	  Theory	  of	  Climatic	  Change.”	  Tellus	  8	  (2):	  140–54.	  Potter,	  Thomas	  D.	  1986.	  “Advisory	  Group	  on	  Greenhouse	  Gases	  Established	  Jointly	  by	  WMO,	  UNEP,	  and	  ICSU.”	  Environmental	  Conservation	  13	  (04):	  365–365.	  doi:10.1017/S0376892900035505.	  Randalls,	  Samuel.	  2010.	  “History	  of	  the	  2°C	  Climate	  Target.”	  Wiley	  Interdisciplinary	  
Reviews:	  Climate	  Change	  1	  (4):	  598–605.	  doi:10.1002/wcc.62.	  RCEP.	  2000.	  “Energy	  -­‐	  The	  Changing	  Climate.”	  22nd.	  Royal	  Commission	  on	  Environmental	  Pollution.	  http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110322143804/http://www.rcep.org.uk/reports/22-­‐energy/22-­‐energyreport.pdf.	  Rive,	  Nathan,	  Asbjørn	  Torvanger,	  Terje	  Berntsen,	  and	  Steffen	  Kallbekken.	  2007.	  “To	  What	  Extent	  Can	  a	  Long-­‐Term	  Temperature	  Target	  Guide	  near-­‐Term	  Climate	  Change	  Commitments?”	  Climatic	  Change	  82	  (3-­‐4):	  373–91.	  doi:10.1007/s10584-­‐006-­‐9193-­‐4.	  Sanderson,	  Benjamin	  M.,	  Brian	  C.	  O’Neill,	  and	  Claudia	  Tebaldi.	  2016.	  “What	  Would	  It	  Take	  to	  Achieve	  the	  Paris	  Temperature	  Targets?”	  Geophysical	  Research	  Letters,	  January,	  2016GL069563.	  doi:10.1002/2016GL069563.	  Sanford,	  Todd,	  Peter	  C.	  Frumhoff,	  Amy	  Luers,	  and	  Jay	  Gulledge.	  2014.	  “The	  Climate	  Policy	  Narrative	  for	  a	  Dangerously	  Warming	  World.”	  Nature	  Climate	  Change	  4	  (3):	  164–66.	  doi:10.1038/nclimate2148.	  Schleussner,	  Carl-­‐Friedrich,	  Joeri	  Rogelj,	  Michiel	  Schaeffer,	  Tabea	  Lissner,	  Rachel	  Licker,	  Erich	  M.	  Fischer,	  Reto	  Knutti,	  Anders	  Levermann,	  Katja	  Frieler,	  and	  William	  Hare.	  2016.	  “Science	  and	  Policy	  Characteristics	  of	  the	  Paris	  Agreement	  Temperature	  Goal.”	  Nature	  Climate	  Change	  advance	  online	  publication	  (July).	  doi:10.1038/nclimate3096.	  Schneider,	  Stephen	  H.	  1975.	  “On	  the	  Carbon	  Dioxide–Climate	  Confusion.”	  Journal	  of	  
the	  Atmospheric	  Sciences	  32	  (11):	  2060–66.	  doi:10.1175/1520-­‐0469(1975)032<2060:OTCDC>2.0.CO;2.	  ———.	  1989.	  “Global	  Warming:	  Are	  We	  Entering	  the	  Greenhouse	  Century?”	  Seager,	  Joni.	  2012.	  “Death	  by	  Degrees:	  Taking	  a	  Feminist	  Hard	  Look	  at	  the	  2°	  Climate	  Policy.”	  Kvinder,	  Køn	  &	  Forskning	  0	  (34).	  https://tidsskrift.dk/index.php/KKF/article/view/44305.	  Seidel,	  Stephen,	  Dale	  L.	  Keyes,	  and	  United	  States	  Environmental	  Protection	  Agency	  Office	  of	  Policy	  and	  Resource	  Management	  Strategic	  Studies	  Staff.	  1983.	  Can	  We	  
Delay	  a	  Greenhouse	  Warming?:	  The	  Effectiveness	  and	  Feasibility	  of	  Options	  to	  Slow	  
a	  Build-­‐up	  of	  Carbon	  Dioxide	  in	  the	  Atmosphere.	  Strategic	  Studies	  Staff,	  Office	  of	  Policy	  Analysis,	  Office	  of	  Policy,	  Planning	  and	  Evaluation.	  Shaw,	  Christopher.	  2013.	  “Choosing	  a	  Dangerous	  Limit	  for	  Climate	  Change:	  Public	  Representations	  of	  the	  Decision	  Making	  Process.”	  Global	  Environmental	  Change	  23	  (2):	  563–71.	  doi:10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2012.12.012.	  Swart,	  Robert	  J.,	  and	  Pier	  Vellinga.	  1994.	  “The	  ‘ultimate	  Objective’	  of	  the	  Framework	  Convention	  on	  Climate	  Change	  Requires	  a	  New	  Approach	  in	  Climate	  Change	  Research.”	  Climatic	  Change	  26	  (4):	  343–49.	  doi:10.1007/BF01094401.	  Tol,	  Richard	  S.	  J.	  2007.	  “Europe’s	  Long-­‐Term	  Climate	  Target:	  A	  Critical	  Evaluation.”	  
Energy	  Policy	  35	  (1):	  424–32.	  doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2005.12.003.	  Torrance,	  Wendy	  E.	  F.	  2006.	  “Science	  or	  Salience:	  Building	  an	  Agenda	  for	  Climate	  Change.”	  In	  Global	  Environmental	  Assessments:	  Information	  and	  Influence,	  by	  Ronald	  Bruce	  Mitchell,	  29–56.	  MIT	  Press.	  Tschakert,	  Petra.	  2015.	  “1.5°	  C	  or	  2°	  C:	  A	  Conduit’s	  View	  from	  the	  Science-­‐Policy	  Interface	  at	  COP20	  in	  Lima,	  Peru.”	  Climate	  Change	  Responses	  2	  (1):	  3.	  Vellinga,	  Pier,	  and	  Rob	  Swart.	  1991.	  “The	  Greenhouse	  Marathon:	  A	  Proposal	  for	  a	  Global	  Strategy.”	  Climatic	  Change	  18	  (1):	  vii	  –	  xii.	  doi:10.1007/BF00142501.	  
Appendices	  
	   301	  
Victor,	  David	  G.,	  and	  Charles	  F.	  Kennel.	  2014.	  “Climate	  Policy:	  Ditch	  the	  2	  °C	  Warming	  Goal.”	  Nature	  514	  (7520):	  30–31.	  doi:10.1038/514030a.	  Wang,	  Xueman,	  and	  Glenn	  Wiser.	  2002.	  “The	  Implementation	  and	  Compliance	  Regimes	  under	  the	  Climate	  Change	  Convention	  and	  Its	  Kyoto	  Protocol.”	  Review	  of	  
European	  Community	  &	  International	  Environmental	  Law	  11	  (2):	  181.	  Wirth,	  Timothy.	  1989.	  Challenge	  of	  Global	  Warming.	  Island	  Press. 	  
Appendices	  
	   302	  
APPENDIX	  4A	  A	   timeline	   of	   events	   in	   the	   emergence	   of	   the	   two	   degrees	   target,	  corresponding	  to	  those	  detailed	  in	  Chapter	  4.	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APPENDIX	  4B	  Outcome	  of	  the	  Villach-­‐Bellagio	  workshops:	  A	  framework	  for	  assessing	  the	   relative	   costs	   of	   limiting	   and	   adapting	   to	   climatic	   changes	   as	   well	   as	  resulting	  externalities,	  and	   that	   these	  should	  be	  assessed	  across	   three	  policy	  scenarios,	   business	   as	   usual,	   moderate	   efforts,	   and	   concerted	   efforts	   (Jäger	  1988,	  p.29).	  	  
	  	  
Appendices	  
	   304	  
APPENDIX	  4C	  Emissions	   reduction	   targets	   for	   each	   of	   the	   Annex	   I	   nations	   for	   the	  2008-­‐2012	   first	   commitment	   period	   of	   the	   Kyoto	   Protocol	   (UNFCCC	   1998,	  p.20).	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APPENDIX	  6A	  On-­‐screen	  greeting	  display	  after	  signing	   in	  through	  the	  GoToWebinar	  online	   webinar	   platform.	   The	   main	   presentation	   screen	   on	   the	   left	   outlines	  details	   of	   the	   webinar	   that	   will	   commence	   shortly,	   with	   a	   control	   panel	  providing	   participants	   with	   a	   range	   of	   options	   such	   as	   ‘raising	   their	   hand’,	  typing	  comments,	  and	  choosing	  to	  mute	  your	  microphone	  or	   to	   indicate	   that	  your	  have	  been	  muted	  by	  the	  webinar	  host	  (it	  was	  common	  practice	  to	  mute	  all	   participants	   unless	   they	  were	   asking	   questions	   or	   presenting	   due	   to	   the	  feedback	  that	  would	  result	  otherwise).	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APPENDIX	  6B	  On-­‐screen	   display	   once	   webinar	   commenced,	   taken	   from	   a	   webinar	  held	   in	   February	   2014	   for	   the	   initial	   call	   of	   TWG	   4.	   Questions	   posed	   in	   the	  dialogue	  box	  would	  only	  appear	  to	  the	  hosts	  of	  the	  webinar,	  while	  the	  hosts’	  messages	  would	  be	  displayed	  to	  all	  participants.	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APPENDIX	  6C	  The	   image	   below	   is	   taken	   from	   a	   PowerPoint	   slide	   displaying	   the	  structure	  of	  the	  document	  being	  drafted	  by	  the	  ‘Accounting’	  work	  stream	  and	  the	   responsibility	   for	   different	   sections	   of	   that	   document	   across	   TWGs	   1-­‐4.	  Note	   that	   TWG	  4	   ‘cuts	   across’	   this	   structure,	  while	   it’s	  main	   responsibilities	  were	  for	  drafting	  Parts	  I,	  II,	  and	  VI,	  as	  displayed	  in	  the	  above	  slide.	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APPENDIX	  6D	  The	   chart	   below	   is	   taken	   from	   a	   PowerPoint	   slide	   displaying	   the	  governance	   structure	   of	   the	   Financed	   Emissions	   Initiative,	   as	   detailed	   in	  Section	  6.1.3.	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APPENDIX	  6E	  A	   list	   of	   all	  Advisory	  Committee	  members,	   adapted	   from	  a	  publically	  available	  summary	  of	  an	  Advisory	  Committee	  meeting.111	  
Advisory	  Committee	  Membership	  
Name	   Organisation	  Christopher	  Bray	   Barclays	  Mark	  Campanale	   Carbon	  Tracker	  Initiative	  Giorgio	  Capurri	   UniCredit	  Stanislas	  Dupre	   2°	  Investing	  Initiative	  	  Tim	  Hassett	   WWF	  US	  James	  Hulse	   CDP	  Kaj	  Jensen	   Bank	  of	  America	  Nathan	  Fabian	  	   Investor	  Group	  on	  Climate	  Change	  (IGCC)	  	  Karsten	  Loeffler	   Allianz	  Group	  Richard	  Pearl	   State	  Street	  Chris	  Walker	   EY	  Christopher	  Rowe	   Prudential	  Investment	  Management	  Cory	  Weiss	   PwC	  Tom	  Kerr	   IFC	  Robyn	  Luhning	   Wells	  Fargo	  Julie	  Fox-­‐Gorte	   Pax	  World	  Bill	  Harnett	   Local	  Government	  Super	  Sefton	  Laing	   RBS	  Daniel	  Marroquin	   Banamex	  Julian	  Poulter	   Asset	  Owners	  Disclosure	  Project	  	  Steve	  Priddy	   London	  School	  of	  Business	  and	  Finance	  	  Elisa	  Tonda	   UNEP	  Business	  and	  Industry	  Unit	  (observer)	  	  Namita	  Vikas	   YES	  Bank	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  111	  (accessed	  on	  10/03/2016	  at	  http://ghgprotocol.org/files/ghgp/AC%20Meeting%20Summary%20of%20Outcomes%20Final.pdf)	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APPENDIX	  6F	  
	  
Right:	  View	  of	  the	  
UniCredit	  tower,	  
located	  on	  Piazza	  
Gae	  Aulenti	  in	  
Milan.	   	  
	  
	  
Below:	  View	  from	  
the	  12th	  floor	  
conference	  room	  in	  
which	  the	  Advisory	  
Committee	  meeting	  
was	  held.	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  Above:	  12th	  floor	  conference	  room	  in	  which	  the	  two-­‐day	  Advisory	  Committee	  
meeting	  took	  place.	  
	  
Below:	  Break	  room	  where	  Advisory	  Committee	  members	  congregated	  during	  
breaks	  and	  where	  coffee	  and	  lunch	  was	  served.	  
	  
